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E S S A Y

ON THE

ORIGIN of EVIL.

By Dr. William King, late Lord Archbiſhop of *DUBLIN.*

Tranſlated from the *Latin*, with large *Notes*; tending to explain and vindicate ſome of the Author's Principles Againſt the Objections of *Bayle*, *Leibnitz*, the Author of a *Philoſophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty*; and others.

To which is prefix'd

A DISSERTATION

Concerning the

Fundamental Principle and *immediate Criterion* of *Virtue.*

AS ALSO,

The *Obligation* to, and *Approbation* of it.

With ſome account of

The *Origin* of the *Paſſions* and *Affections.*

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THE

Tranſlator's Preface.

I Have always look'd upon an Enquiry into the Cauſe and Origin of Evil, as one of the nobleſt and moſt important Subjects in Natural Theology: It leads us into the moſt exalted Speculations concerning the Exiſtence and Attributes of God, and the Original of Things. It firſt diſcovers the true Intent of the Deity in creating any Beings at all, and then purſues that Intent thro' the ſeveral Works of his Creation: it ſhews how this is fully anſwer'd by the Inanimate and Brute Part, and how it might and ſhould be, and why, and in what reſpect it is not by the Rational. It contemplates the Divine Oeconomy in the Government of the Univerſe, ſearches into the various Schemes of Providence, and takes in the whole Compaſs of Nature. Neither is its *Uſefulneſs* inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends to act upon any ſerious Views here, or to entertain any ſolid Hopes of

Dawson's

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Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in ſome degree, is abſolutely neceſſary in order to the ſettling in our Minds right Notions of the Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him; in order to the due Apprehenſion of his Deſign in creating, preſerving, and directing us, and to the regular Conduct of our Lives, and Enjoyment of ourſelves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us. Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Pleaſure can we take in knowing any other? When I enquire how I got into this World, and came to be what I am; I'm told that an abſolutely perfect Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me here on purpoſe to communicate ſome Part of his Happineſs to me, and to make me, in ſome meaſure, like himſelf.——This End is not obtain'd;——the direct contrary appears;——I find myſelf ſurrounded with nothing but Perplexity, Want and Miſery;——by whoſe fault I know not,——How to better myſelf I cannot tell.————What Notions of God and Goodneſs can this afford me?————What Ideas of Religion?————What Hopes of a future State?————For, if God's Aim in producing me be entirely unknown; if it be neither his *Glory*, (as ſome will have it) which my preſent State is far from advancing;——nor mine own *Good*, which the ſame is equally inconſiſtent with; how know I what I'm to do here, and in what manner I muſt endeavour to pleaſe him? or why ſhould I endeavour it at all?————For, if I muſt be miſerable in this World, what Security have I that I ſhall not be ſo in another too; (if there be one) ſince, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for ought I ſee) have been happy in both?————Such Thoughts as theſe muſt needs diſturb a Perſon that has any Concern for his Maker's Honour, or his own Happineſs; that deſires to pay him a reaſonable Service, and anſwer the End of his Creation: in ſhort, that happens either to think at all upon theſe things, or to think for himſelf. And therefore an Endeavour to rid the Mind of ſome of theſe Perplexities, cannot ſure be unacceptable, and a Solution of any one of theſe Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind, which can never be unſeaſonable.————But the Uſefulneſs, as well as Antiquity, of the preſent Debate; and the Abſurdity of the *Manichean* Scheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explain'd, and need

not

not here be inſiſted on: all that ever ſeem'd wanting to an entire Conqueſt over theſe Hereticks, and their abſurd Hypotheſis, was only a tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them into it: and this our Author has effected, as I hope to make appear before I have done.

There are two general ways of Reaſoning, called Arguments *a Priori*, and *a Poſteriori*; or, according to what Logicians commonly ſtile the *Synthetical* and *Analytical* Method: The former lays down ſome evident *Principles*, and then deduces the ſeveral *Conſequences* neceſſarily reſulting from them: The latter begins with the *Phænomena* themſelves, and traces 'em up to their *Original*, and from the known Properties of theſe Phœnomena arrives at the Nature of their Cauſe. Now the former of theſe is evidently preferable, where it can be had, (and I think it may be had almoſt every where, but in the firſt Cauſe) ſince the latter muſt depend upon a large Induction of Particulars, any of which, when failing, invalidates the whole Argument, and quite ſpoils a Demonſtration. "It is "very true (ſays Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 79.) that this is "not a ſtrict Demonſtration of the general Concluſion, becauſe that "can be had no other way than by trying all the Experiments "that can poſſibly be made every where, which is infinite and "endleſs; but it is the beſt that the Nature of the thing is capa-"ble of."

Now, if the Thing before us will admit of the *former* Method, then I think it is capable of a much better; and an Attempt to ſhew that it is ſo, muſt be very deſirable: And this our Author ſeems to have done, without any precarious Syſtem, or ill-grounded Hypotheſis whatſoever. His ſuperior Excellence (as I apprehend) conſiſts in having laid down, and previouſly eſtabliſh'd ſuch ſolid ſubſtantial Principles as may be drawn out *in infinitum*, and eaſily apply'd to all the Difficulties that attend the preſent Queſtion. He firſt of all enquires into the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, and his Deſign in the Creation; ſettles the true Notion of a Creature, and examines whether any could be perfect; and if not, whether all ſhould have been

been made equally imperfect; or ſeveral in very different Claſſes and Degrees. Having proved the laſt of theſe Opinions to be the true one, he proceeds to the loweſt Claſs of Beings: *viz.* *Material* Ones: He enquires into the Nature and eſſential Properties of *Matter*, and the Laws of its *Motion*, and thereby eſtabliſhes ſuch Rules as direct us to the Solution of all the Difficulties attending it, as diſtributed into various *Maſſes*, Syſtems and Animated Bodies. He ſhews the unavoidableneſs, and abſolute neceſſity of *contrary Motions* in Matter, for the ſame Reaſons that it had any Motion at all, and conſequently of *Attrition*, *Corruption* and *Diſſolution*, and all the *Natural* Evils that attend them. In the next place, from the Nature of a *Self-moving* Principle, and the manner of its Operation, he deduces all the Irregularities incident to *Volition*, and the Actions conſequent thereupon. He ſtates at large the true Notion of *Free-Will*, and demonſtrates the abſolute Neceſſity for it in every Rational Being, in order to its Happineſs. Then accounts for the ſeveral Abuſes of it, and the *Moral* Evils ariſing from thence. and examines all the poſſible Ways of preventing them; and upon the whole makes it appear, that none of theſe could have been originally avoided, or can now be removed, without introducing greater; and conſequently that the very Permiſſion of theſe Evils, and the Production and Preſervation of theſe Beings, in the preſent State, is the higheſt Inſtance of infinite Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs. Now theſe are not mere Arguments *ad ignorantiam:* This is not telling us, that we muſt believe ſuch and ſuch things to be the ſure Effects of an infinitely wiſe and good God, tho' no Marks of either Wiſdom or Goodneſs appear in them; which, tho' it may be true, and all that perhaps can be ſaid in ſome particular Caſes, yet has, I think, but very little Tendency towards either the Conviction of an Infidel, or the Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Perſon is ſeriouſly contemplating any Parts of Nature, and ſolicitouſly enquiring into their ſeveral Ends and Uſes, no Pleaſure ſurely can ariſe to himſelf, nor Devotion toward the Author of it, merely from the Perplexity and Unaccountableneſs of thoſe Parts. Nay every ſuch Inſtance, one would think, muſt caſt a damp upon his Spirits, and prove an ungrateful

grateful Reflection on his Weakneſs, a mortifying Argument of his Imperfection. Whereas one ſingle Perplexity clear'd up, or Objection anſwer'd, is a piece of real Knowledge gain'd, upon which he can congratulate himſelf, and glorify his Maker.——Our Author therefore was not content with mere *Negative Arguments*, and barely *avoiding* Difficulties, by removing all Defects from external things to ourſelves, and multiplying Inſtances of the Narrowneſs and Weakneſs of Human Underſtanding: (which any one that thinks at all will ſoon be convinced of, and heartily deſirous of having it ſomewhat enlarg'd and improved, to which this manner of Argumentation, I fear, contributes very little.) But he attacks his Adverſaries in their ſtrongeſt Holds, and plucks up the *Manichean* Hereſy by the Roots: he ſhews by certain pre-eſtabliſh'd Rules, and neceſſary Conſequence, that we can eaſily reduce all to one ſupreme Head, and clearly comprehend how the preſent ſtate of things is the very beſt, in all reſpects, and worthy of a moſt wiſe, powerful, and beneficent Author: And why, taking the whole Syſtem of Beings together, and every Claſs of them in its own Order, none could poſſibly have been made more perfect, or placed in a better. He proves, in the firſt place (as we obſerv'd) that no created Beings could be abſolutely perfect, and in the next, that no manner of Evil, or Imperfection, was tolerated in them, but what was, either in their Claſs and manner of Exiſtence, abſolutely unavoidable, or elſe productive of ſome Good more than equivalent: In both which Caſes there will be the ſame Reaſons for the Creation of ſuch Beings in ſuch Circumſtances, together with their concomitant Evils, as there was for any Creation at all: For which the ſole Reaſon will appear to be an Intention in the Creator of communicating Happineſs to as many Beings as could be made capable of it, on the very beſt Terms; or a Reſolution not to omit the leaſt Degree of *pure* Good on account of ſuch Evils, as did not counterballance it: Or (which is the very ſame, ſince 'twill be evident, that the Prevention of all the preſent Evils in any conceivable Manner, would have been of worſe Conſequence than the Permiſſion of them) an Intention always to chooſe the leaſt of two Evils,

Evils, when both cannot be avoided.———This muſt be granted, to come up to the Point; and when it is once made apparent, will be a full and ſufficient Anſwer to that old triumphant Queſtion, Πόθεν τὸ Κακόν; 'twill be an ample Vindication of the Divine Providence, a Demonſtration of the Power, and Wiſdom, and Goodneſs of God, in the Production, Preſervation, and Government of the Univerſe; and as much as a reaſonable Man can either expect or deſire. And I heartily wiſh this Method had been taken by more of thoſe Authors that have wrote on the preſent Subject, and the Argument purſued a little farther by *Natural Light*, in order to give ſome Light and Confirmation even to Revelation itſelf, in theſe inquiſitive Days, wherein a great many ſeem unwilling to be determined by its ſole Authority; wherein Men are not a little inclined to call every thing into queſtion; and a weak Argument is ſure to be exploded.———Even the moſt learned and ingenious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scripture when a Difficulty begins to preſs him: which, in my Opinion, is deſerting the Argument, and owning, with Mr. *Bayle* (in his Explanation touching the *Manichees* at the End of his Dictionary) "that the Queſtion cannot be defended on any other foot."——— Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanſwerable by Reaſon, or a plain Contradiction to our natural Notions of God; if (as the fore-mentioned Author often urges) "we perceive by our "clear and diſtinct Ideas, that ſuch a thing is entirely repugnant "to his Nature and Attributes,"——referring us to Scripture, which declares that an infinitely perfect Being did conſtitute it thus, will be no manner of Satisfaction, ſince (upon this Suppoſition) we cannot have greater Aſſurance that this Scripture comes from him, than we have that the Doctrine therein contain'd is abſurd and impoſſible. And what that ingenious Perſon's Intent might be in repreſenting the Matter thus, and then referring us to Scripture for an Anſwer, I cannot determine. But ſure I am, that his Account of it ſerves rather to betray the Cauſe, and undermine the Authority of both Reaſon and Revelation, and is enough (if no better could be given) to make a Perſon that argues conſequentially reject all kinds of Religion. Farther, every one muſt have obſerv'd, that moſt Authors upon this Subject treat of God's Diſpenſations toward Man,

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as if they were ſpeaking of one Man's Behaviour toward another. They think it ſufficient to make the Almighty chooſe the moſt prudent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happineſs; and act upon the higheſt *Probability*, tho, upon what account ſoever it matters not, he fail of his End. This may indeed be the beſt manner of acting in all finite, imperfect Beings, and ſufficient to acquit the Goodneſs and Juſtice of God, but is very far from ſatisfying his *Wiſdom*. To a perfect Being who foreſees the Effects of all poſſible Cauſes and Means, as the ſame Authors allow God to do, theſe only appear fit and eligible for the effects and Ends which they will *certainly* produce. Nor is it any reaſon why I ſhould purſue a Method which is apt and wont to ſucceed in moſt Caſes, if I *know* it will fail in this. To a Perſon therefore that takes all the Attributes of God together, and conſiders the whole Scheme of Providence from end to end, it will not appear a complete and ſatisfactory Vindication of them, to aſſert that God either now makes Men, or ſuffers them to make themſelves miſerable, for rejecting that Happineſs which he at firſt made them capable of, and endow'd them with ſuch Powers, and placed them in ſuch Circumſtances as render'd it naturally poſſible and even eaſie to be attain'd by them: tho' this may indeed clear his Juſtice and lay the Blame upon ourſelves: And yet theſe Writers generally content themſelves with going thus far: They bring all our Sin and Miſery from the abuſe of Free-Will, *i. e.* a Power whereby Man might have acted otherwiſe, and prevented it; without ever explaining the Nature of this Principle, or ſhewing the Worth and Excellence of it, and proving that, as far as we can apprehend, more Good in general ariſes from the donation of ſuch a Self-moving Power, together with all theſe foreſeen Abuſes of it, than could poſſibly have been produced without it. To demonſtrate this was an Attempt worthy of our Author, who has at leaſt laid a noble Foundation for it, and ſeems to be the firſt that has propoſed the true Notion of human Liberty, and explained it conſiſtently: All the Doubts and Difficulties attending which intricate Queſtion, will, I hope, be tolerably cleared up; or at leaſt, ſuch Principles eſtabliſh'd as may be ſufficient for that Purpoſe, by this Treatiſe of his, and the Notes upon it. But ſo much for the Subject and our Author's way of treating it.

As for the *Tranſlation*, 'tis barely Literal: I endeavour'd to keep cloſe to the Author's Senſe, and generally to his very Words: ſo that the

Reader may be pretty ſure of finding Dr. *King* here at leaſt. I once intended to have cut off every thing that I could not defend, eſpecially about the Beginning (which uſed to diſcourage moſt Readers from peruſing the reſt of his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have been omitted;) but conſidering that he had involv'd it ſo cloſely in the reſt of his Scheme, that the whole would ſeem confuſed without it——that others might perhaps have a different Opinion of it——and that ſome, probably, would be deſirous of ſeeing even the moſt imperfect Notions of ſo great a Philoſopher; —— I contented myſelf with omitting only part of his firſt Note, and obviating the reſt all along, both from other Authors, and ſuch Obſervations of my own as occurr'd upon the Subject.

Some perhaps may think the frequent and long Quotations very tedious, and introduced only to ſtuff up.——I can only anſwer, that I intended the Notes, and References together, to point out a ſort of *Compendium of Metaphyſics*, or Speculative Divinity; by directing the Reader to a Set of true Notions on the various Subjects which our Author touch'd upon; and which could not be found in any one particular Book, nor collected from ſeveral, without much Trouble and Confuſion, and unneceſſary Reading. I choſe rather to quote the very Words of the Authors, than either uſe worſe of my own, or pretend to diſcover what had been often diſcovered before; or repeat the ſame things over and over again, which is endleſs. I hope the Reader will find that a citation of two or more Authors on the ſame Point is not always tautology: and I believe it will appear, that in the multitude of *References* more than one is ſcarce ever made to the ſame Place, except upon a very different Occaſion, or in ſome different Light. A Writer ſeems to me to do more good to the Public by ſhewing the uſe of ſome of thoſe many Volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; tho' this be of much leſs Advantage to his private Character. I determin'd therefore not to ſay any thing myſelf where I could bring another conveniently to ſay it for me; and tranſcribed only ſo much from others as I judg'd abſolutely neceſſary to give the Reader a ſhort View of the Subject we were upon, and by that Sketch to induce thoſe who have leiſure, opportunity and inclination to go farther, and conſult the Originals; and to afford ſome preſent Satisfaction to thoſe who have not.

But how judiciouſly this is perform'd, the Notes themſelves muſt teſtify, for all that I can ſay by way of Preface will never mend the matter.

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.

Concerning the

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE

OF

VIRTUE or *MORALITY.*

THO' all Writers of Morality have in the main agreed what particular Actions are virtuous and what otherwiſe; yet they have, or at leaſt ſeem to have differ'd very much, both concerning the *Criterion* of Virtue, *viz.* what it is which denominates any Action virtuous; or, to ſpeak more properly, what it is by which we muſt try any Action to *know* whether it be virtuous or no; and alſo concerning the *Principle* or Motive by which Men are induced to purſue Virtue.

As to the former, ſome have placed it in *acting agreeably to Nature*, or *Reaſon*; others in the *Fitneſs of things*; others in a Conformity with *Truth*; others in promoting the *Common Good*; others in the *Will of God*, &c. This Diſagreement of Moraliſts concerning the Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the ſame time their almoſt perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it, would be apt to make one ſuſpect, either that they had a different Criterion (tho' they did not know or attend to it) from what they

profeſs'd; or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favourable Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of them have the ſame Criterion in reality, only they have expreſs'd it in different Wotds.

And there will appear the more room for this Conjecture, if we conſider the Ideas themſelves about which Morality is chiefly converſant, *viz.* that they are all *mixed Modes*, or compound Ideas arbitrarily put together, having at firſt no Archetype or Original exiſting, and afterwards no other than that which exiſts in other Mens Minds. Now ſince Men, unleſs they have theſe their compound Ideas, which are ſignify'd by the ſame Name, made up preciſely of the ſame ſimple ones, muſt neceſſarily talk a different Language; and ſince this difference is ſo difficult, and in ſome Caſes impoſſible to be avoided, it follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to theſe Writers than any other: and that (if we have a mind to underſtand them) we ſhould not always take their Words in the common Acceptation, but in the Senſe in which we find that particular Author which we are reading uſed them. And if a Man interpret the Writers of Morality with this due Candor, I believe their ſeeming Inconſiſtencies and Diſagreements about the Criterion of Virtue, would in a great meaſure vaniſh; and he would find that *acting agreeably to Nature*, or *Reaſon*, (when rightly underſtood) would perfectly coincide with the *Fitneſs of things*; the Fitneſs of things (as far as theſe Words have any meaning) with *Truth*; Truth with the *Common Good*; and the Common Good with the *Will of God.*

But whether this Difference be real, or only verbal, a Man can ſcarce avoid obſerving from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of moſt particular Virtues, and alſo a confuſed Notion of Virtue in general, before they have any Notion of the Criterion of it, or ever did, neither perhaps can they, deduce all or any of thoſe Virtues from their Idea of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds ſhew how thoſe Actions (which the World call Moral, and moſt, if not all Men evidently have Ideas of) are diſtinguiſh'd from other Actions, or why they approve of thoſe Actions call'd Moral ones, more than others.

But

But ſince the Idea of Virtue among all Men (however they differ in other reſpects) includes either tacitly or expreſly, not only the Idea of *Approbation* as the Conſequence of it; but alſo that it is to every one, and in all Circumſtances, an Object of *Choice*; it is incumbent on all Writers of Morality, to ſhew that *that* in which they place Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to meet with Approbation, but alſo that it is always an Object of *Choice*; which is the other great Diſpute among Moraliſts, *viz.* What is the Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to purſue Virtue.

For ſome have imagin'd that that is the only Object of Choice to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more Happineſs than Miſery to the Chooſer; and that Men are and ought to be guided wholly by this Principle; and farther, that Virtue will produce more Happineſs than Miſery, and therefore is always an Object of Choice: and whatever is an Object of Choice, that we approve of.

But this, however true in Theory, is inſufficient to account for Matter of Fact, *i. e.* that the generality of Mankind do approve of Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any Reaſon for their Approbation; and alſo, that ſome purſue it without knowing that it tends to their own private Happineſs; nay even when it appears to be inconſiſtent with and deſtructive of their Happineſs.

And that this is matter of Fact, the ingenious Author of the *Enquiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue* has ſo evidently made appear by a great Variety of Inſtances, that a Man muſt be either very little acquainted with the World, or a mere *Hobbiſt* in his Temper to deny it.

And therefore to ſolve theſe two Difficulties, this excellent Author has ſuppoſed (without *proving*, unleſs by ſhewing the inſufficiency of all other Schemes) a *Moral* Senſe to account for the former, and a *public* or *benevolent Affection* for the latter: And theſe, *viz.* the Moral Senſe and Public Affection, he ſuppoſes to be implanted in us like *Inſtincts*, independent of Reaſon, and previous to any

any Inſtruction; and therefore his Opinion is, that no account can be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we pretend to account for the Pleaſure or Pain which ariſes from Senſation; *i. e.* Why any particular Motion produced in our Bodies ſhould be accompany'd with Pain rather than Pleaſure, and *vice verſa.*

But this Account ſeems ſtill inſufficient, rather cutting the Knot than untying it, and if it is not a-kin to the Doctrine of *Innate Ideas*, yet I think it reliſhes too much of that of *Ocult Qualities.* This ingenious Author is certainly right in his Obſervations upon the Inſufficiency of the common Methods of accounting for both our *Election* and *Approbation* of Moral Actions, and rightly infers the Neceſſity of ſuppoſing a Moral Senſe (*i. e.* a Power or Faculty whereby we may perceive any Action to be an Object of Approbation, and the Agent of Love) and public Affections, to account for the principal Actions of human Life. But then by calling theſe *Inſtincts*, I think he ſtops too ſoon, imagining himſelf at the Fountain-head, when he might have traced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Actions, our own *Happineſs.*

And this will appear by ſhewing, that our Approbation of Morality, and all Affections whatſoever, are finally reſolvable into *Reaſon*, pointing out *private Happineſs*, and are converſant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that whenever this end is not perceiv'd, they are to be accounted for from the *Aſſociation of Ideas*, and may properly enough be call'd *Habits.*

For if this is clearly made out, the Neceſſity of ſuppoſing a Moral Senſe, or public Affections to be implanted in us, ſince it ariſeth only from the Inſufficiency of all other Schemes to account for human Actions, will immediately vaniſh. But whether it be made out or no, we may obſerve in general, that all Arguments *ad Ignorantiam*, or that proceed *a Remotione* only (as this, by which the Moral Senſe and public Affections are eſtabliſh'd to be Inſtincts, evidently does) are ſcarce ever perfectly ſatisfactory, being for the moſt part ſubject to this Doubt, *viz.* Whether there is a full Enumeration of all the Parts; and liable alſo to this Objection, *viz.* That tho' I cannot

not account for Phænomena otherwiſe, yet poſſibly they may be otherwiſe accounted for.

But before we can determine this Point, it will be neceſſary to ſettle all the Terms: We ſhall in the firſt place therefore enquire what is meant by the *Criterion* of Virtue.

SECT. I.

Concerning the Criterion *of Virtue*

THE Criterion of any thing is a Rule or Meaſure by a Conformity with which any thing is known to be of this or that ſort, or of this or that degree. And in order to determine the Criterion of any thing, we muſt firſt know the thing whoſe Criterion we are ſeeking after. For a Meaſure preſuppoſes the Idea of the thing to be meaſured, otherwiſe it could not be known (ſince what is the proper Meaſure of one thing is not ſo of another) whether it was fit to meaſure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Fleſh, have all different Meaſures; Gold and Silver different Touchſtones. This is very intelligible, and the Method of doing it generally clear, when either the Quantity or Kind of any particular Subſtance is thus to be aſcertain'd.

But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criterion for abſtract, mix'd Modes, which have no Exiſtence but in our Minds, and are ſo very different in different Men; we are apt to be confounded, and ſearch after a Meaſure for we know not what. For unleſs we are

are firſt agreed concerning the thing to be meaſur'd, we ſhall in vain expect to agree in our Criterion of it, or even to underſtand one another.

But it may be ſaid, if we are exactly agreed in any mix'd Mode, what need of any *Criterion*, or what can we want farther? What we want farther, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is this; *viz.* to know whether any inferior or particular thing do belong to this mix'd Mode or no. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For let a Man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never ſo clearly, and if you pleaſe let this be the Idea, *viz.* the Eating or Drinking to that degree as to injure his Underſtanding or Health; and let him alſo be never ſo much convinc'd of the Obligation to avoid it; yet it is a very pertinent Queſtion in him to aſk you, How ſhall I know when I am guilty of Intemperance?

And if we examine this thoroughly, we ſhall find that every little difference in the Definition of a mix'd Mode will require a different Criterion, *e. g.* If Murder is defined the *wilful* taking away the Life of another, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how we ſhall know when the Life of another is taken away *wilfully*; i. e. when one who takes away the Life of another does it with that malicious Deſign which is implied by *Wilfulneſs*. But if Murder be defined the *Guilty* taking away the Life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murdet, is to enquire how it ſhall be known when *Guilt* is contracted in the taking away the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Murder, according to one or other of theſe Definitions, will be different. For Wilfulneſs perhaps will be made the Criterion of Guilt, but Wilfulneſs itſelf, if it want any, muſt have ſome farther Criterion, it being evident that nothing can be the Meaſure of itſelf.

If the Criterion is contain'd in the Idea itſelf, then it is merely *nominal*, e. g. If Virtue is defined, The acting agreeably to the Will of God: To ſay the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, is only to ſay, what is agreeable to the Will of God is *call*'d Virtue. But the *real* Criterion, which is of ſome uſe, is this, How ſhall I know what the Will of God is in this reſpect?

From

From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mix'd Mode is neither the Definition of it, nor contain'd in it. For, as has been ſhewn, the general Idea is neceſſarily to be fix'd; and if the *Particulars* comprehended under it are fix'd or known alſo, there remains nothing to be meaſured, becauſe we meaſure only things unknown. The general Idea then being fix'd, the Criterion which is to meaſure or determine Inferiors, muſt be found out and proved to be a proper Rule or Meaſure, by comparing it with the *general Idea* only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to be apply'd. For the truth of the Meaſure muſt be proved independently of the Particular to be meaſured, otherwiſe we ſhall prove in a Circle.

To apply what has been ſaid in general to the Caſe in hand. Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion of *Virtue*; but it is to be fear'd that few know diſtinctly what it is they are enquiring after; and therefore this muſt be clearly ſtated. And in order to this, we muſt (as has been ſhewn) firſt fix our Idea of Virtue, and that exactly; and then our Enquiry will be, how we ſhall know this or that leſs general or particular Action to be comprehended under Virtue. For unleſs our Idea of Virtue is fix'd, we enquire after the Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of Virtue, to give any Satisfaction, ought to be ſo general as to be conformable to that which all or moſt Men are ſuppoſed to have. And this general Idea, I think, may be thus expreſs'd.

Virtue is the Conformity to a Rule of Life, directing the Actions of all rational Creatures with reſpect to each other's Happineſs; to which Conformity every one in all Caſes is obliged: and every one that does ſo conform, is or ought to be approved of, eſteemed and loved for ſo doing. What is here expreſs'd, I believe every one, or moſt, put into their Idea of Virtue.

For Virtue, among all, or moſt, does imply ſome relation to *others:* where *Self* is only concern'd, a Man may be *prudent* but not virtuous; and an Action which relates immediately to *God*, is ſtiled *Religious.*

I think alſo that all Men, whatever they make Virtue to conſiſt in, yet always make it to imply *Obligation* and *Approbation.*

The Idea of Virtue being thus fix'd, to enquire after the Criterion of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are obligd to conform or how that Rule is to be found out which is to direct me in my Behaviour towards others, which ought always to be purſued, and which, if purſued, will or ought to procure me Approbation, Eſteem, and Love.

But before I can anſwer this Enquiry, I muſt firſt ſee what I mean by *Obligation.*

SECT. II.

Concerning Obligation.

Obligation is the neceſſity of doing or omitting any Action in order to be happy: i. e. when there is ſuch a relation between an Agent and any Action that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that Action, then the Agent is ſaid to be *obliged* to do or omit that Action. So that Obligation is evidently founded upon the proſpect of *Happineſs*, and ariſes from that neceſſary Influence which any Action has upon preſent or future Happineſs or Miſery. And no greater Obligation can be ſuppoſed to be laid upon any *free Agent* without an expreſs Contradiction.

This Obligation may be conſider'd four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced: Firſt, that Obligation which ariſeth from perceiving the natural Conſequences of things, *i. e.* the Conſequences of things acting according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, may be call'd *Natural.* Secondly, that ariſing from Merit or Demerit, as producing the Eſteem and Favour of our Fellow-Creatures, or the contrary, is uſually ſtiled *virtuous.* Thirdly, that ariſing from the Authority of the Civil Magiſtrate, *Civil.* Fourthly, that from the Authority of God, *Religious.*

Now

Now from the Conſideration of theſe four ſorts of Obligation (which are the only ones) it is evident that a full and complete Obligation which will extend to all Caſes, can only be that ariſing from the Authority of *God*; becauſe God only can in all Caſes make a Man happy or miſerable: and therefore, ſince we are *always* obliged to that conformity call'd Virtue, it is evident that the immediate Rule or Criterion of it is the Will of God. But is the *whole* Will of God the Criterion of Virtue? No. For tho' the whole Will of God is equally obligatory; yet, ſince Virtue was defined to be the conformity to a Rule directing my Behaviour with reſpect to my *Fellow-Creatures*, the Will of God can be no farther concern'd about Virtue, than as it directs me in that Behaviour.

The next Enquiry therefore is, what that Will of God in this particular is, or what it directs me to do?

Now it is evident from the Nature of God, *viz.* his being infinitely happy in himſelf from all Eternity, and from his Goodneſs manifeſted in his Works, that he could have no other Deſign in creating Mankind than *their* Happineſs; and therefore he wills their Happineſs; therefore the means of their Happineſs: therefore that my Behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happineſs of Mankind, ſhould be ſuch. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to a new Criterion: not to a new Criterion of Virtue *immediately*, but to a Criterion of the *Will of God.* For it is an Anſwer to the Enquiry, How ſhall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of Virtue, and the Happineſs of Mankind the Criterion of the Will of God; and therefore the Happineſs of Mankind may be ſaid to be the Criterion of Virtue, but *once removed.*

And ſince I am to do whatever lies in my Power towards promoting the Happineſs of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Criterion of this *Happineſs*: *i. e.* how ſhall I know what in my Power is, or is not, for the Happineſs of Mankind?

Now this is to be known only from the *Relations* of things, (which Relations, with reſpect to our preſent Enquiry, ſome have call'd their *Fitneſs* and *Unfitneſs.)* For ſome Things and Actions are apt to produce Pleaſure, others Pain; ſome are convenient, others inconvenient

for a Society; ſome are for the good of Mankind, others tend to the detriment of it: therefore thoſe are to be choſen which tend to the good of Mankind; the others to be avoided.

Thus then we are got one ſtep farther, *viz.* to the Criterion of the Happineſs of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all particular Virtues and Vices.

The next Enquiry is, How ſhall I know that there is this Fitneſs and Unfitneſs in things? or if there be, how ſhall I diſcover it in particular Caſes? And the Anſwer is, Either from Experience or Reaſon. You either *perceive* the Inconveniencies of ſome Things and Actions when they happen; or you *foreſee* them by contemplating the Nature of the Things and Actions.

Thus the Criterion of the Fitneſs or Unfitneſs of things may in general be ſaid to be *Reaſon:* which Reaſon, when exactly conformable to the things exiſting, *i. e.* when it judges of things as they are, is called *Right Reaſon.* And hence alſo we ſometimes talk of the *Reaſon of things*, i. e. properly ſpeaking, that Relation which we ſhould find out by our Reaſon, if our Reaſon was right.

The expreſſing by outward Signs the Relations of things as they really are, is called *Truth*; and hence, by the ſame kind of Metaphor, we are apt to talk of the *Truth*, as well as *Reaſon of things.* Both Expreſſions mean the ſame: which has often made me wonder why ſome Men who cry up *Reaſon* as the Criterion of Virtue, ſhould yet diſlike Mr. *Wollaſton*'s Notion of *Truth* being its Criterion.

The Truth is, all theſe juſt mention'd, *viz.* the Happineſs of Mankind; the Relations, or Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of things; Reaſon and Truth; may in ſome ſenſe be ſaid to be Criterions of Virtue; but it muſt always be remember'd that they are only *remote* Criterions of it, being gradually ſubordinate to its immediate Criterion, the Will of God.

And from hence we may perceive the Reaſon of what I ſuggeſted in the beginning of this Treatiſe, *viz.* That the Diſpute between Moraliſts about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Meaning; and that this Difference between them has been occaſion'd by their dropping the immediate Criterion, and chooſing ſome a more remote,

remote, ſome a leſs remote one. And from hence we may ſee alſo the Inconvenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Criterion. For that in a great meaſure has occaſion'd all this Confuſion, as may eaſily be made appear in all the pretended Criterions of Virtue aboye-mention'd.

Thus thoſe who either expreſly exclude, or don't mention the Will of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good of Mankind; muſt either allow that Virtue is not in all Caſes *obligatory* (contrary to the Idea which all or moſt Men have of it) or they muſt ſay that the Good of Mankind is a ſufficient Obligation. But how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to *me*, when perhaps in particular Caſes, ſuch as laying down my Life, or the like, it is contrary to my Happineſs.

Thoſe who drop the Happineſs of Mankind, and talk of Relations, the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things, are ſtill more remote from the true Criterion. For Fitneſs without relation to ſome *End*, is ſcarce intelligible.

Reaſon and Truth come pretty near the Relations of things, becauſe they manifeſtly preſuppoſe them; but are ſtill one ſtep farther from the immediate Criterion of Virtue.

What has been ſaid concerning the Criterion of Virtue as including our Obligation to it, may perhaps be allow'd to be true, but ſtill it will be urg'd, that 'tis inſufficient to account for matter of Fact, *viz.* that moſt Perſons, who are either ignorant of, or never conſider'd theſe Deductions, do however purſue Virtue themſelves, and approve of it in others. I ſhall in the next place therefore give ſome account of our Approbations and Affections.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Concerning Approbation *and* Affection.

MAN is not only a *ſenſible* Creature, not only capable of Pleaſure and Pain, but capable alſo of *foreſeeing* the Pleaſure and Pain in the future conſequences of Things and Actions; and as he is capable of knowing, ſo alſo of *governing* or directing the Cauſes of them, and thereby in a great meaſure enabled to avoid the one and procure the other: whence the Principle of all Action. And therefore, as Pleaſure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor out of his Power, he purſues the former and avoids the latter; and therefore alſo thoſe things which are *Cauſes* of them are not indifferent, but he purſues or avoids them alſo, according to their different Tendency. That which he purſues for its own ſake, which is only Pleaſure, is called an *End*; that which he apprehends to be apt to produce Pleaſure, he calls *Good*, and approves of, *i. e.* judges a proper means to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an Object of choice; that which is pregnant with Miſery he diſapproves of and ſtiles *Evil*. And this Good and Evil are not only barely approved of, or the contrary, but whenever view'd in Imagination (ſince Man conſiders himſelf as exiſting hereafter, and is concern'd for his Welfare then as well as now) they have a *preſent Pleaſure* or Pain annex'd to them, proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them in real Exiſtence; which Pleaſure or Pain ariſing from the proſpect of future

Pleaſure

Pleaſure or Pain is properly call'd *Paſſion*, and the Deſire conſequent thereupon, *Affection*.

And as by reflecting upon Pleaſure there ariſes in our minds a *Deſire* of it; and on Pain, an *Averſion* from it (which neceſſarily follows from ſuppoſing us to be ſenſible Creatures, and is no more than ſaying, that all things are not *indifferent* to us) ſo alſo by reflecting upon Good or Evil, the ſame Deſires and Averſions are excited, and are diſtinguiſh'd into *Love* and *Hatred*. And from Love and Hatred variouſly modify'd, ariſe all thoſe other Deſires and Averſions which are promiſcuouſly ſtiled Paſſions or Affections; and are generally thought to be implanted in our Nature *originally*, like the Power of receiving Pleaſure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objects, are theſe following, Hope, Fear, Deſpair and its oppoſite, for which we want a Name.

SECT. IV.

Approbation and Affection conſider'd with regard to Merit, *or the* Law of Eſteem.

IF a Man in the purſuit of Pleaſure or Happineſs (by which is meant the Sum total of Pleaſure) had to do only with inanimate Creatures, his Approbation and Affections would be as deſcribed in the foregoing Section. But, ſince he is dependent with reſpect to his Happineſs, not only on theſe, but alſo on rational Agents, Creatures like himſelf, which have the Power of governing or directing Good and

and Evil, and of acting for an End; there will ariſe different means of Happineſs, and conſequently different Purſuits, tho' tending to the ſame End, Happineſs; and therefore different Approbations and Affections, and the contrary; which deſerve particularly to be conſider'd.

That there will ariſe different means of Happineſs, is evident from hence, *viz.* that Rational Agents, in being ſubſervient to our Happineſs, are not paſſive but voluntary. And therefore ſince we are in purſuit of that to obtain which we apprehend the concurrence of their Wills neceſſary, we cannot but approve of whatever is apt to procure this Concurrence. And that can be only the Pleaſure or Pain expected from it by them. And therefore, as I perceive that my Happineſs is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my Happineſs, to be a means of Happineſs: *i. e.* I cannot but *approve it.* And ſince the annexing Pleaſure to their Endeavours to promote my Happineſs is the only thing in my power to this end, I cannot but approve of the annexing Pleaſure to ſuch Actions of theirs as are undertaken upon my account. Hence to approve of a Rational Agent as a means of Happineſs, is different from the Approbation of any other means, becauſe it implies an Approbation alſo of an Endeavour to promote the Happineſs of that Agent, in order to excite him and others to the ſame concern for my Happineſs for the future.

And becauſe what we approve of we alſo deſire (as has been ſhewn above) hence alſo we *deſire* the Happineſs of any Agent that has done us good. And therefore *Love* or *Hatred*, when placed on a rational Object, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other things, that it implies a deſire of, and conſequently a pleaſure in the Happineſs of the Object beloved; or, if hated, the contrary.

The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have ſeen, conſiſts in his voluntarily contributing to our Happineſs) is called the *Merit* of the Agent ſo contributing, *i. e.* that whereby he is entitled (upon ſuppoſition that we act like rational, ſociable Creatures, like Creatures whoſe Happineſs is dependent on each other's Behaviour) to our Approbation and Love: *Demerit* the contrary.

And

And this Affection or Quality of any Action which we call *Merit* is very conſiſtent with a Man's acting *ultimately* for his own private Happineſs. For any particular Action that is undertaken *for the ſake of another*, is *meritorious*, i. e. deſerves Eſteem, Favour, and Approbation from him for whoſe ſake it was undertaken, towards the Doer of it. For the preſumption of ſuch Eſteem, *&c.* was the only Motive to that Action; and if ſuch Eſteem, *&c.* does not follow, or is preſum'd not to follow it, ſuch a Perſon is reckon'd unworthy of any favour, becauſe he ſhews by his Actions that he is incapable of being *obliged* by Favours.

The Miſtake which ſome have run into, *viz.* that Merit is inconſiſtent with acting upon *private Happineſs*, as an ultimate End, ſeems to have ariſen from hence, *viz.* that they have not carefully enough diſtinguiſh'd between an inferior and ultimate End; the end of a particular Action, and the end of Action in general: which may be explained thus. Tho' Happineſs, private Happineſs, is the proper or ultimate End of all our Actions whatever, yet that particular means of Happineſs which any particular Action is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly aim'd at by that Action; the thing which, if poſſeſs'd, we would not undertake that Action, may and generally is call'd the *End* of that Action. As therefore Happineſs is the general End of all Actions, ſo each particular Action may be ſaid to have its proper and peculiar End: Thus the End of a Beau is to pleaſe by his Dreſs; the End of Study, Knowledge. But neither pleaſing by Dreſs, nor Knowledge, are ultimate Ends, they ſtill tend or ought to tend to ſomething farther; as is evident from hence, *viz.* that a Man may aſk and expect a Reaſon why either of them are purſued: Now to aſk the *Reaſon* of any Action or Purſuit, is only to enquire into the *End* of it: But to expect a Reaſon, *i. e.* an End to be aſſign'd for an *ultimate* End, is abſurd. To aſk why I purſue Happineſs, will admit of no other Anſwer than an Explanation of the Terms.

Why *inferior Ends*, which in reality are only Means, are too often look'd upon and acquieſc'd in as *ultimate*, ſhall be accounted for hereafter.

Whenever therefore the *particular* End of any Action is the Happineſs of another (tho' the Agent deſign'd thereby to procure to himſelf Eſteem and Favour, and look'd upon that Eſteem and Favour as a means of private Happineſs) that Action is meritorious. And the ſame may be ſaid, tho' we deſign to pleaſe God by endeavouring to promote the Happineſs of others. But when an Agent has a view in any particular Action diſtinct from my Happineſs, and that view is his *only Motive* to that Action, tho' that Action promote my Happineſs to never ſo great a Degree yet that Agent acquires no *Merit*; *i. e.* he is not thereby entitled to any Favour and Eſteem: Becauſe Favour and Eſteem are due from me for any Action, no farther than that Action was undertaken upon my account. If therefore my Happineſs is only the pretended End of that Action, I am impoſed on if I believe it real, and thereby think myſelf indebted to the Agent; and am diſcharg'd from any Obligation as ſoon as I find out the Cheat.

But it is far otherwiſe when my Happineſs is the ſole End of that particular Action, *i. e.* (as I have explain'd myſelf above) when the Agent endeavours to promote my Happineſs as a Means to procure my Favour, *i. e.* to make me ſubſervient to his Happineſs as his ultimate End: Tho' I know he aims at my Happineſs only as a means of his own, yet this leſſens not the Obligation.

There is one thing, I confeſs, which makes a great alteration in this Caſe, and that is, whether he aims at my Favour *in general*, or only for ſome particular End. Becauſe, if he aim at my Happineſs only to ſerve himſelf in ſome particular thing, the Value of my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular thing: And therefore I am under leſs Obligation *(cæteris paribus)* the more *particular* his Expectations from me are; but under Obligation I am.

Now from the various Combinations of this which we call Merit, and its contrary, ariſe all thoſe various Approbations and Averſions; all thoſe Likings and Diſlikings which we call *Moral*.

As therefore, from conſidering thoſe Beings which are the *involuntary* means of our Happineſs or Miſery, there were produced

in

in us the Paſſions or Affections of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, Deſpair, and its contrary: So from conſidering thoſe Beings which *voluntarily* contribute to our Happineſs or Miſery, there ariſe theſe following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love or Hatred placed on involuntary Beings; that placed on involuntary Beings being only a Deſire to poſſeſs or avoid the thing beloved or hated; but this on voluntary Agents being a Deſire to give Pleaſure or Pain to the Agent beloved or hated) Gratitude, Anger, (ſometimes call'd by one common Name, Reſentment) Generoſity, Ambition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence: and if there be any other, they're only, as theſe are, different Modifications of Love and Hatred.

Love and *Hatred*, and the Foundation of them, (*viz.* the Agent beloved or hated being apprehended to be inſtrumental to our Happineſs) I have explain'd above. *Gratitude* is that Deſire of promoting the Happineſs of another upon account of ſome former Kindneſs receiv'd. *Anger*, that Deſire of thwarting the Happineſs of another, on account of ſome former Diſkindneſs or Injury received. And both theſe take place, tho' we hope for, or fear nothing farther from the Objects of either of them, and this is ſtill conſiſtent with acting upon a Principle of *private Happineſs*.

For tho' we neither hope for, nor fear any thing farther from theſe particular Beings; yet the Diſpoſition ſhewn upon theſe Occaſions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings towards us; *i. e.* other Beings will be moved to promote our Happineſs or otherwiſe, as they obſerve how we reſent Favours or Injuries.

Ambition is a Deſire of being eſteem'd. Hence a Deſire of being *thought* an Object of Eſteem; hence of *being* an Object of Eſteem, hence of doing *laudable*, i. e. uſeful Actions. *Generoſity* and *Benevolence* are Species of it. Ambition in too great a Degree is called *Pride*, of which there are ſeveral Species. The Title to the Eſteem of others, which ariſeth from any meritorious Action, is called *Honour*. The Pleaſure ariſing from Honour being paid to us, *i. e.* from others acknowledging that we are entitled to their Eſteem, is with-

out a Name. *Modeſty* is the fear of loſing Eſteem. The Uneaſineſs or Paſſion which ariſeth from a Senſe that we have loſt it, is called *Shame*. So that *Ambition*, and all thoſe other Paſſions and Affections belonging to it, together with *Shame*, ariſe from the Eſteem of others: which is the Reaſon why this Tribe of Affections operate more ſtrongly on us than any other, *viz.* becauſe we perceive that as our Happineſs is dependent on the Behaviour of others, ſo we perceive alſo that that Behaviour is dependent on the Eſteem which others have conceiv'd of us; and conſequently that our acquiring or loſing Eſteem, is in effect acquiring or loſing Happineſs, and in the higheſt Degree. And the ſame may be ſaid concerning all our other Affections and Paſſions, to enumerate which, what for want of Names to them, and what by the confuſion of Language about them, is almoſt impoſſible.

Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Reaſon which will then be obvious.

Thus having explain'd what I mean by *Obligation* and *Approbation*; and ſhewn that they are founded on and terminate in *Happineſs*: having alſo pointed out the Difference between our Approbations and Affections as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means of Happineſs; and farther, that theſe Approbations and Affections are not innate or implanted in us by way of *Inſtinct*, but are all *acquired*, being fairly deducible from ſuppoſing only ſenſible and rational Creatures dependent on each other for their Happineſs, as explain'd above: I ſhall in the next place endeavour to anſwer a grand Objection to what has here been ſaid concerning Approbations and Affections ariſing from a proſpect of private Happineſs.

The Objection is this.

The Reaſon or End of every Action is always known to the Agent; for nothing can move a Man but what is perceiv'd: but the generality of Mankind love and hate, approve and diſapprove, immediately, as ſoon as any moral Character either occurs in Life, or is propoſed to them, without conſidering whether their private Happineſs

pineſs is affected with it, or no: or if they do conſider any Moral Character in relation to their own Happineſs, and find themſelves, as to their private Happineſs, unconcern'd in it, or even find their private Happineſs leſſen'd by it in ſome particular Inſtance, yet they ſtill approve the Moral Character, and love the Agent; nay they cannot do otherwiſe. Whatever Reaſon may be aſſign'd by ſpeculative Men why we ſhould be grateful to a Benefactor, or pity the Diſtreſſed; yet if the grateful or compaſſionate Mind never thought of that Reaſon, it is no Reaſon to him. The Enquiry is not why he *ought to be* grateful, but why he *is* ſo. Theſe after-reaſons therefore rather ſhew the Wiſdom and Providence of our Maker in implanting the immediate Powers of theſe Approbations *(i. e.* in Mr. *Hutcheſon*'s Language, *a Moral Senſe)* and theſe Public Affections in us, than give any ſatisfactory account of their Origin. And therefore theſe Public Affections, and this Moral Senſe, are quite independent on private Happineſs, and in reality act upon us as mere Inſtincts.

Anſwer.

The Matter of Fact contain'd in this Argument, in my Opinion, is not to be conteſted; and therefore it remains either that we make the matter of Fact conſiſtent with what we have before laid down, or give up the Cauſe.

Now, in order to ſhew this Conſiſtency, I beg leave to obſerve, that as in the purſuit of Truth we don't always trace every Propoſition whoſe Truth we are examining, to a firſt Principle or Axiom, but acquieſce, as ſoon as we perceive it deducible from ſome known or preſumed Truth; ſo in our Conduct we do not always travel to the ultimate End of our Actions, *Happineſs:* but reſt contented, as ſoon as we perceive any Action ſubſervient to a known or preſumed *Means* of Happineſs. And theſe preſumed Truths and Means of Happineſs, whether real or otherwiſe, always influence us after the ſame manner as if they were real. The undeniable Conſequences of Prejudices are as firmly adhered to as the Conſequences of real truths

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or arguments; and what is ſubſervient to a falſe (but imagin'd) means of Happineſs, is as induſtriouſly purſued as what is ſubſervient to a true one.

Now every Man, both in his Purſuit after Truth, and in his Conduct, has ſettled and fixed a great many of theſe in his Mind, which he always acts upon, as upon *Principles*, without examining. And this is occaſion'd by the Narrowneſs of our Underſtandings: We can conſider but a few things at once; and therefore, to run every thing to the Fountain-head would be tedious, thro' a long Series of Conſequences. To avoid this we chooſe out certain Truths and means of Happineſs, which we look upon as RESTING PLACES, which we may ſafely acquieſce in, in the Conduct both of our Underſtanding and Practice, in relation to the one, regarding them as *Axioms*; in the other, as *Ends*. And we are more eaſily inclined to this by imagining that we may ſafely rely upon what we call *Habitual* Knowledge, thinking it needleſs to examine what we are already ſatisfy'd in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative and Practical, are difficult to be rooted out, *viz.* few will examine them.

And theſe RESTING PLACES are ſo often uſed as Principles, that at laſt, letting that ſlip out of our Minds which firſt inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them, not as they really are, the *Subſtitutes* of Principles, but Principles themſelves.

And from hence, as ſome Men have imagin'd *Innate Ideas*, becauſe forgetting how they came by them; ſo others have ſet up almoſt as many diſtinct *Inſtincts* as there are *acquired Principles* of acting. And I cannot but wonder why the *Pecuniary* Senſe, a Senſe of *Power* and *Party*, &c. were not mention'd, as well as the *Moral*, that of *Honour*, *Order*, and ſome others.

The Caſe is really this. We firſt perceive or imagine ſome real Good, *i. e.* fitneſs to promote our Happineſs in thoſe things which we love and approve of. Hence (as was above explain'd) we annex Pleaſure to thoſe things. Hence thoſe things and Pleaſure are ſo ty'd together and aſſociated in our Minds, that one cannot preſent itſelf

itſelf but the other will alſo occur. And the *Aſſociation* remains even after that which at firſt gave them the Connection is quite forgot, or perhaps does not exiſt, but the contrary. An Inſtance or two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the World who have as ſtrong a taſte for *Money* as others have for Virtue; who count ſo much Money, ſo much Happineſs; nay, even ſell their Happineſs for Money; or, to ſpeak more properly, make the *having* Money, without any Deſign or Thought of uſing it, their ultimate End? But was this Propenſity to Money born with them? Or rather, did not they at firſt perceive a great many Advantages from being poſſeſs'd of Money, and from thence conceive a Pleaſure in having it, thence deſire it, thence endeavour to obtain it, thence receive an actual Pleaſure in obtaining it, thence deſire to preſerve the Poſſeſſion of it? Hence, by dropping the intermediate Means between Money and Happineſs, they join Money and Happineſs immediately together, and content themſelves with the phantaſtical Pleaſure of having it, and make that which was at firſt purſued only as a *Means*, be to them a real *End*, and what their real Happineſs or Miſery conſiſts in. Thus the Connection between Money and Happineſs remains in the Mind; tho' it has long ſince ceaſed between the things themſelves.

The ſame might be obſerv'd concerning the Thirſt after Knowledge, Fame, *&c.* the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and moſt of the various Exerciſes and Entertainments of Life. Theſe were at firſt enter'd on with a view to ſome farther End, but at length become habitual Amuſements; the Idea of Pleaſure is aſſociated with them, and leads us on ſtill in the ſame eager Purſuit of them, when the firſt Reaſon is quite vaniſh'd, or at leaſt out of our Minds. Nay, we find this Power of *Aſſociation* ſo great as not only to tranſport our Paſſions and Affections beyond their proper bounds, both as to Intenſeneſs and Duration; as is evident from daily Inſtances of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, *&c.* but alſo, that it is able to transfer them to improper Objects, and ſuch as are of a quite different Nature from thoſe to which our Reaſon had at firſt directed them. Thus being accuſtom'd to reſent an Injury done to

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our Body by a Retaliation of the like to him that offer'd it, we are apt to conceive the ſame kind of Reſentment, and often expreſs it in the ſame manner, upon receiving hurt from a Stock or Stone, whereby the hatred which we are uſed to place on voluntary Beings, is ſubſtituted in the Room of that Averſion which belongs to involuntary ones. The like may be obſerv'd in moſt of the other Paſſions above-mention'd.

From hence alſo, *viz.* from the continuance of this *Aſſociation* of Ideas in our Minds, we may be enabled to account for that (almoſt diabolical) Paſſion called *Envy*, which we promis'd to conſider.

Mr. *Locke* obſerves, and I believe very juſtly, that there are ſome Men entirely unacquainted with this Paſſion. For moſt Men that are uſed to Reflection, may remember the very time when they were firſt under the dominion of it.

Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which ariſes in the Mind from obſerving the Proſperity of others; not of *all* others indefinitely, but only of ſome particular Perſons. Now the examining who thoſe particular Perſons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us to the true Origin of this Paſſion. And if a Man will be at the Pains to conſult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that theſe particular Perſons are always ſuch as upon ſome account or other he has had a *Rivalſhip* with. For when two or more are Competitors for the ſame thing, the Succeſs of the one muſt neceſſarily tend to the Detriment of the other, or others: hence the Succeſs of my Rival and Miſery or Pain are joined together in my Mind; and this connection or aſſociation remaining in my Mind, even after the Rivalſhip ceaſes, makes me always affected with Pain whenever I hear of his Succeſs, tho' in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to the Rivalſhip, much more in thoſe that bring that to my Remembrance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it not been for him. This may poſſibly caſt ſome Light upon the black Deſigns and envious Purpoſes of the fallen Angels. For why might not they have formerly had ſome Competition with their Fellows? and why may not ſuch Aſſociations be as ſtrong in them as us?

Thus

Thus alſo we are apt to envy thoſe Perſons that refuſe to be guided by our Judgments and perſuaded by us. For this is nothing elſe than a Rivalſhip about the Superiority of Judgment; and we take a ſecret Pride both to let the World ſee, and in imagining ourſelves, that we were in the right.

There is one thing more to be obſerv'd in anſwer to this Objection, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the moſt part) *make* this Aſſociation ourſelves, but *learn* it from *others: i. e.* that we annex Pleaſure or Pain to certain Things or Actions becauſe we ſee others do it, and acquire Principles of Action by imtating thoſe whom we admire, or whoſe Eſteem we would procure: Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his Father, as well as his Eſtate: Hence *National* Virtues and Vices, Diſpoſitions and Opinions: And from hence we may obſerve how eaſy it is to account for what is generally call'd the *Prejudice of Education*; how ſoon we catch the Temper and Affections of thoſe whom we daily converſe with; how almoſt inſenſibly we are *taught* to love, admire or hate; to be grateful, generous, compaſſionate or cruel, *&c.*

What I ſay then in anſwer to the Objection is this: " That it is " neceſſary in order to ſolve the principal Actions of human Life to " ſuppoſe a Moral Senſe (or what is ſignify'd by that Name) and " alſo public Affections; but I deny that this Moral Senſe, or theſe public Affections are innate, or *implanted* in us: they are acquired either from our own *Obſervation* or the *Imitation* of others. But whether I have rightly deny'd it or no muſt depend upon the Arguments, and the Reader is to judge impartially for himſelf. I think this Matter deſerves a fair Examination; and if what has been ſaid already put others upon thinking of it I have my End.

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4 Why Men are tormented with the continual dread of Death, while the Brutes are not at all concern'd about it. *ibid.*
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CHAP. V.

Of Moral Evil.

Introduction containing the Subſtance of the Chapter.

SECT. I.

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SUBSECT. I.

A View of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from Compulſion only, but not from Neceſſity.

¶.1 That it is not eaſy to underſtand or give a true Repreſentation of the Opinions concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from *Compulſion* only, others from *Neceſſity* alſo. 150
2 The Authors of the former Opinion ſuppoſe that there are Appetites implanted in us by Nature; what is agreeable to theſe is called Good, the contrary Evil. 151
3 Things are agreeable to the Appetite in a threefold reſpect; hence three kinds of Good. *ibid.*
4 That which is actually agreeable to the Appetite is called *Pleaſant.* *ib.*
5 That which is connected with ſomething which is of itſelf agreeable, is called *Profitable.* *ibid.*
6 That which is judg'd by the Underſtanding to be the beſt, all things conſider'd, is abſolutely good, and called *Honeſt.* *ibid.*
7 Inſtances in Health, Medicines, and ſuch things as are agreeable to the Rational Appetite. 152
8 He that can act as his own Judgment directs, is free according to theſe Men. *ib.*

9 But they ſuppoſe that we are determin'd to chooſe either from the Goodneſs or Diſagreeableneſs of Objects perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senſes, and that therefore we are not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties which are ſubject to the Determination of the Will. *ibid.*

10 If this be ſo, all our Actions are abſolutely neceſſary. 154

11 That human Actions are free, not from Neceſſity but Compulſion. 155

12 According to their Opinion there is no *Contingency* in things, nor could any thing be done otherwiſe than it is. 156

13 By Evil they underſtand nothing more than hurtful. *ib.*

14 Villanies are to be placed to the Account of human Miſeries, and not look'd upon as Crimes, properly ſo call'd. 157

15 A Malefactor is reproved, not becauſe he deſerv'd it, but becauſe Reproof may drive him from Evil. *ib.*

16 Puniſhments are apply'd as Medicines to the Sick, neither are Laws uſeleſs ſince they prevent Vice. 158

17 We are obliged to be grateful only in proſpect of a future Benefit. *ibid.*

18 According to this Opinion human Happineſs is impoſſible, ſince it depends upon things which are not in our Power. *ibid.*

19 Its Conſequences are hard, and tho' the Argument from Conſequences be generally a bad one, yet theſe bring ſome Prejudice againſt an Opinion which ſeems to be attended with them, eſpecially if they be acknowledg'd 159

20 All thoſe who declare that the Will is *paſſive* in its Operations, will be eſteem'd to be of the ſame Opinion with the former, and are preſs'd with the ſame Conſequences. *ibid.*

SUBSECT. II.

An Opinion is propoſed in general, aſſerting a Liberty from Neceſſity as well as Compulſion.

¶ 1 This agrees with the former in moſt Caſes, eſpecially in thoſe relating to the Appetites, to *good*, *pleaſant*, *profitable*, and *honeſt*; but determines this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, *viz.* that the one is determin'd by his Bodily Appetite, the other by himſelf. 161

2 The chief Good is neceſſarily deſired, but others are not, becauſe they may be repreſented by the Underſtanding in different Lights. 162

3 Tho' therefore the Will follows ſome Judgment of the Underſtanding, yet it is not neceſſarily determin'd by it. 164

4 This

4 This Opinion eſtabliſhes Liberty, but there are ſome things in it not ſufficiently explain'd. 166
5 Such a Liberty as this ſeems to be of more Prejudice than Benefit to Mankind. *ib.*
6 It takes place only in doubtful Matters, and then 'tis of no uſe or importance. 168
7 We are left in doubt concerning the way which leads to Happineſs, and can have no Help from Liberty. *ibid.*
8 Since that is Good which is agreeable, and this is to be judg'd of by the Underſtanding, if the Will follow this Judgment it is not free, if it does not, it acts againſt Reaſon. We had better therefore be without ſuch Liberty. 169
9 If the Will could ſuſpend its Act contrary to the Judgment of the Underſtanding, it would run directly into Evil; it ſeems therefore neceſſary for it to act at the time, and in the manner which the Underſtending directs. 170
10 There are Anſwers offer'd to theſe Difficulties, but ſuch as are far from being clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion. 171

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Another Notion of Liberty and Election is propoſed.

1 The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End by exerciſe, which is the greateſt Perfection of them, and their beſt Eſtate. 172
2 There is a certain agreeableneſs fixt by Nature between ſome Appetites, and their Objects, whereby they act upon the preſence of them, and ceaſe from Action upon the Removal of them. *ib.*
3 Liberty would be of diſſervice to an Agent endow'd with ſuch Appetites, *&c.* as theſe only. 173
4 We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there is naturally no other Agreeableneſs but what may ariſe from the determination of the Power itſelf. *ib.*
5 Such a Power as this cannot be determin'd by any *Goodneſs* in Objects, ſince the Goodneſs of 'em depends upon the determination. 175
6 Nor by any *Uneaſineſs*. *ib.*
7 Nor by the *Underſtanding*. 176
8 Yet ſuch an Agent has need of Underſtanding in order to diſtinguiſh poſſible things from impoſſible. 177

If

9 If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other Limitation. 177
10 But an Agent of finite Power muſt alſo conſult his Abilities. *ib.*
11 Such an Agent cannot be determin'd by his other Appetites. 178
12 This Power is ſuperior to all the Appetites, and ſubdued by none. *ib.*
13 It ſeems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have ſomething to delight himſelf in when the natural Appetites muſt neceſſarily be fruſtrated. *ib.*
14 This Power, by its acceſſion, increaſes the Pleaſure of the other Appetites; by oppoſition removes, or at leaſt alleviates the Pain. 179
15 The reſt of the Appetites are not to be baulked unneceſſarily. 180
16 Such an Agent as this is Self-active. *ib.*
17 Is determin'd by himſelf, and things are not choſen becauſe they pleaſe him, but pleaſe him becauſe they are choſen. 181
18 Yet he is not determin'd by *chance*. *ib.*
19 Is the true Cauſe of his Actions. 182
20 Is capable of Happineſs. *ib.*
21 An imperfect Underſtanding is ſufficient for his Happineſs, if he do but diſtinguiſh between Poſſibilities and Impoſſibilities, things agreeable and diſagreeable to the Senſes, and conſult his Abilities. 183
22 Tho' Liberty would be a Prejudice to other Agents, yet it is a ſure foundation of Happineſs to this, whoſe convenience depends not on Objects but Election. 184
23 Theſe things are clear enough, tho' they may appear to be a little too ſubtle. *ib.*

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That there is an Agent who is pleaſed with Objects only becauſe he chooſes them.

¶.1 *God* is ſuch an Agent as this. 185
2 Becauſe nothing external is either good or bad to him before Election. *ib.*
3 Becauſe his own Will is the Cauſe of Goodneſs in the Creatures. *ib.*
4 They are not to be regarded who declare that this Goodneſs determines the Will of God. 186
5 If he had not a Power of pleaſing himſelf in Election, he could never have made any thing. 187
6 If he were moved by the Goodneſs of things to create the World, he would be a neceſſary Agent. 188

7 But

7 But if things are good becauſe he has choſen to make them, his whole Work will be free. 188
8 External things are in themſelves abſolutely indifferent to God, but he has a Complacency in his Choice. *ib.*
9 And determine himſelf to Action. 189
10 The Difficulty of conceiving how a Power can determine itſelf to Action ought not to hinder our aſſent to the truth of the Propoſition. 190
11 'Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved by another, as by itſelf, we are prejudiced by being accuſtomed to material, *i. e.* paſſive Agents. *ib.*
12 What is ſaid about indifference, with reſpect to the Will of God, takes place in his primary Elections. 191
13 God may have all things at once in his view which are connected with the thing choſen, and either will or refuſe them by one ſimple Act. *ib.*
14 As he is of infinite Goodneſs, he alſo wills the Good of all things which he has determin'd to create, as far as poſſible. 192
15 When the World therefore is once made, it is impoſſible that thoſe things ſhould pleaſe him which tend to the confuſion, *&c.* of his Work. *ib.*
16 When Man is made of ſuch a Nature as requires him to be juſt, ſober, *&c.* God is not at Liberty not to will theſe things. 194
17 This is no bar to the Divine Liberty. *ib.*
18 A Being endow'd with this Power is more perfect than one that wants it: yet this does not imply infinite Perfection, therefore it is communicable. 196

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That Man partakes of this Principle of pleaſing himſelf by Election.

¶ 1 Some Reaſons are offer'd to ſhew this. 197
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3 The Vulgar often judge better of matters of Fact than Philoſophers. *ib.*
4 'Tis proved that we partake of this Power, becauſe we diſcover the Marks and Properties of it in ourſelves. 200
5 In the firſt place, we impute our Actions to ourſelves, whereby we own ourſelves to be the true Cauſes of them. Hence it is that we diſtinguiſh Misfortunes from Crimes. *ib.*
6 This is a moſt certain Sign that we are conſcious of our Liberty. 201
7 The ſecond Token of this Power, that it can go againſt the Appetites, *&c.* 202
8 'Tis ſhewn that we can do this in regard to our Appetites. *ib.*

9 That

9 That we can do it alſo in our Senſes, and in a manner change the Nature of things by an obſtinate Election. 203
10 That we can conquer not only our Appetites and Senſes, but alſo our Reaſon by the force of Election. 204
11 This appears from Inſtances. 205
12 That the Underſtanding admits not only Evil things for Good, but Falſities for Truths, *viz.* being under Subjection to the Will. *ib.*
13 'Tis prov'd that we have this Power from a Conſideration of theſe Reaſons which are ſuppoſed to determine the Will. 206
14 Theſe are enumerated. *ib.*
15 Firſt, Errors of the Underſtanding: theſe are ſhewn to depend upon deprav'd Election rather than cauſe it. 207
16 Secondly, Obſtinacy: which is ſhewn to be nothing elſe but perſevering in a deprav'd Election. *ib.*
17 Thirdly. The violence of Paſſions, *viz.* Deſire of Fame and Glory, *&c.* all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election. 208
18 The ſame is ſhewn of Hatred, Love, *&c.* 209
19 Of Envy and Revenge. *ib.*
20 Fourthly, *Madneſs*: 'tis prov'd on the contrary, that theſe Men are in their Senſes who chooſe abſurdly. 210
21 All theſe things cannot be explained otherwiſe than by admitting a Principle of this kind in ourſelves. *ib.*
22 As much Good ariſes from this Principle, ſo it is attended with this Evil, *viz.* a Power of ſinning. 211
23 This miſtake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Underſtanding aroſe from hence, *viz.* that it would be imprudent in us to act without conſulting the Underſtanding. *ib.*
24 We can act in order to ſhew our Liberty, which is prov'd to be the ſame as acting without any reaſon at all. 212

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¶. 1 The more free any Being is, the leſs he is expos'd to external Motions from without, and meets with leſs Inconvenience. 215
2 Happineſs ariſes from the proper uſe of the Faculties, *&c.* If therefore a Power of chooſing be the moſt noble of all, the greateſt Happineſs will conſiſt in the Exerciſe of it, *i. e.* in Elections. *ib.*
3 Election is the Cauſe why things pleaſe us. 216

4 He

4 He therefore that has a free power of chooſing, can always pleaſe himſelf. 216
5 We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and ſo can attain Happineſs. 217
6 Care of the Body, and the natural Appetites diſturb Elections in this preſent ſtate, and hinder our Happineſs from being perfect. *ib.*
7 We have reaſon to admire the Divine Wiſdom which created an Appetite that has wherewith to pleaſe itſelf in its own Nature, howſoever external things be diſpoſed. 218

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2 2*dly.* When thoſe things are choſen which are *inconſiſtent* with each other. 220
3 3*dly.* If the things choſen be not in the Power of the Elector. *ib.*
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3 Secondly, By *Negligence.* 223
4 Thirdly, By giving too great indulgence to the exerciſe of Election. *ib.*
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2 Moral Evils have no neceſſary Connection with a free Nature, nor are of any Advantage to it. 227
3 Here then lies the ſtreſs of the Difficulty, *viz.* why did God permit thoſe Evils which are neither neceſſary nor uſeful? *ib.*
4 We don't know ſo much of the Nature of thinking Beings, as of material ones, and therefore are leſs prepared for an Anſwer to this Difficulty than to the former. *ib.*
5 The abuſe of Free-Will may be conceiv'd to have been prevented three ways, which are conſider'd in the three following Subſections. 228

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Why God has created Free-Agents.

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4 Anſwer to the former part of the Objection. *ib.*
5 Anſwer to the latter. *ib.*
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7 Neceſſary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much leſs thoſe which are only poſſible. *ib.*
8 Natural Evils are greater than Moral ones, and Free-Will a greater Good than the Natural Appetites. 232
9 The ſtate of Man wou'd be worſe if Free-Will were taken away. 233
10 Free-

10 Free Agents are capable of perfect Happineſs, therefore it is better to enjoy Liberty. 234
11 The Benefits of Free-Will cou'd not be had without a Power of ſinning. 235
12 The Will could not be determin'd to Good by Objects, ſince the Goodneſs of them generally proceeds from Election. 236
13 The Intellect often finds nothing good in things, except that they help towards the attainment of an Election, the Will therefore could not be determin'd to Good by the Underſtanding. *ib.*
14 The Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God being equal to his Power, hinders him from chooſing amiſs. 238
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17 'Tis better to be in danger of ſinning than to ceaſe from Election. *ib.*

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3 God, by interpoſing in the Elections of his Creatures, would quite invert the Method of treating Free-Agents. 244
4 He would take away that which is the moſt agreeable to us in Elections, *viz.* a Conſciouſneſs that we might have not choſen. 245
5 Free-Agents are placed as it were out of the reach of Divine Power; the Government of theſe therefore is the proper Exerciſe of the Divine Wiſdom, wherein God delights. 248
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2 God does not hear all Prayers. 253
3 God is obliged to the Creatures by his Goodneſs and by Covenant. *ib.*
4 What may be requeſted of the Deity relates either to the Mind, the Body or external things. *ib.*
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6 The Aid of the *Holy Spirit* is not miraculous. 255
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8 And to ſubdue the Affections. 258
9 The Actions of free Beings will produce a Contingency in material things, yet this does not offer any Violence to Nature. 260
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11 God makes uſe of the Miniſtry of Angels in the Government of Mankind, nor is this any Violence to Nature. 262
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13 The *Efficacy of Prayers* cannot be accounted for if all things be left to neceſſary Cauſes. 264
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Why God does not tranſlate Man to ſome other Place, where nothing would occur that could tempt him to chooſe amiſs.

¶.1 This is the ſame as if it were aſk'd, why God did not give the Earth to be inhabited by the Brutes only. 270
2 This is totally to extirpate Mankind. 271
3 God will in due time tranſlate good Men to a better State, but the preſent is as neceſſary as Seed-time is to Harveſt. *ib.*

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2 That the Power of Election is not regarded. *ib.*
3 That there is an Univerſal Corruption. 274

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5 Many attain to a moderate Happineſs. *ib.*
6 Men make uſe of this Elective Power tho' they do not obſerve it. 276
7 Elections produce the ſame Effect in the Moral World as Motion does in the Natural. 278
8 Things are connected together, and a defect in one affects many others. *ib.*
9 Vice and Wickedneſs, tho deform'd in themſelves, do not impair the Beauty of the whole. 279
10 If this be apply'd to particular Caſes, it accounts for the Univerſal Corruption. 282

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2 *Cicero*'s Objection propoſed, which is taken from a Phyſician who gives his Patient Wine when he knows that he will die of it. Or a Father who leaves his Eſtate to a Prodigal Son. 289
3 'Tis ſhewn that the Compariſon is ill put between Reaſon and Free-will, and the giving of Wine; and that God, if he took away Liberty for fear we ſhou'd ſin, wou'd be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he ſhou'd be ſick. 290
4 Reaſon is no leſs improperly compar'd to an Eſtate. 291
5 It tends to the Good of the whole, and of ourſelves alſo, that we ſhould have the uſe of Free-will: for we had rather be what we are than in the Condition of Brutes, or without Reaſon. *ib.*
6 *Cicero* has neither brought oppoſite Similes, nor given good Advice to Providence. 293
7 The Objection of *Epicurus* propoſed, which charged God with Weakneſs if he was not able; or Envy if he was able to remove Evils. 294
8 'Tis a Contradiction that all Evils be removed from created Beings, God is not impotent therefore becauſe he does not remove them. *ib.*
9 God always chooſes the leaſt of Evils, and therefore is not envious. 295
10 God cou'd neither be conceiv'd to be infinitely powerful, if he were not able to create imperfect Beings, *i. e.* Creatures; or things that are contrary to each other, *i. e.* Evils; nor infinitely good if he had been contented in himſelf, and deny'd Exiſtenc to every thing elſe. 296

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6 'Tis

6 'Tis aſk'd in the 2d place, how Puniſhments can be eternal, ſince it is agreeable to Goodneſs to have created all things in ſuch a manner that nothing might repent of its being created. 305
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17 The Diſpute about *Moral Evil* relates to the Mind and its Operations, and on that account muſt neceſſarily be ſomewhat ſubtle. 315

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3 We are partial Judges of Merit, from the inſtance of *Hannibal* and *Scipio*. 311
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6 Concluſion of the whole. *ib.*

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

CHAP. I.

Containing ſome Principles neceſſary to be known in order to the Underſtanding and Solution of the difficulty about the Origin *of* Evil.

SECT. I.

Of the knowledge of External Objects.

I. 'TIS allow'd that external Objects are made known to us from without by the Senſes; but we have entirely forgot how *Light*, *Colours*, and other external Things at firſt affected our Senſes and Minds; nor can we eaſily recollect the riſe and progreſs of our Knowledge concerning theſe things.

That ſenſations repreſent external things to us, or at leaſt diſcover the preſence of them.

However 'tis agreed that the *Conceptions* which we have of theſe either repreſent to us the things themſelves, or at leaſt diſcover the *preſence* and *operations* of them: That the ſenſation of *Light*, for inſtance, ariſes from its being preſented to the Eye; and ſo in all other Objects of the Senſes.

That theſe are confuſed and complicated, but afterwards ſeparated and diſtinguiſh'd by the underſtanding; an inſtance of this in burning Wax.

II. But it is to be obſerv'd that the Repreſentations of things, which we have from the Senſes, are by no means ſimple, but very much confuſed and complicated; for Example, the Eye repreſents to the Mind *burning Wax*, i. e. a thing that is hard, round, capable of being melted in

in the Fire, red, and when ſoftened by heat, changeable into any Figure, ſuſceptible alſo of various colours, and laſtly reſolvable into *Smoke*. The Eye exhibits all theſe properties in the burning Wax almoſt at one glance, but the *underſtanding* ſeparates thoſe things by Reflection, which the ſight had convey'd to the Mind collectively. For it perceives that the Wax preſerves its Eſſence and Denomination, tho' from round it be turn'd into ſquare, from hard and red, into ſoft and black. From whence it appears that all theſe properties are *extrinſecal* to it, but that which continues under all theſe changes is call'd its *Nature* and *Subſtance*.

The firſt diſtinction of our conceptions into *ſenſible Qualities* and *Subſtance*.

III. By *Subſtance* I here underſtand a thing which the Mind can conceive by *itſelf* as *diſtinct* and *ſeparate* from all others: For that thing, the conception of which does not *depend* upon another, nor does include or ſuppoſe any other, is to us a *Subſtance*; (1) and accordingly we diſtinguiſh it by that name: But that which implies *dependence* in

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(1) *Subſtance* in general is a thing or being which can *ſubſiſt* by itſelf without dependence on any other thing as a *Subject*. Our Idea of the word Subſtance, according to Mr. *Locke*, is only a ſuppoſition of we know not what *ſubſtratum* or *ſupport* of ſuch *Qualities* as we have obſerved to exiſt united together, and are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us, which qualities are commonly call'd accidents. Now becauſe we cannot eaſily conceive how theſe accidents ſhould ſubſiſt alone or in one another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and ſupported by, ſome unknown common *ſubſtratum* which inheres not in any thing elſe, and which we denote by the name *Subſtance*. See his Eſſay, B. 2. C. 23. §. 2. and the Notes annex'd.

This is our uſual manner of conceiving things as they are diſtinguiſh'd into *Subſtance* and *Accident*: But what foundation there is in nature for ſuch a diſtinction I know not: In particular what this ſame Subſtance is, or whether it be really any thing at all different from theſe Accidents, or only a relative Idea founded on the modus of their exiſtence, or rather on the manner of our conſidering their exiſtence, we ſhall not pretend to determine. Mr. *Locke*, who does not not much approve of the foregoing diſtinction between ſubſtance and accident, * ſeems generally to take it for an *unknown Cauſe of the union* of what we call Properties or Accidents. The Author of the *Procedure, Extent*, and *Limits* of H. U. ſuppoſes it to be nothing but the union of theſe very Properties, or all theſe conſtituent Properties collected together. ---- "As far as we directly "know the Eſſential properties of any ſub"ſtance ſo far we have a direct knowledge "of the Subſtance *itſelf*: And if we had a di"rect knowledge of *all* the eſſential proper"ties of any Subſtance, we ſhould have an "*adequate* knowledge of that Subſtance; for "ſurely, if there be any meaning in words, "the knowing any of the eſſential properties "of a thing, is knowing *ſo much* of its very "Subſtance or Eſſence." B. 1. C. 3. p. 80, 81.

Whatever is meant by the word *Subſtance*, Mr. *Locke* thinks it ought not to be apply'd to *God, Spirits*, and *Body*, in the *ſame Senſe* † and the Author of the *procedure*, &c. would have us when we talk of *Spirits* to ſubſtitute the word *Being* inſtead of it ‖ and I muſt believe

* B. 2. C. 13. §. 18. 19. 20.) † Ibid. §. 18. ‖ Pa. 77, 78.

that

in the conception of it we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*. For inſtance, we can conceive a certain portion of *matter*, ſuch as Wax is, ſetting aſide all others, and alſo without any particular *Figure*: But are not in like manner able to conceive any particular Figure without matter. Wax therefore is a *Subſtance*, for our conception repreſents it as *diſtinct*, *divided* from, and *independent* of, all other things: Nor is it neceſſary to the knowledge thereof, that we join the conceptions of other things when we think of it; for the conceptions of that and theſe, *contribute* nothing to, nor ſtand in need of, each other in order to their being underſtood. But *Colour*, *Figure*, *ſoftneſs* and *hardneſs* are *modes* or *accidents*, ſince they cannot be conceiv'd without ſomething that is *coloured*, *figur'd*, *ſoft*, or *hard*; but they enter not into the *Subſtance* or *nature* of Wax, for *that* remains, whatever may become of *theſe*.

How we know that there is any ſuch thing as *matter*.

IV. But when this is reſolv'd into *ſmoke*, or *flame* it has no longer the name of Wax given to it; we call the thing *Wax*, which is applicable to a certain peculiar uſe; but when it is once reſolved into ſmoke or flame, it becomes unfit for that uſe to which Wax is ſubſervient; and therefore changes its *Eſſence*, and *appellation*, and is no longer to be called Wax. What therefore does it carry along with it under all mutations? 'Tis always *extended*, and capable of *motion* or *reſt*; and has always parts which are *ſeparable*, and *exclude* one another out of the ſame place; the Subſtance therefore which carries along with it thoſe *Qualities* and *Properties* is called Matter. (2).

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that theſe and the like terms, eſpecially *Subſtratum*, are very apt to miſlead us in theſe inquiries and confine our Imagination to ſome groſs Properties which belong to Matter only. See alſo *Watts*'s Logic, Pt. 1. C. 2. §. 2 and 3, and N. 13.

(2) This comes nearer to the Idea of Body, according to Mr. *Locke*, than that of Matter. "Body, ſays he * ſtands for a ſolid, extended, "figured Subſtance, whereof Matter is but a "partial, and more confuſed conception; it "ſeeming to me to be uſed for the Subſtance "and ſolidity of Body, without taking in its "Extenſion and Figure." Tho' it muſt be conſeſs'd that theſe two words are often uſed promiſcuouſly. It may not be improper to obſerve here that the various ſignifications of theſe general Terms *Body*, *Matter*, *Eſſence*, &c. in different Authors, as well as the uncertainty of what theſe Authors intend to ſignify by them, will ſerve to convince us, in the firſt place, that theſe words don't denote the manner how things really exiſt, but only our manner of conceiving them; and Secondly, that there are no real Exiſtences ſtrictly conformable to this our way of conceiving them, *i. e.* in *generals*. For if either theſe general terms ſtood for real things, or this our way of conceiving things

* B. 3. C. 10. §. 15.

in)

What it is.

V. What is obſervable in Wax, may alſo be obſerv'd in every other Subſtance, which we know by the *Senſes*. For all things that are perceiv'd by the Senſes admit of the like changes, and the above mention'd properties continue both *under*, and *after* all theſe motions and mutations. Any ſenſible Object, howſoever chang'd, is always *extended*, *moveable*, *conſiſting* of *ſolid*, *diſtinct* and *diviſible parts*.

That this Definition does not reach the *Idea* of Matter, but only ſhews us the *Mark* to diſtinguiſh it by.

VI. Not that this is a Definition, *A.* or *Idea* (4) of *Matter*, any more

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(in Generals) was fix'd by nature, neither of them would be ſo various and uncertain as we find they are. But as theſe terms ſtand only for our conceptions, and our fixing them to this or that conception, is merely arbitrary; the ſame term may often be apply'd to different conceptions, or ſeveral terms to the ſame conception. Theſe Conceptions alſo, as they are not of nature's forming, muſt be form'd by the Mind itſelf, and of conſequence are arbitrary too, and ſo may eaſily be different from each other, in different Men, and perhaps different from the real nature of things in all Men. The end of making theſe general conceptions is to range things into *ſorts*, for the convenience of Language. The manner of acquiring them is as follows.

We are at firſt acquainted only with particular ſubſtances, but obſerving, that as theſe particular ſubſtances differ in ſome Ideas, ſo they agree in others (*i. e.* tho' this particular excites in the Mind ſome Idea or Ideas, which another does not, yet there are ſome Ideas excited equally from both of them) we take no notice of thoſe Ideas in which two or more particular Subſtances differ, but ſelect thoſe only in which they agree, and connect them into one complex Idea, by giving them one name. Which complex Idea becomes general, *i. e.* it may be affirm'd of, or belongs to, or is found in, more than one particular ſubſtance. And the Subſtances of which it is affirmed, *&c.* are ſaid to be contain'd under that general Idea. General Ideas of Subſtances are made therefore by leaving out thoſe Ideas in which two or more particular Subſtances differ, and retaining thoſe in which they agree. And from General Ideas thus made we may proceed to more general ones, in the ſame way, *viz.* by always leaving out the particulars wherein they differ. Thus by obſerving a certain agreement among Individuals, and leaving out the reſt, we form an Idea of the ſeveral Species. In like manner, by leaving out the diſtinguiſhing marks of each ſpecies we get the Idea of Animal in general: And again, by dropping that by which Animals are diſtinguiſh'd from all other things which are the objects of our Senſes, we acquire the Idea of Matter or Body: and ſo on.---- When any of theſe General Ideas are found in a particular thing, 'tis call'd the *Eſſence* of that thing; *Eſſence* therefore is only that general abſtract Idea in the Mind by which we determine any thing to be of this or that *ſort*; and which we ſignify by ſuch a general Name as *Animal* or *Matter*. So that the ſame Quality may be Eſſential or not Eſſential to any thing, according as that thing is rank'd under a different *Sort*. This ſhews us both the abſurdity of taking theſe general terms for ſigns of real Exiſtences, which, we ſee, are ſigns of our Ideas only; and alſo the neceſſity for diſtinguiſhing between a Collection or Combination of our own Ideas, and real Qualities, as they are found in Nature; between *Thoughts* and *Things*. If this laſt Diſtinction were ſufficiently attended to, I believe we ſhould not be ſo ready to conclude from any Ideas which we may have of *infinite ſpace*, *Infinite Duration*, &c. that theſe muſt needs be real *Properties*, or *Attributes* of ſome Being.---- Of which hereafter: See N. 5.

A. God ſeems to have endowed us with ſenſes and underſtanding in order to diſtinguiſh things from one another, and to perceive the preſence and uſes of them. It is not therefore neceſſary

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neceſſary that they ſhould be made known to us as they are in themſelves, but only ſo far as they regard and can affect us: For it ſignifies nothing to us what they are in *themſelves*, but only what effects they may have upon us: And the report of the ſenſes muſt be looked upon as true, when they repreſent theſe effects to us uniformly, *i. e.* when the *Object*, *Medium* and *Organ* continuing in the ſame ſtate, they produce the ſame ſenſation in us: For by this means we may perceive the preſence of ſenſible things, and the diſtinction of them from each other, which ſeems to be the end for which we had ſenſes given by nature.*

We come then to the Knowledge of things two ways, by Senſation and Reflection. We are conſcious to ourſelves that we exiſt, from thence we have the notion of *Exiſtence*.† Nor do we ſeem to mean any thing elſe when we call a thing a *Being* or *Thing*, than that it is like us in that whereof we are ſelf-conſcious, viz. *Exiſtence*. For Univerſals are, I think, neither to be interpreted by words alone, nor by conceptions, nor by the particular things themſelves, but *by Analogy*. For Example, when one affirms that *Peter* is a *Man*, he obſerves the Idea of ſome particular Man, perhaps of himſelf, or the Neighbour he ſaw laſt; and when he affirms *Peter* to be a *Man*, he means nothing elſe but that *Peter* is like himſelf or his Neighbour, (and he calls thoſe things alike which have the ſame effects as to him) After the ſame manner he that ſays *Man* is an *Animal*, muſt be ſuppoſed to have the Idea of ſome particular Man and Brute in his Mind, and to mean nothing more when he ſays, Man is an Animal, than that this particular Man and thoſe that are like him, are in ſome reſpects alſo like the particular Brute, the Idea of which he had in his Mind. Thus we learn the Analogy of things by Reflection, but are acquainted with all external things by the ſenſations or Conceptions which they produce in us; and according to theſe various Conceptions we diſtinguiſh them from each other, and divide and define them into various Species. Now we come to the Knowledge of ſome things by immediate Senſation, Proportion, or Connection with what we perceive by the Senſes: ‖ When we perceive any thing in the former way, we are ſaid to know it by *Idea*; when in the latter, not by Idea, but *Reaſon*. The Caſe will be clearer perhaps by an Inſtance: I know a certain King, becauſe I have ſeen and heard him, and his Countenance and Voice are fixed in my Mind; by theſe therefore I can diſtinguiſh him from others, and know him again when I ſee him; for he is known to me by *immediate ſenſation*, that is, by *Idea*. But I know *Cæſar* only by his actions, *i. e.* by Similitude and Connection with the things of which I have a Senſation; nor ſhould I know him again if I met him; for immediate ſenſation has not impreſs'd thoſe marks upon me whereby I might diſtinguiſh him from other Men. I affirm therefore that I have no Idea of him. I know him (as far as is neceſſary) by reaſon alone, *i. e.* from *Similitude* and *Connection* with thoſe things which I perceive by my Senſes.

Thus the Vulgar ſhew us ſufficiently, that they diſtinguiſh between *Idea* and *Reaſon*, when they deny that they have any Ideas of God, Infinite, Spirit, and Subſtance. And yet they don't diſown all manner of knowledge of thoſe things; for they can't deny but that they have certain *Marks* from the Similitude or Relation to, or connection with, ſenſible things whereby they may diſtinguiſh Finite from Infinite, Subſtance from Accident, and Soul from Body. When therefore they deny that they have any Ideas of them, they ſhew that they mean no more than that theſe are not yet made known to them by immediate ſenſation. For they look upon ſuch a perception of a thing as this only, to be the Idea of it; but reckon what they acquire by ſimilitude, proportion or connection, no more an Idea, than *Algebraic ſpecies* are *Ideas* of *Quantity*, for which they are uſed, and by the aſſiſtance of which we know ſeveral things of infinite quantities whereof we can have no

* Concerning the *reality* of our ſenſitive Knowledge in general, and how far it reaches, ſee *Locke*, B. 4. ch. 2. §. 14. and C. 11. For inſtances wherein the Senſes are not to be depended on, ſee N. 6. † See *Locke*'s Eſſay, B. 2. C. 7. §. 7. ‖ See Mr. *Hutcheſon*'s Eſſay on the nature and conduct of the Paſſions, *&c.* p. 3. N. †.

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Ideas; except we will abuſe the word *Idea* contrary to the common Senſe of Mankind.

Neither are thoſe Men excuſeable who ſpeak otherwiſe. They pretend indeed that they may uſe words in their own Senſe; but they have no right to do it; for we are oblig'd to ſpeak with the Vulgar, ſince they are to preſcribe the Rules of Speech; nor muſt we expect that Readers ſhould change the Notions which have been joined to Words from their Childhood, and approved by common uſe, at the pleaſure of every Writer. 'Tis to be obſerv'd farther, that theſe Men generally put a trick upon us, for they define Words in their own Senſe, but in diſcourſing uſe them in the common one; hence proceed quarrels among the learned, and among the half-learned, moſt pernicious Errors: For hearing from celebrated Writers, that all *Knowledge* is by *Ideas*, and taking an *Idea* with the Vulgar, for a *Mark* imprinted on the Mind by immediate Senſation, when they find no ſuch *Mark* impreſſed on their Minds by *God*, by *Subſtance*, by *Infinite*, by the *Myſteries* of Religion, they deny that we have any knowledge at all of theſe things.

But we are to obſerve, that things are as properly known by *Reaſon* as by *Ideas*; for the *Marks* which things imprint on the Mind by immediate ſenſation are not the things themſelves, but the effects of them upon the Mind and Senſes; by theſe then we only know what Effects a thing has upon us, not what it is in itſelf. Now the things which are known by reaſon are alſo diſcovered by their Effects, not produced in us by immediate ſenſation, but in other things that are *connected* with what we perceive by the Senſes. For inſtance; that is *Lucid* which produces the ſenſation of *Light* in me; *Sweet*, which produces that of *Sweetneſs*; But it is the *Sun* which emits the *Light*, and *God* that made the *Sun*, i. e. I know Light by its effect upon me; the Sun by its effect upon the *lucid* Body; *God* by his effect upon the *Sun*. Thus a Man knows his Father by immediate *ſenſation*, or by *Idea*; the Man that begot his Father, is his *Grand father*; and the Perſon that begot his Grand-Father is his *Great-Grand Father*: Theſe then are known by *reaſon*, and as properly as the Father is, tho' never ſeen by him.

When therefore one asks the *Genus* of any thing, he deſires the Perſon ask'd to ſhew ſome thing or things which the Matter enquired after reſembles: When he enquires into the *Difference*, he deſires to have that ſenſation ſhewn him, which the thing ſought, if preſent, would produce in him, and which would diſtinguiſh it from any thing elſe: And if this cannot be done, that at leaſt a *Mark* may be produced which is in ſome manner connected with the ſenſation. Definitions therefore regard ourſelves, and the effect which things have upon our Senſes and Minds. When we have the *Character* or *Mark* of any thing whereby the ſenſation or conception produced in us by it, may be diſtinguiſhed from the ſenſition or conception of other things, and by which we certainly know for the preſent that it is here, and are informed what to do or expect upon the preſence of it, we know as much of it, as our imperfect State requires. Nay, ſuch Knowledge is of much more uſe than the Philoſophical diſcovery of *Genus* and *Difference*. He has a far more uſeful Knowledge of a Man that knows his Countenance, Name, Temper and Condition, than he that is acquainted with the *Principle* of *Individuation* *. Tho' therefore I have no Idea of Subſtance, nor can aſſign a definition which will explain the Eſſence of it; yet if I can produce a *Mark*, whereby I may diſtinguiſh it for the preſent from every other thing that I meet, I muſt be judged to know it ſufficiently. Now ſuch a *Mark* I think I have already given. (3)

(3.) I omit the reſt of our Author's long Note, ſince it contains only ſome Arguments for *innate Ideas*; which Hypotheſis is now almoſt univerſally exploded. We may obſerve, that moſt of his Reaſoning is built on a different Signification of the Word *Idea*. He will uſe it in the *old Platonic* meaning for a *Species*, *Phantaſm*, or *Corporeal Image*, as it were painted on the Brain: The Application of the Mind to which is properly call'd *Imagination*, and comes

* See *Locke*'s Eſſay, B. 2. C. 27. §. 3.

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comes far ſhort of *Knowledge*. Whereas, if we take the Word *Idea* in the more enlarged modern Senſe, as it commonly ſtands for *a Repreſentation of any Thing in the Mind*, or whatſoever is the immediate Object of the *Underſtanding* when a Man *perceives* or *thinks*; we can have no manner of *Knowledge* without both the actual Perception of *Ideas*, and alſo of their *connection* with, or *repugnancy* to, each other.

According to Mr. *Locke*, our Apprehenſion of the Exiſtence of any Being (beſide ourſelves) which we have *ſeen*, *felt*, or *heard*, may very properly be call'd *ſenſitive Knowledge*. But our Aſſurance of the Exiſtence of any other (except God) which we do not ſo perceive by the Senſes, is no *Knowledge* at all, but only *Faith*, *Preſumption*, or *Probability*, *&c.*

Our Author's Method of forming *Univerſals*, or (as we commonly term them) *abſtract Ideas*, by making the Idea of one particular Thing ſtand for all of the ſame Kind, will appear to be wrong, I think, from this ſingle Argument, *viz.* that according to the forementioned Scheme *Univerſals*, ſuch as *Animal*, *Genus*, *&c.* would have a real Exiſtence in Nature, whereas they are evidently the Creatures of our own Minds, and can exiſt no where elſe. We have therefore nothing at all to do with Analogy in forming general Ideas, we can never come at them by ſubſtituting one Particular for another, but muſt rather conceive them to be made by removing all Particularities of Exiſtence, and leaving only what remains in common; according to *Locke*'s Account of *Abſtraction*, B. 2. C. 11. §. 9. See alſo *Watts*'s Logic, Pt. 1. C. 3. §. 3. or N. 2.

By a due Attention to the Nature of theſe abſtract Ideas, and our Way of acquiring them, we ſhall find that they are all mere *entia Rationis*, or form'd by the Mind alone, and of courſe will perceive that Duration, Space, Number, *&c.* which evidently are ſuch, can have no real Exiſtence in Nature, no proper *Ideatum* or *Objective Reality*, nor conſequently be a Proof of any Thing beſide that Power which the Mind has to form them, as will be ſhewn below.

To return: Our Author, in the ſame Place alſo doubly miſapplies the Word *Reflection*, firſt, by making it ſtand for that *particular* Operation of the Mind call'd *Reaſoning*, whereas we now commonly uſe it for the *internal Senſe* or *Conſciouſneſs* both of the Exiſtence of the Mind, and of all its Operations†: And, ſecondly, by making this Reflection or *Reaſoning* to be without *Ideas*; Whereas, according to the preſent Senſe of the Word Idea, 'tis abſurd to ſuppoſe the Mind to reaſon, imagine, apprehend, or think at all, without them.

Tho' the Novel uſe of theſe terms might (as he here complains) occaſion ſome diſorder and confuſion at their firſt introduction, yet ſince the Authority of Mr. *Locke* has chang'd the cuſtom, and happily determin'd their ſignification, we have nothing to do now with the *old* one; but muſt take them in his ſenſe if we would be underſtood. And ſince it is often impoſſible for an Author to find *old* words exactly correſpondent to the Ideas which he wants to expreſs; and very difficult to invent *new ones*: Every Man is certainly at liberty to fix what Senſe to his words he pleaſes and finds moſt convenient for his purpoſe, tho' never ſo different from the derivation and original Senſe of them, provided he at firſt ſufficiently explains them, and ſticks to that Explanation: Which I think Mr. *Locke* has generally done.

He has alſo put it paſt diſpute, in oppoſition to *Des-Cartes* and others, that theſe Ideas are not *innate* and pre-exiſtent in the Mind, and ſo only raiſed and refreſh'd by the preſence of external Objects; but that they are entirely form'd and produced *de novo* by them; or at leaſt, that theſe Objects give occaſion to the forming of them; that there is no manner of innate, (or as ſome will have it) *connate* Idea, no general Truth, or firſt Principle inherent in the Soul and created with it (and the ſame I think may be affirm'd of Paſſion, Appetite, Affection, *&c.*) at leaſt none that ever appears in our preſent State; no immediate Object of the Mind before external things offer themſelves to it, and it perceives, or becomes conſcious of them. *

Our

† See *Locke*, B. 2. C. 1. §. 4.

* See *Locke*, B. 2. C. 9. §. 4.

more than the former was of *Subſtance*, but that hereby we are acquainted with its preſence, and diſtinguiſh it from every other thing; as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other Circumſtances: Nor is it neceſſary that theſe ſhould be applicable to all *Subſtance*, at all times, and to that alone: For it is enough if for this particular Time and Occaſion we know the peculiar *Subſtance* we are talking of by them; and ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it from other things.

How we come to the knowledge of Space.

VII. It is to be obſerved farther, that when a part of this matter is removed another ſucceeds into its Place, but is not in the ſame Place conſiſtent with it. *Place* therefore ſeems to be ſomething beyond, beſide and diſtinct from, the *Matter* which it receives. For as from hence that Wax was ſucceſſively capable of different forms, figures, colours and changes, it appears that ſomething is in it beſide, and different from all theſe, which we call the *Matter* of the Wax: So in like manner from hence that the ſame *Place* or *Space* receives more and different Bodies and Particles of matter ſucceſſively, but cannot admit more than one at the ſame time, it will appear that *Place* or *Space*, is as diſtinct from *Matter* or Body, as Wax is from the Colours ſucceſſively receiv'd; nor is dependent on them any more than Wax is on any particular Form.

VIII.

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Our Author's chief Objection againſt this is, that there ſeems to be no manner of *relation*, *reſemblance* or *connection*, between the parts and motions of external Objects; and thoſe Ideas, which they are ſaid to produce in the Mind. But is there any more connection between the *raiſing* and *recalling* an *old Idea* by theſe motions, than producing a *new one?* Is it harder to conceive how they may *generate freſh Ideas*, than how they can *excite* the *latent ones*. [See N. 7.]

(4) By the word *Idea* the Author ſeems here to mean immediate, intimate, perception, or the ſame with *intuition*, as he explains himſelf in his Note, *B*; but this, as we have obſerv'd, is much better explain'd by *Locke*, who comprehends all our Author's *Notes*, *Marks*, *Characters*, and *Conceptions*, as well as his *Images* and *Ideas*, under that general word *Idea*. This was much more convenient for Mr. *Locke*'s Syſtem, and the liberty, I apprehend, ought to be allow'd him till a better Syſtem be produced on ſome other Principles. But his, I fancy, will yet be generally embraced, notwithſtanding what the ingenious Author of the *Eſſay on the Imagination*, and ſome others, have of late advanc'd to the contrary. As for my part, I cannot conceive what occaſion we have to quarrel, as ſome do, with the great Author abovemention'd for not diſtinguiſhing between an *Idea* and a *Notion*, &c. when one and the ſame word if we pleaſe may eaſily ſerve for all. For an account of the different Opinions of Philoſophers about Ideas and their Origin, ſee the word Idea in *Chambers*'s *Cyclopædia*.

(5.) Tho'

VIII. If therefore we ſet aſide, or annihilate *Matter*, whatſoever ſtill remains will all belong to the nature of *Space*; as in the former caſe when we had ſet aſide the Properties of *Wax*, that which belong'd to the *Matter* or ſubſtance of it remain'd. If you ask what that is? I anſwer, firſt *Local* Mobility is to be ſet aſide, for that ſeems peculiar to Matter. Secondly, an actual *ſeparation* of Parts, for what is immoveable cannot be divided. Thirdly, *Impenetrability*, or Solidity, for that ſuppoſes Motion, and is neceſſary to the Production of it. It remains therefore that *Space* (as we conceive it) be ſomething extended, immoveable, capable of *receiving* or *containing* Matter, and penetrable by it. Tho' therefore we have not a *Definition* or *Idea* * of *Space*, properly ſo call'd; yet we can hereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it from every other thing, and may reaſon about it as much as we have occaſion. (5) What it is.

* *i. e.* in his own Senſe of the word Idea, See *N. A.* or *N.* 4.

IX. Theſe

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(5) Tho' ſo much noiſe has been made about *Space*, which *Leibnitz* juſtly calls an Idol of ſome modern *Engliſh* Men; and ſo great uſe has been made of it in demonſtrating the divine Attributes, in a way which ſome ſtile *a Priori*; yet, I'm forc'd to confeſs that I cannot poſſibly frame any other Notion of it, than either, firſt, as the mere *negation* or *abſence* of *Matter*, or ſecondly, as the extenſion of *Body*, conſider'd *abſtractly*, or ſeparate from any particular Body: As *whiteneſs* without a *white Body*, &c. or thirdly, as a *Subject* or *Subſtratum* of that ſame *extenſion in abſtracto*, for which laſt Notion, See N. 16.

Now according to the firſt Suppoſition we may indeed have a *poſitive Idea* of it, as well as of *Silence*, *Darkneſs*, and many other Privations; as Mr. *Locke* has fully proved that we have, and ſhewn the Reaſon of it. B. 2. C. 8. §. 4. But to argue from ſuch an Idea of Space, that Space itſelf is ſomething external, and has a real exiſtence, ſeems altogether as good Senſe as to ſay, that becauſe we have a different Idea of *Darkneſs* from that of *Light*; of *ſilence* from that of *ſound*; of the *abſence* of any thing, from that of its *preſence*; therefore Darkneſs, *&c.* muſt be ſomething poſitive and different from Light, *&c.* and have as real an Exiſtence as Light has. And to deny that we have any poſitive Idea, or, which is the very ſame, any Idea at all, of the Privations above-mention'd (For every Idea, as it is a perception of the Mind, muſt neceſſarily be poſitive, tho' it ariſe from what *Locke* calls a privative Cauſe) To deny, I ſay, that we have theſe Ideas, will be to deny Experience and contradict common Senſe. There are therefore Ideas and *ſimple* ones too, which have nothing *ad extra* correſpondent to them, no proper Ideatum, Archetype, or objective reality, and I don't ſee why that of ſpace may not be reckon'd one of them. To ſay that *Space* muſt have exiſtence, becauſe it has ſome *properties*, for inſtance, *Penetrability*, or a *capacity* of receiving Body, ſeems to me the ſame as to urge that *darkneſs* muſt be *ſomething* becauſe it has the power or property of *receiving Light*; *Silence* the property of *admitting Sound*; and *Abſence* the property of being ſupply'd by *Preſence*, i. e. to aſſign abſolute Negations, and ſuch as by the ſame way of reaſoning, may be apply'd to *nothing*, and then call them poſitive properties; and ſo infer, that the *Chimera* thus cloathed with them, muſt needs be *ſomething*. Setting aſide the names of its other pretended properties (which names alſo are as merely negative as the ſuppoſed properties to which they belong) thoſe that attribute *extenſion* to ſpace ſeem not to attend to the true notion of that

These three Conceptions, *viz.* of ſenſible Qualities (v. g. Motion, &c.) of *Matter* and *Space*, ſeem to be the chief of thoſe that are external.

IX. Theſe three conceptions, namely, of ſenſible Qualities (*viz. Motion*, &c.) of *Matter* and *Space*, ſeem to be the chief of thoſe which

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Property, which, as the School-men define it (and let them who like not this definition try to give us a better) is to have *partes extra partes*, and as ſuch, *i. e.* as including *parts* (which parts, as they differ in ſituation from each other, may have things predicated of ſome of them different from thoſe which can be predicated of others) it appears plainly inconſiſtent with their own Idea of ſimple, uniform, indiviſible ſpace, and applicable to *Matter* only: And to attribute Extenſion, or parts, to ſpace, according to the firſt notion of it laid down by us, will be the ſame as to talk of the extenſion or parts of *Abſence*; of *Privation*, or of *mere Nothing*. Laſtly, to ask if Space under the ſecond Notion of that word, *i. e.* as Extenſion in the Abſtract, be extended, or have parts, is apparently abſurd; 'tis the ſame with that noted Queſtion of the Man, who being told that to have Riches was to be rich, ask'd if Riches then themſelves were Rich? Well, but tho' we can't aſſign any poſitive or conſiſtent properties to ſpace, yet, ſay they, we have a Clear Idea of *Diſtance* itſelf, and of *different* diſtances one greater than another, which proves that this is ſomething real. Let us examine our Idea of *Diſtance* a little farther, and I believe, we ſhall find it to be only the Conception of a mere *poſſibility* for a line of ſuch a certain *length*, or a Body of ſuch *dimenſions*, to be contain'd between two other Bodies, by mentally applying a *material meaſure* of ſo many inches, feet, *&c.* to the ſuppoſed *diſtance* between theſe two bodies; of which *material meaſure*, and of its *increaſableneſs*, we have, indeed, a clear Idea, as alſo of the poſſibility of its being placed between theſe two bodies, tho' at preſent it be not ſo placed: And this ſeems to me to be all the conception or Idea, that we can poſſibly frame about it. Well, then, according to the firſt Suppoſition, Space will be mere *non entity*, or nothing, *i. e.* nothing can be affirm'd, but every thing deny'd of it: According to the ſecond, it will be only an *abſtract Idea* form'd in the mind from a property peculiar to matter, which property abſtracted in Idea cannot itſelf admit of any other properties, nor be applicable to the *Divine Nature*, nor capable of poſitive Infinity in any reſpect.

" If *Space*, ſays Dr. *Cudworth*, be concluded " to be nothing elſe but the *Extenſion* and *Di-* " *ſtance* of *body*, or *matter* conſidered in *general* " (without reſpect to this or that particular " body) and *abſtractly* in order to the Con- " ception of *Motion*, and the menſuration of " things, then do we ſay that there appeareth " no ſufficient grounds for this *poſitive Infinity* " of Space, we being certain of no more than " this, that be the World, or any figurate bo- " dy, never ſo great, it is not impoſſible but " that it might ſtill be greater and greater " without end. Which *Indefinite increaſable-* " *neſs* of body and ſpace ſeems to be miſtaken " for a *poſitive infinity* thereof. Whereas for " this very Reaſon, becauſe it can never be ſo " *great*, but that *more* magnitude may ſtill be " added to it, therefore it can never be poſi- " tively Infinite.

" To conclude therefore, by Space without " the finite World, is to be underſtood nothing " but the poſſibility of body farther and far- " ther, without end, yet ſo as never to reach " to Infinity. "

Hence appears the Weakneſs of that common Argument urg'd by *Gaſſendus*, Dr. *Clarke*, and *Raphſon*, for the *abſolute infinity of Space*, viz. From the impoſſibility of ſetting *bounds* or *limits* to it; ſince that, ſay they, would be to ſuppoſe *Space* bounded by *ſomething* which *itſelf* occupies Space, or elſe by *nothing*, both which are contradictions.

Which Argument, either firſt of all ſuppoſes that Space is really ſome *thing*, or ſome poſitive Quality; which wants to be proved: Or elſe improperly applies bounds and bounders to mere non-entity, or bare poſſibility; which has nothing to do with the Idea of Bounds.

If

* *True Intell. Syſtem*, p. 644 & 766.

which we have from without, and ſo natural to us that there is no reaſonable Man but perceives them in himſelf. There are ſome who deny

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If therefore we take Space in the firſt Notion laid down, then its unboundedneſs, will (as Dr. *Cudworth* ſays) ſignify nothing but the poſſibility of Body farther and farther without end; according to which Senſe, Let us ſtate their uſual Queſtion in other Words, and the great fallacy and impropriety of it will appear. What is there, ſay they, *beyond* this Space? You muſt either imagine more ſuch Space or *nothing*. What is there, ſay we, *beyond* this *poſſibility* of *Exiſtence?* You muſt either imagine *more* ſuch *poſſibility* of *Exiſtence* or mere *nothing*, i. e. *non Exiſtence*. What Conſequence can poſſibly be drawn from ſuch an odd kind of Argumentation?

But if Space be taken in the ſecond Senſe, *i. e.* as Extenſion in *abſtracto*, then the meaning of our *not being able to ſet bounds to it* will only be, that we have a power of enlarging our abſtract Idea *in Infinitum*, or that we always find in our ſelves the ſame ability to add to, or repeat it, and if we always find that we can add, we ſhall never find that we cannot add, which (as a very eminent Writer on the Subject obſerves) is all the Myſtery of the Matter, and all that can be underſtood by infinite Space. But it is farther urg'd that there muſt be ſomething more in the preſent Caſe; for *we find not only a Power of enlarging the Idea, but find it impoſſible to ſet bounds to the thing; whereas, we can enlarge the Idea of Matter to infinity, but can alſo ſet bounds to the thing it ſelf.* In anſwer to the firſt part of this Objection 'tis ask'd, What thing, I pray you, but the thing in your own mind, that is, the Idea? Prove it to be thing; and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds or not; but to ſay the thing is infinite or boundleſs, before you have prov'd it to exiſt, or to be a thing, is too large a ſtep to take. The above-mention'd excellent Writer ſolves the Difficulty ariſing from the ſecond part of the Objection by another parallel Caſe. "When "I conſider the number of the Stars, I can go "numbering on in my thoughts ſtill more and "more Stars *in Infinitum*, But I can alſo ſet "bounds to them, can ſuppoſe their numbers "finite, but to number itſelf I can ſet no "bounds. Yet what is Number? Nothing "but an Abſtract Idea, nothing *ad extra*, and "to ſay to that number is infinite, comes only "to this, that we can ſet no bounds to our "Faculty of Numbering, it being always as "eaſy to add to a thouſand, or a Million, one "more, *&c.* as to One. Well then, to ſet "bounds to number in the abſtract, is to ſet "bounds to the Faculty itſelf, and to deny that "it is in my Power to add, when I plainly "perceive that I can; and ſo is a direct Contradiction. But as to the Number of Stars, "or Hairs, or Men, or any thing, I can ſet "bounds to that, without any contradiction, "becauſe it ſtill leaves me in poſſeſſion of the "power of numbering, which I find I have; "and which does not require any ſubject *ad* "*extra*, but may go on independent of any, "and indifferent to all. Now to apply this to "other caſes: the Mind finds in itſelf the faculty of enlarging and extending its Idea of "extenſion. It can apply it to Matter, or can "let it alone; can ſuppoſe Matter infinitely expanded, or can ſet bounds to it: But to ſet "bounds to all Extenſion, as well imaginary "as real, is cramping the Faculty, is denying "it the power of enlarging, which is always "preſent to the mind, and which ſhe can never loſe; and, in a word, is a contradiction. "Any, either imaginary, or real, Subject is "ſufficient for the mind to exerciſe its Faculties upon; and ſo if you either ſuppoſe God "or Matter, or Space to be infinitely extended, it is equally ſatisfied with any. All "that ſhe requires is that ſhe may be able to "enlarge the Idea of Extenſion. But, if you "take from her Extenſion itſelf, that is the "Idea of it, and the Power of adding to it, "you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny "her a power which ſhe finds ſhe has. In a "word, we can ſet bounds to any thing that "ſtill leaves the power of enlarging or extending infinitely, as we find, we always "can: and if we would ſpeak ſtrictly, it is "not *number* that is *infinite* nor *extenſion* infi-

"nite,

that Space is any thing diſtinct from *Matter*, nor is it much to our purpoſe

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" nite, which are nothing but *notions* abſtracted " from things: But the mind of Man is able " to proceed numbering or extending infi- " nitely, that is, without ever coming to any " Stop or Bounds. For to ſet bounds is to " deny and deſtroy the Faculty itſelf: if it " could not always do it, it could not do it at " all. He that can add one to one, as often " as he will, can never find an end of num- " bering, nor he that can double an Inch as " often as he will, find an end of enlarging; " it is all nothing more than repeating one of " the eaſieſt operations or exerciſes of the " mind, and it will always be a contradiction " for any rational Mind to want it. ------ The " Caſe being plainly thus, I think it ſhould " not be ask'd, why a Man cannot ſet bounds " to Number or Extenſion, but how he comes " to have the Faculty of Counting and Re " peating, which is really tantamount to the " other, and what it ultimately reſolves into. " And then, I ſuppoſe, the Anſwer is very " eaſy, and we need not go to the utmoſt " Limits of the World to enable us to reſolve " the Riddle. - - -

" I cannot but ſmile to obſerve how groſly " we are impoſed upon by Words ſtanding for " abſtract Ideas, for want of conſidering how, " and upon what Occaſions, theſe abſtract " Ideas were invented for the Help of weak " and narrow Conceptions, and have been uſed " ſo long till they are thought to ſtand for real " Things. ------ I forgot to add, that we find " much the ſame Caſe with reſpect to the *Di-* " *viſibility* of Extenſion, as in regard to the " other. For when we have mentally divided " our imaginary Space into 10, 20, or 30 " parts, we are not in the leaſt hinder'd from " dividing and ſubdividing every part, as " often and as long as we pleaſe. For by this " Artifice of the Mind, Diviſibility is brought " under *Addition*, and there is no End of that. " We can always be adding to the number of " diviſible parts one way, as well as to en- " larged parts the other. They are both but " the ſame work of the Mind. And hence " come many notable demonſtrations of the " *Diviſibility* of *Extenſion* (and ſometimes, " *Matter*) in infinitum: the Engliſh of all " which is no more than this, that whenever " we begin to add, we know not when to " have done, becauſe its nothing elſe but do- " ing the ſame over and over again, and we " do not loſe, but rather improve, our Facul- " ties by the Exerciſe of them

" To conclude this Point: I hope it ſuffi- " ciently appears that the Power the Mind has " of *adding* and *repeating* does abundantly " account for our not being able to ſet bounds " to *Ideal Extenſion*, any more than to *Number*, " in the abſtract, or to *Diviſibility*, all ariſing " from one and the ſame Principle, and owing " to the ſame Cauſe."

This, I think, is a ſolid and ample confuta- tion of the Argument drawn from the Idea of *Space* and its imaginary *infinity*. We ſhall only add a Word or two to ſhew that *Duration*, as well as *Space*, *Number*, and all *Quantity*; any thing which can be conſidered only by way of parts, or in ſucceſſion; is abſolutely repugnant to, or incapable of, true poſitive infinity in any reſpect. Now by a poſitive, or *Metaphyſical*, *Infinite* we always mean that which is ab- ſolutely *Perfect* in its kind, which cannot ad- mit of *Addition*, or *Increaſe*. 'Tis an Idea of a certain Quality in the *Abſtract*, which has no *mixture* of the contrary Quality in it, no *fai- lure* or *defect*: and which therefore is our *Stan- dard* to which we always refer, and by which we try, all imperfections, all mix'd or finite Qualities, which are for this reaſon called im- perfect, becauſe they fall ſhort of our original Standard, and are properly *negations* of it: Conſequently our Idea of *Perfection* muſt be a poſitive one, and prior to that of *Imperfection*; as will appear from *Cudworth* cited in *Xe*, where the Reader may find a full account of this poſitive Infinity, and how we get the Idea of it, and are able to diſtinguiſh it from that negative one explain'd by Mr. *Locke*, which is frequently confounded with it.

To return. If then a Metaphyſical Infinite means *perfect*, or *that to which nothing can be added*, 'tis plain that Duration, Number, and all

purpoſe whether it be or no: yet we cannot without offering Vio-

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all Quantity, the very Nature and Idea of which includes perpetual *Increaſeableneſs* or *Addibility*, muſt be eſſentially incapable of this abſolute or poſitive Infinity, in like manner as *Cudworth* has ſhewn of Space and Body in the Paſſage referr'd to above. Farther, if we attend to the Notion of an *Infinite Series*, and take a view of the manifold Abſurdities which accompany it, in any manner of conception (from which abſurdities we draw our only Proof of a *firſt Cauſe*, or *God*) we ſhall be neceſſarily led to exclude from Infinity all ſuch things as exiſt *Seriatim*, or muſt be conceiv'd as conſiſting in, and compoſed of, *ſucceſſive parts*, *i. e.* ſuch as *Duration*, *Number*, *Space*, *Motion*, *Magnitude*, *&c.* all which, when ſaid to be infinite, are nothing but ſo many *infinite Series*, and therefore liable to the ſame abſurdities; as the abovemention'd Author has demonſtrated of them altogether. *Intell. Syſtem*, p. 643, *&c.* and of *Motion* in particular, p. 843. The ſame is ſhewn of Duration or Time, by Dr. *Bentley*, *Boyle's Lect. Serm.* 3. p. 104, 105, 5th Edit. Where ſpeaking of *Infinite Generations* of Men ſuppoſed to be *already paſt* (and the Argument is the very ſame in Years or Ages) "Whatſoever, ſays he, is now paſt, was once actually preſent; ſo that each of thoſe infinite Generations, was once in its turn actually preſent, therefore all except one Generation were once future; and not in being, which deſtroys the very Suppoſition: For either that one Generation muſt itſelf have been infinite, which is nonſenſe; or it was the finite beginning of infinite Generations, between itſelf and us, that is, infinity terminated at both ends, which is nonſenſe as before. Again, Infinite paſt Generations of Men have been once actually preſent, there may be ſome one man, ſuppoſe then, that was at infinite diſtance from us now, therefore that man's ſon likewiſe, 40 years younger, ſuppoſe, than his father, was either at infinite diſtance from us, or at finite: if that Son too was at infinite diſtance from us, then one infinite is longer by 40 years than another; which is abſurd: if at finite, then 40 years added to finite makes it infinite, which is as abſurd as the other."

Theſe and a great many more Arguments of the ſame kind occur in Sir *M. Hale*'s Primitive Origination of Mankind, § 1. c. 4. and *Stillingfleet*'s Origines Sacræ, B. 3. C. 1. prop. 7, 8. See alſo the Confutation of an Infinite Series of ſucceſſive Beings in the beginning of N. 18. and *Xb.* (How this Reaſoning is conſiſtent with the Eternity of God, and what the true meaning of that Attribute is, ſee N. 18. *X. c.* or Dr. *Bentley*'s 3d Sermon at *Boyle*'s Lecture, prop. 1. or A. Bp *King*'s Sermon on Predeſtination, *&c.*) The like is ſhewn of *Number* and all *Quantity*, by the ingenious Author of the *Impartial Enquiry into the exiſtence and nature of God*, p. 24, *&c.* "If any Number be abſolutely or infinitely great, it can be for no other reaſon than becauſe 'tis abſolutely or in its very nature incapable of increaſe without an abſolute contradiction. But the very nature of all Quantity infers on the contrary a neceſſity of the increaſe of its Greatneſs on the ſuppoſition of the leaſt addition: For ſince no Quantity is more or leſs ſuch, or poſſeſſes more or leſs of the nature of Quantity, than another, it follows, that all Quantities being of the ſame general Nature muſt ſeverally bear a proportion to each other. For example, that can be no Unit which by the addition of an Unit will not become two: and by parity of reaſon, that is no Million which by the addition of a ſingle Unit will not increaſe to the greatneſs of a Million and an Unit. For if it be but a Million after the Addition of an Unit, 'tis plain it muſt before that Addition have been leſs than a Million by an Unit. ------ The like may be ſaid of all other Quantities. p. 25."

The Learned Dr. *Clarke* endeavours to evade all theſe Arguments about *Parts*, *&c.* by denying that any Number of Years, Days, and Hours; or of Miles, Yards, or Feet, *&c.* "can be conſider'd as any *aliquot*, or *conſtituent* parts of infinite *Time* or *Space*, or be compared at all with it, or bear any kind

lence to our Underſtandings, deny but that the *conception* of *Space* is diſtinct from the conception of *Matter*.

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" of proportion to it; or be the foundation of " any Argument in any Queſtion concerning " it." *Demonſtr. of the Divine Attr.* p. 37, 38. 5th Edit. But does not this look ſomething like avoiding one great difficulty by admitting a greater? For how do we come at our confuſed Idea of infinite Quantity but by firſt having a clear Idea of ſome certain part of that Quantity, in *Space*, For inſtance, of ſuch a ſtated Length, as a *Foot*; in *Time*, of an *Hour*, *&c.* and then by doubling, trebling, or any way multiplying, that ſame Idea as long as we pleaſe, and ſtill findin as much room for, or poſſibility of, multiplying it as we did when we began: "After the utmoſt enlargement of " that Idea we can poſſibly make, we find " no more reaſon to ſtop, nor are one Jot " nearer the End of ſuch enlargement, than " we were when we firſt ſet out. *Locke* B. 2. c. 17. § 3. But does this Idea of Infinite (which ſeems to be the only one the Doctor ever thought of) when applied to *Time* or *Space*, alter the very *nature*, *eſſence*, and *idea* of that *Time* and *Space*? Don't we ſtill conſider it as an *infinity* of the *ſame* Time and Space; or as conſiſting in a continual *addibility* of *ſuch* portions of Time and Space; or as a *Whole* (if that word did not imply *limitation*) made up of numberleſs ſuch parts of time and ſpace as are of the ſame kind with theſe hours and feet? To ſay that infinite Space has no parts, is (as *Leibnitz* urges in his fourth Letter to Dr. *Clarke* N°. 11. p. 99.) " to ſay that it does not conſiſt " of finite Spaces; and that infinite Space " might ſubſiſt, tho' all finite ſpaces ſhould be " reduced to nothing. It is as if one ſhould " ſay, in the Carteſian ſuppoſition of a mate- " rial, extended, Unlimited World, that " ſuch a World might ſubſiſt, tho' all the Bo- " dies of which it conſiſts, ſhould be reduced " to nothing." 'Tis therefore impoſſible to conceive, that hours and feet, *&c.* ſhould not be *aliquot parts* of infinite Time and ſpace, and that theſe parts ſhould not bear ſome kind of Proportion to this Infinity. Theſe parts indeed will never reach our *poſitive abſolute Infinity* (i. e. that to which nothing can poſſibly be added) becauſe they include a perpetual addibility, as we obſerv'd, which is call'd their *Infinity*, and which is a direct contradiction to what we call a poſitive Infinite: And therefore poſitive Infinity apply'd to them is very wrong apply'd, and a poſitive infinity of Matter, number, time, ſpace, any quantity or quality that conſiſts of parts, or muſt be conſider'd in ſucceſſion, *i. e.* to which this negative infinite, and this only, is and muſt be apply'd, are all contradictions. Now inſtead of anſwering this Argument againſt the abſolute Infinity of Time and Space, Dr. *Clarke* firſt of all *ſuppoſes* that *time* and *ſpace* are abſolutely infinite, and then becauſe, according to this our way of conceiving infinity, (which yet is the only way we have of conceiving it in theſe things) they could not poſſibly be infinite: He argues that we muſt not conſider them in this way, namely as if their *parts* had any relation at all to their *Infinity*. But ſhould not the Argument rather be revers'd, and the conſequence of it ſtand thus? This is our only way of conceiving any infinite applicable to theſe Things, but this way we cannot conceive theſe to be poſitively infinite (or poſitive Infinity cannot be apply'd to theſe) without a contradiction; therefore we cannot at all conceive theſe to be poſitively Infinite without a contradiction, or therefore theſe are not poſitively infinite.

There is indeed a certain uſe of the term infinite among Mathematicians, where this reaſoning of Dr. *Clarke*'s might be admitted, but that is only where they conſider Quantities, relatively, and not abſolutely, and therefore that can have no place where we are conſidering real Exiſtences. Thus when Geometricians ſay that one Quantity is infinitely leſs than another, they mean that their infinitely ſmall Quantity is nó aliquot part of, bears no proportion to, or cannot be compared with the other; but proportion is (nothing real but) purely relative, and therefore the term infinite apply'd here muſt be ſo too. Thus for inſtance, the Angle of Contact made by a Curve and its Tangent

SECT. II.

Of the Enquiry after the First Cauſe.

I. Suppoſing theſe three, *viz. Motion*, *Matter*, and *Space*, we are in the next place to examine whether they be of themſelves, or of ſomething elſe? If of themſelves, the thing is done, and we are to enquire no farther about it. For thoſe things that exiſt by *Nature* are cauſes of *Exiſtence* to themſelves, *i. e.* do not ſtand in need of any *external cauſe*; if they depend on ſomething elſe, there will be a queſtion about that alſo, what it is, and what are its properties. An enquiry concerning Motion, Matter, and Space; whether they exiſt of themſelves.

II. We muſt preſume that all our conceptions of ſimple Objects without us are true, that is, repreſent the things as God would have them known to us, except we elſewhere diſcover ſome *Fallacy* or *Prejudice* adhering to them. (6) For we can judge of things no otherwiſe than from our Conceptions. Nor are we to ſeek for any other (*B.*) *Criterion* We are to form our Judgment of things whether they exiſt of themſelves, or require a Cauſe, from our ſimple Conceptions when there is no ground to ſuſpect a Fallacy.

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Tangent is infinitely leſs than any rectilinear Angle, *i. e.* bears no proportion to it, is no meaſure of it, or cannot any ways be compared with it.---- If this were not the ſenſe of Mathematicians here, I cannot ſee how there could be a difference of Infinites amongſt them, but 'tis well known that they have infinitely little quantities, which yet are infinitely great ones, *i. e.* with reſpect to other Quantities: And thus they may have an infinite ſucceſſion of increaſing quantities, every one of which ſhall be infinitely greater than the other that is lower in the ſeries:* But all this is nothing to abſolute Metaphyſical Infinite which cannot be conſider'd in that manner, and therefore what relates to the former infinites cannot be the foundation of any Argument concerning this. The equivocal uſe of the word Infinite in theſe different ſenſes by jumbling Mathematics and Metaphyſics together, has, I believe, occaſion'd moſt of the Confuſion attending Subjects of this kind.

(6.) Thus in *Sight* we find the *ſhape* and *ſize* of a viſible object are very much varied upon us according to its diſtance, and the ſituation of the place from whence the proſpect is taken. When the Picture of Objects being prick'd out by the *Pencils* of *rays* upon the *Retina* of the *Eye* do not give the true Figure of thoſe Objects (as they not always do, being diverſely projected, as the *Lines* proceeding from the ſeveral points happen to fall upon that *concave ſurface*) this, tho' it might impoſe upon a Being that has no faculty *ſuperior to ſenſe*, does not impoſe upon our *Reaſon*, which knows *how* the appearance is alter'd, and *why*. Reaſon may be apply'd to over-rule and correct ſenſe in this and the like caſes. *Wollaſton Rel. Nat. delin.* p. 54, *&c.* ſee more impoſitions of this kind in *Locke*'s *Eſſay*, B. 2. C. 9. §. 8, 9.

(*B.*) They who look for any other Criterion of Truth or Certainty loſe their Labour; they who ſay that a *Clear*, *diſtinct*, or *determinate Idea* is the Criterion, are never the nigher, for the Queſtion

* Vid. *Newton* Princ. Math. L. 1. §. 1. *Keil* Introd. ad ver. Phyſ. §. 3. and *Hayes*'s Fluxions ad Princip.

Criterion of Truth than that a Conception of any thing offered to the Mind

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Queſtion returns, *viz:* by what Criterion are we certain that this Idea is clear, *diſtinct* or *determinate*, or that this is to be look'd upon as the Criterion; and ſo on in *infinitum*: we muſt therefore ſtop ſomewhere, and determine of the *Intellect*, as of the *ſenſes*, that an Object by its preſence, according as it is repreſented to the *Mind*, whether it be *clear*, or *obſcure*, *diſtinct* or *confuſed*; whether it be *determinate* or *indeterminate*, effectually determines that to exert the act it ſhould exert, and that there is no need of any Criterion. For inſtance, if any one would be certain whether the Sun ſhines, whether the Light be clear, or obſcure, he need uſe no other Criterion beſide his *Eyes*, let him open them, and whether he will or no, he'll perceive whether it ſhines or not, and alſo what that Light is, nor can he otherwiſe avoid perceiving this, and being certain of it, than by ſhutting or turning away his Eyes. The ſame Method is to be obſerved in *Intellectuals*. Let him that wants to know whether any Propoſition be true or falſe, apply it to his Mind, with the Reaſons which prove or diſprove it (if there need any Reaſons) and he'll be forc'd whether he will or no, to *aſſent* or *diſſent*, or *ſuſpend* his aſſent, according as the Condition of the object requires; nor can he avoid paſſing his Judgment but by diverting his Intellect. For ſince *perception* of Objects is an Act of the Mind itſelf, and *clearneſs* or *obſcurity*, *determinateneſs* or *undeterminateneſs*, are *modes* or *affections* of this *Act* of *conceiving* Objects, not of the *Objects* themſelves, we can judge of the Acts of our Minds and their affections no otherwiſe than from the Senſe and Indication of the Mind itſelf. For as by a power of the Mind we are conſcious that we *perceive* a thing, ſo by the very ſame power we are no leſs conſcious whether we perceive the thing *obſcurely* or *clearly*, *determinately* or *undeterminately*.

Nor do they come off better who put the *Agreement* or *Diſagreement* of *Ideas* for a Criterion; nay worſe, for they think to diſpatch a matter of the greateſt Conſequence by a *Metaphor*, which is unworthy of Philoſophers. Nor yet do they attain their End; for the Queſtion recurs as before, by what Criterion are they aſſur'd of the *Agreement* or *Diſagreement* of Ideas, or whence did they learn the Truth of this proportion, *viz. That this is the Criterion of Truth?* If they ſay, 'tis evident to the Mind of itſelf, and needs no other Criterion, why are not other Truths after the ſame manner diſcovered without a Criterion? Setting aſide Criterions therefore, we muſt neceſſarily attend to the Conceptions themſelves, and in all things follow the Guidance of our Mind. For it will as certainly embrace Truth duly offer'd to it, as Fire will conſume combuſtible Matter: And there's no more neceſſity for a Criterion for the *Underſtanding* to diſtinguiſh Truth from Falſehood, than for the Fire to diſtinguiſh between combuſtible and incombuſtible Matter: Apply an Object, and the thing will be done of itſelf. A Perſon may reply, that there is ſomething in the combuſtible Matter which fits it for the reception of the Flame, namely *ſulphur*, or ſomething of that nature; after the ſame manner alſo there is ſomething in things whereby they are naturally fitted to determine the Aſſent of Underſtanding, and this is the *Agreement* or *Conformity* of *Ideas*, which therefore diſcovers the Truth, and is the Criterion by which the Underſtanding is determined. I anſwer, all Logicians (as far as I remember) uſed to found *Affirmation* in the *Agreement*, *Negation* in the *Diſagreement of the Terms* between themſelves, and *Illation*, in their Agreement in the ſame third. But ſince this Conformity or Agreement of the Terms may be either *real* or *apparent*, here is the proper place and uſe of a *Criterion*, namely to diſtinguiſh the *apparent* from the *real*: For a verbal affirmation of the agreement between the Terms, when the Mind perceives none, is a *lye*; when 'tis only apparent, an *Error*; but in both a *Falſity*.

If any one can produce any other Criterion to diſtinguiſh this apparent conformity, or diſagreement, from the real, beſide the application and attention of the Mind, he might be thought to have diſcover'd ſomething truly uſeful to Mankind;

Mind forcibly extorts aſſent; as there is no other Criterion of Objects perceived by the Senſes, than that an Object, by its preſence forces us to perceive it even againſt our Wills. If therefore the Conceptions

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Mankind; but inſtead of that to put upon us the very Agreement or diſagreement of Ideas, is to lay down the thing itſelf as done, about which the Query is how it can be done? For that is what we enquire after, *i. e.* how we may be certain that we are not deceiv'd in taking *apparent* Conformity for real. I know, there is a certain Art of propoſing Truths to the Underſtanding by which it may more eaſily perceive and judge whether they really agree or no; as there is an art of placing the Fuel ſo as to take Fire more readily, but this is nothing to the Criterion of Truth; nay it proves that there is none other beſide the Mind duely apply'd.

'Tis to be obſerv'd alſo that the Antients placed *Affirmation* in the Agreement of the *Terms*, much more properly than the Moderns do in the Agreement of *Ideas*: For as we have ſhewn before, * we know ſeveral Truths of things whereof we have properly no Ideas; unleſs they will abuſe the Word Idea contrary to common uſe, and the ſenſe of Antiquity. For according to *Plato*, who ſeems to have been the firſt that introduced *Ideas* into Philoſophy, Knowledge by Ideas is peculiar to God, who alone perceives things immediately by their Eſſences: But we (as was ſhewn before, †) by *Marks* and *Characters*, which whether they be impreſs'd on the Mind by immediate ſenſation from the Things themſelves, or collected from the ſimilitude, proportion, or relation to the Things which are perceived by the Senſes, cannot more properly be call'd the Ideas of Things, than the very Words can: For they are often no more like the Eſſences of things, nor is it neceſſary that they ſhould; ſince they ſufficiently anſwer the ends for which Knowledge was given us, if they diſtinguiſh things from one another and diſcover their Uſes.

And in reality this ſeems to be the only difference between *Words* and theſe *Marks*, that we connect Sounds with the things by voluntary impoſition, but the *ſenſations* of the Mind, which are the *Marks* whereby the Underſtanding diſtinguiſhes things from each other, are join'd by Nature to the Preſence of them. 'Tis from Inſtitution, for Inſtance, that we call a Body from which Light is diffuſed, the Sun: But nature imprints the ſenſation of Light, and a Globe of two Foot upon the preſence of it, which are the marks from whence the Mind reaſons about it, and perhaps reſemble its Eſſence no more than that very ſound of the Word Sun does.

'Tis to be obſerv'd farther, that theſe *Marks* are produced in us at various times, and by different Faculties, and ſometimes have no manner of connection with each other. When this happens, we are in doubt whether they belong to the ſame thing: ſometimes alſo they are equivocal, and belong to more things, and then we enquire whether the things with which they are connected be different. That we be not impoſed upon by theſe, there's need of *Enquiry*, *Attention*, *Obſervation* and *Re-ſearch*: By application to theſe, the Underſtanding diſcovers Truth, and embraces it when diſcover'd, without any Criterion, beſide the Power implanted in it by Nature, whereby 'tis naturally adapted to perceive the Truth duly propoſed (as the Sight does Colours, the Taſte ſavours) and to diſtinguiſh, by Marks, the real from the apparent Congruity of Things. (7)

(7) Tho' our *Author* ſeems to have been arguing ſtrenuouſly againſt *Locke* in moſt of this Note; yet the whole, I think, is a diſpute only about Words, and will come to the very ſame thing, whether we take his, or *Locke*'s Account of it. Our *Author* ſays, a Conception offer'd to the Mind forces its aſſent, without any other Criterion of its reality or conformity to the Thing. *Locke* tells us, that Truth, or Certainty, conſiſts entirely in the Con-

* *Note* A. † *Note* A.

tions which we have of theſe three before mention'd, repreſent them to us as exiſting *neceſſarily*, ſo that they cannot be ſeparated from Exiſtence (*C.*) even in Thought, we muſt affirm that theſe exiſt of *themſelves*,

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Connection, Relation or Agreement of our Ideas, of which connection, *&c.* we have no other evidence than the real perception of it by the Mind. Our *Author* affirms, that the Application or Attention of the Mind is ſufficient to diſtinguiſh Truth from Falſhood. *Locke* ſays, a clear perception of the Mind is all that is required to that end. Our *Author* tells us, in the laſt place, that Truth or Affirmation was much better placed in an agreement of *Terms*, *Marks*, or *Characters*, than of *Ideas*. *Locke* diſtinguiſhes Truth into *Verbal* (which is the conformity of Ideas to the Terms) and *Mental* (which is the conformity of Ideas to each other) and *Metaphyſical*, or *real*, (which is their conformity to the real exiſtence of things) of which laſt kind of Truth we have no Criterion, ſo that there ſeems to be no other difference between theſe two Authors, than what lies in the different uſe of the Word Idea (as was above mentioned in the Notes 3 and 4.) which, according to the Latitude 'tis uſually taken in by Mr. *Locke* and his Followers, comprehends all our Author's *Marks*, *Characters*, *Senſations*, and *Conceptions*, &c. For a more compleat anſwer to that old Queſtion, *What is the General Criterion of Truth?* ſee Mr. *Watts*'s Logic, *P.* 2. *c.* 2. §. 7. *p.* 173, 174. 2d. Edit.

(*C.*) This way of Reaſoning is different from that of *Des Cartes*: for he applies this Argument to Complex Ideas made by the Mind out of ſimple ones, but this proceeds upon ſimple ones only. The ground of the difference lies in this, the Mind may erroneouſly join ſuch things together as neither are nor can be join'd in nature: for example, the moſt perfect Being is made up of a Collection of all the Perfections which the Mind has obſerv'd diſperſed all over Nature: But whether ſuch a Collection does really exiſt any where may well be queſtion'd; (8.) nor can it be proved from that very collection or *Idea*, which is a Work of the Mind alone. But the caſe is different in a ſimple Idea produced by the Object itſelf. For ſince this comes not from elſewhere, we cannot attribute any other manner of Exiſtence to it than that which it brings along with it into the Mind.

When I think of a Man preſent, I cannot but believe that he exiſts, *i. e.* I attribute *actual Exiſtence* to him; but that he will exiſt for the future, I perceive, may either be or not be, *i. e.* I aſſign him *poſſible Exiſtence*; but if there be any thing, which, from the Idea that I have of it, I cannot conſider otherwiſe than as *exiſting*, I am as certain that it does always exiſt, as that the Man exiſts when I ſee him. For, the reaſon why I believe the Man that is preſent to exiſt, is, becauſe I cannot even in my Mind conceive him not to exiſt, while I perceive that he is preſent. If therefore there be any thing which I cannot ſo much as conceive in my Mind not to have exiſted, or not to exiſt for the future, 'tis manifeſt that I believe this to have exiſted always, for the very ſame reaſon that I believe the Man to exiſt who is now preſent.

Now it is to be obſerved, that ſomething muſt exiſt of itſelf and include *neceſſary Exiſtence* in its Nature; in the next place we enquire what that is; nor can it be determin'd otherwiſe, than by the conceptions which we have of things: If any thing which we know to exiſt, implies Exiſtence in its very notion, and cannot mentally be ſeparated from it, we muſt conclude, that this hath always exiſted, and does not require a Cauſe diſtinct from itſelf. But if I have any reaſon to ſuſpect that, I do not ſee the preſence of a Man, but a *Statue*, and ſo may be miſtaken; I find this is poſſible, and in that caſe would not attribute *actual Exiſtence* to it without Examination. So if there be any reaſon why I cannot conceive a thing not to have exiſted, or not to exiſt for the future, tho' in reality it once did not exiſt, and perhaps does not now; in this caſe I may ſuſpect myſelf to be miſtaken, and to attribute neceſſary Exiſtence to it from an erroneous Conception.

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ſelves, and require no *Cauſe* of their *Exiſtence*. But if we can conceive theſe once not to have been, to have begun to be, or to be capable of Annihilation, 'tis plain that *Neceſſary Exiſtence* belongs not to them, nor are they of themſelves, they muſt therefore have their Being from

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It muſt be confeſt, this Suſpicion is ſtronger in *Complex Ideas* form'd by the Mind, than in thoſe *ſimple* ones that are produced in it by the very Objects themſelves, and without its aſſiſtance; yet it may have place in both, as may be ſeen below. Care alſo muſt be taken, that we do not rob things of their exiſtence raſhly, and without Examination; for who doubts but we may be miſtaken in ſeparating Exiſtence from, as well as attributing it to, them. But if, after due Attention, we plainly find that our Conceptions of certain things do not attribute neceſſary Exiſtence to them, we muſt conclude, that we are either miſtaken in every thing, or not miſtaken here. If then we find that neither the Idea of *Motion*, nor of *Matter*, includes Exiſtence in itſelf, nor is connected with it; nay, if after our greateſt diligence and enquiry, they appear plainly ſeparable, it is as certain that *Matter* and *Motion* do not exiſt of themſelves, as any thing can be: For nothing is otherwiſe certain than from the conceptions which we have of every thing.

It may be objected, that there are ſome who doubt of, ſome who deny, the Being of a God; we cannot therefore conclude, becauſe we may conceive ſomething not to exiſt, that Exiſtence is not included in its nature; For, by this Means, not only *Space* and *Matter*, but alſo God himſelf, would not be *ſelf-exiſtent*, ſince we ſee ſome bereaving him of his Exiſtence, *i.e.* conceiving him not to exiſt, whereas he neceſſarily muſt be ſelf-exiſtent: 'Tis not a right Concluſion therefore, that Space, *&c.* do not exiſt of themſelves, becauſe we can in our Minds ſeparate Exiſtence from them.

There are, I own, who deny the Being of a God, (for what is there ſo abſurd that ſome may not imagine?) but in the interim, that they really believe him not to exiſt, I very much doubt. However, ſuppoſing God to have exiſtence, there are none but do acknowledge that he exiſts neceſſarily; nor do any ſeek for a cauſe of his Exiſtence: all ſee that 'tis of ſuch a nature as excludes a Cauſe.

But in *Space*, *Matter*, and *Motion*, 'tis quite another thing; almoſt all Men grant that theſe do now exiſt, yet theſe ſame Men own that they may not exiſt; which cannot be ſaid of God, if He be but granted to exiſt. Why can I, mentally at leaſt, deprive *Space*, *&c.* which are conceiv'd actually to exiſt, of their Exiſtence, and conſider them for the future as non-exiſtent, but cannot ſeparate the Idea of God from Exiſtence even in thought, if I once grant that he does exiſt? There's certainly no other reaſon, but that the *Divine Nature* includes Exiſtence in itſelf; whereas the nature of *Space*, *Matter* and *Motion* does not.

For 'tis to be obſerv'd, that we are no farther ſolicitous about the Cauſe of things, than as the nature of them appears to be ſuch as muſt require a Cauſe: We enquire, for inſtance, from whence the *Tide*, and *Saltneſs* of the Sea proceed, and ſearch for the cauſes of them: But why do we ſuſpect that theſe really have a Cauſe? Is it becauſe we obſerve the Sea ſometimes toſs'd with the Tide, or Salt; and ſometimes ſtill, or ſweet? Nothing like it: For, who ever ſaw the Sea perfectly ſtill, or ſweet, ſo as from thence to raiſe a doubt about the Cauſe? Why then don't we reſt without enquiring after Cauſes, perſuaded that things have always been as they are, and that thoſe which are Eternal require no Cauſe? Whence is it, that the Mind does not at all acquieſce in this, nor is any one ſo ſtupid, as to be moved by it to lay aſide the Search of Cauſes? Is it not from hence that the Mind remonſtrates againſt it, and declares to us, even againſt our Wills, that the Tide, or Saltneſs of the Sea, is not eſſential to it? Nor does it otherwiſe diſtinguiſh whether an *Affection*, *Mode*, or *Quality*, be extrinſical to the thing, or require a

Cauſe

ſomething elſe. For, ſince they may either exiſt, or not exiſt, Exiſtence is not of their Nature, and if it be not of their Nature they muſt have it from without; and there wants a Cauſe by which the Indifference,

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Cauſe, than as this is not included in the Eſſence of that thing in which it happens to inhere. This appears plainly enough from hence, that it troubles not itſelf about the Sea's being extended, ſince it ſees that is eſſential to it, but is in the interim ſolicitous why it is Salt; for no other reaſon, but becauſe it can conceive that it may be either ſalt, or ſweet.

The ſame muſt be ſaid of *Matter*, and its *Affections* or *Modes*. If any things be contain'd in the conception of its Nature, or have a neceſſary connection with it, our Mind enquires not after their Cauſe, but acquieſces as ſoon as ever it perceives that neceſſity or connection: but it ſeeks ſolicitouſly after the Cauſes of others, and reſts not till it has found them. For Example, when it thinks of the Exiſtence or Mobility of Matter it looks for no Cauſes of them, for it perceives that theſe are included in the nature of it, or flow neceſſarily from it; But it demands a Cauſe of its Exiſtence, Fluidity and Motion, for it judges theſe to be as foreign to *Matter*, as the Tide and Saltneſs are to the Sea.

And if any ſay theſe have been always ſo, and therefore require no Cauſe, he'll appear to talk no leſs abſurdly, than he that ſhould ſay the ſame of the Tide and Saltneſs of the Sea; nor will he ſatisfy our Thoughts any better: For whether the Tide and Saltneſs be ſuppoſed eternal or temporary, ſince they proceed not from the very nature of the Sea, they muſt neceſſarily have a Cauſe, if we will believe our own Minds. After the ſame Manner, whether the Exiſtence, Motion and Fluidity of Matter be ſuppoſed eternal or temporary, ſince they are not included in its Nature, nor flow neceſſarily from it, any more than the Tide and Saltneſs of the Sea do from its Nature, 'tis equally neceſſary that they have a Cauſe. Either all Enquiry into the Cauſes of things is entirely to be rejected, or to be admitted in theſe. Either we muſt imagine that nothing has any Cauſe, or grant that theſe require one: For, 'tis unreaſonable to expect a Cauſe in ſome particular things, and to pronounce it unneceſſary in others, which are exactly alike.

I know, ſome think that theſe things come by Nature, and that we muſt ſeek for no other Cauſe beſide it, and I think they ſay true: All theſe come by Nature, but by the Nature of what? Let them tell us. Not by their own; Not by the Nature of Space, or Matter; for they have no neceſſary connection with theſe, nor are included in them. We muſt therefore ſuppoſe another Nature from whence they proceed and derive their Origin.

Hence it appears, that if we will truſt our own Thoughts, and follow their direction, we are no leſs certain of a Cauſe diſtinct from Matter and Space, which gave Exiſtence and particular Qualities to each of them, than that the Tide and Saltneſs of the Sea muſt have another Cauſe beſide the Sea itſelf. Nay, we muſt either change our whole Method and procedure of inveſtigating cauſes, or admit a Cauſe of theſe, which Cauſe can be no other than God himſelf, in whoſe Nature the cauſality of all things is contain'd. (9.)

(8.) That is, might be queſtion'd, if there were no better proof of its Exiſtence than that Conception only. However, this Notion has been very much inſiſted on, both by the *Carteſian* and ſeveral of our own Philoſophers, who were not willing to part with any one Argument which ſeem'd to have the leaſt tendency towards the ſupport of ſo good a Cauſe. The Sum of their Argumentation ſeems to be this. We can have no Idea of any thing, but what has either an *actual* or a *poſſible* Exiſtence; but we have an Idea of God, *i. e.* of a Being of Infinite Perfections, which might poſſibly exiſt; therefore he muſt have an actual Exiſtence: For actual Exiſtence is a degree of Perfection, and the foremention'd Idea, according to the Suppoſition, includes all poſſible Perfection, therefore it muſt include that, otherwiſe we ſhould have an Idea of ſomething abſolutely perfect without one poſſible Degree of Perfection, which is a contradiction in terms.

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rence or Poſſibility of Exiſtence, or non-exiſtence, may be determin'd. Nor do we judge a Cauſe in things to be otherwiſe neceſſary than as they are in their own Nature *indifferent*, that is, *paſſive*, in regard to Exiſtence. For, if our Conceptions repreſent ſomething to us as neceſſary in its own nature, we enquire no farther about the Cauſe whereby it exiſts.

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But this is all begging the Queſtion. For it is not the bare poſſibility of *ſuppoſing* it to have all poſſible perfections that infers its *actual exiſtence*, but the *proving* it to have them. Indeed if we ſuppoſe it to have all poſſible perfections, we muſt at the ſame time neceſſarily ſuppoſe it to exiſt, ſince Exiſtence is a poſſible perfection; otherwiſe we ſhould ſuppoſe it to have all poſſible perfections, and yet to want one, which is a Contradiction. But ſtill this is only an Exiſtence, *ex Hypotheſi*, a true conſequence from doubtful premiſes, and which will as eaſily follow from the ſuppoſal of its having but any *One* perfection, ſince that muſt neceſſarily imply exiſtence. The certainty then of ſuch actual exiſtence, does by no means follow from the ſuppoſed *poſſibility* of it, as theſe Men would be underſtood: This Concluſion will never hold good; what cannot be ſuppoſed without a Contradiction certainly does not *exiſt*, therefore what can be ſuppoſed without a Contradiction certainly *does*.

Others endeavour to prove the *exiſtence* of God from our *Idea* of him after this manner. Whatever we have an *Idea* of, that either *is*, or if it be not, it is *poſſible* for it to *be*; but we have an Idea of an *Eternal* and *neceſſarily Exiſtent Being*; therefore ſuch a Being either *is*, or it is *poſſible* for it to be. But if ſuch a Being either now *is not*, or once *was not*, or ever will *not actually be*, it would not be *poſſible* for it *to be at all* (except it could make itſelf, or be made by Nothing) contrary to the *former* part of the Suppoſition; nor would it be either *Eternal* or *neceſſarily Exiſtent*, contrary to the latter. Therefore ſuch a Being now is, and always was, and ever will be.------Or, ſhorter, thus: Our Idea of God is an Idea of ſomething which implies no contradiction, and therefore ſuch a Being may *poſſibly be*: and therefore he *muſt actually be*, or elſe he *could not poſſibly be*, which is contrary to the Hypotheſis. Now to make this and the like Argument of any force, it muſt be clearly prov'd, that we have ſuch an *Idea* of a *neceſſarily Exiſtent Being*, as will infer its actual exiſtence; (which may perhaps appear to be ſomething doubtful from Note 14.) and alſo, that this Idea is *ſtrictly innate* or *connate* with us, and conſequently capable of being urged *a Priori*, for a Proof of the Exiſtence of ſome Being correſpondent to ſuch an Idea (which is now generally given up) For if this Idea be only gathered *a poſteriori*, viz. by a deduction of Arguments from our own Exiſtence, then it is only a Conſequence of theſe Arguments, and cannot of itſelf be alledg'd as a diſtinct one. For how can any Idea conſequent upon ſome certain proofs of ſomething *a Poſteriori*, be an antecedent, independent proof of the ſame thing *a Priori?* Beſides, either theſe arguments are enough to convince any Man of the Exiſtence and Perfections of God, or they are not; if they *are*, this is *unneceſſary*; if they *are not*, this is *inſufficient*; nay, it is *none at all*, ſince 'tis a bare *conſequence* of theſe, and entirely *founded* in them, and therefore muſt ſtand or fall with them. But there is no occaſion for this or any ſuch *Quibble*, a *Priori*, in order to demonſtrate the Being and Attributes of God, ſince numberleſs irrefragable Arguments occur, *a poſteriori*, and ſuch as are obvious to all capacities. [For a particular Deduction of the Divine Attributes, ſee N. 18. Thoſe that have a Mind to be farther acquainted with the proofs of a Deity drawn from the *Idea*, may find the Queſtion fully diſcuſs'd in *Cudworth*, p. 721, *&c.* or, in *Fiddes's Theol. Spec.* B. 1. P. 1. C. 9. or, in the impartial

'Tis prov'd that *Motion* requires a Cauſe, tho' it be ſuppos'd eternal, and that Matter is not the Cauſe of it.

III. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the Things in Queſtion, it will appear whether they be ſelf-exiſtent, or require a Cauſe. In the firſt place, let us examine *Motion*, which is really *Action*, but in all Action it is neceſſary, if we may truſt our thoughts, that there be an *Agent* and a *Patient*, without theſe we have no Notion of Action. In *Motion* therefore, ſince that is Action, there is required an *Agent* and a *Patient*. We have indeed the Patient, namely Matter; we muſt in

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tial Enquiry into the Exiſtence, &c. of God, B. 2. P. 1.]

(9.) What our Author has been endeavouring to prove in all this Note, is, That we cannot apprehend either *Matter* or *Motion* (and he will ſhew the ſame by and by of *Space*) to be independent or ſelf-exiſtent, and conſequently that they require ſome cauſe of their Exiſtence diſtinct from and antecedent to themſelves: And tho' he frequently makes uſe of that confuſed equivocal Term, *neceſſary Exiſtence*, yet he ſeems to apply it only in a negative ſenſe for *Self-Exiſtence*, or *Exiſtence without a Cauſe*, as appears from the latter end of the ſecond and ſixth paragraphs of this Section, and which is as much as his Argument requires. For, where any thing appears to be an effect, as Matter and Motion do, we muſt require a Cauſe; where no ſuch *Cauſedneſs* can be diſcovered, we call the Thing *Self-exiſtent*, tho' perhaps it really be not ſo, but did proceed from ſomething elſe; and where an abſurdity would follow from ſuppoſing any Being not to have exiſted once, or not to exiſt for the future, we ſay there's a *neceſſity* for ſuppoſing that it did and will always exiſt: or we ſtile that Being *neceſſarily Exiſtent*: which is perhaps as far as we can go. But as theſe Words, *Neceſſary*, *Neceſſity*, &c. ſeem to have been taken to denote ſome *poſitive*, *extrinſic Principle* of Exiſtence; and which accordingly is often ſtiled *antecedent*, *abſolute*, *original Neceſſity*, a *Neceſſity ſimple*, *and uniform*, *and abſolutely ſuch in its own nature*, *in itſelf*, &c. It may be of ſome uſe to conſider the ſeveral Things to which theſe Terms are apply'd, and what Ideas we fix to them; which may perhaps convince us that they are all merely *relative*.

Neceſſity is chiefly and perhaps primarily apply'd to *Means*: and when it is thus apply'd, it evidently has *Relation* to ſome *End* to be attain'd by thoſe *Means* of which its affirm'd. Thus, when we ſay ſuch a thing is neceſſary, we mean, that ſome *End* cannot be attain'd without the Exiſtence of that thing. Thus Religion is *neceſſary* to a Rational Creature, or more properly, to the Happineſs of a Rational Creature, *i. e.* a Rational Creature cannot attain Happineſs, its ultimate End, without Religion. Farther, Means being a Relative Idea, whatever is affirm'd of Means *as Means*, muſt be Relative alſo; or which is much the ſame, muſt be an Affection of a Relative Idea. v. g. When we ſay, any Action is *Good*, *Fit*, *Right*, *Reaſonable*, &c. all theſe terms are apply'd to it, as it is conceiv'd to be a Means to ſome End, and conſequently are relative; therefore to call any Action fit, &c. *in itſelf*, will be the ſame as to affirm any thing to be *relative in itſelf*, which is nonſenſe.

Neceſſity is alſo apply'd to *Truth*, and then it has relation to ſome other Truths, either antecedent or conſequential, according to the different manner in which that Truth is prov'd to be *neceſſarily true*, *i. e.* according as the Proof is direct or indirect. When the proof is direct, *i. e.* when the truth of any propoſition is ſhewn to follow by unavoidable Conſequence, from ſome other truth before known; then the *Neceſſity* of that Truth ariſeth from the Relation which that Truth has to ſome antecedent Truth: When the proof is indirect, *i. e.* when the Truth of any Propoſition is ſhewn, by ſhewing that the ſuppoſition of the contrary to that Truth, *i. e.* the Denying that Truth, would imply the Negation of, or be inconſiſtent with,

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in the next place ſee what is the Agent: *viz.* Whether Matter produces Motion in itſelf; or (to ſpeak properly) Whether Motion be coeval with it, natural, and neceſſarily adhering to its Eſſence, as Figure is to Body. But if we remember what was laid down above † and carefully examine the Sentiments and Conceptions of our Mind, it will appear that the nature of Matter (as far as we know of it) is indifferent to *Motion*, or *Reſt*, and moves not except it be moved.

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ſome other known Truth; then the *Neceſſity* of that Truth ariſes from the Relation which that Truth has to ſome conſequential Truth. *Neceſſity* is alſo apply'd to Axioms; and then it has Relation to the terms themſelves, *i. e.* it ariſeth from the Relation which is between the terms themſelves; and means, that ſuppoſing or laying down thoſe Terms, that Relation or Connection between them cannot but be. Farther, the ſame may be ſaid of *Truth*, as of *Means*. Truth being relative alſo; conſequently ſuch Phraſes as theſe, *true*, or *falſe in itſelf*, a *contradiction in itſelf*; or *abſolutely ſuch*, &c. are very abſurd ones.

Neceſſity is alſo apply'd to Exiſtence, and then it ariſeth either from the relation, which the Exiſtence of that thing of which it is affirm'd has to the Exiſtence of *other things*; or it ariſeth from the relation which the Exiſtence of that thing, of which it is affirm'd has to the *Manner* of *its own* Exiſtence. In the former Signification, when Neceſſity of Exiſtence has Relation to the Exiſtence of other things, it denotes, that the Suppoſition of the Non-exiſtence of that thing of which Neceſſity is affirm'd, implies the non-exiſtence of things which we know to exiſt. Thus ſome Independent Being does *neceſſarily Exiſt*. Becauſe to ſuppoſe no independent Being implies *that there are no Dependent Beings*; the contrary of which we know to be true, ſo that Neceſſity of Exiſtence, in this Senſe, is nothing elſe but Neceſſity of Truth as related to Conſequential Truth. And this ſort of Proof is call'd, *Demonſtratio a Poſteriori*.

When the Neceſſity of Exiſtence ariſes from the Relation which the Exiſtence of any thing has to the *Manner* of its own Exiſtence; then Neceſſity means, that that thing of which it is affirm'd exiſts after ſuch a Manner that it never could have not exiſted. Thus every *Independent Being*, or every Being exiſting without a Cauſe, is *neceſſarily* exiſting. Becauſe ſuch a Being, from the *very manner* of its exiſting, could not *begin* to exiſt, therefore muſt *always* have exiſted, *i. e.* does neceſſarily exiſt. For to ſuppoſe a Being to *begin* to exiſt, is to ſuppoſe a *Mutation*, *viz.* from Non-Entity to Entity; and to ſuppoſe a *Mutation* is to ſuppoſe a *Cauſe*; For if there's no Cauſe, every thing muſt continue as it was: Therefore every Being which had no *Cauſe* of Exiſtence, *i. e.* which is Independent, cannot begin to exiſt, conſequently cannot be ſuppoſed not to exiſt, *i. e.* is *neceſſarily* exiſtent *. Whether this is *Demonſtratio a priori* I leave to be determin'd by the learned. I think it is; becauſe Neceſſity of Exiſtence follows from Independency, or Exiſting without a Cauſe. No matter whether Independency is prov'd *a Poſteriori*, or *a Priori*.

N. B. Neceſſity, as apply'd to Exiſtence in theſe two ways, muſt carefully be diſtinguiſhed. For tho' an Independent Being cannot be neceſſarily exiſtent in the former Senſe, without being ſo in the latter alſo: yet it may be neceſſarily exiſtent in the latter Senſe, without being ſo in the former. There may be two or more neceſſarily exiſtent Beings in the latter Senſe, though in the former there can be but one neceſſarily exiſtent Being: which ſhews the inconcluſiveneſs of Dr. Clarke's ſeventh propoſition. And upon the whole, I think we may be convinc'd, that no Ideas can poſſibly be fix'd to this Propoſition, *Neceſſity abſolute in itſelf*. [See alſo the Notes 14, and 18.]

† In the Author's laſt Note.

* See Note 14.

ved. Motion therefore does not follow from its nature, nor is it contain'd in its Eſſence, nor do we conceive it to ariſe from thence; Matter is therefore merely paſſive in regard to Motion, and an Agent muſt be ſought elſewhere. If you ſay it has been in Motion from Eternity, you'll be never the nearer; for Duration alters not the nature of things. If it has been mov'd from Eternity, it has had an eternal Cauſe, and ſince Matter is only paſſive with reſpect to the Motion which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was ſtill, *paſſive*, *only*, and there wanted an eternal Agent to produce eternal Motion (10.) in it: for eternal Action cannot be more eaſily conceived, without an eternal Agent, than temporary, without a temporal one. But, you'll ſay, what is eternal, ſince it was never made, requires no Cauſe. Does it not ſo? Suppoſe the Sun to have ſhin'd from Eternity, and the Earth, nouriſhed by its heat, to have undergone eternal viciſſitudes of Seaſons; had thoſe viciſſitudes therefore no Cauſe? Would they be ever the leſs dependent on the Sun as their Source and Original? Hence it appears that Eternity of Action does not exclude an active Cauſe; and it is ſo far from truth that ſuch Action was never produced, becauſe it is conceiv'd to have been from Eternity, that we muſt rather ſay it has always been produced. For, in the Inſtance given, it appears that the Sun did always, and from eternity, cauſe the change of Seaſons: Not that I think the Sun really was, or could be eternal, but if Motion ſhould be ſuppoſed eternal (which is the only ſubterfuge left to them that deny the neceſſity of an Agent, in order to the exiſtence of Motion) the Sun might equally be eternal with its light and their effects. And if this be granted, it will plainly appear, that *Eternity* of *Action* does not exclude an *active Cauſe*. If then we follow the guidance of our thoughts, we muſt acknowledge

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(10.) Eternal Motion ſeems to be a contradiction, [See Infinite Series in N. 5. and S. C's Impartial Enquiry, *c.* 7. and x b.] unleſs we could conceive two Eternals, one before the other; as every mover muſt, in the order of our Ideas, neceſſarily operate before they moved: Theſe things therefore which imply Beginning, Change, Succeſſion, or Increaſe, are finite as well as in Duration, as in any other reſpect, and conſequently the Suppoſitions here and below are all impoſſible ones. Concerning the Equivocation which ariſes from uſing the Words *Motion* and *Action* promiſcuouſly, as our Author ſeems to do, ſee N. 62.

ledge that there is ſomething beſide *Matter* and *Motion*, which muſt be the *Cauſe* of Motion.

IV. Secondly, as to Matter itſelf, if we may ſuppoſe it to have had a beginning, or to be annihilated; *neceſſary* Exiſtence will manifeſtly not be imply'd in its Nature, for that may be taken from it, at leaſt in thought; but a thing cannot be ſeparated from its Nature or Eſſence even by the Mind: If therefore Exiſtence were *eſſential* to Matter, it could not be divided from it even in thought, that is, we could not conceive Matter not to exiſt. But who doubts whether he can do this? Is it not as eaſy to conceive that *Space* which the Material World occupies to be *empty*, that is, void of Matter; as *full?* Cannot the Underſtanding aſſign to the Material World a beginning and an end? They who admit of *Space*, or a *Vacuum* (11.) cannot deny but

That *Matter* requires a Cauſe of its exiſtence.

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11. Theſe two Words, *Space* and *Vacuum*, tho' they ought perhaps to have both the ſame meaning, *i. e.* neither of them to mean any real thing or quality exiſting in Nature, but only a Negation of Matter and its Qualities, yet as the former is more evidently a poſitive term, it is apt to convey an Idea of ſomething poſitive, and thereby leads us to frame ſome imagination of that ſomething, and ſo at length draws into a Notion quite different from that, which the latter Word more naturally offers, and which comes nearer to the truth of the Caſe; and therefore I think it not quite ſo convenient to uſe theſe two Words promiſcuouſly. It may be doubted whether our ſubſtituting the former of theſe terms for the latter, when the Ideas uſually fixt to them have in reality nothing to do with one another, may not have given riſe to moſt of the Diſputes againſt a *Vacuum*, which have been carried on by many able Writers. *Vacuum*, in Natural Philoſophy, is (according to the true import of the Word) only *Emptineſs*, or abſence of Matter, *i. e.* a Term that implies mere Negation; tho', when we come to prove that Matter exiſts not every where, or that there is really any ſuch emptineſs or abſence of Matter, we are oblig'd, thro' the defect of Language, to make uſe of poſitive Terms about it, *viz.* that there is a *Vacuum* in this or that place, or that there is a real foundation in Nature for ſuppoſing it, *&c.* Hence, probably, Metaphyſicians, when they come to conſider it, being uſed to contemplate real Eſſences, are led to underſtand it, as ſomething poſitive; which might properly be ſaid to *be here* and *there*, *&c.* Their next ſtep is, to bring it under the *Imagination*, and ſo finding the Idea of Space, or Extenſion, in ſome meaſure connected with this Emptineſs, they eaſily ſubſtitute one for the other, and often change the negative Idea into a poſitive one, and define *Vacuum* to be *Extenſion void of Solidity*, or *Space without Body**, Whereas the Ideas of Vacuity and Extenſion have no real connection with each other, as was ſaid before, tho' they be very apt to go together. Well then, theſe two diſtinct Ideas being both included under the Word *Vacuum*, it becomes equivocal, and conſequently that may be affirm'd or deny'd of it according to the one Idea, which cannot according to the other, and here's room for endleſs Juggle. *v. g.* It may be ſaid that there is a real foundation in Nature for ſuppoſing a *Vacuum* in the negative ſenſe of the Word, *i. e.* as ſignifying mere emptineſs; but the ſame thing may be deny'd of it,

* *Locke*, B. 2. C. 13. §. 22.

but Matter is at leaſt mentally ſeparable from Exiſtence. For Space may be conceived either full or empty; that is, with Matter, or without it. The Notion therefore of the Creation of Matter, is no more repugnant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of Space.

That it is not neceſſarily exiſtent, as appears from the Confeſſion of thoſe Perſons who ſuppoſe Space to be the Image of the Body.

V. But whether there be any ſuch thing as Space or no, we are certain that we have an *Idea* of it, tho' whence we had it, Philoſophers are not agreed. Thoſe that deny any diſtinction between it and Body,

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in the poſitive, *i. e.* as ſtanding for pure extenſion, which is an *abſtract Idea*, form'd by the mind itſelf, and, as ſuch, has no foundation any where elſe. Again, Philoſophers, who take a Vacuum for Space or Extenſion in the abſtract, ſtifly deny that there is a Vacuum in Nature, which is true indeed of abſolute Space, which exiſts only in the Mind, but is not ſo of Vacuity or abſence of Matter, which has as real a foundation in nature as Matter itſelf has: except we'll argue that it cannot be ſaid to *be* or to have *exiſtence* predicated of it, becauſe 'tis only a negation; which is playing upon, and puzzling one another with words. To illuſtrate what has been ſaid of the diſputes about a Vacuum, I ſhall preſent the Reader with ſome Arguments brought againſt it by Mr. *Green* and *Bayle*; which may be of uſe to us, ſo far as they overthrow the Reality of abſolute, ſimple Space, which they do effectually, tho' I take them to be mere quibbles with regard to the End for which theſe Authors ſeem to have urged them. They may ſerve alſo for another Inſtance of the great confuſion caus'd by a jumble of Mathematics and Metaphyſics together: an Example of which was given before in the Word *Infinite*, N. 5.

" Extenſion into Length, Breadth and " Thickneſs, or what is call'd mere Space, or " Diſtance, is a Quantity abſtracted by the " Mind, as all other Mathematical Quantities " are; as a Line, or Superficies; and can be " no more imagin'd to exiſt in nature alone, " than Length or Breadth can. A Line is " produced from the flowing of a point; a " Surface from the flowing of a Line; and a " Space or Mathematical Solid from the flowing of a Surface: But 'tis own'd that there " is no ſuch real point, and conſequently no " ſuch Line in being, therefore no ſuch Surface. And what reaſon can there be aſſign'd " why we may not go one Step farther, and " from the ſame principles conclude there is " no ſuch Solid. For how is it poſſible for a " Superficies which has not a being, and is imaginary and abſtracted, to produce an effect which is not equally ſo?

" We have ſaid, that Length, Breadth, and " Thickneſs, is the Definition of Imaginary " Space; and it is likewiſe the Notion we " have of a *Vacuum*, as to the nature and eſſence " of it: for the foreign properties of Light, " or Heat, or Sound, *&c.* are not included in " the conceptions our Minds have form'd of " Room to move in, or ſimple Space. If " therefore the Definition of Imaginary Space " and a *Vacuum*, are the ſame, and a *Vacuum* " is real Space, it follows, that real Space and " imaginary are the ſame, which is a contradiction. Since to abſtract any thing in the " Mind from Beings as they really exiſt, is " not to conſider Beings as they really exiſt.

" From this Idea of Space, being only an " abſtracted one, it is eaſy to give an account " of what *Place* is, namely, that it is only a " portion of this abſtracted Space, we have " mentioned, ſeparated from the reſt, and apply'd to that body which it conſiders as a " meaſure of its capacity. Therefore primary " or abſolute Place alſo, as well as Space, is a " creature of the mind, and nothing really " exiſting,

Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World to be annihilated; and then, if we remember the things that did exiſt, without conſidering of what kind they were, but only that they were without the Mind, we have what we call *Space*. If this be true, then it will be certain

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" exiſting, as ſome Philoſophers imagine." *Mr.* Green's *Principles of Natural Philoſophy*, B. 1. C. 4. §. 8, 18.

" Let us rummage as much as we pleaſe into " all the receſſes of our Mind, we ſhall never " find there any Idea of an unmoveable, indi- " viſible, and penetrable extenſion. And yet " if there is a *Vacuum*, there muſt exiſt an " Extenſion eſſentially endued with theſe three " Attributes. It is no ſmall difficulty to be " forced to admit the exiſtence of a Nature, of " which we have no Idea, and is beſides re- " pugnant to the cleareſt Ideas of our Mind. " But there are a great many other inconve- " niencies which attend this. Is this *Vacuum*, " or immoveable, indiviſible, and penetrable " Extenſion, a Subſtance or a Mode? It muſt " be one of the two, for the adequate Divi- " ſion of Being comprehends but theſe two " Members. If it be a Mode, they muſt then " define its Subſtance; but that is what they " can never do. If it be a Subſtance, I ask " whether it be created or uncreated? If crea- " ted, it may periſh without the Matter, from " which it is diſtinct, ceaſing to be. But it is " abſurd and contradictory, that a *Vacuum*, " that is, a Space diſtinct from Bodies, ſhould " be deſtroy'd, and yet that Bodies ſhould be " diſtant from each other, as they may be af- " ter the deſtruction of the *Vacuum*. But if " this Space diſtinct from Bodies is an uncrea- " ted Subſtance, it will follow either that it " is God, or that God is not the only Sub- " ſtance which neceſſarily exiſts. Which part " ſoever we take of this Alternative, we ſhall " find ourſelves confounded. The laſt is a " formal, and the other, at leaſt, a material " Impiety: for all extenſion is compoſed of " diſtinct parts, and conſequently ſeparable " from each other; whence it reſults, that if " God was extended he would not be a ſim- " ple, immutable, and properly infinite Be- " ing, but a Maſs of Beings, *Ens per aggrega- " tionem*, each of which would be finite, tho' " all of them together would be unlimited. " He would be like the Material World, which " in the *Carteſian* Hypotheſis, is an infinite " Extenſion. And as to thoſe who ſhould " pretend that God may be extended without " being material or corporeal, and alledge, as " an Argument, his Simplicity, you will find " them ſolidly refuted in one of Mr. *Arnauld*'s " Books, from which I ſhall cite only theſe " Words: *So far is the Simplicity of God from " allowing us room to think that he may be ex- " tended, that all Divines have acknowledged, " after St.* Thomas, *that it is a neceſſary conſe- " quence of the Simplicity of God, not to be ex- " tended.* Will they ſay, with the School- " Men, that Space is at moſt no more than a " privation of Body; that it hath no reality, " and that, properly ſpeaking, a *Vacuum* is " nothing? But this is ſuch an unreaſonable " Aſſertion, that all the modern Philoſophers " who declare for a *Vacuum*, have laid it aſide, " tho' never ſo convenient in other reſpects. " *Gaſſendus* carefully avoided any reliance on " ſuch an abſurd Hypotheſis; but choſe ra- " ther to plunge himſelf into the moſt hideous " abyſs of conjecturing, that all Beings are not " either Subſtances or Accidents, and that all " Subſtances are not either Spirits or Bodies, " and of placing the extenſion of Space a- " mongſt the Beings, which are neither Cor- " poreal nor Spiritual, neither Subſtance nor " Accidents.

" Mr. *Locke*, believing that he could not " define what a *Vacuum* is, hath yet given us " clearly to underſtand, that he took it for a " poſitive Being. He had too clear a Head " not to diſcern, that nothingneſs cannot be " extended in length, breadth, and depth.

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that Matter is not Self-exiſtent: for we may conſider it as annihilated, neither can we attribute any other nature to it, than ſuch as anſwers to our Conceptions of it. If Space therefore, according to them, be a Phantaſm of the Body, that is, an Idea of Body recall'd to mind, which formerly was, but now is not, or is not ſuppos'd to be, 'tis certain, that Body or Matter, ſo far as we know any thing of its

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" Mr. *Hartſoeker* hath very clearly apprehended " this Truth. *There is no* Vacuity *in nature,* " ſaith he, *this ought to be acknowledged without* " *difficulty, becauſe it is utterly contradictory to* " *conceive a mere non-entity, with all the proper-* " *ties which can only agree to a real Being.* But " if it is contradictory, that nothingneſs ſhould " be endued with extenſion or any other Qua- " lity, it is no leſs contradictory, that Exten- " ſion ſhould be a *ſimple Being,* ſince it con- " tains ſome things of which we may truly " deny what we may truly affirm of ſome o- " thers, which it includes. The Space fill'd " up by the Sun is not the ſame Space that is " taken up by the Moon; for if the Sun and " the Moon fill'd the ſame Space, thoſe two " Luminaries would be in the ſame place, and " penetrated one with another, ſince two " things cannot be penetrated with a third, " without being penetrated betwixt them- " ſelves. It is moſt evident, that the Sun and " Moon are not in the ſame place. It may " then be ſaid truly of the Space of the Sun, " that it is penetrated by the Sun; and it may " as truly be deny'd of the Space penetrated " by the Moon. There are then two portions " of Space, really diſtinct from one another, " by reaſon that they receive two contrary de- " nominations of being penetrated and not be- " ing penetratted by the Sun. Which fully " confutes thoſe who venture to aſſert that " Space is nothing but the immenſity of God: " and it is certain that the Divine Immenſity " could not be the place of Bodies. without " giving room to conclude that it is compoſed " of as many real diſtinct parts as there are " Bodies in the World.

" It will be in vain for you to alledge, that " Infinity hath no parts; this muſt neceſſarily " be falſe in all infinite *Numbers,* ſince Num- " ber eſſentially includes ſeveral *Units.* Nor " will you have any more reaſon to tell us " that incorporeal extenſion * is wholly con- " tain'd in its Space, and alſo wholly contain'd " in each part of its Space: for it is not only " what we have no Idea of, and beſides, " thwarts all our Ideas of Extenſion; but alſo " what will prove that all bodies take up the " ſame place, ſince each could not take up its " own, if the Divine Extenſion was entirely " penetrated by each Body numerically the " ſame with the Sun and with the Earth. You " will find in † Mr. *Arnauld,* a ſolid refuta- " tion of thoſe who attribute to God the diffu- " ſing himſelf throughout infinite Space. *Crit. Dict.* p. 3083, 3084. See alſo *Epiſcop.* p. 294. If any Perſon wants any more Arguments againſt the Exiſtence of ſimple Extenſion, or the application of it to a Spirit, he may find enough in *Bayle,* p. 2790, 3077, *&c.*

* *Tota in toto, & tota in ſingulis partibus*: that is, what the School-Men ſay of the preſence of the Soul in a human Body, and of the preſence of Angels in certain places.

† *Arnauld,* Letter 8 and 9 to Father *Malebranche.* See alſo a Book of *Peter Petit, de Extenſione Animæ & rerum incorporearum natura.* And *M. de la Chambre*'s Anſwer to it, which he publiſh'd at *Paris, Anno* 1666. *4to.* with this Title, *Defence de l'Extenſion & de partes libres de l'ame,* all the reaſons he alledges to ſhew, that extenſion and Spirituality may be together, are ſo weak, that they are only good to ſhew the falſity of his Aſſertion.

its nature is indifferent to exiſtence or non-exiſtence. It has not therefore Exiſtence of itſelf; for that which exiſts by neceſſity of *nature*, Exiſtence enters into its *Idea* (12.), nor can it be conceiv'd otherwiſe than as exiſting.

VI. Others deny that *Space* is diſtinguiſhable from Matter, any other way than as a *general Quantity* is from a *particular* one; *For, as when Individuals are changed, the Nature of Man or Animal remains unchang'd: ſo when Body is chang'd or tranſlated into an other place,* And of thoſe who deny Space to be diſtinguiſhable from Matter, any otherwiſe than as Extenſion in general is from a particular Extenſion.

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(12.) We cannot allow of this or any ſuch Argument drawn from this *neceſſity* of *nature*, taken in a *poſitive* ſenſe, for the reaſons which will be given in Note 14. And tho' *Matter itſelf* perhaps cannot ſtrictly be prov'd not to be *Eternal*, yet any *Body*, or *Syſtem* of Bodies, formed out of it, as the ingenious Author of the *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Chriſtian Religion* has fully prov'd * muſt *neceſſarily have had a beginning*; and that *matter*, or any *material ſubſtance*, is not *eternal, independent, &c.* may be made probable from ſome ſuch Argument as this. We conclude from the faculties of our mind (viz. *thinking, volition, &c.* all which are in a perpetual flux, and as it were made up of Succeſſions, and conſequently incapable of Eternity, by Notes 5, and *X. c.)* that it did not exiſt from *Eternity*, therefore it had its exiſtence from ſome *Cauſe*, (which Cauſe, if itſelf was not eternal and independent, had its exiſtence from another, and that from another, and ſo on till we come at one which was) from the ſame cauſe that it had its *exiſtence*, it had alſo all its faculties; the perception or knowledge of matter is one of theſe Faculties, therefore it had the perception of matter from the above mention'd cauſe. Now it could not have the perception of Matter from the foremention'd cauſe, unleſs the cauſe itſelf had it, therefore that cauſe alſo had the perception of matter. But if matter was eternal, independent, *&c.* that cauſe, as far as we can apprehend, could not have any perception of it: for as that cauſe itſelf was alſo eternal, independent, *&c.* it could not poſſibly be any ways affected *ab extra*, nor conſequently by matter, nor conſequently have any *notices* or *perceptions* of matter, unleſs matter proceeded from that cauſe itſelf, and was *created* by it, which is contrary to the Suppoſition of its Eternity. But that cauſe has the perception of matter, becauſe *we* have, therefore matter muſt have proceeded from that cauſe, or been created by it, and conſequently was not eternal, independent, *&c.* Or thus:

If Matter were an eternal, independent principle, it ſeems impoſſible for God to have had any manner of knowledge of it, becauſe it could no ways affect him; ſince he alſo is *independent*: but *he* has knowledge of it, becauſe *we* have; therefore it is not an eternal independent Principle.

'Tis here taken for-granted, that Matter is eſſentially incapable of *thought*, nor can poſſibly have any *thinking Quality* ſuper-added to it, and conſequently that the firſt Cauſe cannot be *Material*; which will appear by the ſame Argument which is brought to prove a *thinking* Being incapable of Extenſion, in Note n. Beſides, from all the proofs of a *Vacuum*, both *external* and *interſperſed*, it appears that all Matter is every way limited or defective, and conſequently requires a *Limiter* or *External Cauſe*, and therefore cannot belong to the firſt Cauſe. See X f.

* See the Note X d.

place, the Extenſion of the place which it occupied remains unchang'd, namely empty, or fill'd with another Body. I would not ſpend a Cenſure on this reaſoning; but granting it to be true, it would follow, that Body or Matter contains nothing in the Idea of it, which might induce us to believe, that it is of itſelf, or exiſts by the Neceſſity of its Nature: but on the contrary, that it may be annihilated at leaſt in Conception.

If therefore we conſult our Ideas, we muſt confeſs that Matter does not exiſt neceſſarily, but is as indifferent to Exiſtence, or Non-exiſtence, as to *Motion* or *Reſt*, i. e. is in that reſpect merely paſſive. It requires a Cauſe then which may determine it to *Exiſtence* no leſs than to *Motion*. For that which is not of itſelf muſt neceſſarily be of another, nor can we know that any thing is of itſelf, otherwiſe than from the Ideas which we have of its nature, if theſe repreſent the nature of any thing as *neceſſarily* exiſting, ſo that we cannot conceive it not to be, we enquire no farther about its cauſe; if not, we fly to a Cauſe; nor is the Underſtanding ſatisfy'd till it has found one. Why are we inquiſitive about the Original of Man, or any thing elſe? but only becauſe our Conceptions repreſent theſe as indifferent in themſelves to *Being*, and therefore, as requiring ſome Cauſe of their being diſtinct from themſelves. From the Nature then of *Matter* as well as *Motion*, we are forc'd to admit of *another* Principle to be the Cauſe of both.

That Space ſeems at firſt ſight inſeparable from Exiſtence.

VII. Thirdly, As to *Space*, many doubt whether its Nature be diſtinguiſhable from Exiſtence. Whether it can be annihilated even in thought, or conceived not to have been. For when the whole material World is annihilated in the Mind, the Idea of Space remains, as of a thing yet exiſting; it obtrudes itſelf upon the Underſtanding, and ſuffers us not to aſſign any beginning or end of its Exiſtence. It forces us therefore to confeſs, whether we will or no, that it exiſts; nor does it ſeem to require a Cauſe why it exiſts, ſince it is of ſuch a Nature as, being ſelf-ſufficient, muſt have exiſtence of itſelf. For what will be ſelf-exiſtent, if that be not, which cannot even be conceiv'd not to exiſt?

'Tis ſhewn, that this may ariſe from Prejudice.

VIII. This ſeems to argue ſtrongly for the *Self-exiſtence* of Space. Yet a doubt may ariſe, whether this Inability of our Underſtanding, to ſeparate the Nature of *Space* from Exiſtence, proceed from that

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ſame Nature of Space, or rather from the *imperfection* of our Reaſon. For, tho' all our ſimple Conceptions muſt for the moſt part be look'd upon as true, as we ſaid before *, yet theſe are to be excepted from this Rule in which we find any grounds of fallacy or *prejudice*. And in this reaſoning about Space, it is to be ſuſpected that we connect Exiſtence with its Nature merely out of *prejudice*.

IX. We may underſtand how this comes to paſs, if we conſider, *1ſt*. That our Conceptions come for the moſt part *from without*, when therefore ſomething is preſented to our minds, we always conceive it as without us: this Notion therefore of *external* and *internal* adheres to all our Conceptions, and we continually aſſign a *Place* to every thing which we happen to think of, but that there ſhould be any thing external, or which has a *Place*, and no *Space*, is inconceivable. As long then as we think of any thing external, we cannot but at the ſame time believe that Space exiſts, in which Space we conceive *that* thing to exiſt. For while we ſuppoſe any thing exiſting beſide ourſelves, that neceſſarily ſeems to be without us; but imagine all externals removed, and turn the Mind upon itſelf, and that *without* will be taken away, and, together with it, the neceſſity of *Space* or *Place*. For, while we conceive nothing to exiſt beſide ourſelves, *i. e.* our *Minds*, we don't think of this *without*, that is, of *Space*, nor ſee any neceſſity for its Exiſtence (13.).

Without, ſuppoſes *Space*; while therefore we conceive ſomething to exiſt without us, we cannot annihilate Space in Thought.

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(13.) From hence, I think, it appears ſufficiently that Space, were it granted to have any real Exiſtence at all, I mean, to be any thing more than an Idea in our Minds, (which ſome perhaps will not be very ready to grant, from an attentive conſideration of the Notes, 5 and 11.) yet it cannot be ſuppoſed to exiſt neceſſarily, in Dr. *Clarke*'s ſenſe of *neceſſary Exiſtence*. For, according to him, " † Whatever " is neceſſarily exiſting, there is need of its " exiſtence, in order to the ſuppoſal of the " exiſtence of any other thing; ſo that nothing " can poſſibly be ſuppos'd to exiſt, without " preſuppoſing and including antecedently, " the Exiſtence of that which is neceſſary. " Therefore, the ſuppoſing any thing poſſibly " to exiſt alone, ſo as not neceſſarily to in- " clude the preſuppoſal of ſome other thing, " proves demonſtrably, that *that* other thing " is not neceſſarily exiſting: becauſe, whatſoe- " ver has neceſſary Exiſtence, cannot poſſibly, " in any conception whatſoever, be ſuppoſed " away. There cannot poſſibly be any notion " of the exiſtence of any thing, there cannot " poſſibly be any notion of exiſtence at all, " but what ſhall neceſſarily preinclude the " notion of that which is neceſſarily exi- " ſtent.

Now, if we can conſider our own Souls as exiſting alone, and without this *Space*, without

* §. II. paragr. II. † *Anſwer to the firſt Letter*, p. 10.

That things are conceived to be annihilated by ſubſtituting ſomething elſe in the Room of them; but we have nothing to ſubſtitute for Space.

X. It is to be obſerved farther, that when we would annihilate any thing in our Mind, we conſider it as ſomething evaneſcent, and remov'd out of ſight; but yet we look upon ſome other thing as ſubſtituted in the room of that which diſappeared; thus when *Accidents* are removed, we conceive the *Subſtance* remaining; ſetting aſide *Matter*, we ſubſtitute *Space*; but when *Space* is removed, we have nothing to ſubſtitute in its ſtead, except material or external things; but all theſe ſuppoſe *Space*, and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no wonder then that we cannot annihilate Space, while we conceive theſe as exiſting. If therefore we would come at a right underſtanding of the nature of Space, we muſt not apply our Minds to any thing *material* or *external*, but attend to our own thoughts and ſenſations, which have no relation to external things, or to Quantity: And when our Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be no more neceſſity for the exiſtence of Space than of Matter.

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out conſidering it as a *cauſa ſine qua non*, or in any other *reſpect*; without *preſuppoſing*, or any ways *including* it: This (according to the Dr. himſelf) will prove demonſtrably, that Space is not neceſſarily exiſtent. But let any one ſhew us what neceſſity there is for the exiſtence of *Space*, in order to the ſuppoſal of the exiſtence of a *Spirit*. Let him try whether he cannot conceive an *immaterial*, *thinking* ſubſtance, without the Idea of *Space* or *Extenſion*; nay, whether he can poſſibly conceive it with them; whether theſe Ideas are at all applicable to an immaterial Being, and not rather repugnant and contradictory to the very notion of it; whether they belong not ſolely to *matter*, and if that were annihilated, might not eaſily be ſuppoſed away. Few, I believe, beſide Dr. *Clarke*, can apprehend how Space is (as he calls it in his 4th Reply to *Leibnitz*, N°. 29. p. 141.) the *Place of all Ideas*. I'm ſure, Space and Spirit, and the diſtinct properties of each, appear to me as diſtant and incompatible, as the moſt remote and inconſiſtent things in nature; and an *extended Soul* ſeems juſt ſuch another propoſition as a *green ſound*, an *Ell of Conſciouſneſs*, or a *Cube of Virtue*. Dr. *Clarke* grants *, that *Extenſion does not belong to Thought*, (as our Author has indeed prov'd in many of its Modes, in paragr. XIV. and XV.) and at the ſame time endeavours to ſhift off the conſequence by anſwering, that *Thought is not a Being*. But where's the difference in this reſpect? Don't we frame our Idea of the *Being* from its eſſential *Properties?* and if theſe have no manner of relation to Extenſion, why ſhould the Being to which theſe Properties belong have any? † I'm apt to think, that our conceiving *Subſtance* by way of ſome *Subſtratum* (concerning which, ſee Note 1.) has led us into the Notion, that all kind of Subſtances muſt be *extended*; and 'tis perhaps impoſſible for us to *imagine* any ſuch thing as an *Unextended Subſtance*; but yet reaſon convinces us, that there are many real things of which we can form no imagination. And that there are Beings in nature to which no manner of extenſion can poſſibly be apply'd, we find ſufficiently prov'd by *Cudworth*, from p. 823 to 832. Among the various arguments there produced, this is the Subſtance of one. "If the Soul be an *extended Subſtance*, then it muſt

* *Anſwer to the ſecond Letter*, p. 16.

† *See* X.h. *at the end of this Chapter.*

XI. It proceeds therefore from *Prejudice*, and an unwary way of thinking, that we couple *neceſſity of Exiſtence* with *Space*; neither do we obſerve, that for this very reaſon we cannot conceive Space not to exiſt, becauſe we imagine thoſe things ſtill exiſting, which cannot exiſt without Space: which is no greater a Wonder than if any one intent upon the Mobility of the Heavenly Bodies, ſhould complain that he could not annihilate the *Matter* of them, while the *Motion* continued; for material and external things, have no leſs dependence on, and connection with, *Space*, than Mobility has with *Matter*; if then we conceive God only to exiſt, while He contemplates himſelf as exiſting alone, he can no more be judg'd to ſtand in need of Space, or be

We attempt to annihilate Space while thoſe things continue which ſuppoſe Space, and therefore it cannot be annihilated.

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" muſt of neceſſity be either a *Phyſical point* " (for a *Mathematical point* has no *extenſion*) or " *minimum*, the leaſt extenſion that can poſſibly " be; or elſe it muſt conſiſt of *more* ſuch *Phy-* " *ſical points* join'd together. As for the for- " mer of theſe, it is impoſſible that one *ſingle* " *Atom*, or *ſmalleſt point* of extenſion ſhould be " able to perceive diſtinctly all the *variety* of " things, *i. e.* take notice of all the *diſtinct* and " *different* parts of an *extended Object*, and have " a *deſcription* or *delineation* of the whole of " them at once upon itſelf, (for that would be " to make it *diviſible* and *indiviſible* at the ſame " time) As for the latter, if the Soul be an " extended Subſtance conſiſting of *more points*, " one without another, all concurring in eve- " ry *ſenſation*, then muſt every one of thoſe " *points* either perceive a *point* and *part* of the " Object only, or elſe the *whole* Object: Now " if every point of the *extended Soul* perceives " only a point of the *Object*, then is there no " one thing in us that perceives the *whole*; or " which can compare one part with another. " But if every point of the extended Soul, " perceives the *whole* Object at once conſiſting " of many *parts*, then will the former abſurd- " ity return: and alſo there would be innume- " rable *Percipients* of the ſame *Object* in every " ſenſation, as many as there are points in the " extended Soul: And from both theſe ſuppo- " ſitions it would alike follow, that no Man " is one ſingle *Percipient*, or Perſon, but that " there are innumerable diſtinct *Percipients* or " *Perſons* in every Man. Neither can there be " any other ſuppoſition made beſides thoſe " three forementioned: As that the whole *ex-* " *tended Soul* ſhould perceive *both* the *whole* " *ſenſible object*, and all its ſeveral *parts*, no " part of this Soul in the mean time having a- " ny perception at all by itſelf; becauſe the " whole of an *extended Being* is nothing but " *all the parts* taken together; and if none of " thoſe *parts* have any *life*, *ſenſe*, or *perception* " in them, it is impoſſible that there ſhould be " any in the *whole*. But in very truth, to ſay " that the whole Soul perceiveth all, and no " *part* of it any thing, is to acknowledge it " not to be *extended*, but to be *indiviſible*, " which is the thing we contend for."

From hence alſo, that an *indiviſible* Being or Subſtance, is not capable of receiving a *Diviſible* Quality, nor a *Diviſible* Subſtance an *indiviſible* One, he makes it fully appear, that neither *Matter* can poſſibly *think*, nor *Spirit* be *extended*. Ibid. p. 827, 828, 829.

Where *S. C.* might have found a ſufficient anſwer to his Argument for the Soul's *extenſion*, from its *receiving Ideas of extended Things*. *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 222. And to his Maxim, that *like is known by like*, and by conſequence a Subject abſolutely void of extenſion could have no Ideas of extended things, p. 223.

" Nay the Soul (ſays *Cudworth*) conceives " *extended* things themſelves *unextendedly* and

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be conſcious of it as actually exiſting, than we are, while we contemplate only the reflex acts of the Mind. But when he will'd external things, he made *Place* or *Space* for them to exiſt in *.

God cannot be conceived not to exiſt.

XII. It may be objected, that *we can ſeparate Exiſtence from God* after the ſame manner as we endeavour to remove it from Space. For, the mind being reflected on itſelf, and ſolely intent upon contemplating its operations, may deny God to exiſt as well as Space. If therefore we deny Space to be ſelf-exiſtent, becauſe we can conſider our mind as exiſting alone in nature, and conſequently Space as not exiſting; why may not we, by the ſame way of reaſoning, deny that God is *ſelf-exiſtent*. I anſwer, we are conſcious that we do not exiſt of ourſelves, while therefore we contemplate ourſelves, and our intellectual operations, we are neceſſarily carried to ſome Cauſe; being certain that we have Exiſtence from another, and not of ourſelves; we

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" *indiviſibly*; for as the difference of the whole " *Hemiſphere* is contracted into a narrow com- " paſs in the pupil of the eye, ſo are all diſtan- " ces yet more contracted in the Soul itſelf, " and there underſtood *indiſtantly*: for the " *thought* of a Mile *diſtance*, or 10,000 Miles, " or ſemi-diameters of the Earth, takes up no " more *room* in the Soul, nor *ſtretches* it any " more than does the thought of a *foot* or *inch*, " or indeed of a *Mathematical point*." p. 827, 829, *&c.*

The foregoing Arguments againſt the ſimplicity of *extenſion*, as well as thoſe in N. 5 and 11. conclude equally againſt *S. C*'s *Amplitude* or *Expanſion*.† Since, if it be any thing real, it muſt have parts really diſtinct from one another; which diſtinct parts can never be the ſubject of an undivided Quality, nor any addition of them ever reach a poſitive Infinity. But in truth, theſe Words *Expanſion*, *Amplitude*, *&c.* don't ſeem to imply any poſitive thing or quality, or indeed to have any determinate meaning at all; like the *Ubi* of the School-men, which was not *place* but ſomething elſe, they did not know what, and muſt belong to Spirits, tho' how or why they could not tell.

The abovemention'd *S. C.* has a ſecond Argument for the *Amplitude* or *Expanſion* of the *Divine Nature* grounded on another Maxim, *viz. Nothing can beſtow what it has not in itſelf*: but God has created *material expanſion*, therefore he muſt be expanded himſelf, p. 223. Which Argument he may ſee anſwer'd by our *Author* in the 18th Paragr. and Note D. who ſhews that ſuch *Expanſion* is a mere *imperfection* as well as *materiality*, and conſequently is equally inconſiſtent with the perfection of the Divine Being. See alſo X h.

That no Collection or Combination of Atoms can think, and the ſame reaſon holds againſt any thing which can be conceiv'd by way of parts, ſee proved at large in *Bayle*'s Dict. p. 1924. under the Article *Leucippus*, Remark E. See alſo Dr. *Clarke*'s Letters to *Dodwell* concerning the immortality of the Soul, *&c.* or *Religion of Nature, Delin.* p. 186, *&c.* or *H. Ditton*'s appendix to his Excellent Diſcourſe concerning the Reſurrection.

* We conceive Space to have no real Exiſtence, and therefore think that it cannot properly be ſaid either to be made, annihilated, bounded or meaſured, *&c.*

† *Impartial Enquiry, &c.* p. 212.

we cannot therefore exert even one act of the Underſtanding but it muſt have a neceſſary connection with ſome *Cauſe* diſtinct from us.

XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourſelves as the only Beings in nature, for we muſt admit, along with us, the Cauſe from which we derive Exiſtence, which is a confuſed conception of God. But the ſame cannot be ſaid of Space, for the operations of our mind are ſo intimately perceiv'd by us as to have no neceſſary connection with Space, and we underſtand clearly enough that theſe may be, tho' there were no Space, and do not ſtand in need of it for their Exiſtence. If we conceive ourſelves as conſiſting of both *Body* and *Mind*, 'tis certain we ſtand in need of Space for our Exiſtence, and during that conception, 'tis impoſſible for us to conceive Space to be annihilated; *viz.* becauſe ſuch a Conception has a neceſſary connection with Space. After the ſame manner, if we conceive ourſelves to be *Mind* only, yet we muſt own the Exiſtence of God. For a finite Mind requires a Cauſe *from* which it may exiſt, no leſs than a Body does a Place *in* which it may exiſt; and from hence, in reality, *it is* that we attribute *Self-exiſtence* to Space, becauſe, whenever we think of ourſelves, we imagine ourſelves to conſiſt of both *Body* and *Mind*. While therefore we are conſcious of our own Exiſtence, we form our Belief of Space alſo as neceſſarily exiſting, inſomuch as it is connected with the conception of *Body*, i.e. of *ourſelves*.

Becauſe we are conſcious that we do not exiſt of ourſelves.

XIV. Secondly. It is remarkable, that the Conceptions which we have from *hearing*, *ſmelling*, or *taſting*, tho' they be produced in us by external Objects, yet have no connection with the conceptions of *Space*; for, who can imagine the longitude, latitude, or profundity of *Sound*, *Smell*, or *Taſte?* If then we had only theſe three Senſes, we ſhould not ſo much as imagine that there was any Space. Our Conceptions therefore abſtract from all Extenſion, nor do the notions of external and internal adhere ſo cloſely to our thoughts but we may lay them aſide; and if we ſet theſe aſide, the Self-exiſtence of Space does not neceſſarily obtrude itſelf upon us. Now, as the common People attribute *Smells*, *Taſtes*, *Colours*, and other *ſenſible Qualities* to the Objects themſelves, and believe that they exiſt in them; while they who attend better to their thoughts, know that theſe exiſt only in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by which they are produ-

Smell, Taſte, Hearing, do not give us any notice of the exiſtence of Space.

ced; beſides the peculiar Motion and Texture of their parts: after the ſame manner, 'tis probable, we are impoſed upon in attributing neceſſary exiſtence to Space, becauſe we obſerve, that almoſt all our Thoughts are produced in us from without, and thereby accuſtoming ourſelves to join Space with them, while we are conſcious that we think we conceive alſo that Space exiſts: whereas, if we remember that all our ſenſations, even thoſe produced by external things, ſuch as *Smells, &c.* do not bring along with them the notion of Space, we may eaſily lay aſide this prejudice, and, with drawing our thoughts from the contemplation of Space, may conceive it not *to be*.

The Mind reflected upon itſelf has no relation to Space, nor any neceſſity for it.

XV. And this will appear 3dly. if by a reflex act we view the *Mind itſelf* and its *operations*; for nothing of Extenſion or Space offers itſelf in theſe; nor does the Mind, when employ'd about them, think at all of Space, nor is it conſcious that it occupies Space; it withdraws therefore from the conceptions of *internal* and *external*, and may conceive nothing to be in the world beſides *itſelf*, and its *Cauſe*; i. e. can imagine Space to be non-exiſtent. Thinking Beings then may exiſt without Space; it proceeds therefore from *Prejudice* that we join *Neceſſary Exiſtence* with it (14.).

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(14.) As to that *neceſſity* of *exiſtence* which the learned Dr. *Clarke* and others have ſo largely inſiſted on, I muſt confeſs that I was never able to conſider it in any *poſitive* ſenſe, nor to form any clear argument from it, which could either affect the nature of *Space, Matter, &c.* or help to demonſtrate the *exiſtence* and *attributes* of God *a priori*. With regard to the firſt of theſe perhaps too much has already been ſaid, in Notes 5, 11 and 13. As to the laſt, we gather indeed a *Poſteriori* that an *infinite*, i. e. an *abſolutely perfect* Being, muſt *neceſſarily* have exiſted *always*, becauſe it would have been always a Contradiction for him not to have exiſted; namely, he himſelf, and all the things that are, muſt have aroſe from nothing. But this is only a *Conſequential* Neceſſity, and from hence to infer any thing concerning the *Manner* of his *exiſtence* ſeems to be building a great deal more on this argument than it will bear. This is indeed a *Reaſon* by which we find, and for which we believe, that he *muſt* have exiſted always, but it is a reaſon to *us* only, and does not affect *his* nature, or the cauſe of it, and when it is apply'd to that, I think 'tis uſed equivocally. Conceiving that he cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed not to Exiſt, is far from conceiving *how* or *why* he actually does *exiſt*; we can eaſily ſhew a reaſon for the one, but it ſeems above human comprehenſion to account in any reſpect for the other: Nay, the attempt to do it ſeems altogether as abſurd and uſeleſs, as endeavouring to ſhew how or why a thing is what it is: how or why a Firſt Cauſe is a Firſt Cauſe; How a Triangle is a Triangle, or why Truth is Truth.

Farther: This *eternal Being*, we ſay, is *Independent*; or, which is the ſame thing, *Self-exiſtent*, i. e. his Exiſtence depends upon nothing *beſide* himſelf? But does it therefore poſitively depend *upon* himſelf? Will it follow, that becauſe he has no *external* Cauſe, therefore

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XVI. Fourthly. It is to be remark'd that Space, ſo far as it appears to our Conceptions, is of ſuch a Nature as cannot be annihilated by *Parts*, for they are in ſuch a manner united to, and dependent upon one another, that if we ſuppoſe one part, it will imply a contradiction for the others not to exiſt. We can in Thought remove all Matter out of a Veſſel, or Chamber, and the Space interjacent between the

We may conceive Space to be annihilated altogether, but not by parts.

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he muſt have an *internal* one? Or, becauſe no ground or reaſon of his Exiſtence can be drawn from any other Subſtance, therefore one muſt be contain'd in his *own Subſtance or ſelf?* This is uſing the Word *Self exiſtence* in two different Senſes, both as *negative* and *poſitive*, which have no manner of connection with each other, and the latter of which will perhaps appear to be no very good one. It is not then apparent yet that there needs any *Phyſical reaſon* at all for the *exiſtence* of the *eternal, independent Being*. Nor, 2dly, if there did, would this *Neceſſity* of *Nature* uſually aſſign'd as ſuch, ſerve for that purpoſe. For, firſt, it is not the *Subſtance* itſelf, that would be to make the ſame thing the *ground* of itſelf; which is nonſenſe. 'Tis therefore a *perfection*, *property* or *attribute* of that Subſtance (we know no other diſtinction) and as ſuch, muſt, in the Order of our Ideas, be Conſequent upon the exiſtence of that Subſtance in which it inheres. Whatever it is, it has in ſome reſpect or other a *Relation* to the Subject to which it belongs. Let it then be an *Attribute*, *ſui Generis*, *cujus cunq; generis* (if we mean any thing at all by this word) it muſt be *predicated* of, and *preſuppoſe* its Subject, and conſequently cannot, according to our Ideas, be the antecedent *ground* or *foundation* of it. And to endeavour to clear it (as ſome do) by making it not an attribute of the *Subſtance*, but of the *attribute* of the Subſtance; or as they phraſe it, a *Property* of a *Property*; is only thruſting it ſtill farther back, and making it poſterior in conception to both the Subſtance and its Attribute or Property.

But 3dly, ſuppoſing this *Neceſſity*, this *Ground* or *Reaſon*, could be conſider'd as *antecedent* to the Divine Nature, and inferring its actual *exiſtence*, we are got but one Step farther yet; for, will there not be the ſame neceſſity for demanding a *reaſon* for that reaſon, *a ground* for that ground, and ſo on *in infinitum?* And what ſhall we get by ſuch an endleſs progreſſion? Why ſhould we not ſtop at a firſt *Being*, as well as at this *Ground*, which muſt itſelf want a foundation if the other does, ſince there cannot be any intuitive knowledge in either; and the ſame reaſons which are given for ſtopping at this *ground* will hold equally for ſtopping before we come at it, and convince us, that we might as well, or perhaps better, acquieſce in the actual Exiſtence of the firſt Being. We muſt then reſt ſome where: We muſt either admit one firſt cauſe of all Things and Qualities, itſelf *exiſting* without cauſe (for that is imply'd in its being called the firſt) or an *infinite ſeries* of Beings exiſting without any original Cauſe at all; *i. e.* either *ſome one* thing muſt be without a Cauſe, or *every thing*.

Here then are two difficulties: the leſs is to be choſen; let us ſee which that is. Now, if the *Manner of exiſtence* in all theſe Beings were entirely the ſame, I grant it would be as eaſy to ſuppoſe *all* of them *exiſting* without a Cauſe, as *One*. But here I think lies the difference: There was a time when all of them, except one, were indifferent either to *exiſtence* or *non-exiſtence*; were nothing. Therefore for them that were once indifferent to *exiſtence* or *non-exiſtence*, to be actually determin'd into Exiſtence, to be brought from *nothing* into *ſomething*, or *made* what they once were not; is a real *change*, an *action*, an *effect*, and as ſuch, muſt require ſome *changer*, *agent*, *cauſe*. But on the other hand, all that we know of this *one* Being, is, that it *now exiſts*, and *always* did ſo; that it never had a *Beginning* of its *exiſtence*, was never *changed* from what it is, never *made* or produced; Here is no *effect*, and therefore no *rea-*

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the Walls remains extended in length, breadth, and depth: But the Space cannot be *removed*, ſince it is of its own Nature immoveable,

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ſon, nor *room*, for a *ground* or *cauſe*. Nay, to aſſign one in any reſpect *prior* to its exiſtence, as it muſt be ſuppos'd to be if conſider'd as a Cauſe; (and it muſt be conſider'd as a Cauſe, or extrinſic Principle, if conſider'd at all: I mean, ſo as to be made any uſe of in the preſent Queſtion, or to infer any thing concerning actual Exiſtence) I ſay, to aſſign any Ground *prior* to the *exiſtence* of this Being, would be to prove this Being *not eternal*, nor the *firſt Cauſe*: as attempting to prove a *ſelf-evident* propoſition is endeavouring to ſhew that propoſition not to be ſelf-evident by aſſigning a *clearer*.

Now to lay down ſome *neceſſity*, *ground*, or *reaſon* of Exiſtence, muſt either be to propoſe it by way of *Cauſality*, or to fix no manner of Idea at all to theſe Words: and indeed no manner of Idea ſeems poſſible to be fix'd to them (as has been obſerv'd by the Ingenious *Author* of the *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Chriſtian Religion*) which is not utterly inconſiſtent with exiſting without Cauſe, as that Being is prov'd to exiſt. For, why do we conſider that *Ground* or *Reaſon in the Order of our Ideas*, as *antecedent* to the Exiſtence of the Being, otherwiſe than as it ſeems *in the Order of Nature antecedently neceſſary* to the Exiſtence of that Being? To which nevertheleſs we allow, that no *Thing*, *Mode*, *Quality*, &c. can be really antecedent. The Caſe will be no better, if we imagine this neceſſity *co-etaneous*, or *co-exiſtent* with the Exiſtence of the Being which is ſupported by it; Since this is to ſuppoſe *that* actually exiſting already, in order to the Exiſtence of which this neceſſity is introduced: and alſo ſeems much the ſame as an effect *co-exiſtent* with its Cauſe. For, as was ſaid before, this *Neceſſity* muſt either be a *Cauſe*, or *nothing* at all to the preſent purpoſe. And that it was propoſed, by the forementioned Author, as ſome ſort of a Cauſe (if he would have ſpoke out) is I think pretty plain.

The whole Caſe then ſeems to ſtand thus. On the one hand here is a certain *alteration* made, a poſitive *effect* produced, without a *Cauſe*; which is a clear contradiction. On the other hand there is a *difficulty* indeed, but not an apparent *contradiction*: There is ſomewhat exiſting of which we can give no *account* (the manner of whoſe *Exiſtence* is different from that of any thing elſe) which will admit of no *Cauſe*, the Idea of which is entirely repugnant to that of *Cauſality*.

This may be hard to conceive, but cannot be deny'd without affirming ſomething worſe, namely, an expreſs contradiction, as has been ſhewn above. In order to ſet this in as clear a light as is poſſible, I ſhall take the Liberty to inſert a paſſage from the learned Writer cited in Note 5, &c. "The Idea of a Self-Exiſtent "Being is the Idea of a *Being that always was*, "*is, and will be*, becauſe he always was, is, "and will be infinitely *able* to be. If you ask "why he is ſo, I know not; Why I believe "ſo, I think I know; it is, becauſe he has *in* "*fact* exiſted from all Eternity, which he "could not have done, had he not been in"finitely able to exiſt. If you ask after the "ground or foundation of this *infinite Ability*, "it is the ſame that is the ground or founda"tion of all his other Perfections, his Infinite "Nature, Eſſence or Subſtance, if you ask far"ther for the ground of *that*, I muſt call it "trifling: if you aſſign *abſolute neceſſity*, I "muſt ask what's next? Or what that means? "or refer you to the *Indian* Philoſopher's *Ele*"*phant* and *Tortoiſe*, as the beſt comment upon "*abſolute, antecedent Neceſſity*."

Neither need we run ourſelves into ſuch abſurdities as theſe: This Independent Being *exiſts becauſe it does exiſt*; or, it exiſts by *chance*. Since it is enough for us to ſay, *There can be no Reaſon why it does exiſt*; or, which is the very ſame thing ſtill, no *Cauſe*, no Cauſal Neceſſity, or antecedent Ground of its Exiſtence.

But if we grant the firſt Being to be now exiſting, there will be a reaſon (contrary to what Dr. *Clarke* aſſerts in his laſt Letter) why he ſhould *exiſt* to morrow, and to all Eternity, ſince

able, (15.) nor can it be *annihilated*; for diſtance would ſtill remain between the bounds which cannot be without Extenſion, nor Extenſion without a Subject; but Space, as far as we can conceive it, is the primary

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ſince ceaſing to be is an *alteration* from Exiſtence to Non-exiſtence, *i. e.* a *Poſitive Effect*, and conſequently muſt require a *Cauſe*; unleſs it can be effected and not effected at the ſame time. Now, as the exiſtence of this Being depends upon no cauſe, no cauſe can ever affect or deſtroy it, and for him to *deſtroy himſelf*, will be the ſame abſurdity, as to ſuppoſe him to make himſelf: therefore he muſt always exiſt, and in the ſame manner that he does *. The reſt of the learned Dr's Arguments contained in the ſame Letter, will be conſidered in the Notes to the 3d Section of the firſt Chapter of this Book †. I ſhall only beg leave to obſerve one thing more in this place, namely, that all the above mention'd reaſoning about *neceſſary exiſtence* ſeems to be built upon that falſe Maxim which *Leibnitz* lays down as the foundation of all Philoſophy, (and which Dr. *Clarke* was very ready to grant him, ſince it was the foundation of his own Book on the Divine Attributes) namely, that *Nothing is without a reaſon, why it is rather than not, and why it is ſo rather than otherwiſe*. Tho' the Dr. is ſoon forced to deny this very Principle, when (in his way of conſidering *Time* and *Space*) he propoſes the *mere Will of God*, as the only reaſon why the World was created at ſuch a certain period of time, and in ſuch a particular point of Space ‖. Of which *Divine Will*, or of its determination, according to himſelf, there can poſſibly be no manner of *reaſon*, ſince he ſuppoſes theſe effects of the Divine Will to be, in every poſſible Manner of Conception, abſolutely *equal* and *indifferent*, and conſequently it would be abſurd to ſuppoſe any reaſon of ſuch ſpecial *Will*, or ſuch particular *determination*. If then we may ſuppoſe two things in nature abſolutely, and in every reſpect, *equal*, (which *Leibnitz*, to be conſiſtent with himſelf, and I believe for no ſufficient reaſon elſe, found it neceſſary to deny) the preference of one of theſe before the other muſt be abſolutely without a *reaſon*. And tho' there may be a ſufficient reaſon for a perſon's *acting* in general, rather than not acting at all, yet (as *Leibnitz* well obſerves **) except there be one alſo for his acting in a certain *particular manner*, which in the preſent caſe there cannot be (according to Dr. *Clarke*'s conceſſion ††) the above mention'd principle is entirely overthrown. See more of this in the latter end of Note 18. and Note 62.

The ſame Argument will hold againſt *Locke*'s *Hypotheſis of Anxiety*, if it be conſider'd as the ſole and abſolute determiner to all Action ‖ ‖, ſince it can never determine the *Mind* to *Will* one Action before another, where both are entirely equal; of which kind numberleſs occur in life, as will be ſhewn at large in its proper place.

(15.) That is, as I have often hinted, if we ſuppoſe it to have any *real Nature*, or to *Exiſt* at all, it muſt, as our Author ſays, exiſt every where, and cannot be remov'd by parts. And in this Senſe ſhould the Words of Sir *Iſaac Newton* be underſtood †††. "*The order of the* "*parts of Space is immutable; remove theſe from* "*their places, and you will remove them, as I* "*may ſay, from themſelves.*" For to ſuppoſe it at all once away, ſeems ſo far from amounting to that *abſurd Suppoſition* mention'd by Dr. *Clarke* ‖ ‖ ‖, that it is no more than what muſt be conceiv'd in every *Annihilation* of any thing, which is the total deſtruction or *taking away* of its Exiſtence, the removal of it, as we may ſay, *from itſelf*, or from Being: which is a Suppoſition that is generally thought to carry no abſurdity along with it.

* *See* Xe. *at the end of* Chap. I. † *See the latter end of Note* 18. ‖ 3*d Reply*, N°. 5. p. 81.
** 5*th Letter*, N°. 17. p. 169. †† N°. 1, 2. p. 12. *of his* 4*th Reply.*
‖ ‖ *See* Note 65. ††† Princ. Schol. ad def. 8. ‖ ‖ ‖ *Anſwer to the* 5*th Let.* p. 39.

primary Subject (16.) of Extenſion, therefore it neceſſarily continues with Diſtance, nor can it be annihilated, unleſs we would have Extenſion without a Subject, that is into *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Depth*, without any thing *Long*, *Broad* and *Deep*. Hence it appears that Space cannot be *partially* annihilated, and from hence the Opinion of its *ſelf-exiſtence* might ariſe.

XVII. For

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(16.) Dr. *Clarke* affirms †, that *Space* is not a *Subſtance*; and yet declares that it has real *Qualities* ‖. Is not this either to ſuppoſe *qualities* or *properties* inherent in one another? or elſe, with *Gaſſendus*, to imagine ſome *middle* thing between *Subſtance* and *Accident*, which is neither of them, but partakes of both?

The learned Writer refer'd to in Note 5. is of the ſame opinion with our Author in this place, *viz.* that we are apt to conceive Space to be a ſort of Subſtance, or *Subſtratum* of *Extenſion*, and ſo are uſed to attribute that and other imaginary Qualities to it. "The Idea "of Space is not the Idea of Extenſion, but "of ſomething extended, it is the *Subſtratum* "of Extenſion, and not Extenſion itſelf. But "when I ſay it is the *Subſtratum*, do not imagine I make it to be any thing without; it "is an *Ideal Subſtratum*, and nothing more. "When the Mind has been conſidering the Idea of Extenſion abſtracted from the extended Bodies, from whence it firſt receiv'd "the Idea, (whether as they are *cauſes* or occaſions of it I conſider not now) it is a very "eaſy Step for the Mind to make farther, to "frame an *imaginary Subſtratum* to ſupport an "*imaginary Extenſion*. And this is the more "eaſy, becauſe the Idea we have of a *real Subſtratum* or Subſtance, the ſupport of real "Qualities is dark and confuſed, an Idea of "*ſomewhat*, and that's all. Now it is but "joining the Idea of *ſomewhat* with the Idea "of one Quality only, namely Extenſion, and "we have an imaginary *Subſtratum* preſently "formed, that is, an Idea of Space, or an *Ideal* extended ſomething. Whether this be "not the very Caſe, I muſt leave to any Man "to judge, by reflecting on his own Ideas.

Again: To this Queſtion, *Why may not Space be rather defin'd Extenſion in the Abſtract, or imaginary Extenſion, rather than the imaginary Subſtratum of imaginary Extenſion?* He anſwers, "Extenſion in the general, or in the "abſtract, is an Idea of *pure Intellect*, i. e. is "to be underſtood, but cannot be *imagin'd* a"ny more than *Whiteneſs* in the general: or a "thouſand other the like abſtract Ideas. But "as ſoon as *imagination* comes to deal with this "general abſtract Idea (or Ideas) it ſupplies it "with an *imaginary* Subſtratum, and ſo makes "the *general*, which was *inviſible*, be conceiv'd "as a *particular*, for the help of the Underſtanding. So if the imagination comes to conceive any certain degree of *Whiteneſs*, it ſupplies the Mind with ſome imaginary white "Surface, and brings down the general Idea "to a particular Object. In like manner, "when it comes to conceive a *Length*, a "*Breadth*, a *Thickneſs*, it ſupplies the Mind "with a Subſtratum, *pro hac vice*, ſuch as may "ſerve the purpoſe, otherwiſe the Mind muſt "reſt in pure intellect only, as in numbers; "and there is nothing more tedious or uneaſy "to the Mind generally than to be wholly *abſtracted*; which is the reaſon, by the way, "that *Arithmetical* Demonſtrations, tho' as "clear and certain as any, are leſs delightful "than *Geometrical*, and nothing more irkſome "than abſtract numbers. Now Space being "the Object of the *Imagination*, and not of pure "*Intellect*, as are all general, abſtract Ideas, it "is properly the *imaginary Subſtratum of an imaginary*

† *Anſwer to the 3d Letter*, p. 22. *and to the 4th.* p. 28.
‖ *Anſwer to the 6th Letter*, p. 38.

XVII. For ſince it is of ſuch a Nature as muſt be annihilated either altogether, or not at all, they that attempted to annihilate it only by *Parts*, ſaw that it was impoſſible to be done, the nature of the thing remonſtrated againſt a partial annihilation, and if one part be ſuppoſed, all others might be demonſtrated to exiſt by neceſſary connection. But if any one ſhould ſuppoſe all extended things to be removed together and at once, he would find nothing impoſſible in that ſuppoſition: For one may imagine nothing to exiſt in Nature beſide his own Soul, and the cauſe on which it depends; which, as a thinking Being, includes nothing of Extenſion in it: every thing that is extended may therefore be ſeparated from Exiſtence. But they that attempted this by parts, when they found it impoſſible, did not ſcruple to reſolve the Cauſe into the ſelf-exiſtence of Space, tho' in reality it did not ariſe from thence, but from this, that they attempted to ſeparate things naturally inſeparable, namely, the parts of Space one from another. Hence aroſe the prejudice for its ſelf-exiſtence.

XVIII. But whether there be any ſuch thing as Space, or no; whether its Extenſion be diſtinguiſh'd from the Extenſion of *Body*, or not: Be it nothing at all: Be it mere *privation of Contract*, as ſome are pleas'd to term it; be it mere *Poſſibility* or *Capacity* of exiſting, as others; be it, laſtly, either ſomething *created*, or of *itſelf*, and *neceſſarily exiſting*, yet ſtill, as far as we know any thing of the nature of it. 'tis an *indolent* thing, it neither *acts*, nor is in the leaſt *acted upon*; We are certain of a firſt Cauſe, in what manner ſoever the diſpute about Space be determin'd

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" *ginary Extenſion*, or the general Idea of Extenſion particulariz'd in an *imaginary Subject*; " and hence it is that *Space* is ſaid to be extended, which would be nonſenſe to ſay of Extenſion itſelf: and Bodies are ſaid to be in " *Space*, which would likewiſe be nonſenſe to " ſay of *Extenſion*. And ſo it is conceiv'd as " *immoveable*, *indiviſible*, *infinite*. Immoveable, &c. all properties of Subſtances; which " makes it plain that it is conceiv'd after the " manner of Subſtance, and therefore is, becauſe it can be nothing elſe, an *imaginary* " *Subſtratum*, which the Mind takes to particularize, and thereby render conceivable, its " general Idea of Extenſion; which could " not otherwiſe fall within the Imagination, " nor be eſtimated any way but by abſtract " numbers, ſo many Yards, or ſo many Miles, " 10, 20, 30; without attending to any thing " but the numbers, and the meaning of the " Words, Yards, Miles, &c. as it is when we " reckon Ounces, Pounds, &c. of Weight.-- " Thus then you ſee how we come by the " notion of Space, and what it is." See alſo Note 5.

on; it cannot therefore, as mere *Extenſion*, under which notion only it appears to us, be the *Cauſe* of *Matter*, or impreſs *Motion* on it, (D.) There

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(D.) There are ſome, who conſidering Space as *ſelf-exiſtent*, imagine it to be the *immenſity* of God. And indeed, if we grant it to exiſt of itſelf, it muſt neceſſarily be refer'd to God. For whatever has *ſelf-exiſtence*, muſt at the ſame time be believ'd to have all *Perfection*. For what can limit a ſelf-exiſtent Being? Self-exiſtence is the greateſt perfection, and no reaſon can be conceiv'd why all perfections ſhould not be aſcribed to him who has that. We muſt therefore entirely deny Space to be *ſelf-exiſtent*, or elſe refer it to *God*. Theſe Men urge farther, in defence of their Opinion, that every *Faculty* which is in any degree *conſcious*, is to be refer'd to *God*, and has him in ſome reſpect for its *Object*. For they think it abſurd to ſuppoſe, that the Creatures ſhould be perceiv'd, and the Author, whoſe Workmanſhip they are, not perceiv'd in the leaſt. All Faculties therefore which are in any reſpect *perceptive*, perceive God ſome way or other: ſome in a greater degree and more clearly, others leſs and more obſcurely, according to their native Perfection. Now our *ſenſes* being very imperfect, can apprehend nothing in God beſide his *Immenſity*, and that very obſcurely: But our *Underſtanding* perceives his *intellectual Attributes*, namely, *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, *&c.* and an Intellect more perfect than that of Man may apprehend ſome properties as much unknown to us as Wiſdom and Goodneſs are to the Senſes: Nay, pious Men, and ſuch as are endow'd with the Holy Spirit, eſpecially the inſpired Prophets, behold ſuch Marks of the Divine Preſence, as neither can be perceiv'd nor believ'd by the Impious.

When they are ask'd how *Space*, to which no *Action* can be attributed (as far as we know any thing of its nature) may belong to God, who is entirely and eſſentially *active*; they reply, that an Object, when perceiv'd by different Faculties, leaves *Tokens* of itſelf, which have no more connection with one another, than if they proceeded from the moſt different Objects, and hence it comes to paſs, that we often take a thing which is perceiv'd by many Faculties, to be more than one. A blind Man that felt *Snow* to be *cold*, and when his eyes were open'd, perceiv'd the ſame under the appearance of *white*, would not know it to be the ſame, without a new Experiment. But, after comparing and examining it, he would eaſily apprehend that the ſame thing ſeemed *cold* to the *touch*, and *white* to the *Eyes*, tho' *Cold* and *Whiteneſs* have no more connection with each other than the Mind and Space. He therefore that apprehends *God* by his *Senſes* as *extended*, by his *Reaſon* as a *Spirit*, may not obſerve without Examination, that theſe tokens belong to the ſame Being, any more than the Man that was lately blind, but now ſees, can perceive that the tangible and viſible Qualities inhere in the ſame Subſtance; namely, the Snow: but upon Examination he will find, that this Space is *ſelf-exiſtent*, and alſo *eternal*, *infinite*, *immoveable*; and that an *infinite Mind*, ſuch as God is, has the very ſame Attributes. Since then there cannot be *two* Infinite and Self-exiſtent Beings, they will have it to be plain, that theſe are partial perceptions of the ſame thing, and belong to the ſame Subſtance, no leſs than Cold and Whiteneſs to the *Snow*.

But to theſe we reply,

1*ſt*. That the Self-exiſtence of Space is not certain, which being taken away, the whole Reaſoning falls to pieces.

2*dly*. 'Tis affirm'd, without a Reaſon, that every *perceptive Faculty* has *God* in ſome manner for its Object: for how can they prove this in *Hearing*, *Smell*, or *Taſte*, ſince *Space* is not perceiv'd by them, nor any thing that can be refer'd to God?

3*dly*. 'Tis true, a thing may be apprehended by different Faculties, under Tokens that have no connection with one another, and thereby we are often deceiv'd, believing that there are different

There muſt then neceſſarily be another *Cauſe* of *Matter* and *Motion*, that is, *active*, *ſelf-exiſtent*, and the Cauſe of all *Things* and *Actions*, which, ſince they are not of themſelves, require a *Cauſe*.

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different Objects perceiv'd by our Faculties, when it is but one and the ſame. But tho' theſe Tokens be *diſperate*, yet they are not contrary and inconſiſtent: Whereas *Space* and *Spirit* ſeem entirely inconſiſtent; ſince one appears by its nature equally incapable of acting or being acted upon; the other ſelf-active, and inſeparable from Action.

4*thly*. Thoſe Objects that are perceiv'd by different Faculties, under Tokens which have no connection with one another, may alſo be actually ſeparated; for inſtance, a thing may be cold and not white, white and not cold; and ſince Space and Spirit are in the Mind as independent as Cold and White, they may be ſeparated, and have a ſeparate Exiſtence, which cannot be ſaid of any Divine Attribute.

5*thly*. It ſeems *uſeleſs*, and to no manner of purpoſe, that God ſhould be the Object of the Senſes, for Brutes, that are held thus to perceive him, worſhip him not, nor acknowledge him as the Author of their Beings, which muſt be eſteem'd to be the only End of perceiving the Creator. From hence, I think, it appears, that this Opinion is by no means probable.

SECT. III.

Of the Firſt Cauſe.

I. WHAT this *active Principle* is we cannot apprehend otherwiſe than by *Reaſon*, for it occurs not to the Senſes, unleſs by its *Effects*, nor is it perceived by them any more than *Light* is by the Ears: our Reaſonings therefore about this Principle will be like thoſe of a *blind* Man about *Light*. A *blind* Man may be aſſur'd that there is a certain thing call'd *Light*, which the Eye can perceive, as the Noſe can Smells; he may be taught alſo by them who ſee, to underſtand many Advantages of Light, namely, that it can *direct* the Steps, that it can *warm*, that it derives its Origin from a large remote

Our Reaſonings about the firſt Cauſe are like thoſe of a blind Man about Light, ſince it is not an object of Senſe.

Body, *i. e.* the *Sun* (17.), that by the help of it very *diſtant* Bodies may be perceiv'd, with their *Forms* and other *Qualities* unknown to him; and that *Fire* which affords only *heat* to him, can give *light* alſo to them who ſee: Laſtly, that it ariſes from ſome Motion in the minuteſt Particles of a *Fluid* (17.).

Yet we know a great many things concerning it.

II. From theſe *external* Properties he might diſcourſe of Light, and in ſome meaſure underſtand the reaſonings of other Men upon it: he would believe it to be diſtinct from *Heat*; he would eagerly deſire, and willingly undergo many hardſhips, to enjoy the benefit of it; yet would he never have any ſuch ſenſe of it as thoſe who ſee. After the ſame manner we may know many things about this active Principle, which we are compell'd, by the force of Reaſons, to believe certainly to exiſt, tho' we are no leſs ignorant of what it is in itſelf, than the blind Man is of the Senſation which Light produces in thoſe who ſee *.

That all other Beings proceed from it.

III. For inſtance; In the *firſt* place we are certain, that all other things come from this *active Principle*: For nothing elſe, as we have ſhewn before †, contains in itſelf *Neceſſary Exiſtence*, or *active Power*, entirely independent of any other; as therefore itſelf is from none, ſo all others are from it. For from hence we conclude, that this Principle does Exiſt; becauſe, after conſidering the reſt of the things which exiſt, we perceive that they could neither *be* nor *act*, if that had not exiſted, and excited Motion in them.

IV. *Se-*

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(17.) Theſe two particulars ſeem neither neceſſary to be mentioned here among *the advantages* that Light affords, nor will the *latter* of them be thought to be exactly *true*, if underſtood of the *Carteſian* Subtle Fluid. Tho' perhaps in effect the *Carteſian* and *Newtonian* doctrines of *Viſion* may in this reſpect be conſiſtent. For, Sir *Iſaac Newton* ſuppoſes, that *Viſion* is perform'd chiefly by the vibrations of a fine *Medium*, which penetrates all Bodies, excited in the bottom of the Eye by the rays of Light, and propagated thro' the Capillaments of the *Optic Nerves* to the *Senſorium*: and *Des Cartes* maintains, that the Sun preſſing the *Materia Subtilis*, wherewith the World is fill'd every way, the Vibrations or Pulſes of that Matter reflected from Objects are communicated to the Eye, and thence to the Senſory. So that the Action or Vibration of a *Medium* is equally ſuppoſed in both, *Chambers*.

* *This Compariſon is farther illuſtrated by the Author of the* Procedure of Human Underſtanding, *in his* Introduction.

† §. 2. *Paragr.* 3, 4, 5, &c. *and Note* 14.

IV. *Secondly*, we are certain that this Principle is *One*, Similar and Uniform; For *Matter* is, as to its *Eſſence*, every where *One* and *alike*; the ſame muſt be ſaid of Space, if we grant it to be any thing diſtinct from Matter: much more muſt the Cauſe, which fills Space with Matter be *One*, *ſimple* and *uniform* (18.). That it is *One*

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(18.) This Argument, (as well as ſome others hereafter mention'd) were the *foundation* of it true, can but be call'd a probable, preſumptive one at beſt: nay, the contrary will rather follow from the *multiplicity* and *diverſity* of created *Subſtances*. We ſhall therefore endeavour to give a diſtinct proof of the *Being* and *Attributes* of *God*, ſo far, at leaſt, as the knowledge of them may affect our preſent Subject.

Now theſe ſeem capable of a clear deduction from this one *ſelf-evident* Principle *, *I Exiſt. I my ſelf exiſt*: therefore *ſomething* exiſts. If *ſomething* exiſts *now*, then ſomething has exiſted *always*, otherwiſe, that ſomething which now exiſts, muſt *once* either have been made by *nothing*, i. e. been *cauſed* by no *Cauſe*, which is abſurd; or elſe have *made* itſelf, *i. e.* have *acted* before it *exiſted*, or been at once both *Effect* and *Cauſe*; which is alſo abſurd; or, laſtly, (which is the only ſuppoſition left) it muſt have been produced by ſomething, which had its Exiſtence from ſomething *elſe*, which alſo depended on ſome *other* Cauſe, and ſo on in an *infinite Series* of Caus'd or Succeſſive Beings, without any eternal or firſt Cauſe, which is alſo abſurd. For either *ſome one* part of this infinite Series has not been *ſucceſſive* to any other, or elſe *all* the ſeveral parts of it have been ſucceſſive: if *ſome one* part of it has not, then there was a *firſt*, which deſtroys the Suppoſition; if *all* the ſeveral parts of it have been ſucceſſive to each other, then they have all once been *future*, and if they have been once all future, then there was a time when *none* of them exiſted; and if there was a time when none of them exiſted, then either all the *parts* of this *Infinite Series*, and conſequently the *whole*, muſt have ariſen from *nothing*; which is abſurd; or elſe there muſt be ſomething in the *whole* beſide what is contain'd in all the *parts*; which is alſo abſurd. This *infinite Series* therefore is, in the whole, and in every part, an expreſs contradiction. Or thus: Since all the parts of this *infinite Series* are *ſucceſſive* or *future* to one another, they muſt once either have been all future, *i. e. non-exiſtent*, (and then the ſecond abſurdity will follow, *i. e. that this whole Series aroſe from nothing*) or elſe all but ſome *one*, (and then the firſt will follow, *i. e. that it had a beginning*) which *one* added to the reſt, either makes them *infinite*, which is abſurd, or they are *infinite* without that one, and then that one added to them makes one more than *infinite*, which is alſo abſurd †.

Hence we gather the *Eternity* ‖ of *ſome one Thing* or *Being*. That *every* one is not in like manner Eternal *a parte ante*, (as the Schoolmen improperly ſpeak) or, *never had a Beginning*; particularly, that no *Body* or *material Syſtem* can be ſo (and the ſame reaſons hold equally againſt any *finite immaterial Subſtance*) is ſufficiently prov'd in the *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Chriſtian Religion* ††.

From Eternity comes *Independence* or *Self-Exiſtence*. For that which never had a beginning of Exiſtence, could not poſſibly have any *Cauſe* of that exiſtence (for then it would not be the *firſt Cauſe*, contrary to what we have prov'd above) or could *depend* upon no other thing for it, *i. e.* muſt be *independent* of all others; or, which is the ſame thing, muſt exiſt of itſelf, *i. e.* be *ſelf-exiſtent* ‖‖.

Eternity *a parte poſt*, or *neceſſary Exiſtence*, or an impoſſibility of ever ceaſing to be, is a neceſſary conſequence of Independence. For, what

* *See* X a. *at the end of* Chap. I. † X b. ‖ X c. †† X d. ‖‖ X e.

Infinite in *Nature* and *Power.*

V. *Thirdly*, That it is *Infinite* both in *Nature* and *Power:* For ſince it exiſts of *itſelf*, there is nothing that can bound its *Nature* or *Power.*

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what depends upon no Cauſe can never be alter'd or deſtroy'd by any, as was ſhewn in Notes 9 and 14, and X e.

From Independence comes alſo *Omnipotence.* For a Being that depends upon no external Cauſe for his Exiſtence, and has *active Power*, (as was ſhewn at the ſame time that we prov'd his Exiſtence, and by the ſame Medium) cannot depend upon any for the exertion of that power, and conſequently no *limits* or defect can be apply'd to *either* his Exiſtence or Power. For *Limitation* is an *effect* of ſome *ſuperior cauſe*, which in the *preſent* caſe there cannot *be*: conſequently to ſuppoſe *limits* where there can be no *limiter*, is to ſuppoſe an *Effect without a Cauſe*; which is a Contradiction †.

To ſuppoſe this Being limited *in* or *by* its own *Nature*, is to ſuppoſe ſome *Nature antecedent*, or *limiting Quality ſuperior*, to that Being, to the Exiſtence of whom, no Thing, no Quality, is in any reſpect *antecedent*, or *ſuperior*: which is another Contradiction. And to ſuppoſe that there is no ſuch thing as *action* or *power* in a Being which appears to be the fountain of all action and power, is (if poſſible) the worſt ſuppoſition of all.

Liberty is alſo included in the Idea of Omnipotence: *Active Power* implies *Freedom*. *Infinite Power* is *abſolute Freedom.* What therefore has no bounds ſet to its power, what can have no oppoſition made to its Will, nor reſtraint laid on its Actions, muſt both will and act *freely.* This Attribute is alſo prov'd from the beginning of Motion, and the creation and diſpoſition of indifferent things ‖. But tho' this Being is *free*, and as ſuch, the Author of *Change* in other *Beings*, yet he muſt himſelf be *Unchangeable.* For all *changes* have a beginning, and conſequently are Effects of ſome *prior Cauſes*: But there can be nothing *prior* to the Exiſtence of this Being, as he is *Eternal*, neither any *Cauſe* of it, as he is *independent*; nor conſequently any *change* in it: except we could ſuppoſe him to *change himſelf*, which is the ſame abſurdity as to *produce* himſelf, *i. e.* to be at the ſame time both *Effect* and *Cauſe.*

Thus we come to the Knowledge of an *Eternal, Independent, Omnipotent, Free*, and *Unchangeable Being.*

Omniſcience, as well as ſome of the foregoing Attributes, may be more eaſily deduced thus. We find in ourſelves ſuch Qualities as *Thought* and *Intelligence, Power, Freedom, &c.* of which we have *intuitive Knowledge*, as much as of our own *Exiſtence*; and that to have theſe is a *perfection*, or, better than to be without them: We find alſo, that theſe have not been in us from *Eternity*, conſequently they muſt have had a *Beginning*, and conſequently ſome *Cauſe*, (for the ſame reaſon that a *Being*, beginning to exiſt in time, requires a Cauſe) which Cauſe, as it muſt be *ſuperior* to its *Effect*, has them in a *ſuperior* Degree ††; and if it be the *firſt Cauſe*, as itſelf can depend upon no *other*, muſt have them in *perfection*, or in an *infinite* or *unlimited* Degree (if theſe Words can properly be here apply'd ‖‖.) Since *Bounds* or *Limitation* would be without a Limiter (as has been ſhewn) *i. e.* an Effect, without a Cauſe.

The *Phænomena* of *Nature* alſo lead us up to *one*, ſuch firſt Cauſe, which is ſufficient for their production, and therefore none elſe are *neceſſary*; and tho' *ſeveral* more *independent* Beings might poſſibly exiſt, yet would they be no *Gods* to us; for they would have no manner of Relation to us, nor we any thing to do with them *. Since therefore the ſame reaſon holds for no more than *One* ſuch, to ſuppoſe more than one is at leaſt unreaſonable.

Theſe ſeem to be all the *ſimple* Attributes obſervable in the Divine Nature, which, as they are differently combin'd by us, come under different names. Thus the unlimited exerciſe of Gods *Knowledge* and *Power* demonſtrates

† X f. ‖ *See Note* 20. *and our Author's Note* F. *and the references.* †† *See the latter part of* X k. ‖‖ *See* X l. * X g.

Power. 'Tis to be obſerv'd farther, that the number of *poſſible* things is conceiv'd by us to be infinite at leaſt in *Power*, but nothing can be *poſſible*,

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ſtrates him *Omnipreſent*, *i. e.* at all times and in all places ſo preſent with every Creature, as to have an abſolute *Knowledge* of, and *Power* over it; always to *ſupervise* and govern it †.

His enjoying all conceivable perfections in an entire abſolute manner, denotes him infinite, or abſolutely *perfect* ‖; and, which is the ſame thing, his being capable of no *want*, *defect*, or *unhappineſs* whatſoever, defines him *all ſufficient*.

And ſince we can never fully comprehend the *nature* of ſuch an infinite or perfect Being, nor conceive the *manner* of his *Exiſtence*, we ſtile him *Incomprehenſible*. To doubt whether his *Nature*, and *manner* of Exiſtence may be in reality thus *incomprehenſible* to us, is to doubt whether the *leſs* may not contain the *greater*; and whether our Ideas of things all exiſting *with* a Cauſe, may not ſhew us the *manner* of a thing's exiſting *without* a Cauſe, exiſting in a *manner* quite *different* from every other thing. He that can doubt of this, may doubt alſo, whether twice two may not be equal to twenty; and whether he may not know how the Sun ſhines by his being always in the Dark.

The *Moral Attributes* of God, are deducible after the ſame manner from his *Natural* ones. All of them (except Goodneſs) are conſider'd only as conſequences of the former, when exerciſed on ſome other Beings, and ſeem to be the Perfections of his *External* Acts, rather than any new internal perfections of his Nature or Eſſence; and are very properly term'd, his *ſecondary*, *relative* Attributes *.

And tho' the Exiſtence of any moral Quality or Action is not capable of ſtrict Demonſtration, becauſe every moral Action or Quality, as ſuch, depends upon the Will of the Agent, which is abſolutely free. Yet, we have as great an Aſſurance that there are Moral Qualities in God, and that he will always Act according to theſe Moral Qualities, as the nature of the thing admits, and may be as abſolutely certain of it, as if we could demonſtrate it ††.

I ſhall begin again, with a Self-Evident Propoſition:

Pleaſure is different from *Pain*; conſequently there's a *difference* in things. Pleaſure is *fit* for, or *agreeable* to, the Nature of a ſenſible Being, or is a *natural Good*; Pain is *unfit*, or is a *natural Evil*: conſequently, there's a natural *fitneſs* and *unfitneſs* of things; or (which is the very ſame, and what theſe terms ſhould always mean) *Natural Good* and *Evil*.

The voluntary *application* of this *fitneſs* and *unfitneſs* to any *Rational* Being, or the Production ‖‖ of this Natural Good and Evil by a Rational Being, is *Moral Fitneſs* and *Unfitneſs*, or Moral Good and Evil: conſequently there is ſuch a thing as Moral Good and Evil. An *Inclination* to, and *Approbation* of, this Moral Good, is implanted in every rational Creature, and is perfective of its Nature, and therefore it muſt be communicated by, and conſequently be inherent in, the Creator †††.

To Will and Act agreeably to this Affection and Approbation, is alſo a Perfection; the contrary an imperfection; conſequently the former, as it is a Perfection found in ſome degree in the Creature, muſt belong to, and be, in the higheſt degree, in the Creator, who has been already proved to exiſt in the beſt manner poſſible, or to have all *natural* perfections in an infinite or perfect Degree ‖‖‖; and therefore he muſt have all *moral* ones ſo too.

As his *Knowledge* and *Power* are *perfect*, he muſt always both perceive and be able to purſue this Moral Good. And as his *Happineſs* is *complete*, there can be no poſſible reaſon why he ſhould ever *will* the contrary; nay, there is a good reaſon why he ſhould not, namely, otherwiſe a perfect Thing would contradict itſelf, and will a *defect* or *imperfection*, i. e. be be perfect and not perfect at the ſame time: And

† X h. ‖ *See* Wollaſton, *p.* 70, 93. * *See* Impartial Enquiry, *p.* 29, 68, &c.
†† *See* Ditton *on* Moral Evidence, *p.* 1, 2. ‖‖ X i. ††† X k. ‖‖‖ X l.

poſſible, to which there is not ſome *Power correſpondent*, that might actually effect it, ſince therefore the things that are poſſible, cannot be

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And a Being infinitely happy, and who loves and approves himſelf, becauſe he is ſo, would hate and diſapprove the very ſame thing in others, *i. e.* would love his own Nature, and yet hate any thing that reſembled it; which is abſurd *. It follows then, that he muſt always *know*, be *able*, and *willing* to do, and therefore *actually* do what is abſolutely *beſt* to be done, *i. e.* produce the greateſt Sum of Happineſs, or be abſolutely and completely Good. This alſo was included in Benevolence, and the moral Senſe above mentioned †.

For if he has implanted Benevolent Affections in us, and a Senſe which approves them, he muſt himſelf have both the ſame Affections, and the ſame Senſe of them ‖.

Again: The Idea of *Goodneſs* properly implies an inclination of communicating happineſs to others; if then this Being be *Good*, he muſt actually have communicated happineſs to others; and *vice verſa*, if he have communicated happineſs to others, he muſt be *good*: But this Being has communicated happineſs to others, therefore he is *Good*.

The Idea of *Wiſdom* implies his knowledge and obſervance of the moſt proper methods of effecting this, and is included in his *Omniſcience*; it being nothing but that very knowledge conſider'd, with relation to practice. It appears farther, from conſidering the only *cauſes* of *imprudence* in Men, which are either *Ignorance*, *Partiality*, or, *Inattention*; none of which can have place in God: He cannot be *ignorant* of any thing, ſince both all things, and their *Relations* to each other, proceed from him: he cannot be *aw'd* by any *Power*, or *ſway'd* by any *intereſt*, ſince (as has been ſhewn) he is *independent* and *all-ſufficient*; and he cannot be *inattentive*, ſince he always ſees every thing *intuitively* and at once; and conſequently he muſt always *know* and *do* what is *fitteſt* and *wiſeſt* to be done.

From which alſo follows his *Juſtice*: For he that ſees all the *circumſtances of things*, and the *qualifications of perſons*, and has *ability* to *regulate* theſe, and no manner of *temptation* to do otherwiſe, muſt certainly ſuit theſe Circumſtances to thoſe Qualifications, or, provide that perſons receive the natural and proper conſequence of their Actions; or (which is the ſame) do with every perſon what is exactly juſt and right.

The ſame alſo holds for his *Holineſs* and *Veracity*, or rather *Faithfulneſs*. As to the former, he muſt always diſlike and deteſt Evil, ſince it can never become in the leaſt *agreeable* to his *Perfections*, or *ſerviceable* to his *Uſe*: As to the latter, he muſt adhere to *Truth*, as it is a *Perfection*, and co-incident with *Good*, *&c.* ſince he can have no poſſible *reaſon* or *motive* to deviate from it. "The reaſon why Men break "their Words (*ſays Bp.* Wilkins) is either be- "cauſe of their *raſhneſs* and *inconſideratneſs* "in making Promiſes, or their *forgetfulneſs* "in not minding them, or their *inconſtancy* in "not keeping them, or their *impotence* to per- "form them: But now the Divine Nature be- "ing infinitely *wiſe*, and *all-ſufficient*, can have "no temptation to be otherwiſe than *true* and "*faithful*, his infinite *knowledge* and *wiſdom* ſe- "cures him from being deceiv'd *himſelf*, his "*Omnipotence* doth exempt him from ſtanding "in *need* of deceiving *others*, and his *Goodneſs* "ſecures us from the leaſt ſuſpicion of any *in-* "*clination* thereto ††."

Thus may we reaſon about the ſeveral perfections of the ſupreme Being, but that which ſhould chiefly direct us in theſe our Enquiries, is the Idea of his *Infinite Goodneſs*. "This "(*ſays the ſame learned Perſon* ‖‖) is the firſt "and cleareſt Notion we have of him, the foun-

* *See* Scot's *Works*, Vol. 2. Diſc. XIV. p. 303. † *See* Xi. ‖ Ibid.
†† Nat. Relig. Ch. 10. p. 142. *6th* Edit. ‖‖ Ibid. p. 138.

be limited, there muſt alſo be a Cauſe infinitely powerful. For as one Poſſibility

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" dation of all our Worſhip and Religion; and " without which all his other Attributes " would not afford ſufficient grounds for our " *Love* and *Adoration.*" *Power* without *Goodneſs* is attended only with the Idea of *Terror*; *Juſtice*, of *Rigour* and *Severity*; *Wiſdom*, of *Artifice* and *Cunning*; and *Truth* will be nothing but rigid *Inflexibility* in arbitrary Decrees *. So that there is no other Attribute, when conſider'd ſeparately from it, capable of giving the Heart any kind or amiable impreſſions; and all the other moral Attributes (if they can properly be call'd Attributes) are ſo far from exiſting apart from it, that they may be conſider'd only as ſo many *different Views* of the ſame Goodneſs in the Creator, and various *Sources* of *Happineſs* to the *Creature*. Nay, farther, the reſt of the moral Attributes ſeem as it were *ſub-ordinate* to, and *regulated by*, this one principal Perfection, and brighteſt ray of the Divinity. Thus we conceive his *Juſtice* to be exerted on any Being no farther than his Goodneſs neceſſarily requires, in order to the making that Being, or others, *ſenſible* of the *heinous* nature and *pernicious effects* of *Sin*; and thereby bringing either *it*, or ſome *others*, to as great a degree of Happineſs, as their ſeveral *Natures* become *capable* of †. His *Holineſs hates* and *abhors* all *Wickedneſs*, only as the *neceſſary Conſequence* of it is abſolute and unavoidable *Miſery*; and his *Veracity* or *Faithfulneſs*, ſeems to be no more concern'd for *Truth*, than as it is connected with, and productive of, the Happineſs of all rational Beings; to provide the propereſt *Means* for attaining which great *end*, is the exerciſe of his *Wiſdom*. Thus, tho' we are certain, that all the Divine Attributes proceed equally from one and the *ſame principle*, and are united in one *Eſſence*; yet when we conſider that Eſſence as exhibited to us in *different reſpects*; we alſo conceive it *partially* under the diſtinct Ideas of *Superior*, and *Inferior*, *antecedent* and *conſequent*, *&c.* In which Senſe, Goodneſs is ſuperior and antecedent to, and as it were, the *root* and *foundation* of, all the *Moral Attributes*.

I have all along declin'd the Argument *a priori*, drawn from the antecedent *neceſſity* of *Exiſtence*, as well for the reaſons given above in Note 14. as alſo, becauſe it ſeem'd not to carry *ſome* Atttributes, ſo far as they might be deduced *a Poſteriori*, and to be ſcarce conſiſtent with *others*. That the *Self-exiſtent* Being, for inſtance, is not a *blind*, *unintelligent* Neceſſity, but in the moſt proper Senſe, an *underſtanding* and really *active* Being, cannot be demonſtrated ſtrictly and properly *a priori*, as Dr. *Clarke* ſays ‖, with a great deal of reaſon; and how *abſolute Neceſſity* is reconcileable with *abſolute freedom*, ſeems hard to conceive. For why ſhould not this neceſſity extend to all the *Operations*, the *Will*, the *Decrees*, as well as the *Exiſtence* of the firſt Cauſe: and take away that Freedom of determination, that entire *Liberty* of *Indifference*, which our Author has ſufficiently proved ††, to be a property of *God* himſelf, as well as *Man?* And, if we cannot admit it in one caſe, why ſhould we in the other? I don't ſay this *Neceſſity* is inconſiſtent with perfect *Freedom*, as the former is an *Imperfection*, ſince we do not conceive it to be ſuch, any farther, than as it proceeds, *ab extra*, from ſome ſuperior Cauſe *impoſing* it. But, this I ſay, that, be it what you pleaſe, the very *Nature* and *Idea* of it ſeems repugnant to that of *Freedom*, *i. e.* the power of determining in caſes abſolutely indifferent, without any previous *reaſon*, or *neceſſity* whatſoever; and conſequently theſe two can never be *co-exiſtent* in the *ſame Cauſe*: He that conſiders this attentively, will, I believe, find it to be more than a mere *quibble* on the Words ‖‖.

Laſtly, This *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence, being (as Dr. *Clarke* contends ***) *Simple* and *Uniform*, without any poſſible *difference* or variety, ſhould admit

* *See* Tillotſon's 90 *Serm.* vol. 2. Fol. p. 679. † Xm. ‖ *Demonſtr.* p. 52.
†† Chap. 5. §. 1. Subj. 4. *and elſewhere.* ‖‖ *See Notes* 14 & 62. ** *Demonſtr. Prop.* 7.

Poſſibility requires a Cauſe, ſo infinite Poſſibilities require a Cauſe infinitely powerful (19.).

Free. VI. Fourthly, Since *Space* is conceiv'd as merely *idle* and *indifferent*, with reſpect to *Repletion* or *Vacuity*; ſince the *Matter* which fills Space, is in like manner merely paſſive and indifferent with reſpect to *Motion* and *Reſt*; it follows, that the *Cauſe* which fills Space with Matter, and produces Motion in that Matter, is perfectly *free*; ſo that the Creation and Motion of Matter muſt be Works of free Choice, and not Neceſſity, in the Agent. For, if the Agent effected theſe by Neceſſity, they would alſo be neceſſary Effects, and could not be conceiv'd to be in themſelves indifferent to Exiſtence

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admit of no difference or variety of any ſort, or in any reſpect, and conſequently muſt exclude all *diverſity*, or *different kinds* of *perfection* (as well as different *Perſons*) from the Divine Nature, which is ſuppos'd to exiſt thereby. It muſt be utterly inconſiſtent with that Variety of Attributes, ſuch as *Knowledge* and *Power*, &c. which we conceive to be very *diſtinct* Properties, and which Dr. *Clarke*, and every one elſe, concludes to be eſſentially in God.

If the *Learned Doctor*'s Notion of *abſolute Neceſſity* proves all this, I humbly conceive it proves too much, and if it does not prove this I cannot apprehend how it proves any thing at all. See *S. C*'s *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 170.

(19.) I ſhall give the Reader this Argument as it is propos'd after another manner by Dr. *Fiddes*, and the Anſwer to it, by *S. C.*

" To ſay a thing is poſſible, is to ſay, there " is ſome *thing*, ſome *power* or other capable " of producing it. For *nothing*, or what has " no power, can produce *no effect*. The " power therefore, which is to bring what is " *poſſible* into *Being*, is neceſſarily ſuppoſed al- " ready to exiſt; otherwiſe a *Perfection* might " ariſe out of *non-entity*, or without a Cauſe; " and what we conceive poſſible, would be " *really* impoſſible *." "

Which the *Author* of the *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. confutes, by a parallel inſtance.

" If a perſon having firſt proved the exi- " ſtence of a Power that is perfect, and made " it appear, that a perfect power cannot but " extend to whatever is a capable object of " power, or includes not a contradiction; " ſhould proceed to prove, that the *Act of Cre- " ation* implies no contradiction, and then at " *laſt* ſhould conclude, that therefore *Creation* " is a poſſibility (*i. e.* effectible by the exer- " ciſe of that perfect or almighty power, whoſe " Exiſtence he had before demonſtrated) I " conceive there could be no reaſonable ex- " ception againſt ſuch a method of Arguing. " But if, on the contrary, he ſhould ſay, I " plainly perceive there's no contradiction in " the Suppoſition of the Creation, or produ- " ction of a thing that was not, and ſhould " from thence immediately infer, that a power " capable of Creation exiſts, this would be a " very prepoſterous way of Demonſtrating: " which yet is the ſame method with that of " the preſent Argument ‖."

* Theolog. Spec. p. 15.

‖ *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 178.

ſtence or Non-Exiſtence, as proceeding from a neceſſary Cauſe, (20.)

That it is a *conſcious*, intelligent Being, and omniſcient.

VII. Fifthly: Tho' by our outward Senſes, and the notices which they convey to us, we cannot go beyond *Space*, *Matter*, *Motion*, *ſenſible Qualities*, and this *Active Principle* which we are ſpeaking of; yet, if we inſpect our own Minds, we may contemplate a *Self-conſcious* and *thinking Principle* within us, whoſe Actions are, to *will*, *refuſe*, *doubt*, *reaſon*, *affirm* and *deny*, which carry nothing of Extenſion along with them, nor neceſſarily include it in them, nor have any relation to *Place* or *Space*; but are entirely abſtracted from the Notions of *external* or *internal*. That there is ſuch a Principle in us we are certain, not only from our ſenſes, or the impulſes of external objects, but alſo from Reflection and Self-Conſciouſneſs. 'Tis to be obſerv'd farther, that we can at our pleaſure move ſome parts of Matter, and ſhake the Limbs of our Body by thought only, that is, by Volition *, whence it appears, that Motion may be produc'd in Matter by thought; and that ſomething of this kind is to be attributed to the firſt Cauſe, in order to put Matter into Motion, nay, to bring it into Being. *Cogitation* alſo, *Will* and *Conſciouſneſs*, or Faculties equivalent to theſe, are neceſſary to a *free* Cauſe, and on that account to be attributed to the firſt Cauſe, being (as ſhall be ſhewn below) perfectly Free: which Cauſe, ſince it is infinite (as we have proved) in its Eſſence and Power, it muſt be ſo likewiſe in *Intelligence*, viz. *Omnipotent* and *Omniſcient*.

That he acts for an *End*.

VIII. Sixthly: Since this Principle (which we call *God*) is the Cauſe of all things, and infinite in *Knowledge* as well as *Power*, it follows, that he acts, not by blind impulſe but, *for an End*; and has order'd his Works by ſuch Wiſdom, as to be conſiſtent with themſelves, and not deſtructive of each other.

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(20.) For an excellent illuſtration of this Argument, ſee Dr. *Clarke*'s *Demonſtrat.* p. 24, 25, 26. and 65, 66, 67. 5th Edit. See alſo *Cudworth*, p. 667, *&c.* and the *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, *&c.*

* That *Volition* and *Action* are perfectly diſtinct, and muſt proceed from two different *Powers*, See Note 61. That *Action* alſo is two-fold, See Note 62.

That the end of Creation was to exerciſe the power, and to communicate the Goodneſs of the Deity.

IX. Seventhly: Since God is perfect in himſelf, ſince all things ſubſiſt by his Providence, and ſtand in need of him, but he of none; and, ſince he can neither be profited nor incommoded by his Works, nor affected by their Good or Evil; it follows, that he made theſe things for no Advantage of his own, and that he neither receives nor expects any Benefit from them. For by creating things without himſelf, he muſt neceſſarily have ſought either their Benefit or his own; but what Benefit can God ſeek for himſelf, who poſſeſſes all Good? That certainly which was wanting to him, and neceſſarily muſt be wanting, to a Being even abſolutely perfect, till he has created ſomething; I mean the Exerciſe of his Attributes *without* the communicating of his Power and Goodneſs: That therefore only muſt he be ſuppoſed to have ſought in the Creation and Diſpoſal of his Works (21.). Not that *Externals* can add any thing to *God*, for

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(21.) Some have objected here, that according to this Notion, there muſt have been a Time before the exiſtence of any created Beings, when God was neither infinitely *happy*, nor abſolutely *Good* *. But the one part of this objection evidently ariſes from a miſtake of our Author's Notion, who has often told us, that he does not ſuppoſe any thing external to the Deity, to *add* the leaſt to his own Happineſs, or Eſſential Perfections; (and indeed, to think otherwiſe, would be worſe than to imagine the Fountain fed by its own Streams; or the Sun enlighten'd by its own Rays) but only to *manifeſt* them to us his Creatures, and encreaſe our happineſs and perfection, by our *knowledge* and *imitation* of them. The *other* part cannot be of force againſt Creation in any *particular* time; becauſe it will hold equally againſt it in *all* times: Againſt the very poſſibility of Creation in General, ſince with God there is no *prior* and *poſterior*, no difference of time applicable to his Exiſtence, as we have endeavour'd to prove in Xc. Beſides, is it not abſurd to talk of *time*, before the beginning of things, which time (as we have ſhewn in the ſame place) can only be conceiv'd as *co-exiſtent with*, or rather *conſequential to*, the Being of theſe things? 'Tis in vain therefore to ask, why were not Beings created *ſooner?* Since no part of Duration conceivable can ever be aſſign'd, when ſome were not Created, and every period of time has equal relation to Eternity. "As to the ſecond Senſe of the "Queſtion (ſays *Cudworth*) Why the World, "tho' it could not poſſibly be from Eternity, "yet was no ſooner, but ſo lately made? We "ſay, that this is an *abſurd Queſtion*, both becauſe Time was made together with the "*World*, and there was no *ſooner* or *later* before *Time*; and alſo, becauſe whatſoever had "a beginning, muſt of neceſſity be once but a "*day old*. Wherefore, the World could not "poſſibly have been ſo made by God in time, "as not to be once but *five* or *ſix thouſand* "Years old and no more, as now it is." p. 887. See the ſame more at large in *Fiddes*'s *Theolog. Spec.* B. 3. Part 1. Ch. 2. and in *Bentley*'s *Boyle*'s *Lect.* p. 232, 235. 5th Edit. or *Jenkin*'s *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, Vol. 2. C. 9. or Sir *M. Hale*'s *Prim. Originat. of Mankind*, S. 1. C. 6. Where

* *See Bp.* Pearſon *on the* Creed, 2d Edit. p. 62, 63.

for they have no manner of Proportion to his *Power* or *Nature*: but he has in himſelf the adequate Exerciſe of his Powers, namely in the Contemplation and Love of himſelf. Externals therefore can neither encreaſe nor diminiſh the *Exerciſe* of his Powers, which before was *infinite* (22.) God is indifferent therefore as to theſe, nor does his Exerciſe *without* pleaſe him, otherwiſe than as he has choſen to exerciſe himſelf thus; as will be ſhewn below *. And hence it manifeſtly follows, that the World is as well as it could be made by infinite *Power* and *Goodneſs*. For ſince the Exerciſe of the Divine Power, and the Communication of his Goodneſs, are the Ends for which the World is fram'd, there is no doubt but God has attain'd theſe Ends.

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Where you have all the abſurd Queries of that kind ſolidly and acutely anſwer'd.

(22.) The *Powers* or *Attributes* themſelves were in ſome Senſe *Infinite*, but I don't apprehend how the *Exerciſe* of them can properly be ſaid to be ſo. It ſeems impoſſible to ſuppoſe any Divine Attribute, either Natural or Moral, to be exerted infinitely on a finite Subject, ſince that Subject muſt neceſſarily be incapable of receiving it. Whence appears the abſurdity of imagining any Man to be the object of God's *infinite Juſtice*, and at the ſame time, of his *infinite Mercy* too, in an infinite manner, as ſome love to ſpeak; which with them raiſes a mighty difficulty about *Hell Torments*: Whereas, if we ſhould allow that the Divine Juſtice is an Attribute entirely diſtinct from Goodneſs, and alſo, that a perſon may be at the ſame time the object of both; concerning which ſee X m. Yet ſtill we can eaſily ſuppoſe theſe two Attributes in ſuch a Caſe *bounded* and *balanc'd*, as it were, by each other, without any *defect* in either; all the limitation here only riſing from the limitation or *finiteneſs* of the *Subject* on which they are ſuppos'd to be *exerted*; which, as 'tis finite, manifeſtly cannot receive an infinite Exerciſe of an infinite Power.

The ſame Obſervation will help us to ſolve the Difficulty which ſome bring againſt the very notion of infinite Power in God, which, ſay they, implies this Contradiction, *viz.* that he *cannot* do all that he *can* do: He could not make the World ever ſo ſoon, but that it was poſſible for him to have made it ſooner: he can never make it ſo large, that it will be impoſſible for him to make it larger: which is abſurd. To which we anſwer; If theſe terms, *can* and *cannot*, were applied to the ſame thing, in the ſame *reſpect*, it would indeed be a plain contradiction; but in the preſent caſe 'tis otherwiſe. The *former* is apply'd to the *Objects* of power in general, which are included in this Idea, *i. e.* 'tis affirm'd, that the Power of God is perfect, or extends, and is commenſurate, to all objects of Power, or that he can do whatever is in the nature of things poſſible to be done. The latter is affirm'd only of ſome *particular Subject*, which is in its own nature incapable of Perfection, or incommenſurate to this infinite Power, and on which therefore we may truly ſay, that this infinite Power cannot be employ'd, or that this Perfection can never be completely exhibited, or exhauſted in it. So that in the preſent Caſe, theſe two Words

* *See* Chap. 5. §. 1. Subj. 4.

When the World is said to be created for *God's Glory*, 'tis *after the manner of Men.*

X. I know 'tis commonly ſaid, that the World was made for the *Glory of God:* but this is *after the manner of Men.* For *Deſire of Glory* is attributed to God in the ſame manner as *Anger*, *Love*, *Revenge*, *Eyes*, and *Hands.* When therefore the Scripture teaches us, that the World was created for the Glory of God, 'tis to be underſtood, that the Divine Attributes, namely, *Power*, *Goodneſs* and *Wiſdom*, ſhine forth as clearly in his Works, as if he had no other intent in making them, beſide the Oſtentation of theſe Attributes; nor could they have anſwer'd that End more fitly, if they had been deſign'd for *Glory:* but, ſtrictly ſpeaking, the Power of God is infinite, and when he acts for the Good of his Creatures according to that infinite *Power*, he is *infinitely Good.* Infinite knows no bounds, nor has the Goodneſs of God any other bounds beſides his *Wiſdom* and *Power*, which are alſo infinite. And in reality, this makes moſt for the *Glory of God*, viz. to have created a World with the greateſt *Goodneſs.* (23.)

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Words may be uſed, without any Contradiction: and infinite, or rather perfect, Power may properly enough be term'd, *not able* to do ſeveral things without ſuppoſing a defect in that power, but only in the Subjects which are incommenſurate to it, or eſſentially incapable of receiving it. Now, that the *Material World*, and every part or property thereof is, in every reſpect, incapable of this Infinity, has, I think, been prov'd in Note 5. and that *no created Being* whatſoever can be capable of it, will be ſhewn in Note 28.

(23.) " The reaſon why God made the " World (ſays the *learned Perſon* ſo often cited " above) was from his own overflowing and " communicative *Goodneſs*; that there might " be other Beings alſo happy beſide himſelf, and " enjoy themſelves." And afterwards, " *God* " *did not make the World merely to oſtentate his* " Skill *and* Power, *but to communicate his* Good- " neſs, *which is chiefly and properly his* Glory, " *as the Light and Splendor of the Sun is the Glo-* " *ry of it* †."

We have a fine Paragraph or two to the ſame purpoſe in Mr. *Wollaſton's Delin. of the Religion of Nature*, p. 115—120.

The ſame *Notion* is well ſtated in *Scott's Chriſtian Life*; where the Glory of God and the Happineſs of Man are ſhewn to be *co-incident* ‖. As this ſeems to be very often miſunderſtood, it may not be improper to inſert a Paſſage or two from that excellent Author. " *A true Sur- " vey and Inſpection of God's *Nature*, will " inſtruct us, that being *infinitely perfect*, as " he is, he muſt be *infinitely happy* within him- " ſelf; and ſo can deſign no ſelf-end without " himſelf; and conſequently, that the end for " which he requires our Service, is not any " advantage he expects to reap from it, or " farther *addition* to his own happineſs, he be- " ing from all Eternity *paſt*, as completely " happy as he can be to all Eternity *to come*; " and

† *Intell. Syſtem*, p. 886.
‖ *See* Vol. 1. p. 4, 5.
* Vol. 2. Chap. 6. p. 434, 435.

XI. By *Good*, I here underſtand that which is *convenient* and *commodious*, that which is *correſpondent* to the *Appetite* of every Creature. God therefore created the World with as great convenience, and fitneſs, with as great congruity to the Appetites of things, as could be effected by infinite *Power*, *Wiſdom*, and *Goodneſs*. If then any thing inconvenient or incommodious be now, or was from the beginning in it, that certainly could not be hindered or removed even by infinite Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs (24.).

That God made the World as well as it could be made by the higheſt Power, Goodneſs, and Wiſdom.

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" and therefore, what other end can he be ſup-
" pos'd to aim at, than *our* Good and Happi-
" neſs? It is true indeed, he deſigns to Glo-
" rify *himſelf* in *our* Happineſs; but how?
" Not to render himſelf *more* glorious by it
" than he is in himſelf, for that is impoſſible;
" but to *diſplay*, and *ſhew forth* his own eſſen-
" tial Glory to all that are capable of *admi-*
" *ring* and *imitating* him; that thereby he
" might *invite* them to *tranſcribe* that Goodneſs
" of his into their Nature, of which his Glo-
" ry is the *Shine* and *Luſtre*, and thereby to
" Glorify *themſelves*; and what can more ef-
" fectually diſplay the Glory of a Being who
" is infinitely *wiſe*, and *powerful*, and *good*,
" than to *contrive* and *effect* the Happineſs of
" his Creatures, and eſpecially of his rational
" Creatures, who, of all others, have the moſt
" ample capacity of Happineſs?

And again: " † But, doth not the Scripture
" tell us, *that he doth all things for his own*
" *Glory*, and that he obtains this end, as well
" by *puniſhing*, as by *rewarding*, his Creatures?
" very true; but then it is to be conſider'd,
" that the Glory he aims at, conſiſts not in
" receiving any *Good* from us, but in doing
" and communicating all Good to us. For
" infinite Goodneſs can *no otherwiſe* be *glori-*
" *fied*, than by its own overflowings and free
" communications, and it can no otherwiſe be
" glorified in the puniſhment of its Creatures;
" but only as it doth *good* by it: For, ſhould
" it puniſh without good reaſon, it would re-
" proach and vilify itſelf; but if it doth it
" for good reaſon, it muſt be becauſe it is
" good either for *itſelf*, or *others*: for *itſelf* it
" cannot be; for how can an *infinitely* happy
" Being, reap any *Good* from *another*'s Miſe-
" ry? And therefore it muſt be for the Good
" of others, either to reduce *thoſe* who are pu-
" niſh'd, or to warn *others*, by their Example,
" from running away from their Duty and
" Happineſs. So that to do *Good* is the end of
" God's Puniſhment; and becauſe it is ſo, he
" is *glorify'd* by it: and conſidering that he is
" ſo *infinitely* happy, that he can no ways ſerve
" himſelf by our Miſeries, it is impoſſible he
" ſhould have any other end in concerning
" *himſelf* about us, but only the *Great; God-*
" *like* one of doing us Good, and making us
" happy." See alſo Diſcourſe 14 in the ſame Vol. p. 302.

To the ſame purpoſe is *Smith*'s Excellent Diſcourſe of the *Exiſtence and Nature of God*, Ch. 4 and 7. ‖ And *D'Oyly*'s firſt *Diſſertation*, p. 122. and *Rymer*'s *General Repreſentation of Reveal'd Religion*, p. 260——267. and p. 511. and Bp. *Burnet*'s *Expoſition of the Articles*, p. 27. 4th Edit. and our *Author*'s *Sermon* on *Divine Predeſtination*, &c. §. 33. For a ſufficient Anſwer to the Objection drawn from *Prov.* 16. 4. ſee *Tillotſon*'s 2 vol. of Sermons, Fol. p. 681.

(24.) Our *Author* rightly concludes from the *Nature* and *Will* of God, as diſcover'd above, that nothing can be made by him (by whom are all things made) really unworthy of, or inconſiſtent with, theſe; however unaccountable and irregular things may at preſent ſeem to us: For,

† Vol. 2. p. 204. Fol.

‖ *See* Select Diſcourſes, p. 136, and 147.

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For, having demonſtrated the Divine Perfections in one Senſe *a Priori*, i. e. prior to the Examination of particular Phænomena, no ſeeming difficulties or objections whatſoever *a Poſteriori*, i. e. from theſe Phænomena, ought to invalidate the belief of them, but ſhould be all over-ruled by, and give way to, theſe; except they amount to an equal degree of *Clearneſs* and *Certainty*, with the proofs of theſe themſelves; and alſo cannot poſſibly admit of any manner of *Solution* conſiſtent with them; neither of which Caſes can ever be made out, as will, I hope, appear in the following Chapters of this Book.

REMARKS, referr'd to in Note 18.

[X a.] That this Propoſition muſt be allow'd for *ſelf-evident*, and as ſuch, incapable of *proof*, appears from the *abſurdities* which all run into who attempt to prove their own Exiſtence from any other *medium*, *viz.* from any of their *operations*. *I think*, ſay they, therefore *I am*, i. e. *I*, who *am*, *think*; therefore, *I*, who *think*, *am*. I being ſuppoſed to *exiſt*, do think, therefore this *thinking* proves that *Exiſtence*. Is not this plainly arguing in a *circle*, and *proving* a thing by *preſuppoſing* it? And is it not full as clear to me that *I am*, as that *I think?* Tho' perhaps I could not be certain of my Exiſtence except *I perceiv'd* ſomething: yet ſure the perception of my own Exiſtence muſt be both as *early* and as *evident* as any other perceptions. The firſt Propoſition therefore is *ſelf-evident*, and if the ſecond be not ſo too, 'tis however neceſſarily connected with one. I begin with our own Exiſtence, becauſe we have *Intuitive Knowledge* of no other.

[X b.] See the abſurdity of this Infinite Series, as to Generations, Motion, Number, Magnitude, *&c.* in the Notes 5, and X d. All, or any of which Arguments demonſtrate the Abſurdity of it, as it is fairly and fully ſtated by Dr. *Green* in his late *Philoſophy* *. Where you ſee the true old *Atheiſtic Series* in a different dreſs from that in Dr. *Clarke*'s 2d Propoſition.

The ſame way of reaſoning is made uſe of in a *Philoſophical Eſſay towards an Eviction of the Being and Attributes of God*, by *S. W* †. "That "the World was not eternal, but created, is "demonſtrable from things that are viſible: "Our Argument ſhall be from Generation. "Whatſoever is begotten, was begotten of "ſome other; for nothing can poſſibly beget "or make itſelf, otherwiſe it will follow, "that the ſame thing is, and is not, both at "one inſtant, ſeeing it is both the producer, "and the thing to be produced. It is to be "produced, and ſo it is not yet, it is likewiſe a producer, and that ſuppoſeth that it "is in Being: It is therefore in Being, and "it is not in Being, that's a manifeſt contradiction. Wherefore, nothing can generate, "make, or produce itſelf: wherefore, every "thing that is begotten, is begotten of ſome "other, and then the other which begot it, "either was itſelf in the ſame manner begotten, or it was not; if it was not, we are already come to the firſt Principle, which "was, unbegotten, and ſo have diſcover'd a "God-head. If it was begotten, either we "muſt follow up the Courſe of ſucceſſive Generation to ſome firſt Production from a "Cauſe eternal, or elſe we muſt neceſſarily "ſay, that the Courſe of Generations had no "beginning, and conſequently, that infinite "Succeſſions are already paſt, which is as "much as to acknowledge, that an infinite Number

* *B.* 6. C. 5. §. 8. p. 763.

† 2d Edit. *Oxford*, 1655.

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" Number of Succeſſions, are paſt, and if paſt, " then they are at an end; So we have found " an infinite Number, which hath had an " end, that is another Contradiction. Again: " if any ſhall affirm, that the courſe of Gene- " ration had no beginning, but that the num- " ber of them hath been Infinite: let us put a " Caſe, and reaſon with him: We will ima- " gine the Generations of *Abraham*, for ex- " ample, and *Joſeph* the Son of *Iſaac*, the Son " of *Abraham*. I demand therefore, whether " before the birth of *Abraham* there had paſt " an infinite Series of Generations, or not? " If the Series was finite, the Work of Gene- " ration had beginning; which is the Conclu- " ſion I contend for: if the Series paſt was in- " finite; then, at the birth of *Joſeph*, 'tis evi- " dent, that more Generations were paſt, ſo " we have found a Number greater than that " which was ſuppos'd to be Infinite: and con- " ſequently that was not Infinite; ſo it was " both Infinite and not Infinite, a manifeſt " contradiction.

" But if we ſay that *Abraham*'s was Infinite, " and that ſo was *Joſeph*'s alſo, then it will " follow, that the Number of *Abraham*'s was " equal with the number of *Joſeph*'s, but *A- braham*'s was but a part of *Joſeph*'s, where- " fore the part is equal to the whole. Elſe ad- " mit that *Abraham*'s was finite, but when it " came to *Joſeph*, that then the number was " Infinite, it follows then, that a finite num- " ber added to a finite, ſhall make an Infinite, " which likewiſe is againſt the common light " of reaſon. We ſee therefore, that ſuppoſing " the Eternity of the World, or the Infinity " of Generations, doth force the Mind to con- " tradictions, and conſequently the Fiction is " vain and utterly impoſſible. And, as we " have argued in the way of Generation, ſo " we may likewiſe in every thing where there " is a Motion, or Mutation, that is, in all the " parts of the viſible World. The Creation " therefore of the World, from the viſible " things thereof, is manifeſt. Q. E. D." p. 19.

And again, p. 22. Well, having concluded " the Creation and Beginning of the World, " we ſee it follows, that thence we conclude " the Eternal Power and God-head; that is, " the Eternity and Power of the God-head. " As for Eternity, we have, by undeniable " conſequence, reſolv'd all Motions in the " World into the boſom of a firſt Mover, and " if we ſuppoſe him a firſt Mover, the Suppo- " ſition will evidently conclude, that he is E- " ternal, *i. e.* that he is without Beginning of " Eſſence, or without any term or limit of " Duration. For if it had any beginning of " Eſſence or Duration, that beginning of Be- " ing preſuppoſeth a priority of not-being, " (that is, actual Being is not of the Eſſence of " it) and ſo that we may, without any contra- " diction, ſuppoſe it not to be yet in Being; " that is, we may bring our Underſtandings, " without error, to the apprehenſion of it, as " being yet in the State of Power only, or " Potential-being, ſo as things are in their " Cauſes. So then, let us conceit it in this " State, and compare this State with the other " when it had Being; and it is evident, that " this paſſage, or tranſition from want of Be- " ing to a Being, cannot be without a Mo- " tion, nor Motion without an actual Mover: " but that which moves a thing from not be- " ing to a State of Being, is neceſſarily a pre- " cedent Mover to that which from it receives " its Being: So then that which is ſuppoſed " to be the firſt original Mover will have a " Mover, which ſhall of neceſſity have gone " before it, and conſequently it will be both a " firſt and not a firſt Mover, which is a plain " Contradiction. Inſtead of multiplying Ar- " guments without neceſſity, we will only re- " turn by the Footſteps of our Analyſis, and ſo " from the Being of a firſt Mover, conclude " the Eternity. If it be a firſt Mover, then it " had no former Mover; and if ſo, then it ne- " ver was produced from Nothing into Being; " and if ſo, then it never had any beginning of " its Being, then it is Eternal. Therefore, " whatſoever is the firſt Mover, it muſt of " neceſſity likewiſe be eternal: but from the " common affections of things viſible, we did " before demonſtrate an Original and firſt " Mover: Wherefore, the viſible things of this " World,

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" World, they likewiſe do evict the Eternity " of the God-head *.

" And that God was a God of Power, it " was demonſtrated then, when we found him " to be the firſt Cauſe, and Original Mover, " and Creator of the World †."

[X c.] The generally receiv'd Notion of *Eternity*, as conſiſting in a continual addibility of *ſucceſſive Duration*, is, I think, the very ſame thing as an *infinite Series*, and conſequently liable to the ſame objections: We muſt therefore try to reſcue this Divine Attribute from ſuch an abſurd interpretation.

Now, if we attentively examine our *Idea* of *Eternity*, I believe we ſhall find that it amounts to thus much: *viz. uniform, invariable Exiſtence*: or, *ſimple Exiſtence* join'd with *Neceſſity*: by which laſt Word we only underſtand an *Impoſſibility of having ever begun, or of ever ceaſing*. This I apprehend to be all that can conſiſtently be affirm'd of the Divine Exiſtence in this reſpect, and perhaps we may more eaſily and ſafely determine what the manner of it is *not*, than what it is; v. g. that it continues not by *time*, or in *place*: Indeed *local Extenſion* and *ſucceſſive Duration*, are modes of the Exiſtence of moſt Beings, and therefore we find it very difficult to conſider any exiſtence without them: But as we have endeavour'd to ſhew the poſſibility of removing the *former* from the Divine Eſſence, in Notes 5, 11, & 13. So here, I think, it may be ſhewn alſo, that the *latter* has no neceſſary connection with it, but rather the contrary.

In order to do this, it will be neceſſary to explain what we mean by *Time*, which (according to Mr. *Locke*) is of the very ſame *kind* with *Duration*; and may properly be term'd a *part* of it. This is very well defin'd by *Leibnitz*, to be the *Order of Succeſſion of Created Beings*. We manifeſtly get the Notion of it, by reflecting on the Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, which we are apt to conceive as a *Chain* drawn out in length, of which all the particular Ideas are conſider'd as the *Links*, Whereas, had we but one *invariate perception*, without any ſuch Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, we could have no ſuch notion as this of *Duration*, but that of pure *Exiſtence* only. Now *Exiſtence* being evidently a ſimple Idea, (tho' perhaps *Duration* be not) is conſequently incapable of a Definition, and we need, I think, only obſerve of it here, that if we join our Idea of *Duration* to it, we ſtill add nothing to the Idea of it as it is in *itſelf*, but merely a *relation* to external things; which Idea of Duration therefore ſeems purely accidental to it, and no neceſſary Ingredient of the former Idea, which is complete without it. *Time* then, or *Duration*, is an Idea entirely reſulting from our Conſideration of the Exiſtence of Beings, with reference to a real or imaginary *Succeſſion*. Whence it will follow in the *firſt* place, that we cannot poſſibly frame any Idea of this kind of *Duration*, without taking in Succeſſion; and ſecondly, that we *can't* eaſily ſeparate the *Exiſtence* of any finite, changeable Beings from this kind of *Duration*.

Our next Enquiry muſt be, whether this Idea of Duration be connected with the Exiſtence of thoſe Beings entirely as they *exiſt*, or only as they exiſt in ſuch a *particular manner*: Whether it belongs to all *Exiſtence*, as *Exiſtence*, or only to a particular *Sort* of Exiſtence, *viz.* that Exiſtence which includes the forementioned relation to Succeſſion. The latter, I think, will appear more probable, when we reflect that it is only from the *variableneſs* and *contingency* of our own Exiſtence, that all our Succeſſions ſpring: whereas, were we entirely *independent*, we muſt be abſolutely *immutable*, and invariably *permanent*; and alſo, that we can contemplate even this Exiſtence of ours without any Succeſſion, *i. e.* we have a power of confining our thoughts and attending to this Idea *alone* for ſome ſmall *time* (if that Word be excuſeable here) excluſive of all other Ideas, and conſequently excluſive of Succeſſion. This Mr. *Locke* allows, being what he calls an *Inſtant*, which, ſays he, " *is that which takes up* " *the time only of one Idea in our Minds*, without " the Succeſſion of any other, wherein there- " fore we perceive no Succeſſion at all ‖."

Succeſſion

* p. 25. † p. 34. ‖ Eſſay on *Human Underſtanding*, B. 2. Ch. 14. §. 10.

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Succeſſion therefore does not appear to be neceſſarily join'd with the Idea of abſolute exiſtence, ſince we can conſider *one* (for how ſmall a time ſoever) *without*, and *independent* of, the *other*. Nay, laſtly, there is a certain Exiſtence to which it cannot poſſibly be in any ſenſe apply'd, and that is a *Perfect* one. Suppoſe this perfect Being *alone* in nature, as we muſt believe him once to have been, and then what *change* of Nature, or *Succeſſion* of Ideas can be found? What *flux* of Moments, what *alteration* or *increaſe* can we imagine in his own uniform, invariable Eſſence? What Idea have we of *Duration* as apply'd to his Exiſtence, antecedent to his *Willing* and *Creating* External things? Such Duration then as we are acquainted with, can, I humbly apprehend, have no manner of relation to this immutable Being, while ſuppos'd to exiſt alone: But as ſoon as he determin'd to exerciſe his ſeveral Attributes in the production of ſomething without himſelf, then we have reaſon to think, that *Time*, *Succeſſion*, and *Increaſe* began. " Tho' " the Eternal Being had no neceſſary Succeſſion in his own Nature, yet being perfectly " *Self-active* and *free*, thence it proceeded, " that the exerciſe of his freedom in decreeing " and producing the Creatures, in ſuch a " manner and order as was judg'd fit by his " moſt perfect Wiſdom, became the Original " of whatever real Succeſſion has been in Nature, and ſuch Succeſſion as we are apt to " conceive to have *preceeded*, is no other than " imaginary." *Impart. Enq.* p. 208.

To the ſeveral Objections againſt this Notion drawn from God's Eternal *Wiſdom*, *Ideas*, *Decrees*, &c. ſee a ſufficient Anſwer in the ſame place.

I ſhall tranſcribe this excellent Author's reply to the moſt common and conſiderable one about the Schoolman's *punctum ſtans*, which we alſo eſteem as indefenſible an Hypotheſis as the other.

" Some will poſſibly object, that if there " was once no real Succeſſion in Nature, it " will follow, that the Divine Exiſtence was " then at leaſt (as 'tis uſually ſaid to be) *In-* " *ſtantaneous*. But to this it may be reply'd, " that Exiſtence is nothing, if diſtinguiſh'd " from the Being which exiſts. Conſequently, " there can no real quantity belong to it as ſo " diſtinguiſh'd. Wherefore it cannot properly " be denominated either *finite* or *infinite*, *ſuc-* " *ceſſive* or *inſtantaneous*. For theſe are Attri- " butes which have a Reference to *Quantity*, " and can no more agree to exiſtence, which " is but a *Mode* of Beings, than they can to " Neceſſity, or Contingence, which are Modes " of Exiſtence. To define Eternity or Ne- " ceſſary Exiſtence by Infinity or the Negation " of Limits, ſeems to be no leſs impertinent, " than to define Virtue by the Negation of " *Red* or *Blew*. For Exiſtence (which has no " Quantity or Dimenſions) hath no more Ana- " logy to Extenſion and Limits, than Virtue " (which hath no Colour) hath to Red or " Blew. And, for the ſame reaſon, it is no " leſs improper to define it to be *inſtantaneous*, " ſince even an *Inſtant* (as likewiſe an Atom) " is conceiv'd as quantity, tho' the minuteſt i- " maginable. But if it cannot properly be " denominated inſtantaneous, much leſs can " it be ſucceſſive.*."

See alſo *Epiſcop. Inſt. Theol.* L. 4. C. 9.

To which give me leave to add the Teſtimony of *Cudworth*, *True Intell. Syſt.* p. 644, &c. Where, having confuted the abſurd Notion of the World's Eternity, he adds: " Here will " the Atheiſt think preſently he has got a great " advantage to diſprove the *Exiſtence of a God*. " *Do not they who thus deſtroy the Eternity of the* " *World at the ſame time alſo deſtroy the Eter-* " *nity of the Creator? For, if Time itſelf were* " *not Eternal, then, how could the Deity or any* " *thing elſe be ſo?* The Atheiſt ſecurely ta- " king it for granted, that God himſelf could " not be *otherwiſe Eternal than by a ſucceſſive* " *flux of infinite Time*. But we ſay, that this " will on the contrary afford us a plain *De-* " *monſtration* of the *Exiſtence of a Deity*. For, " ſince the *World* and *Time* itſelf were not *in-* " *finite* in their *paſt Duration*, but had a *Begin-* " *ning*, therefore were they both certainly " made together, by ſome other Being, who is

* *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 210.

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" is, in order of *Nature*, *ſenior* to *Time*, and ſo " *without* Time *before* Time: He being above " that ſucceſſive Flux, and comprehending in " the *Stability* and *immutable Perfection* of his own " Being, his *Yeſterday*, and *to Day*, and *for ever*. " Or thus: Something was of neceſſity *infinite* " in *Duration*, and without a *Beginning*; But " neither the *World*, nor *Motion*, nor *Time*, i. e. " no *Succeſſive Being* was ſuch; therefore is " there ſomething elſe, whoſe Being and Dura- " tion is not *ſucceſſive* and *flowing*, but *perma-* " *nent*, to whom this Infinity belongeth. The " Atheiſts here can only ſmile, or make faces; " and ſhew their little Wit in quibbling upon " *nunc ſtans*, or a *ſtanding Now of Eternity*; as " if this *ſtanding Eternity* of the *Deity* (which " with ſo much reaſon hath been contended " for by the antient *genuine Theiſts*) were no- " thing but a *pitiful ſmall moment of Time ſtan-* " *ding ſtill*; and as if the Duration of all Be- " ings whatſoever muſt needs be like their " own: whereas the Duration of every thing " muſt of neceſſity be agreeable to its nature: " and therefore, as that whoſe *imperfect nature* " is ever *flowing* like a River, and conſiſts in " *continual Motion*, and *changes* one after ano- " ther, muſt needs have accordingly a *ſucceſ-* " *ſive* and *flowing Duration*, ſliding perpetually " from *preſent* into *paſt*, and always poſting " on towards the *future*, expecting ſomething " of itſelf which is not yet in Being, but to " come; ſo muſt that whoſe *perfect Nature* is " *eſſentially immutable*, and always the *ſame*, " and *neceſſarily exiſtent*, have a *permanent Du-* " *ration*; never loſing any thing of itſelf once " preſent, as ſliding away from it; nor yet " running forwards to meet ſomething of it- " ſelf before, which is not yet in Being, and " it is as contradictious for it ever to have be- " gun, as ever to ceaſe to be."

After all, it muſt be again confeſs'd, that the Idea of Succeſſion (as *S. C.* obſerves) ſo inſinuates itſelf into our Idea of Exiſtence, and is ſo cloſely connected with the exiſtence of all finite Beings, that we find it extremely difficult to imagine the Eternal Exiſtence of God, any otherwiſe than as an Eternal continued Series or Succeſſion.

Our conſtant converſation with material Objects, makes it almoſt impoſſible for us to conſider things abſtracted from *time* and *place*, which (as we obſerv'd before) are Modes of the exiſtence of moſt things, and therefore we are apt raſhly to apply theſe conſiderations to the great Author and Preſerver of all things. We ſeem to think, that as the moſt exalted Idea we can form of God's *Eternity* and *Omni-preſence* muſt be infinite *Duration*, and unbounded *Extenſion*, ſo theſe are to be ſtrictly and poſitively attributed to him; whence muſt follow all the abſurdities of *paſt*, and *future*, Extenſion in *this* and *that* place, as compatible with the Divine Eſſence. Whereas *abſolute poſitive Infinity* (ſuch as belongs to God *) does, in its very notion exclude the conſideration of *Parts*; ſince no addition of any parts whatſoever can amount, or in the leaſt degree approach to it. (Tho' ſuch negative Infinity as belongs to all *Quantities*, cannot poſſibly be conſider'd otherwiſe †.) So that whoſoever acknowledges God's perfections to be ſtrictly *infinite*, does, by that confeſſion, deny that they may be conſider'd as made up of parts: that *Immenſity* can be compoſed of any *finite Extenſions*, or *Eternity* conſiſt of multiply'd *Durations*, and conſequently, that there can be *Length* or *Space*, *Diſtance* or *Time*, *paſt* or *future*, with the *Eternal God* ‖. When therefore we ſay that God *always was*, or *ever will be*, we don't mean, by theſe and the like Words, that his Exiſtence has ſtrictly any relation to times paſt or future, that it is at all increas'd, alter'd, or affected thereby; but only thus much is intended, *viz.* that whenever we ſuppoſe any other Beings exiſting, or time and Succeſſion begun, then it was, is, or will be proper for theſe Beings to affirm in any part of this their Time or Succeſſion, that God *alſo exiſts*. In the ſame manner as it may be affirm'd of ſome Propoſitions, that they always were and will be true, that they are true in this or that, and every place: tho' ſuch aſſertions are exceedingly improper, becauſe Propoſitions, or neceſſary Truths, have no manner of Relation to either time or place. All Expreſſions therefore-

which

12.

* See Note 5, and X I. † *Ibid.* ‖ See *Locke* on H. U. B. 2. C. 15. §

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which imply Succeſſion, ſuch as, *was*, *will be*, *always*, *when*, &c. as well as thoſe that imply Locality, ſuch as, *Ubi*, *where*, &c. *, can only be apply'd to finite temporary things, which exiſt in time and place: with which things ſo exiſting, as well as every point of time and place, the Deity is ſuppos'd to be *co-exiſtent*, or *commenſurate*; tho' his own Nature and Eſſence be very different from theſe, and have properly no manner of relation to, or connection with them. If then we will attribute *Duration* to him, it muſt be *permanent*, *unſucceſſive* Duration, *i. e.* Duration of a quite different *kind* from what we meet with here. But it is to be remember'd, that we don't pretend to explain the *Nature* of Eternity, or to determine the *manner* of ſuch Exiſtence as excludes all *Succeſſion*; ſince it is ſufficient for us here to ſhew the poſſibility of conceiving the thing in general, the certainty of it having been demonſtrated already, when we prov'd that ſomething muſt be *Eternal*, having alſo ſhewn, that Eternity could not conſiſt in ſucceſſive Duration.

If then the Divine Exiſtence cannot include ſucceſſion of parts, or our kind of Duration, (which perhaps by this time may not ſeem altogether improbable) neither can his *eſſential Attributes*. His *Knowledge*, v. g. can have no relation to times *paſt* or *future*, to *fore* or *after*; nor can any object be ſaid to be at a *Diſtance* from it, or any imaginary diſtance ſet *bounds* to it.

The chief reaſon why *we* don't perceive and know any thing that has a real Exiſtence, is, becauſe that Exiſtence is remov'd from us by the diſtance of *time* or *place*: But this reaſon cannot hold with God, who is (tho' in a manner far different from his Creatures) always *preſent* to *all* times and places, and conſequently muſt behold all things exiſting therein, as well as we ſee any object at due diſtance directly before us. Thus he that is travelling on a Road cannot ſee thoſe who come behind, or are gone far before him; but he who from ſome *Eminence* beholds the *whole* Road, from end to end, views at once all the diſtant travellers ſucceeding one another. But this, I think, is ſo evident in itſelf, that neither Argument nor Simile can make it more ſo.

Hence then appears the impropriety of thoſe terms, *Divine Preſcience*, *Predeſtination*, &c. which have ſo long puzled the World, to no manner of purpoſe: and the only concluſion at laſt muſt be, that all things which ever *were*, or *will be*, which, with reſpect to ſome former or latter times, and to perſons placed therein, may be call'd *paſt* or *future*, are always equally and at once *preſent* to the view of God; that to him, ſtrictly and abſolutely, *a thouſand Years are as one Day*, and *one Day as a thouſand Years*; and that whatever difficulties ſeem to attend this conception of things being ſucceſſive to us, and not ſo to him, can be no Argument againſt the matter itſelf, which is demonſtrable; but only one of the many Inſtances of the Weakneſs of Human Underſtanding in things pertaining unto God.

Againſt the common Notion of *Eternity*, ſee the *Spectator*, N° 590. or Sir *M. Hale*'s *Prim. Orig. of Mankind*, §. 1. c. 6. p. 123. or a *Philoſophical Eſſay*, &c. by *Seth Ward*, p. 23. or *Grew*'s *Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 1. c. 1. par. 9.

Both this Attribute and Omnipreſence are alſo well treated of by *J. Smith*, in his Diſcourſe concerning the *Exiſtence and Nature of God*, C. 2. §. 4, 5. *Select Diſcourſes*, p. 125, 126, &c.

[X d.] " Here we find certain *Chains* of " *Cauſes* and *Effects*, and many *parts* of this " *Syſtem* owing their *Exiſtence*, and the *manner* " of their Exiſtence, to a preceeding Cauſe, " conſequently we can't, with any poſſibility " of reaſon, aſſert, that the *whole* Syſtem ex- " iſt without a Cauſe; for this is the ſame as " to aſſert, that the *parts* do not belong to " the *whole*. Again, a material Syſtem com- " poſ'd of parts that are *changeable*, cannot ex- " iſts without a Cauſe *diſtinct* from, and *prior* " to ſuch a Syſtem. For, wherever there is a " *Change*, there muſt be a *Cauſe* of that Change, " otherwiſe there would be a *Beginning* without " a *Cauſe*. The Cauſe of this Change cannot

* See X h.

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" be in the *materials* of this Syſtem for the very ſame reaſon: therefore it muſt be in ſomething *diſtinct* from, and *prior* to, the Syſtem itſelf. The ſame will be the Caſe as to *Motion* in a Material Syſtem; there is no Motion but what is the effect of a *former* Motion, conſequently there is no Motion in ſuch a Syſtem which has been from *Eternity*, or which has not been *Cauſed*, &c. *

" From the *Imperfection* alſo, or *Unhappineſs*, which we ſee in this Syſtem, in *Man* particularly; from the *frame* and *conſtitution* of it, 'tis evident that it did not exiſt without a Cauſe.

" The Queſtion then will be, What is the Cauſe of its Exiſtence? Now that cannot be in *itſelf*, for then a thing would be before it was, which is a contradiction. It follows then, that ſome *other* Being is the Cauſe of its Exiſtence; and the next Queſtion will be, *who* is this Being? Now as whatever began to exiſt, muſt owe its Exiſtence to ſome *preceeding Cauſe*; ſo that Cauſe if it has not exiſted eternally, muſt likewiſe owe its Exiſtence to ſome *other* preceeding Cauſe, and that to *another*, and ſo on till we aſcend to (the *firſt Cauſe*, or to) a Being that is *Eternal*, and exiſts abſolutely *without* Cauſe. " And that there is ſuch a Being is evident, " otherwiſe, as nothing could begin to exiſt " without a Cauſe, ſo nothing that is not Eternal could ever have exiſted †.

[X e.] That the Idea of *Self Exiſtence* can imply nothing more than a *Negation* of *Dependence* on any *External* Cauſe; and that there can be neither *external* nor *internal Cauſe* of the Exiſtence of an *Eternal* Being, neither *antecedent* nor *concomitant* Neceſſity, nor any poſitive *permanent Ground* or *Reaſon* whatſoever, See Note 14.

To what has been ſaid already on the head of *Neceſſity*, I ſhall add a Paſſage from the *Philoſophical Eſſay*, *&c.* from which we may perceive what was formerly underſtood by that Attribute, and how it was us'd to be prov'd. " I " ſay then that the Godhead is a *Neceſſary Being*, that is, that it is impoſſible it ſhould " fail, and implies a Contradiction, that it " ſhould not be. That is it which Divines " mean, when they ſay it is Eternal *a parte* " *poſt*, as well as *a parte ante*: for if it be not " a Neceſſary Being, that is, if Neceſſity of " Being be not included in the Eſſence of the " God-head, then it is not impoſſible that it " ſhould loſe its Being, *i. e.* it is in the power " of ſomething to cauſe it to loſe its Being: " But nothing can paſs from Being to not Being, without Change, or Motion; ſo then, " the Motion of it is in the power of ſome other, and conſequently, this is not the Original of Motion, but that other; but we ſuppos'd that to be the Original of Motion, " conſequently, it is not poſſible it ſhould be " depriv'd of its Being, that is, it is a neceſſary Being in reſpect of others: and as impoſſible it is that it ſhould loſe its Being of " itſelf. Indeed it is a manifeſt Contradiction, " that any thing ſhould have a power over its " own Eſſence, and needs no farther conviction, or oppoſition, ſeeing the active power " of any thing is founded in the Eſſence of it, " and conſequently cannot exceed the Eſſence, " or bring it not to be ‖."

[X f.] For a Being to be *limited*, or *deficient* in any reſpect, is to be *dependent* on ſome *other* Being in that reſpect, which gave it juſt ſo much and no more **; conſequently, that Being which in *no* reſpect depends upon any other, is not limited or deficient at all. For tho' *Figure*, *Diviſibility*, *&c.* and all manner of Limitation, is in *one* Senſe (*viz.* in Beings *eſſentially* Imperfect) as Dr. *Clarke* obſerves ††, properly a mere *Negation* or *Defect*; yet in another, *viz.* in a Being eſſentially and abſolutely *perfect*, Finiteneſs muſt be conceiv'd as a *poſitive Effect* of ſome Cauſe, reſtraining it to a certain

* *See* S. C's *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, *&c.*

† *Enquiry*, p. 11, 12, 18, *&c.* *See alſo* *Dr.* Bentley's Boyle's Lect. *Serm.* 6. p. 127, *&c.* *5th* Edit. *and the other* Authors *refer'd to in* Note 5.

‖ *Philoſoph. Eſſay*, p. 26, *&c.* ** *See* Scott, *in* Note 32. †† *Demonſt.* p. 56, 57. *5th* Edit.

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certain Degree. In all Beings capable of Quantity, Increaſe, &c. and conſequently *uncapable* of *Perfection* or *abſolute Infinity*; *Limitation* or *Defect*, is there a neceſſary conſequence of *Exiſtence*, and cloſely *connected* with it, and is only a *Negation* of that Perfection which is entirely *incompatible* with their *Eſſence*; and therefore in theſe it requires no farther *Cauſe*. But in a Being naturally *capable* of *Perfection* or ſtrict *Infinity*, all *Imperfection* or *Finiteneſs*, as it does not *neceſſarily* flow from the *Nature* of it, muſt have ſome *ground* or *reaſon*, which reaſon muſt therefore be foreign to it, and conſequently is an effect of ſome *other* external Cauſe, and conſequently cannot have place in the Firſt Cauſe. That this Being is *capable* of Perfection, or abſolute Infinity, appears, I think, from hence, that he is manifeſtly the Subject of one Infinite or perfect Attribute, *viz. Eternity*, or abſolute Exiſtence. His Exiſtence has been ſhewn to be perfect in this one reſpect, and therefore it may be perfect in every other alſo. Now that which is the Subject of one Infinite Attribute or Perfection, and *may* have others ſo too, *muſt* have all of them Infinitely or in Perfection: Since, to have any Perfections in a finite limited manner, when the Subject and theſe Attributes are both *capable* of ſtrict *Infinity*, would be the foremention'd abſurdity of poſitive *Limitation* without a Cauſe. This method of arguing, will prove any Perfection to be in the Deity *infinito modo*, when we have once ſhewn that it belongs to him at all: at leaſt, will ſhew that it is unreaſonable for us to ſuppoſe it limited, when we can find no manner of Ground for any Limitation, which is perhaps as far as we can go.

[X g.] That the Word *God* is *relative*, ſee *Newton Princ. Schol. Gen. ſub. fin.* p. 525, &c. 3d Edit. or *Maxwell*'s Appendix to *Cumberland*, p. 106.

To ſhew that there is only *one* Eternal Self-Exiſtent Being, which bears the Relation of God to us, ſeems to be going as far as either is neceſſary, or natural Light will lead us. As Dr. *Clarke*'s Demonſtration of this and ſeveral other Attributes is entirely founded on his Idea of *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence, of *Space*, &c. *, they muſt ſtand or fall together. They who endeavour to deduce it from *Independence* or *Omnipotence* evidently preſuppoſe it in their definition of theſe Attributes.

[X h.] We cannot include any ſuch Notion in *Omnipreſence*, as makes the Deity *preſent in his ſimple Eſſence to* (or co-extended with) *every point of the boundleſs Immenſity* †; Since this Idea of *Extenſion* or Expanſion, ſeems plainly inconſiſtent with that *ſimple* Eſſence ‖. Not that we ſuppoſe theſe Attributes of *Knowledge* and *Power* acting *ſeparate* from his Eſſence, but we ſuppoſe his Eſſence to have no more *relation* to the Idea of *Space, Place, where*, &c. than either of theſe Attributes has *⁎.

Dr. *Clarke*'s Query, " How it can be ſhewn " upon any other Principle than that of Ne- " ceſſary exiſtence, that his *governing Wiſdom* " and *Power* muſt be *preſent* in thoſe boundleſs " Spaces where we know of no *Phænomena* or " *Effects* to prove its exiſtence ††?" is well anſwer'd by *Epiſcopius*: I ſhall give it in his own Words. " *Hoc (nempe Deum eſſe extra* " *mundum) non modo prorſus eſt* αναλογον *ſed* " *etiam valde abſurdum, quia totum atque omne* " *illud ſpatium quod extra hunc mundum eſſe di-* " *citur, nihil omnino reale eſt, ſed pure pute i-* " *maginarium, & prorſus nihilum; ut autem* " *Deus eſſe dicatur in pure pute imaginario, &* " *prorſus nihilo, per ſe abſurdum eſt; quia* eſſe in " *dicit realem habitudinem aut denominationem ab* " *eo in quo quid exiſtit: Realis autem habitudo* " *& denominatio a nihilo, ſive ab eo quod nihil re-* " *ale eſt, accipi nullo modo poteſt. Dicere Deum* " *ibi habere intrinſecam & abſolutam preſentiam* " *qua in ſeipſo realiter Exiſtit, eſt fingere præ-* " *ſentiam ſine Relatione aut denominatione ad id,* " *cui quod præſens eſſe dicitur, quod implicat con-* " *tradictionem. Intrinſica enim ſive abſoluta præ-* " *ſentia, qua quid in ſeipſo realiter exiſtit, non eſt* " *præſentia in nihilo; ſed mera eſſentia ſive exi-* *tia.*

* *See* Notes 5 & 14. † *Dr.* Clarke's *Demonſt.* p. 47. ‖ *See* Note 11. *⁎ *See* Note 13.
†† *Anſwer to 7th Letter*, p. 495.

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" *ſtentia extra nihilum. Nihil enim ſibi ipſi præ-*
" *ſens eſſe poteſt* ‖."

Now to urge upon us the *old Maxim*, that *nothing can act where it is not*, is ſtill ſuppoſing a *Spirit* exiſting *ſomewhere*, or in ſome *Ubi*, or *co-extended*, or *co-expanded*, with ſome part of *Space*, and *acting* in ſome other part of ſuch imaginary Space (which Suppoſitions we have long ago diſcarded) 'Tis confining its exiſtence to one particular *Modus*; and, as we conceive, to a *wrong* one: concerning the *Modality* of whoſe exiſtence we can only think and argue *negatively*: *viz.* that it is not by way of *Extenſion* in any ſenſe.

To the trite Objection, that what has no *magnitude*, or is *no where*, is therefore *Nothing*, ſee a ſufficient Anſwer in *Cudworth*, p 770, to 778, *&c.* How this agrees with *Philo*'s Paradox, *that God is every where and yet no where*, ſee *ibid.* p. 773. But the ſtrongeſt confirmation of this Opinion, which Dr. *Moore* ſtiles *Nullibiſm*, may be drawn from the learned Dr's Arguments againſt it in his *Enebir. Metaph.* C. 27.

[X i.] By the above mentioned pleaſure or *natural Good*, I mean that pleaſure which every one feels in himſelf. By the *production* of it here, I underſtand both the producing ſuch in himſelf, and alſo in others: to both which he is equally determin'd by his Nature, tho' from quite different Principles. To the former he is directed by Self-Love: To the latter by a certain diſintereſted Benevolent Inſtinct or Affection, and that which determines him to approve the Affection and the Actions flowing from it is called his *Moral Senſe*. The former of theſe Inſtincts, as it implies increaſe of Happineſs, is only applicable to finite, imperfect Creatures: the latter ſeems to be common to us and the Deity. Who could have been determin'd to create us only by ſuch a diſintereſted Benevolent Affection, as this is ſuppoſed to be. This is always approv'd by the Moral Senſe; tho' it may be doubted whether that be confined entirely to it.

The Object of both theſe Inſtincts is *natural Good*; and, I think, *moral* Good may be allow'd to conſiſt in the proſecution of either, or both of them together, ſo long as the former is in due ſubordination to the latter. As for my part, I cannot extend the Notion of Virtue ſo far, as totally to exclude all manner of regard to *Self*, or *private* Good, conſider'd as ſuch, and therein to overlook the tendency of all ſuch private Affections as the All-wiſe Author of our Being has thought fit to implant in us, as neceſſary helps and inducements to Self-Preſervation. I ſee no reaſon why a particular endeavour in any Man to perfect his Faculties both of Body and Mind, to improve and advance his own Happineſs in the whole, (which is in ſome reſpect anſwering the End of his Creation and co-operating with the Will of his Maker) may not deſerve the Name of *Virtue*; at leaſt of *Duty*; the diſcharge of which will make a Perſon the proper Subject of Reward, even abſtractedly from Benevolent or Publick Affections*. Tho' theſe indeed are intitled to it in a much higher and ſublimer degree, becauſe they are productive of more univerſal Good. Nay, the kind Author of Nature has inſeparably annex'd ſuch a pleaſing Senſation, or agreeable Conſciouſneſs, to the Performance, or even Remembrance of theſe Benevolent Actions, as is ſcarce diſtinguiſhable from the Inſtinct or Affection itſelf, which impels us towards them: and therefore to have ſome attention to this *Self-complacency*, this inward Satisfaction, and Delight, which accompanies our nobleſt Actions; to be in ſome degree directed by it in the performance of them, does not appear to detract from their Worth, and moral Excellency. For a full proof, as well as a beautiful Explication of this moral Senſe, ſee Mr. *Hucheſon's Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good*, together with his *Illuſtrations*.

That all the Notion we can poſſibly frame of *Moral Good* or *Evil*, of *Virtue* or *Vice*, *&c.* conſiſts entirely in *promoting* or *procuring* this natural *Good* or *Evil*, ſee ſufficiently confirmed by *Sherlock*†. " Whereas, ſays he, we diſtin-
" guiſh between *Moral* and *Natural Good* and
" *Evil*; the only difference between them is
" this,

‖ Inſt. Theol. L. 4. c. 13. p. 294.

* *See Mr.* Jackſon's Defence of Human Liberty, p. 2.

† *On Judgment*, p. 20 to 25.

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" this, that *Moral Good* and *Evil* is in the *Will* " and *Choice*, *Natural Good* and *Evil* is in the " *Nature of things*; that which is *good* or *hurt-* " *ful* to ourſelves or others, is naturally *Good* " or *Evil*; to *love*, to *chuſe*, to *do* that which is " *good* or *hurtful* to *ourſelves* or *others*, is *morally* " *Good* or *Evil*; or is the *Good* or *Evil* of our " *Choice* or *Actions*. If you will but recollect your " ſelves, you will find that you have no other " notion of *Good* or *Evil* but this: when you " ſay ſuch a Man has done a very *Good* or very " *Evil* Action, what do you mean by it? Do " you not mean, that he has done ſomething " very good or very hurtful to *himſelf* or *o-* " *thers*? When you hear that any Man has " done *Good* or *Evil*, is not the next Queſtion, " what good or what hurt has he done? and " do you not mean by this, *Natural Good* or " *Evil*? which is a plain Evidence, that you " judge of the *Moral Good* or *Evil* of Actions, " by the *Natural Good* or *Evil*, which they do." See more on this Subject, deliver'd in the ſame place, with an Elegance and Perſpicuity peculiar to that *Author*.

To the ſame purpoſe is *Turner*'s excellent *Diſcourſe* of the *Laws* of *Nature*, and the *reaſon* of their *Obligation*.

This ſeems to be the ultimate *Criterion* of that *Fitneſs*, *Congruity*, *Reaſonableneſs* and *Relation of Things*, ſo often repeated by ſome late Writers, *without* or *beyond* which I can fix no meaning at all to theſe Words. And this Criterion ſhould, I think, have been more diſtinctly ſpecify'd. For when you ſay any thing is *fit*; muſt we carry our enquirys no farther? Is it not a very proper Queſtion, to ask, *for what is it fit?* *Fit*, *Congruous*, &c. (as well as the Word *Neceſſary*) are mere relative terms (as we obſerv'd in Note 9.) and evidently refer to ſome *End*, and what can the end be here but Happineſs? Theſe *Relations*, &c. may perhaps in ſome tolerable ſenſe be call'd *Eternal* and *Immutable*, becauſe, whenever you ſuppoſe a Man in ſuch certain Circumſtances, ſuch Conſequences and Obligations, did, or will, always certainly follow *.

What is good for me now in theſe Circumſtances and Reſpects, will always be ſo in the ſame Circumſtances and Reſpects, and can never be alter'd without altering the Nature of things, or the preſent Syſtem: but we cannot imagine theſe *Relations* therefore to be any real *Entities*, or to have exiſted from all *Eternity*, or to be antecedent to, or independent of the Will of God himſelf; as ſome Writers ſeem to have done, if they had any determinate meaning at all †. We cannot, I ſay, imagine them to be either ſtrictly *eternal* or *independent* of the Will of God, becauſe they muſt neceſſarily preſuppoſe a determination of that Will, and are in truth only conſequences of the exiſtence of things, which things proceed entirely from that determination ‖. Much leſs can we apprehend how theſe Relations, *&c.* " *Are to be* " *choſen for their own Sakes and intrinſic Worth*; " *or have a full obligatory power antecedent to a-* " *ny reward or puniſhment annex'd either by na-* " *tural Conſequence or poſitive Appointment to the* " *Obſervance or Neglect of them* *." Since the Natural Good or Happineſs, conſequent upon, and connected with, the obſervance of them, or the immediate rational pleaſure which they produce, is to us the grand *Criterion* of them; the *Argument* and *Indication* of their *Worth*, the Ground of all their *Obligation*.

This Notion is pretty well handled by *Turner*. " The *Laws of Nature* [or, which is the " ſame, *Natural Right* and *Wrong*] are ſuch " Laws and Rules of Life, as to the breach of " which there is a natural Puniſhment annex'd. " For to ſay a thing is eſſentially good or evil, " to call it by hard Names, and to affirm that " it hath a Natural Turpitude; or, to paſs a " Compliment upon it, and call it a Moral " Rectitude, and ſuch like fine Scholaſtic " Terms—without aſſigning a particular Rea- " ſon of Intereſt, why we ſhould do the one " or avoid the other, is as much as to ſay, a thing

* *See* Locke's *Eſſay*, B. 4. C. 11. §. 14. *or* Turner *on the Laws of Nature, and their Obligation*, §. 20. *or* N. 76.

† *See* Hutcheſon's *Illuſtrat.* §. 2. p. 250, 251.

‖ *See our* Author, C. 1. §. 3. par. 9. *and* C. 5. §. 1. par. 23, *&c. and* Notes 75, 76.

* *Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, prop. 1. §. 7. p. 218.

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" thing is good--for nothing; or, it is bad, " but we know not why; or, it is good or " bad, for a Woman's Reaſon, becauſe it is: " and this Reaſon will ſerve as well to prove, " that Murder or Adultery are good things, as " that they are bad ones ††.

" The Laws of Nature, therefore, have e- " very one of them their Sanction in *them-* " *ſelves* *, *i. e.* ſome things naturally tend to " our Happineſs, and others to our Miſery, and for that Reaſon they become natural *Laws* to us, or are *Rules* to direct our Actions by; and we are *oblig'd* to do the one and avoid the other, " Upon a Principle of Self-happineſs, " and Self-preſervation, which is the very root " and ſpring of all Obligation whatſoever †.

" From whence we may diſcern the Vanity " and Folly of thoſe learned Men, who are u- " ſed to talk ſo loudly of *eſſential Rectitudes*, " and *eternal Notions*, and I know not what " phantaſtical *Ideæ*, in an abſtracted way; where " as there is indeed nothing which is either " good or bad merely by itſelf, but every thing " which is good, is good, that is, uſeful to " ſomething; and every thing which is bad, " is ſo with reference to ſome Nature or other, " to which it is more or leſs pernicious and " deſtructive: from whence it follows (the " nature of Obligation being a reſult ariſing " from the uſefulneſs or hurtfulneſs of a thing " propoſed to be the object of a free Agent's " choice, with reſpect to that Agent which is " converſant about it) that all Obligation muſt " be not of a ſimple, but of a compound, or " concrete nature, and muſt always have an in- " ſeparable reſpect to the Intereſt or Happineſs " of thoſe to whom that Obligation is bind- " ing. And it is not only true, that our Inte- " reſt and our Duty are both of them the ſame, " but that it is abſolutely impoſſible any thing " ſhould be our Duty, which is not our Inte- " reſt into the Bargain; for no Man can poſ- " ſibly be obliged to that which, all things con- " ſidered, will be to his Diſadvantage ‖."

Farther, moſt Authors who treat of the Production of this *Natural good* or *evil* in ſuch a manner as to conſtitute Right or Wrong, moral good or evil, *&c.* appear either to equivocate in a double meaning of the Words: *viz.* as they imply producing Happineſs either in *ourſelves* alone, or in *others*, (which are two very different things, and ſhould accordingly be always diſtinguiſh'd) or elſe to be deficient in pointing out a *Rule*, and proving an *Obligation* to it in the latter Senſe, *viz.* with regard to *others*. This great defect in their Syſtems, ſeems to ariſe from not ſufficiently attending to the above mention'd *Moral Senſe* or *Conſcience*, (as the meaning of that Word is well fix'd by Mr. *Butler*‖‖) which is of itſelf both *Rule* and *Obligation*. As an *Inſtinct*, it directs us to approve ſuch Actions as tend to produce Happineſs in others, and ſo is a *Rule* whereby we determine all ſuch Actions to be virtuous; as it gives us pain, or makes us uneaſy at the neglect of theſe Actions, or at the Practice of the contrary ones; it obliges us to purſue them, or *makes* the practice of them abſolutely neceſſary to our Happineſs: which is the true meaning of the Word *Oblige*, as was ſhewn in the *preliminary Diſſertation*; and is proved more at large by *Cumberland* **.

That therefore, and that only, muſt be ſaid to oblige us, which is *neceſſary to our Happineſs*. Now, as the Sum of our Happineſs depends upon the whole of our Exiſtence, that only can be a complete and indiſpenſible Obligation, which is equal and commenſurate to the Sum total of our Happineſs. Or, that Being only can, abſolutely and effectually, oblige us, who has it in his Power to make our whole Exiſtence happy or miſerable; and of conſequence, the *Deity*, who alone has that Power, muſt neceſſarily be taken into all Schemes of Morality, in order to ſuper-induce a full, adequate Obligation, or ſuch an one as will hold at all times, and extend to every action; and an endeavour to exclude the Conſideration of his Will, or to deduce all Obligation from any Principles independent of it, has, I think, occaſion'd another great defect in moſt of our modern Syſtems.

That this Moral Good is a *Perfection* in any Being, *i. e.* agreeable to, or perfective of, its Nature,

†† *Laws of Nat.* &c. §. 1. * *Ibid.* §. 2. † *Ibid.* §. 6. ‖ *Ibid.* §. 14. *See alſo Mr.* Clarke's *Foundation of Morality*, &c. ‖‖ *Serm.* 2d and 3d. ** C. 5. §. 27. *See alſo* Puffendorf, B. 1. C. 6. §. 5. Note 4. and §. 8. Note 1.

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Nature, appears by the very Terms: alſo, that this *Moral Senſe* is the greateſt Perfection of *Human Nature*, and that there is ſomething *analogous* to it, in the *Divine Nature*, may be ſeen in the above mention'd *Enquiry*, and *Illuſtrations of the Moral Senſe*, p. 239, *&c.* See alſo *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Vol. 2. p. 33, 37, *&c.*

N. B. What has been here ſaid about *Inſtinct*, *Affection*, *Moral Senſe*, &c. may ſeem to imply, that theſe are all *innate*; contrary to what was proved in the *Preliminary Diſſertation*: and indeed this was drawn up at firſt upon the ſuppoſed Validity of that Notion, which many may, perhaps, eſteem valid ſtill, and therefore I let the Argument ſtand in the old Terms; eſpecially as it is not at all affected by the Truth or Falſity of that Notion; ſince it will really come to the ſame thing, with regard to the Moral Attributes of God, and the Nature of Virtue and Vice, whether the Deity has implanted theſe Paſſions, Inſtincts, and Affections in us, or has framed and diſpoſed us in ſuch a manner; has given us ſuch Powers, and placed us in ſuch Circumſtances, that we ſhall neceſſarily *acquire* them; they'll be alike natural in either Senſe, juſt as all moral Axioms, *&c.* are equally certain upon *Locke*'s Hypotheſis, as upon the old footing of innate Principles.

And tho' I take implanted *Senſes*, *Inſtincts*, *Appetites*, *Paſſions*, *Affections*, *&c.* to be a remnant of the *Old Philoſophy*, which uſed to call every thing Innate that it could not account for; and therefore, I heartily wiſh that they were all eradicated, (which was undoubtedly the aim of that great *Author* laſt mention'd; as it was a natural Conſequence of his firſt Book, tho' he might not then think proper to ſpeak out;) yet, as common uſe has fix'd this Notion of Innateneſs to them, I am oblig'd to follow my Author, and treat of them in the common Language. Only let it be obſerved here once for all, that every Argument which is built upon theſe Paſſions, Senſes, *&c.* will be equally concluſive, whether they be implanted or acquired. As to the preſent point in particular, Mr. *Hucheſon* has fully proved, that we are led inſenſibly, and by the conſtitution and circumſtances of our very Being, to love and approve certain Actions, which we call Virtuous: which is enough for my purpoſe, as was hinted above. Againſt the Notion of *implanted Inſtincts*, ſee *Velthuyſon de Principiis juſti & decori*, p. 73, &c. *Amſtel.* 1651.

[X k.] That God muſt have the ſame Judgment and Approbation of this Moral Good, which all Rational Beings naturally have *; and that we muſt judge of the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, only by that Nature and thoſe Perfections which we derive from him, is, I think, very plain: I mean, that we muſt not endeavour to conceive the ſeveral Attributes of God by *ſubſtituting* ſomething in him of *a quite different kind, and totally diverſe* from that which we find in ourſelves, (as the learned Author of the Procedure of Human Underſtanding, ſeems to declare, p. 138, and elſewhere) tho' that be in ſome reſpects ſimilar and *analogous* to this: But we are to ſuppoſe ſomewhat of the very *ſame kind* and *ſort*, the ſame Qualities or Properties in general to be both in him and us, and then remove all manner of *defect* or *imperfection* which attends the particular *Modus* only of their Exiſtence, as they are in us. Thus we aſcribe to God all kinds and degrees of apparent Perfection obſervable in his Creatures, except ſuch as argue at the ſame time Imperfection (*v. g.* Motion, which neceſſarily implys Limitation) or are inconſiſtent with ſome other and greater Perfection (*v. g.* the Exerciſe of punitive Juſtice in ſuch a degree as would exclude Mercy; or, Materiality, which excludes Knowledge and Liberty †.) We alſo remove from him all *want*, *dependence*, *alteration*, *uneaſineſs*, &c. In ſhort, all that reſults either from ſimple fineteneſs, or from the mere Union of two finite imperfect Subſtances, ſuch as conſtitute Man. And when we have thus apply'd every thing in every manner of exiſtence which ſeems to imply

* *See* Scott's *Chriſtian Life*, Part 2. C. 1. p. 21, 22. 1ſt Edit.

† *See A. Bp.* Tillotſon, *Serm.* 76. 2d Vol. Fol. p. 569, *&c.* *Dr.* J Clarke *on Moral Evil*, p. 95, *&c.* *and* Scott's *Chriſt. Life*, Part 2. C. 6. §. 2. p. 447, *&c.* 1ſt Edit.

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imply Perfection, and excluded every thing in every manner of Exiſtence which implies or includes the contrary, we have got our Idea of an abſolutely perfect Being, which we call God. 'Tis therefore attributing to God ſome real Qualities of a certain determinate kind, (v. g. Knowledge or Power, Goodneſs or Truth) the nature of which Qualities we do perceive, are directly conſcious of, and know, which gives us an Idea or Conception of him, and a *proper* one too, (if any ſuch diſtinction of Ideas are allow'd) and not imagining ſome others, we cannot tell of what ſort, totally different in nature and kind from any that we ever did perceive or know; which would give us no Idea or Conception at all of him, either proper or improper.

In like manner we frame a partial conception of a Spirit in general (which we confeſſedly have) not by ſubſtituting ſome properties *different* in *kind* from thoſe which we perceive in our own Spirit; but by ſuppoſing the very *ſame* properties, *i. e.* in *kind*, (*viz.* Cogitation, and a power of producing Motion) to be alſo inherent in ſome other immaterial Beings which we therefore call by the ſame Names. Now this is (as far as it goes) true, real knowledge, and may be apply'd and argu'd on intelligibly: but the other would, I fear, take away all poſſibility of arguing from the ſeveral Attributes or Properties of the Deity, to thoſe of ourſelves, and *vice verſa*, all our reaſonings upon them (as the learned Author expreſſes it, p. 134) would be precarious, and without any ſolid foundation in the Nature of things. Such analogical Knowledge then as that, is (according to my Notions of Knowledge) ſtrictly and properly none at all; and if the Author uſes analogy in that Senſe, 'twill, I believe, be ſtill taken only for a ſort or degree of *Metaphor*, after all he has ſaid in the laſt Chapter of his firſt Book, to diſtinguiſh them.

I would here be underſtood to affirm thus much of the ſimple *Nature* only, or *Kind*, or our *abſtract Idea* of theſe Qualities *themſelves*, and not of the *manner* of their Exiſtence: which two (tho' this Author is pleas'd to uſe them promiſcuouſly in p. 84, *&c.*) ſeem yet very diſtinct Conſiderations. For we apprehend ſeveral Properties, or Qualities, as exiſting in our own Nature, independent of any particular manner; nay, in very *different manners*: v. g. Knowledge, either by Senſation or Reflection, by Deduction or immediate Intuition: Love attended with a certain degree of Pleaſure or Pain, *&c.* and therefore we ſuppoſe that theſe Qualities may exiſt in the Divine Nature, in a manner entirely different from what they do in us, and yet be the very ſame Qualities ſtill; which *Modus* of the Divine Being, or of any of his Attributes, is totally unknown to us, and we can only gueſs at it by ſome diſtant reſemblance or *Analogy*; which Analogy I would therefore apply to this *Modus* of Exiſtence, and to this *only*; which ſeems ſufficient for all the great Purpoſes of Religion, and in which Senſe the Notion may perhaps be juſt and uſeful, but cannot, I think, be extended to our Idea of the *whole Nature* and *Genus* of the Attribute itſelf. For, if the Divine Attributes be, *toto genere*, diſtinct and different from thoſe Qualities which we eſteem perfections in ourſelves or others, if (as the ſame Author urges, p. 82.) the greateſt perfections of thoſe Creatures which fall under our Obſervation, (and theſe he will grant to be all that we have any Idea of) are really "*but ſo many Imperfections, when referr'd or attributed to the Divine Nature, as it is in itſelf, in any meaning whatſoever; even with the moſt exalted meaning we can poſſibly annex to them,*" (the Author underſtanding, I ſuppoſe, as uſual, the *whole Nature* and *diſtinguiſhing kind* of thoſe Qualities in themſelves.) Then, how ſhall we diſcover which kind of Qualities God prefers before the contrary? How can we be certain that theſe in particular are agreeable to him? or how ſhall we hope and endeavour to make ourſelves like him? Can we know the nature of one thing by another, entirely different from it? or can we imitate what we don't at all apprehend. "*It is fooliſh* (ſays A. Bp. *Tillotſon*) *for any Man to pretend that he cannot know what Juſtice, and Goodneſs, and Truth in God are; for, if we do not know this, 'tis all one to us whether God be good or not; nor could we imitate his Goodneſs: for, he that imitates, endeavours to be like ſomething that he knows, and muſt of neceſſity have*

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"*have ſome Idea of that to which he aims to be* "*like*; *ſo that if we had no certain and ſettled* "*Notion of the Juſtice and Goodneſs and Truth of* "*God, he would be altogether an unintelligible* "*Being: and Religion, which conſiſts in the Imi-* "*tation of him, would be utterly impoſſible* *."

Which deſtroys the Notion of Analogy (as was obſerv'd long ago by the *Free-thinker*, p. 50, *&c.*) as it is beautifully deliver'd by our Author in his Sermon on *Divine Predeſtination &c.* if he did not intend by that Word ſomething in God really *parallel* and *equivalent* to what we find in ſome of his Works, and ſo very like it, that nothing can be liker, except that which exiſts in the very ſame *manner* too, *i. e.* in a perfect one. If this could be his meaning, (which may not appear improbable from his Anſwer to the like Objection, §. 22. where he declares, that theſe Attributes have much more *Reality* and *Perfection* in them, than the things by which we repreſent them, *&c.*) then is he perfectly conſiſtent with the other great Author cited above. I wiſh the moſt learned Author of the Procedure, *&c.* were ſhewn to be ſo too, who is ſuppoſed to have purſued this Notion of Analogy farther than almoſt any will be able or willing to follow him.

But this is no place for a full Examination either of that Notion, or this learned Author's Application of it. I ſhall only add an Obſervation, which perhaps may ſerve in ſome meaſure to ſhew directly (as he is pleas'd to require, *Introduct.* p. 17.) that the *Foundation* upon which he has placed his *Analogy* is falſe and groundleſs: which Foundation is, as I apprehend, the *Nature* of the Being, inſtead of the *Modus* of its Exiſtence. To carry the face of an Argument, let it ſtand thus. The Nature of the forementiond Qualities is either wholly the ſame in God and us, or wholly different: if the former be maintain'd, then this analogical Senſe is turn'd into an *Identical* one; if the latter, then can no manner of Reſemblance or *Analogy* be drawn between them; ſince one nature (as has been obſerv'd) cannot in the leaſt help to repreſent or explain another *quite different* from it; I mean, in thoſe very points wherein they differ; for that is to be different and not different, alike and unlike in the very ſame reſpect, at the ſame time: And then this analogical Senſe is turn'd into a *diſperate* or *quite oppoſite* one, *i. e.* into no analogy at all: Or, laſtly, they muſt be *partly* the *ſame*, and *partly different*, or alike and unlike in *different reſpects*, (which is the thing we contend for) *viz.* alike in *Perfection*, unlike in *Defect*, or imperfection; or the ſame in *Nature*, or *Eſſence*, and different in *Degree*, or the *manner* of Exiſtence. If therefore the Author founds this Analogy on the very *Nature* of the thing, he ſeems to incur the forementiond abſurdity, of ſuppoſing a nature contradictory to itſelf; if, with us, he will pleaſe to diſtinguiſh between the *Nature* of the thing in general, and the particular *Modus* of its Exiſtence, he muſt with us alſo remove this analogy from the former foundation, and fix it upon the latter. Farther, no *Similitude* whatſoever, whether deduced from human Reaſon or Holy Scripture, can have force enough to perſuade us, that the *whole nature* of theſe things is quite different from what we apprehend or can conceive them to be; ſince it is univerſally allow'd, that no compariſon can (as we commonly ſay) *run upon all four*; or (which is the very foundation and deſign of this whole analogical Scheme) can ever conſtitute a proper and *concluſive Argument*, in order to prove to us ſuch a paradox: and if ſo great Streſs is to be laid on any, v. g. that of a *Looking-Glaſs*, uſed in a ſtrict Philoſophical manner, (as the Author of the *Procedure* ſeems to do, *p.* 112, *&c.*) why may not ſome urge it ſtill farther, and argue, that as the Image of your Face ſuppoſed to be ſeen in the Glaſs, is nothing real, ſolid, and ſubſtantial contain'd in the Glaſs itſelf, but barely an appearance exhibited in the Brain; ſo all the conceptions which we pretend to have of the Divine Nature and Attributes, are nothing at all in God himſelf, but mere Phantaſms and deluſive Images, exiſting only in our own Mind. This, will theſe Men ſay, muſt appear abſurd at firſt Sight, and yet may be drawn from the Similitude with as much Propriety as the

* *See A. B.* Tillotſon's *Serm.* 76. Vol. 2. Fol. p. 572. and p. 678.

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the reſt; conſequently the whole Scheme of this *Analogy* is to be rejected as entirely falſe, and at laſt the true Medium of all our Knowledge in the Nature of theſe things, will be what we truly and properly *perceive* of them, in ſome ſmall degree in *ourſelves*: If it be objected here, that the *Nature* and *Modus* of any thing muſt be the very ſame, ſince by different Natures are only meant different *Manners* of Exiſtence.

I anſwer: By the Nature of any thing, I underſtand its ſeveral *diſtinguiſhing Properties*. By the Nature of any *Property*, I underſtand ſome certain poſitive *Mark* or *Character* which diſtinguiſhes that property from any others. Thus, by the nature of Body, I mean ſolid, diviſible, figur'd and moveable Extenſion. By the Nature of Solidity, I mean Reſiſtence, or a power of excluding other Bodies out of its place; which Mark ſufficiently diſtinguiſhes it from Diviſibility, or any other property belonging to the ſame Body, as well as all the foremention'd properties diſtinguiſh a Body from ſomething elſe: both which we may therefore properly enough be ſaid to perceive or *know*; tho' perhaps we may never in like manner, know *how* theſe ſeveral Properties are united together, and come to form one Aggregate or Subſtance; nor *whence* this Power or Property of Reſiſtence proceeds, or how it is *cauſ'd*, which is what we underſtand by the *Modus* of each. So that, knowing or having a clear determinate Idea of a certain Thing or Quality, ſo as to be able to diſtinguiſh it from another Thing or Quality, and always to perceive it to be really *thus*; is quite different from knowing how the ſaid Thing or Quality *comes to be* thus: *How* or *Why* it is, are Modes of Exiſtence, and differ plainly from *what* it is, or what *Idea* we have of it, which denotes its *Nature* or *Eſſence*. But any Man, I think, that has a mind, may apprehend what we mean by this diſtinction without any more Words, whether he will approve of it or not, is another Queſtion.

Againſt this Notion of *Analogy*, as apply'd to the whole Nature of the Attributes of God, ſee *Fiddes's Body of Divinity*, B. 1. Part 2. c. 13 and his *Practical Diſcourſes*, Fol. p. 234, *&c.* or, *J. Clarke* on *Moral Evil*, p. 95, *&c.* or *Chubb's Tracts*, p. 146, *&c.* or, *the preſent State of the Republic of Letters for* July 1728; or, *a Vindication of the Divine Attributes*, London 1710.

[X 1.] By the Words, *Infinite Degree*, here and above, we don't mean any *indefinite Addition*, or encreaſableneſs of theſe ſeveral Attributes partially conſider'd (to which ſuch terms are vulgarly, tho' not ſo properly apply'd) but only an entire abſolute *Perfection*, without any kind of *failure* or *deficiency* in theſe reſpects: which we have intimated in Note 5, and elſewhere, to be our Notion of Infinity, as apply'd to any of the Divine Attributes. "Thus "Infinite *Underſtanding* and *Knowledge*, is no- "thing elſe but *perfect* Knowledge, that which "hath no defect or mixture of *Ignorance* in it, or "the knowledge of whatſoever is knowable. "Infinite *Power* is nothing elſe but *perfect* "Power, that which hath no defect or mix- "ture of *Impotency* in it: a Power of produ- "cing and doing all whatſoever is *poſſible*, i. e. "whatſoever is *conceivable*, and ſo of the "reſt *.

"Now, that we have an Idea or Conception "of *Perfection*, or a *perfect Being*, is evi- "dent from the Notion that we have of *Im- "perfection*, ſo familiar to us: *Perfection* being "the *Rule* and *Meaſure* of *Imperfection*, and not "*Imperfection* of *Perfection*, as a *ſtraight Line* is "the *Rule* and *Meaſure* of a *Crooked*, and not "a *Crooked Line* of a *Straight*. So that Per- "fection is firſt *Conceivable* in order of nature, "before *Imperfection*, as *Light* before *Darkneſs*, "a *poſitive* before the *privation* or *defect*. For "Perfection is not properly the want of Im- "perfection, but Imperfection of Perfec- "tion.

"Moreover, we perceive ſeveral Degrees of "Perfection in the Eſſences of things, and "conſequently a *Scale* or *Ladder* of Perfections "in Nature, one above another, as of *living* "and *animate* things above *ſenſeleſs* and *inanimate*,

* *Cudworth*, p. 647.

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" *mate*, of *rational* things above *ſenſitive*; and " that by reaſon of that *Notion* or *Idea*, which " we firſt have of that which is *abſolutely per-* " *fect*, as the Standard, by comparing of things " with which, and meaſuring of them, we " take notice of their approaching more or leſs " near thereunto. Nor indeed could theſe " gradual *Aſcents* be *infinite*, or without End, " but they muſt come at laſt to that which is " abſolutely perfect, as the top of them all. " Laſtly, we could not perceive Imperfection " in the moſt perfect of all thoſe things which " we ever had Senſe or Experience of in our " Lives, had we not a *Notion* or *Idea* of that " which is *abſolutely perfect*, which ſecretly " comparing the ſame with, we perceive it to " come ſhort thereof *.

" Wherefore, ſince *Infinite* is the ſame with " *abſolutely perfect*, we having a Notion or I- " dea of the latter, muſt needs have of the " former. From whence we learn alſo, that " tho' the Word *Infinite* be in the form there- " of *Negative*, yet is the Senſe of it, in theſe " things which are really capable of the ſame, " *poſitive*, it being all one with *abſolutely per-* " *fect*: as likewiſe, the Senſe of the Word " *Finite* is negative, it being the ſame with " *Imperfect*: So that *finite* is properly the " *Negation* of *Infinite*, as that which in order " of nature is before it, and not *Infinite* the " *Negation* of *Finite*. However, in thoſe things " which are capable of no true *Infinity*, be- " cauſe they are eſſentially *finite*, as *Number*, " *corporeal Magnitude*, and *Time*; Infinity being " there a mere *imaginary* thing, and a non- " entity, it can only be conceiv'd by the *Ne-* " *gation* of *Finite*, as we alſo conceive *Nothing* " by the Negation of *Something*, that is, we " can have no *poſitive Conception* at all there- " of †."

Now, all this, is not attempting to make the Attributes of God *poſitively Infinite*, by ſuperadding a *Negative Idea* of *Infinity* to them (as the Author of the *Procedure*, *&c.* juſtly urges againſt Mr. *Locke*, in B. 1. c. 3. p. 82. and the ſame might with equal Juſtice be objected to Dr. *Clarke*, when he applies *infinite Space* and *infinite Duration* to the Deity, and calls one his *Immenſity*, and the other his *Eternity.*) But it is making them poſitively and abſolutely *perfect*, by firſt proving them to have ſome *real Exiſtence* in the Divine Nature, and then by removing from it all Poſſibility of *Want*, or *Deficiency*, *Mixture*, or *Allay* ‖.

[X m.] By the Word *Juſtice*, as it relates to Puniſhment, we mean, the *Exerciſe of a Right*, or doing what a Perſon has a *Moral Power* to do. *Mercy* implies his *receding* from that Right, or not exerting that moral power. When we apply theſe Terms to the Deity, we conſider his Diſpenſations in a partial View, *viz.* only with Relation to the Perſon offending, and himſelf the offended, or as mere Debtor and Creditor, excluſive of all other Beings, who may be affected thereby, and whom therefore we ſhould ſuppoſe to be regarded in theſe Diſpenſations. In this Senſe, theſe two Attributes have a diſtinct Meaning, and may both be always ſubordinate to Goodneſs, but can never be repugnant to each other. Thus, where a Creature has forfeited its Right to a Favour, or incurr'd a Penalty, by the breach of ſome Covenant, or the Tranſgreſſion of ſome Law, the Creator, conſider'd with reſpect to that Being alone, and in thoſe Circumſtances, has always a Right to withdraw the Favour, or to inflict a Penalty; and will proſecute that Right, whenever he finds it neceſſary, to ſome farther End: But yet his Goodneſs may incline him often to remit it, on ſome foreign Motive, *viz.* on account of the preſent Relation between the Criminal and other Men, in very different Circumſtances, or in view of a future Alteration in the Circumſtances of the Criminal himſelf. Now as theſe Motives belong to, and are generally known by, God alone, tho' they may influence his Actions towards us, yet they don't at all affect his Right over us, and therefore, ought not to diminiſh our Love, Gratitude, *&c.* to him in any particular Inſtance, either of Judgment or of Mercy. Whenever we ſuffer for our Crimes, we have no Reaſon to complain

* *Cudworth*, p. 648. † *Ibid.* 649. ‖ *See* X k.

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plain of any Injury, nor can he, when, upon the formention'd Motives, he forgives us, ever injure himſelf. For Juſtice, conſider'd barely as a *Right* or *Moral Power*, evidently *demands* nothing, nor can properly be ſaid to *oblige* one way or other: and therefore, the Being poſſeſs'd of it, is at liberty either to ſuſpend or exert it; but he will never uſe this Liberty, otherwiſe than as his Goodneſs requires, conſequently Juſtice and Mercy in ſuch a Being can never claſh.

Whether this way of conceiving theſe Divine Attributes be not attended with leſs Difficulty than the common manner of treating them, under the Notion of two Infinites diametrically oppoſite, muſt be left to the Judgment of the Reader.

As to the Nature of *Diſtributive* Juſtice, or the true Reaſon of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*, ſee *S. C*'s *Impartial Enquiry, &c.* B. 1. c. 11. prop. 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the Nature and Diviſion of Evil, and the Difficulty of tracing out its Origin.

I. GOOD and *Evil* are Oppoſites, and ariſe from the Relation which things have to each other: For, ſince there are ſome things which profit, and others which prejudice one another; ſince ſome things agree, and others diſagree; as we call the former Good, ſo we ſtile the latter Evil. Whatever, therefore, is *incommodious* or *inconvenient* to itſelf, or any thing elſe; whatever becomes *troubleſome*, or fruſtrates any *Appetite* implanted by God; whatever forces any Perſon to do or ſuffer what he would not, that is *Evil.*

By Evil we underſtand whatſoever is incommodious, inconvenient or troubleſome.

II. Now theſe Inconveniencies appear to be of three kinds, thoſe of *Imperfection*, *Natural* and *Moral* ones. By the Evil of *Imperfection*, I underſtand the Abſence of thoſe Perfections or Advantages which exiſt elſewhere, or in other Beings: By *Natural* Evil, Pains, Uneaſineſſes, Inconveniencies and Diſappointments of Appetites, ariſing from natural Motions: By *Moral*, vicious Elections, that is, ſuch as are hurtful to ourſelves, or others.

Evils are of three kinds, thoſe of Imperfection, Natural, and Moral.

III. Theſe Evils muſt be conſider'd particularly, and we are to ſhew how they may be reconcil'd with the Government of an infinitely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For, ſince there is ſuch a Being, 'tis ask'd, as we ſaid before, Whence come Evils? Whence ſo many *Inconveniencies* in the Work of a moſt *good*, moſt *powerful God?* Whence that perpetual War between the very *Elements*, between *Animals*, between *Men?* Whence *Errors*, *Miſeries* and *Vices*, the conſtant Companions of human Life from its Infancy? Whence

The difficulty is, how theſe come into the Work of a God of the higheſt Goodneſs and Power.

Good to Evil Men, Evil to the Good? If we behold any thing irregular in the Works of Men, if any Machine anſwers not the End it was made for; if we find ſomething in it repugnant to itſelf or others, we attribute that to the Ignorance, Impotence, or Malice of the Workman: but ſince theſe Qualities have no place in God, how come they to have place in any thing? Or, Why does God ſuffer his Works to be deform'd by them?

Some that were unable to ſolve this difficulty, have deny'd the Exiſtence of a God, others have ſuppoſed a double One.

IV. This Queſtion has appear'd ſo intricate and difficult, that ſome finding themſelves unequal to the Solution of it, have deny'd, either that there is any God at all, or at leaſt, any Author or Governor of the World. Thus *Epicurus*, and his Adherents: nor does *Lucretius* bring any other Reaſon for his denying the *Syſtem of the World to be the Effect of a Deity*, than that *it is ſo very faulty* *. Others judg'd it to be more agreeable to Reaſon, to aſſign a double Cauſe of things, rather than none at all. Since it is the greateſt Abſurdity in Nature, to admit of Actions and Effects, without any Agent and Cauſe. Theſe then perceiving a Mixture of Good and Evil, and being fully perſuaded, that ſo many Confuſions and Inconſiſtencies could not proceed from a good Being, ſuppoſed a malevolent *Principle*, or God, directly contrary to the good one; and thence derived Corruption and Death, Diſeaſes, Griefs, Miſeries, Frauds and Villanies; from the good Being nothing but Good: nor did they imagine, that Contrariety and Miſchief could have any other Origin than an Evil Principle. This Opinion was held by many of the Ancients, by the *Manicheans*, *Paulicians*, and almoſt all the Tribe of ancient *Heretics*, (25.).

V. And

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(25.) In order to give ſome light into the Opinions of theſe Men, concerning the Origin of Evil, I ſhall tranſcribe a Paragraph from *Bayle*'s Dictionary, in the Article *Manichees*, Remark *D.* where he introduces *Zoroaſter* defending the two oppoſite Principles above mention'd. "*Zoroaſter*, ſays he, would "go back to the time of the Chaos, which is "a State as to his two Principles, very like "that which *Hobbs* calls the State of Nature, "and which he ſuppoſes to have preceded the "firſt Eſtabliſhment of Societies. In this "State of Nature, one Man was a Wolf to a-"nother, and every thing belong'd to the firſt "Poſſeſſor; none was Maſter of any thing, "except he was the ſtrongeſt. To get out of "this Confuſion, every one agreed to quit his "Right to the whole, that he might have a "Property.

* B. 2. v. 180.

V. And there are ſome ſtill who think this Difficulty unanſwerable. They confeſs, indeed, the Suppoſition of a double Principle to be abſurd, and that it may be demonſtrated that there is but one Author of all things, abſolutely perfect and good; yet there is Evil in things, and this they ſee and feel: but whence, or how it comes, they are entirely ignorant; nor can human Reaſon (if we believe them, in a-

There are ſome who are of opinion, that it is unanſwerable, and that the *Manichees* offer'd a better ſolution, by ſuppoſing two Principles, than the *Catholics* do by owning only One

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" Property in ſomething, they tranſacted one " with another, and ſo the War ceas'd. Thus " the two Principles weary of this Chaos, " wherein each confounded and overthrew " what the other would do, came at laſt to an " Agreement; each of them yielded ſomething, " each had a ſhare in the Production of Man, " and the Laws of the Union of the Soul: " The good Principle obtain'd thoſe which " procure to Man a thouſand Pleaſures, and " conſented to thoſe which expoſe him to a " thouſand Sorrows: and if it conſented that " Moral Good ſhould be infinitely leſs in " Mankind than Moral Evil, he repair'd the " Damage in ſome other kind of Creatures, " wherein Vice ſhould be much leſs than Vir- " tue. If many Men in this Life have more " Miſery than Happineſs, this is recompenc'd " in another State; what they have not under " an human Shape, they ſhall recover under a- " nother. By means of this Agreement, the " Chaos was a paſſive Principle, which was " the Field of Battle between theſe two ac- " tive Principles. The Poets * have repreſen- " ted this diſentangling under the Image of a " Quarrel ended. This is what *Zoroaſter* " might alledge, boaſting that he does not at- " tribute to the Good Principle the produc- " tion of a Creature at his own Pleaſure, " which was to be ſo wretched and miſerable; " but only, after he had found by Experience " that he could do no better, nor better oppoſe " the horrible Deſigns of the Evil Principle. " To render his Hypotheſis the leſs offenſive, " he might have deny'd that there was a long " War between the two Principles, and lay " aſide all thoſe Fights and Priſoners which " the *Manicheans* ſpeak of. The whole might " be reduced to the certain Knowledge of the " two Principles, that one could never obtain " from the other but ſuch and ſuch Conditi- " ons: and thus an Eternal Agreement might " have been made upon this Foot.

For a farther Explication and Amendment of their Hypotheſis, and Replies to ſeveral Arguments urg'd againſt it, ſee the Words, *Manicheans*, *Marcionites*, *Paulicians*, *Origen* and *Zoroaſter*, in the abovemention'd Dictionary.

That there is no *Occaſion* for any Hypotheſis of this kind, will be ſhewn in the following Chapters. Let it ſuffice in this place, to point out the abſurdities of the Hypotheſis itſelf. And firſt, it may be obſerv'd, that the Suppoſition of an *abſolute* and *infinitely Evil Principle* (if theſe Words mean ſuch a Being as is totally oppoſite to the Good One) is an expreſs contradiction. For as this Principle oppoſes and reſiſts the infinitely Good One, it alſo muſt be independent and infinite: It muſt be infinite or abſolute in Knowledge and Power. But the notion of a Being infinitely Evil, is of one infinitely Imperfect; its Knowledge and Power therefore muſt be infinitely Imperfect; *i. e.* abſolute Ignorance and Impotence, or no Knowledge and Power at all. The one of theſe Beings then is abſolutely perfect, or enjoys all manner of poſitive Perfections, conſequently the other, as it is directly the Reverſe, muſt be purely the negation of it, as Darkneſs is of Light; *i. e.* it muſt be an *infinite Defect*, or *mere nothing*. Thus, this *Evil* Being muſt have ſome *Knowledge* and *Power*, in order to make any

* *Hanc Deus & Melior* Litem *Natura diremit.* Ovid. Met. l. 1.

ny meaſure diſcover. Hence they take Occaſion to lament our Unhappineſs, and complain of the hard Fate attending Truth, as often as a Solution of this Difficulty is attempted unſucceſsfully. The *Manicheans* ſolve the Phænomena of things better, a hundred times better (as theſe Men think) with their moſt abſurd Hypotheſis of two Principles, than the Catholics do with their moſt true Doctrine of One

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any oppoſition at all to the *Good* One; but as he is directly oppoſite to that Good or Perfect One, he cannot have the leaſt degree of *Knowledge* or *Power*, ſince theſe are *Perfections*: therefore, the Suppoſition of ſuch an Exiſtence as this, implies a contradiction.

But ſuppoſing theſe Men only to mean (what any underſtanding Perſon among them muſt mean) by this Evil Principle, an abſolutely *Malevolent* Being, of equal Power, and other natural Perfections with thoſe of the *Good* One, " It would be to no purpoſe (ſays *Tillotſon* *,) to ſuppoſe two ſuch oppoſite Principles.—For, admit that a Being infinitely Miſchievous, were infinitely cunning, and infinitely powerful, yet it could do no Evil, becauſe the oppoſite Principle of infinite Goodneſs, being alſo infinitely wiſe and powerful, they would tye up one another's Hands: ſo that upon this Suppoſition, the Notion of a Deity would ſignify juſt nothing, and by virtue of the Eternal Oppoſition and Equality of thoſe Principles, they would keep one another at a perpetual Bay, and being an equal Match for one another, inſtead of being two Deities, they would be two Idols, able to do neither Good nor Evil.

I ſhall only produce one argument more as to Moral Evil, out of *Simplicius*'s Comment on *Epictetus*, which, by the Confeſſion of *Bayle* himſelf, ſtrikes home at the Doctrine of Two Principles, tho' it be conſider'd with the greateſt Simplicity.

He ſays †, " *It entirely deſtroys the Liberty of our Souls, and neceſſitates them to Sin, and conſequently implies a Contradiction. For, ſince the Principle of Evil is eternal and incorruptible, and ſo potent that God himſelf cannot conquer him, it follows, that the Soul of Man cannot reſiſt the Impulſe, with which he moves it to Sin. But if a Man be invincibly driven to it, he commits no Murder or Adultery, &c. by his own Fault, but by a ſuperior eternal Fault, and in that Caſe he is neither guilty nor puniſhable. Therefore, there is no ſuch thing as Sin, and conſequently this Hypotheſis deſtroys itſelf; ſince if there be a Principle of Evil, there is no longer any Evil in the World. But if there be no Evil in the World, it is clear there is no Principle of Evil; whence we may infer, that thoſe who ſuppoſe ſuch a Principle, deſtroy, by a neceſſary Conſequence, both Evil and the Principle of it.*"

More of this may be ſeen in *Bayle*'s Explanation concerning the *Manichees*, at the End of his Dictionary, p. 66, *&c.* See alſo Mr. *Gurdon*'s *Boyle*'s *Lecture*, Serm. 5. or *Stillingfleet*'s *Orig. Sacræ*, B. 3. C. 3. §. 10, 12. See alſo *Sherlock* on *Judgment*, 1ſt Edit. p. 173.

Neither does Mr. *Bayle*'s amendment of this Hypotheſis free it from the Difficulty. He ſuppoſes the two Principles to be ſenſible of the above mention'd Conſequence ariſing from their Equality of Power, and therefore, would compound the Matter, by allowing an equal Mixture of Good and Evil in the intended Creation. But if the Quantity of Good and Evil in the Creation be exactly equal, neither of the Principles has attain'd, or could expect to attain, the End for which it was ſuppos'd to act. The Good Principle deſign'd

* 2 Vol. of Serm. Fol. p. 690. † p. 152. Ed. *Lond.* 1670.

One perfect, abſolutely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For the *Manicheans* acquit God from all manner of Blame, as he was compell'd by the contrary Principle to ſuffer Sin and Miſery in his Work, which in the mean while he oppoſes with all his Power. But, according to the Catholics, as their Adverſaries object, he permits theſe voluntarily, nay, is the Cauſe and Author of them. For if, as theſe Men argue, there be but one Author of all Things, Evils alſo ſhould be refer'd to him as their Original; but it can neither be explain'd nor conceiv'd, how infinite Goodneſs can become the Origin of Evil. If God could not hinder it, where is his Power? If he could, and would not, where is his Goodneſs? If you ſay, that Evil neceſſarily adheres to ſome particular Natures; ſince God was the Author of them all, it would have been better to have omitted thoſe with the concomitant Evils, than to have debaſed his Workmanſhip with an Allay of theſe Evils, (26.).

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ſign'd to produce ſome abſolute Good, the Evil One ſome abſolute Evil; but to produce an equal Mixture of both, would be in effect producing neither: One would juſt counterbalance and deſtroy the other; and all ſuch action would be the very ſame as doing nothing at all: and that ſuch an exact Equality of Good and Evil muſt be the Reſult of any agreement between them is plain: For, as they are by Suppoſition perfectly equal in *Inclination*, as well as *Power*, neither of them could poſſibly concede, and let its oppoſite prevail: The Creation therefore cannot be owing to ſuch a Compoſition.

But the beſt Confutation of this Scheme may be found in the Chapter before us; where our *Author* ſhews, that it does not at all anſwer the End for which it was introduced. This completes the abſurdity of it.

(26.) Since this Objection contains all that can be ſaid upon Evil in general; and it appears to me abſolutely neceſſary for every Man to do Juſtice to Objections, who expects that others ſhould receive any Satisfaction from his anſwers, I ſhall inſert it, as it is propoſed in its full force, by *Cudworth* *. "The ſuppoſed Deity and Maker of the World, was either willing to aboliſh all Evils, but not able, or he was able and not willing: or, thirdly, he was neither willing nor able: or, laſtly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that anſwers fully to the Notion of a God. Now, that the ſuppoſed Creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to aboliſh all Evils, is plain, becauſe then there would have been no Evils at all left. Wherefore, ſince there is ſuch a Deluge of Evils overflowing all, it muſt needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was *impotent*; or elſe he was able and not willing, and then he was *envious*; or laſtly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both *impotent* and *envious*."

Almoſt

* *True Intell. Syſt.* p. 78, 79.

This difficulty has exerciſed the Philoſophers and Fathers of the Church, and ſome deny that it is anſwer'd yet.

VI. It is well known, that this Difficulty has exerciſed both the ancient Philoſophers and Fathers of the Church (27.): and there are ſome who deny that it is yet anſwer'd; nay, who undertake to refute all the Solutions hitherto offer'd; nor do I promiſe a complete one in every Reſpect, tho' I hope to ſhew, in the following Part of the Treatiſe, that it is not wholly unanſwerable.

There is more Good than Evil in the World.

VII. It is manifeſt, that tho' Good be mix'd with Evil in this Life, yet there is much more Good than Evil in Nature, and every Animal provides for its Preſervation by Inſtinct or Reaſon, which it would never do, if it did not think or feel its Life, with all the Evils annex'd, to be much preferable to Non-exiſtence. This is a Proof of the Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Power of God, who could thus temper a World infeſted with ſo many Miſeries, that nothing ſhould continue in it which was not in ſome meaſure pleaſed with its Exiſtence, and which would not endeavour by all poſſible Means to preſerve it.

'Tis no leſs repugnant to Infinite Goodneſs to have created theſe things which he ſaw would be corrupted by another, than ſuch as would corrupt themſelves. The Suppoſition of a double Principle is therefore of no Service toward the Solution of this Difficulty.

VIII. Neither does the Suppoſition of an Evil Principle help any thing towards the Solution of this Difficulty. For the Aſſerters of two Principles maintain, that the great and good God tolerates Evil, becauſe he is forced to it by the Evil One, and that either from an Agreement between themſelves, or a perpetual Struggle and Conteſt with each other. For, ſince the Beneficent Author of Nature was

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Almoſt the ſame occurs in *Lactantius* *, and is cited, and ſufficiently refuted by our Author in C. 5. §. 5. *Sub.* the laſt: See alſo *Prudentius* in *Hamurtigenia*, v. 640.

The Subſtance of all *Bayle*'s Objections may be ſeen in a Book call'd *Free Thoughts on Religion*, *&c.* C. 5. p. 104, *&c.* See alſo the following Note. The Anſwers to them will follow in their proper places.

(27.) Any one that wants to be acquainted with the Antiquity of this Diſpute, or the Perſons engaged in it, or the way of managing it, made uſe of by the *Fathers*, may conſult the beginning of Dr. *J. Clarke*'s Enquiry into the Cauſe and Origin of Evil: and *Bayle*'s Dictionary, in the Articles *Minicheans*, Remark *B. Marcionites*, Remarks *F*, and *F* Δ. *Paulicians*, Remarks *K*, and *K* Δ. and *Zoroaſter*, Remark *E*. Or *Cudworth*, from p. 213, to p. 224. or *Stillingfleet*'s *Origines Sacræ*, B. 3. C. 3. §. 8, 9, 11, 12, *&c.* or *Fabricij Biblioth. Græc.* v. 5. p. 287, *&c.* or *Delectus Argumentorum*, *&c.* C. 15.

* *De Ira Dei*, C. 13. p. 435. Edit. Cant.

was hinder'd by the Evil Principle, from producing all the Good he was willing to produce, he either made an Agreement with it, to produce as much as he was allow'd, but with a Mixture of Evil, according to the Agreement between them; or elſe there is a Mixture of Good and Evil proportionable to the Power which prevails in either. Hence they think the good God excuſable, who confer'd as many Bleſſings on the World as his Adverſary permitted, and would have tolerated no manner of Evil, unleſs compell'd to it by the adverſe Power. So that he muſt either create no Good at all, or ſuffer an Allay of Evil. All which very great Abſurdities have this farther Inconvenience, that they do not anſwer the End for which they were invented. For he is no leſs culpable who created any thing which he knew would be render'd miſerable by another, than if he had made that which he foreſaw would bring Miſery upon itſelf. If therefore God might, conſiſtently with Goodneſs, create Things which he knew the Evil Principle could and would corrupt, as the *Manicheans* aſſerted; then he might, conſiſtently with the ſame Goodneſs, have created Things that would corrupt themſelves, or were to periſh in a Tract of Time. If then, according to the Defenders of this Hypotheſis, God ought to have omitted, or not created thoſe Beings, in whoſe Natures Evil or Contrariety is inherent, he ought alſo to have omitted thoſe, whoſe Natures he foreſaw the Evil Principle would corrupt. And if there was ſo much Good in theſe, as made him think it better to create them, tho' they were to be corrupted ſome time or other by the oppoſite Principle, he might alſo judge it preferable to produce the ſame, tho' they were at length to periſh by their inherent Evils. Nor will God tolerate Evil in his Works, as forced to it more, according to the *Manicheans*, than the *Catholics*. For, as he might have not made thoſe Beings which have Evils neceſſarily adhering to them, ſo he might alſo have not made thoſe which he foreknew the contrary Principle would corrupt. After the ſame manner in both Caſes he could have prevented Evil, and ſince he could, why did he not? The Suppoſition of two Principles conduces nothing at all therefore to the Solution of this Difficulty.

IX. But

If it can be ſhewn, that it does not contradict infinite Power and Goodneſs to permit Evils, or that theſe neceſſarily ariſe from the exerciſe of them, then may the Difficulty be anſwer'd.

IX. But if we can point out a Method of reconciling theſe Things with the Government of an abſolutely perfect Agent, and make them not only conſiſtent with Infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power, but neceſſarily reſulting from them (ſo that theſe would not be Infinite, if thoſe did not or could not poſſibly exiſt) then we may be ſuppoſed to have at laſt diſcover'd the true Origin of Evils, and anſwer'd all the Difficulties and Objections that are brought on this Head, againſt the Goodneſs, Wiſdom, Power, and Unity of God. Let us try therefore what can be done in each kind of Evil; and firſt, concerning the *Evil of Imperfection.*

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Evil of Defect.

I. AS for the Evil of *Imperfection*, it is to be conſider'd, that before the World was created God exiſted alone, and nothing beſide him. All things therefore are out of nothing, and whatſoever exiſts, has its Exiſtence from God; neither can that Exiſtence be different either in Kind or Degree from what he gave *.

Things can be no otherwiſe than as God pleaſed.

II. Secondly, God, tho' he be omnipotent, cannot make any created Being *abſolutely perfect*, for whatever is abſolutely perfect, muſt neceſſarily be Self-exiſtent. But it is included in the very Notion of a Creature, as ſuch, not to exiſt of itſelf, but from God. An abſolutely perfect Creature therefore implies a Contradiction. For it ſhould be of itſelf, and not of itſelf, at the ſame time (28.). Abſolute Perfection is therefore peculiar to God, and if he would communicate his own peculiar Perfection to another, (E.) that other would be God. The

All Created things are neceſſarily imperfect, ſince they do not exiſt of themſelves.

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(28.) A *perfect Creature* is a contradiction in terms. For if it be *perfect* it is *independent*; and if it be independent, it is no *Creature*. Again; to ſuppoſe a created Being *infinite* in any reſpect is to ſuppoſe it *equal* to its Creator in that reſpect; and if it be equal in one reſpect, it muſt be ſo in all, ſince an Infinite property cannot inhere in any finite Subject, for then the Attribute would be more perfect than its ſubject, all which is abſurd. Granting, therefore, this one Principle, which cannot be deny'd, (*viz.* that an Effect muſt be inferior to its Cauſe) it will appear, that the Evil of Imperfection, ſuppoſing a *Creation*, is neceſſary and unavoidable; and conſequently, all other Evils which neceſſarily ariſe from that, are unavoidable alſo. What our Author has advanced upon the following Head, ſeems perfectly concluſive.

(E.) This Poſition ſeems very agreeable to the *Catholic Faith*, which teaches that the *Father* did communicate his Nature, and all his Per-

* *See* Scott *in* Note 32.

The *Evil of Imperfection* muſt therefore be tolerated in Creatures, notwithſtanding the Divine Omnipotence and Goodneſs: for Contradictions are Objects of no Power. God might indeed have refrain'd from creating, and continu'd alone, Self-ſufficient, and perfect to all Eternity, but his Infinite Goodneſs would by no means allow it; this oblig'd him to produce external things; which things, ſince they could not

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Perfections to the *Son*, and with him to the *Holy Ghoſt*: each of them therefore is very God under a different *Subſiſtence*. The Divine Nature which is inherent in them, may be conceiv'd to be of itſelf, but the Modus of Exiſtence cannot. Now the Church looks upon the Nature thus ſubſiſting, as a *Perſon*. Not that it is a Perſon in the ſame manner as the human Nature ſubſiſting by itſelf, but by Reaſon of a certain Similitude and Analogy which they have between them. Since Divine Matters are not objects of the Senſes, they cannot, as we ſaid before *, be known by Marks impreſs'd upon us by Senſation; they are therefore conceiv'd by a Similitude, Relation, Proportion, or Connection with ſenſible things: The Paſſions, Affections Intellect, and Will, are the Principles of our Actions, and therefore we attribute theſe to God. For if we were to do thoſe things which God performs, theſe would be the Principles and Cauſes of them: We attribute therefore to God ſomething analogous, or equivalent to theſe, but we know that it is as diſtant as finite is from Infinite Nay, 'tis demonſtrable, that neither Will, nor Love, nor Anger, nor Juſtice, nor Mercy, are in God, after the ſame manner, as they exiſt in, and are conceiv'd by, us †. But we muſt make uſe of theſe Words, becauſe we have no better, and they ſufficiently anſwer the End for which God would have us to know him. Now, after the ſame manner we point out the diſtinction declared in Scripture between the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*, by the Word *Perſon*, becauſe we have nothing nearer to compare them by; and the Repreſentation under this Analogy ſhews us very well what we may hope for from each of them, and what Worſhip we ought to pay them. Tho' at the ſame time we are certain, that theſe differ no leſs from human Perſons, than the Divine Intellect does from human, or the Principles of Divine Actions from human Paſſions; for inſtance, Anger, Hatred, and the like. 'Tis ſtrange therefore, that Men who would be eſteem'd learned, ſhould diſpute againſt a Plurality of Perſons in the Deity, after the very ſame Way of Reaſoning with which *Cotta* in *Cicero* argues againſt the Intelligence, Prudence, and Juſtice of God ‖, namely, becauſe they cannot be in God after the ſame *manner* as we conceive them to be in Men; forgetting, in the mean time, that theſe are attributed to God by a kind of *Analogy* and Accomodation to our Capacity, and rather from the reſemblance of things done by God, to thoſe done by us, than of the Principles from which they proceed. But the Scriptures and the Church have ſufficiently forewarn'd us to beware of this erroneous Way of Reaſoning. For when God is deſcribed under theſe Figures, Similitudes, and Analogies, leſt we ſhould take Images of things for the things themſelves, and ſo fall into abſurd Reaſonings about them, the ſame things are deny'd of God in one Senſe, that are affirm'd of him in another. Thus God is often ſaid to repent, and in another place 'tis deny'd that he repents as a Man. Thus Light is aſcribed to God, as his habitation, and elſewhere, Thick Darkneſs. He is often ſaid to be ſeen, and yet is call'd Inviſible.

* Note *A.*

† *See* Woolaſton, p. 115, 116. *and* Epiſcopius *Inſt. Theol.* L. 4. C. 22. p. 310. *or our Author's Sermon on Predeſtination*, &c.

‖ *Qualem autem Deum, &c.* (*Cic. de Nat. Deor.* §. 15. Ed. Lond. —*See our Author's Serm.* §. 37.

not poſſibly be perfect, the Divine Goodneſs preferr'd imperfect ones to none at all. Imperfection then aroſe from the Infinity of Divine Goodneſs. Had not God been infinitely Good, perhaps he might not have ſuffer'd imperfect Beings; but have been content in himſelf, and created nothing at all.

III. Thirdly, There are infinite Degrees of Perfection between a Being *abſolutely perfect* and *Nothing:* of which, if Exiſtence be conceiv'd as the Firſt, every thing will be ſo many degrees diſtant from nothing, as there are *Perfections* to be found in it joined with Exiſtence. In this Scale then God will be the *Top*, and Nothing the *Bottom*; and how much farther any thing is diſtant from nothing, it is ſo much the more perfect, and approaches nearer to God. How much any thing can reſemble God in Perfection, or how nearly approach to him (F.) we know not; but we are certain that there is always an infinite

'Tis to be determin'd by the Divine Pleaſure what Degrees of Perfection every thing muſt have, ſince all things are neceſſarily at an Infinite diſtance from the higheſt Perfection.

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viſible. The Father is God and Lord, and alſo the Son and the Holy Ghoſt, and yet it is ſaid there is but one God and Lord. All which and more of the ſame kind, we muſt believe to be thus expreſs'd, for no other Reaſon, but to hinder us from imagining them to be aſcribed to God in the ſame manner as they are in us, (29). But Smatterers in Learning reject and ridicule theſe forms of Speech as Ænigmas, being ignorant of both the Sacred and Eccleſiaſtical Dialect, which they refuſe to learn, tho' we muſt make uſe of it in Divine Matters, or elſe entirely refrain from all Reaſoning about them. For ſince they are known no otherwiſe than by ſimilitude and analogy, they cannot be deſcribed otherwiſe, as any one will find who tries. But it is no wonder if theſe Men, while they take ſimilies for the things themſelves, ſhould eaſily imagine that they diſcover abſurdities in them. If they do this on purpoſe, cunningly, and with an ill Intent, they are Villains; but if thro' Ignorance or Error, they deſerve Pity, if they did not ſwell with a proud conceit of Science, and exalt themſelves above the Vulgar; who yet are much wiſer than theſe Philoſophers. For they fear the Anger of God, love his Goodneſs, embrace his Mercy, adore his Juſtice, and give Glory to the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, and yet believe in and worſhip one God, moſt perfect, and free from Paſſions. Whereas, the Smatterers in Science have got nothing to place in the Room of theſe, which they themſelves, much leſs the Vulgar, can underſtand; or, which can equally excite the Affections of the Mind, or promote Piety.

(F) Suppoſing the World to be Infinite, there would be, as far as appears to us, Infinite Orders of Creatures deſcending gradually from God to Nothing: but ſince neither our Underſtanding can comprehend, nor does the Nature of Quantity and Motion ſeem to admit of Infinity or Eternity; 'tis better to refer the Matter to the Divine Will. For if an Infinity in Creatures be impoſſible, 'tis the ſame thing wherever we ſtop. For all Finites are equally diſtant

(29) *This is a good Inference from theſe and the like Expreſſions, but can hardly be ſuppoſed to have been the principal deſign, much leſs the* only reaſon, *of them. For more inſtances of this kind, ſee the foremention'd Sermon,* §. 23, 27.

finite diſtance between them. It muſt have been determin'd therefore by the Will of God, where he would ſtop, ſince there is nothing but his own Will to bound his Power. Now it is to be believ'd, that the preſent Syſtem of the World was the very beſt that could be, with regard to the Mind of God in framing it (30.). It might have been better

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diſtant from Infinite. If therefore God had created twice, thrice, or a thouſand thouſand times as great, and as many Beings, and a thouſand thouſand Ages ſooner than he has, the ſame objections might be made, Why not before? Why not more? The World therefore muſt either have been created Infinite and from Eternity, which the very Nature of the thing ſeems not to allow, or it is all one when and how great it might be, and not determinable by any thing beſides the Divine Pleaſure. See Chap. 5. §. 1. Subſ. 4. and *J. Clarke* on *Nat. Evil*, p. 90, 93, 280, *&c.*

(30.) In order to confirm this belief, and come to a right Knowledge of the whole Queſtion before us, it is neceſſary to enquire a little into the meaning of theſe Words; to conſider (with reverence) what this Mind of God might be in framing the World, and what was the moſt proper Method of anſwering it. Now it appear'd from the Concluſion of the firſt Chapter, and Note 23. that the ſole Deſign of Almighty God in creating the Univerſe, was to impart Felicity to other Beings: and in the beginning of this Chapter it was proved, that any Happineſs thus communicated could not be *Infinite*. His Deſign then is completely anſwer'd, if the greateſt Degree of Happineſs be imparted, of which created Beings are capable, conſiſtent with one another; or when the utmoſt poſſible Good is produced in the Univerſe collectively. This alſo ſhews us what we are to underſtand by *the very beſt Syſtem*, viz. one that is fitted for, and productive of, the greateſt abſolute *general Good*: The *manner* of effecting which comes next under conſideration. As to this, it is queried in the firſt place, whether all Animals ought to have been created equally perfect; or ſeveral indifferent Ranks and Degrees of Perfection; and ſecondly, whether God may be ſuppoſed to have placed any Order of Beings in ſuch a fix'd unalterable condition, as not to admit of advancement: to have made any Creatures as perfect at firſt as the Nature of a created Being is capable of. The former of theſe doubts is fully diſcuſs'd in this and the following Chapter, §. 2. The latter ſeems not ſo eaſy to be determin'd. They who hold the affirmative argue from our notion of Infinite or *abſolute Goodneſs*, which muſt excite the Deity always to communicate all manner of *Happineſs*, in the very higheſt Degree, for the ſame reaſon that it prompts him to communicate it ever in any degree. But this, ſay they, he has not done, except he at firſt endow'd ſome Creatures with all the Perfection a Creature could poſſibly receive, and gave to every ſubordinate Claſs of Beings *, the utmoſt *Happineſs* their ſeveral Natures were capable of. Neither can this Opinion be confuted from Holy Scripture, which declares that God made innumerable glorious Orders of *Cherubim* and *Seraphim*, all far above our Comprehenſion, and ſome, for any thing that we know, in the very next Step to the *Top* of the great *Scale* of *Beings*, and only *Second* to the Almighty. Thoſe that hold the contrary Opinion, diſtinguiſh between Happineſs and Perfection, and think that theſe do not either neceſſarily imply, or inſeparably attend each other. They deny therefore the conſequence of the former Argument, and aſſign this Reaſon for it, *viz.* becauſe a Being produced in the higheſt degree of natural Perfection which a Creature is capable of, and ſtill continued in the *ſame*, will not receive as much *Happineſs* in the main, as others that were placed in a much inferior State at the firſt. This, tho' it ma-

* *Concerning theſe Claſſes, ſee* Notes 33 and 35.

ter perhaps in ſome Particulars, but not without ſome new, and probably greater Inconveniencies, which muſt have ſpoil'd the Beauty, either of the whole, or of ſome chief Part.

IV. Fourthly; From hence it appears alſo, that all Beings cannot have equal Perfections. For the World muſt neceſſarily be compos'd of

All things could not be equally perfect, ſince ſome are Parts of others.

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may appear ſomething like a Paradox, yet, upon farther conſideration, will perhaps be judg'd not improbable. Thus, for a Creature conſcious of no deficiency of any thing neceſſary to its well-being, to meet with a perpetual acceſſion of new, unknown Pleaſure, to reflect with comfort on its paſt Condition, and compare it with the preſent, to enjoy a continued Series of freſh Satisfaction and Delight, and be always approaching nearer and nearer to Perfection, this muſt certainly advance the Sum of its *Happineſs*, even above that of others, whoſe condition is ſuppoſed to have begun and to continue in that degree of perfection, where this will end (if there could be any end in either) and which never knew defect, variety, or increaſe. A finite Being fix'd in the ſame State, however excellent, muſt, according to all our Conceptions (if we be allow'd to judge from our preſent Faculties, and we can judge from nothing elſe) contract a kind of *Indolence* or *Inſenſibility (i. e.* cannot always be equally affected by an equal degree of Good in the Object) which Inſenſibility, nothing but alteration and variety can cure. It does not therefore ſeem probable, that God has actually fix'd any created Beings whatſoever in the very higheſt degree of Perfection next to himſelf. Nay, it is impoſſible to conceive any ſuch higheſt Degree, and the Suppoſition is abſurd. That which admits of a continual addibility, can admit of no *higheſt*; and to ask, why God created not all Beings with the very higheſt Perfection? is the ſame abſurdity as to ask, why he did not make as many Creatures, or as many Worlds as he could? For which ſee Note 22. Since then the Creation cannot be Infinite; and finites, how much ſoever amplified, can never reach Infinity or abſolute Perfection*, we can ſet no manner of bounds to the Creating Power of God: but muſt refer all to his Infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs: which Attributes we know can never be exhauſted, nor will, we believe, produce any Beings in ſuch a State, as ſhall not leave room enough for them to be ſtill growing in Felicity, and for ever acquiring new Happineſs, together with new Perfection.

This notion of a growing Happineſs is embraced by moſt Divines, and affords the ſtrongeſt Motive for endeavouring to improve and excell in every Chriſtian Grace. 'Tis beautifully touch'd upon by Mr. *Addiſon*, Spectator N°. 111. "*There is not, in my Opinion, a more "pleaſing and triumphant Conſideration in Religion, than this of the perpetual Progreſs which "the Soul makes toward the Perfection of its Nature, without ever arriving at a Period in it. "To look upon the Soul as going on from Strength "to Strength; to conſider, that She is to ſhine "for ever with new Acceſſions of Glory, and "brighten to all Eternity; that She will be ſtill "adding Virtue to Virtue, and Knowledge to "Knowledge, carries in it ſomething wonderfully "agreeable to that Ambition which is natural to "the Mind of Man. Nay, it muſt be a Proſpect "pleaſing to God himſelf, to ſee his Creation for "ever beautifying in his Eyes, and drawing nearer "to him by degrees of Reſemblance.*"

That the *Happineſs* of *Saints* and *Angels* may be continually increaſing, ſee *Tillotſon's* 77th *Sermon*, Vol. 2d. Fol. p. 578, &c.

From

* *See* Note F: *and Dr.* Bentley's *Boyle's Lect.* Serm. 6. p. 236, 237. 5th Edit.

of various *Parts*, and theſe *parts* of *others*, and ſo on. But a Part muſt needs come ſhort, both of the *Divine Perfection*, and the Perfection of the *whole*. For it is nothing with regard to all the Perfections which it has not, whether theſe be Divine, or Created; and ſince one Part is not another, nor the *whole*, 'tis plain, that every part wants the Perfections not only of the whole, but of other Parts alſo. And that the *whole* is more perfect than a *part*, is evident from hence, that it neceſſarily includes the multiplied Perfection of every part; and

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From theſe Conſiderations, and ſome which follow in the remainder of this Note, it may perhaps ſeem probable, that in us, and all Beings of the like nature, changes from worſe to better, muſt be attended even with greater degrees of Pleaſure than a ſettled permanence in any, the higheſt State of Glory or Perfection, and conſequently become neceſſary to the completion of all finite Happineſs. But in oppoſition to all this, *Bayle* urges, that encreaſe or alteration is not in the leaſt requiſite to a laſting Felicity even in ourſelves.

"That 'tis no ways neceſſary that our Soul "ſhould feel Evil, to the end it may reliſh "what is Good, and that it ſhould paſs ſucceſſively from Pleaſure to Pain, and from "Pain to Pleaſure, that it may be able to diſcern that Pain is an Evil, and that Pleaſure "is a Good thing. We know by Experience, "that our Soul cannot feel, at one and the "ſame time, both Pleaſure and Pain; it muſt "therefore at firſt either have felt Pain before "Pleaſure, or Pleaſure before Pain. If its "firſt Senſation was that of Pain, it found that "State to be uneaſy, altho' it was ignorant of "Pleaſure. Suppoſe then that its firſt Senſation laſted many Years, without Interruption, you may conceive that it was in an "eaſy Condition, or in one that was uneaſy. "And do not alledge to me Experience, do "not tell me that a pleaſure which laſts a long "time becomes inſipid, and that a long pain "becomes inſupportable: For I will anſwer "you, that this proceeds from a Change in "the organ which makes that pain, which continues the ſame as to kind, to be different as "to Degrees. If you have had at firſt a Senſation of ſix Degrees, it will not continue "of Six to the end of two Hours, or to the "end of a Year, but only either of one Degree, or of one Fourth part of a Degree. "Thus Cuſtom blunts the Edge of our Senſations; their Degrees correſpond to the Concuſſions of the parts of the Brain, and this "Concuſſion is weaken'd by frequent Repetitions: from whence it comes to paſs, that "the Degrees of Senſation are diminiſh'd. "But if Pain or Joy were communicated to "us in the ſame Degree, ſucceſſively, for an "hundred Years, we ſhould be as unhappy, or "as happy in the hundredth Year, as in the "firſt Day; which plainly proves, that a "Creature may be happy with a continued "Good, or unhappy with a continued Evil, "and that the *Alternative*, which *Lactantius* "ſpeaks of *, is a bad Solution of the Difficulty. It is not founded upon the nature of "Good and Evil, nor upon the Nature of "the Subject which receives them; nor upon "the nature of the Cauſe which produces "them. Pleaſure and Pain are no leſs proper "to be communicated the ſecond Moment than "the firſt, and the third Moment than the ſecond, and ſo of all the reſt. Our Soul is "alſo as ſuſceptible of them after it has felt "them one Moment, as it was before it felt "them, and God who gave them, is no leſs "capable of producing them the ſecond Moment than the firſt †."

As

* Note 103. † *Critical Dict.* p. 2486.

and beſides the parts when join'd together, and connected, acquire a new and peculiar Perfection, whereby they anſwer their proper Ends, which they could not do aſunder, they defend themſelves much better, and aſſiſt each other. The Perfection of the whole therefore, is not only more *extenſive* than that of the parts, by the accumulation of many parts, perhaps equal to one another; but more *intenſe* alſo, by

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As this is one of the ſtrongeſt objections, and applicable to all kinds of Evil, I have quoted it at length (tho' ſome parts may not relate immediately to our preſent purpoſe) and ſhall endeavour to give a full anſwer to it in the following Notes. It will be conſider'd with reſpect to Moral Good and Evil, in Notes 90, 106, and 108. Let us confine ourſelves at preſent to Natural Good, which may be divided into ſenſitive and intellectual. As to the former, we perceive that the Mind, for the augmentation of its Happineſs, is endow'd with various Senſes, each of which is entertain'd with a variety of Objects; now, any one of theſe Senſes can convey ſo much Pleaſure for ſome time, as is ſufficient to fill our preſent narrow Capacity, and engroſs the whole Soul. She can be entirely happy in the Satisfaction ariſing from the Sight, Hearing, *&c.* or from the Memory, or any other Mode of Perception by itſelf. If therefore any one of theſe Organs could (as *Bayle* ſuppoſes) continue to communicate the ſame Degree of Pleaſure to us for an hundred Years, all the reſt would be unneceſſary: but an All-wiſe Being, who cannot act in vain, has implanted this Variety of Senſes in us; this then is a good Argument, that none of theſe particular Senſes could continue in its preſent State, and always communicate the ſame Degree of Happineſs. Farther, this Suppoſition will appear to be impoſſible, from conſidering the Nature and Properties of that Matter of which the ſenſitive Organs are compoſed. If there be (as *Bayle* maintains) ſo cloſe a connection between the Soul and certain Modifications of Matter, as that the Degrees of ſenſitive Pleaſure are diminiſh'd by a *Change* in the Organ, by weakening the Concuſſion of ſome parts of the Brain *by frequent Repetitions*; then we ſay, 'tis plainly impoſſible, that the ſame Degrees ſhould be continued by this Organ, which, as it is material, is perpetually expoſed to this *Change*, and liable to Diſſolution, and neceſſarily weaken'd by theſe *frequent Concuſſions*. Every Motion in it muſt in time be ſtop'd by contrary ones, as our Author has fully ſhewn in Chap. 4. §. 1.

If he ſuppoſes that the ſame Degree of Pleaſure may ſtill be communicated tho' the Organ alters, he ſuppoſes that there is no ſuch Connection between any portion or poſition of Matter, and our Spirit; which is directly contrary to his former Suppoſition, and alſo to Truth, as will perhaps appear from the following Chapter. If then *Bayle* imagines, that the ſame, or different Matter, when moved or at reſt; or when moved in different Directions, may ſtill affect the Mind in the very ſame manner, he muſt either take it for granted that the Affections of Matter are no Cauſes of the Senſations of the Mind, that is, contradict his former Suppoſition; or elſe he muſt ſuppoſe the ſame Effect to proceed from different Cauſes; either of which will tend equally to advance his Syſtem. But in reality, this decreaſe of Pleaſure in Familiarity and Cuſtom, does not entirely depend on any Change of the corporeal Organs, but on the original Faculties of the Soul itſelf, as may be gathered from ſome ſuch Obſervations as this which follows. View a delightful Landskip, a pleaſant Garden, or any of thoſe Figures which appear moſt *beautiful*, renew the Proſpect once, or twice, to Day, to Morrow, and at ſeveral diſtant Periods; it ſhall afford a great degree of Pleaſure for ſome time, while any *Novelty* may be ſuppoſed to remain; but that Pleaſure periſhes together with

this

by the Addition of certain Degrees, whereby the whole muſt of Neceſſity excell the Parts. As therefore we have proved, that an abſolutely perfect Creature is an Impoſſibility, ſo it may be proved from hence, that all cannot have an *equal Degree* of Perfection. For the World conſiſts of Parts, and thoſe again of others, perhaps diviſible *in infinitum*: but that every ſingle Part ſhould have the Perfection of all,

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this Novelty, tho' the external Organs of Viſion ſtill continue perfect, and your Senſations are moſt evidently the ſame the laſt Day as the firſt. You are able to behold the ſame Scenes over again, with the ſame eaſe and accuteneſs, but not with the ſame Intenſeneſs of Delight. To attempt a Mechanical Solution of this by a ſuppoſed alteration of ſome imaginary *Traces* in the Brain (which yet, if they were allow'd, cannot mend the matter a jot, as was juſt now ſhewn) will only throw us into ſtill greater difficulties, as any one that attentively conſiders the whole of that Chimerical Hypotheſis, muſt conclude, and of which *Bayle*, who ſoon perceiv'd the Defects and Abſurdities of moſt other Syſtems, was undoubtedly convinc'd. It ſeems to me much more properly reſolvable into a native Property of the Soul itſelf. Is it not probable, that the mind of Man is originally framed with an Appetite or Diſpoſition for *Variety?* that it cannot be always on the ſame Bent, but as it is endow'd with different Faculties, ſo theſe relieve one another by turns, and receive an additional Pleaſure from the *Novelty* of thoſe Objects about which it is converſant; and that by this means it enjoys a greater Sum of Happineſs than it could other ways attain to? See the *Spectator*, N°. 600. N°. 626. or N°. 412. or *Watts* on *the Paſſions*, §. 4.

I ſhall only add an Obſervation on this Head from the ingenious Author of the *Vindication of God's Moral Character*, p. 21. which ſhews us the neceſſity for this Variety or Increaſableneſs of Perfection, in order to our *Intellectual Happineſs*, ſince moſt of that ariſes from our paſt Defects. "*By* Intellectual Happineſs, *I mean* "*the* Diſcovery and Contemplation of Truth, "*with regard to which I have this to obſerve,* "*that all the Pleaſures we taſte of this kind are* "*owing either to our preceding* Ignorance, *to the* "*care and Pains we take in the Diſcovery of* "*Truth, or to the* Degree *of our* Knowledge, "*when we attain to a* greater meaſure *than o-* "*ther Men. All Truth, when conſider'd ſepa-* "*rate from theſe, is alike as* Truth (*tho not of* "*the like Importance to us*) *the Object of the Un-* "*derſtanding, and as ſuch, it muſt afford the* "*ſame Delight. If we all could, with equal eaſe* "*and clearneſs, ſee all the Relations of things,* "*they muſt all in the nature of the thing equally* "*affect us. We ſhould taſte as much Pleaſure in* "*knowing or contemplating that two and two makes* "*four, as in knowing or contemplating any Propoſition* "*which now appears the moſt* difficult, *and ſo affords* "*the moſt Pleaſure: or rather, we ſhould not* "*have Pleaſure from any of them. Now if this* "*be the Caſe, then it is evident, that the* Capa- "city *we have for taſting this kind of Pleaſure,* "*renders us* capable *of its contrary. We could* "*not be delighted in the Diſcovery or Contempla-* "*tion of Truth, if we were not capable of being* "*ignorant, and of the Unhappineſs which ariſes* "*from it.*"

This is the Conſequence we would draw from all that went before: but of this more at large under the head of *Moral Evil.*

We reply then to *Bayle*, that this *Alternative* or Variety of either Good or Evil, as far as concerns the preſent Argument, is founded on the Nature of the *Subject which receives them*, and that our Soul in its preſent State, is not ſo ſuſceptible of them, after it has felt them two or three times as at firſt. What it might have been made capable of, is nothing to the Purpoſe, ſince (as it was obſerv'd before, and muſt often be repeated) we are to conſider Man as we find him at preſent; and draw all our Arguments, not from ſuch Faculties as are per-

or many, is impoſſible; and we are not to arraign the Power or Goodneſs of God for not working Contradictions. There muſt then be many, perhaps infinite (31.) Degrees of Perfection in the Divine Works; for whatever ariſes from *Nothing* is neceſſarily imperfect; and the leſs it is removed from nothing (taking *Exiſtence* for one Degree, as we ſaid before) the more imperfect it is. There is no occaſion therefore for an Evil Principle to introduce the Evil of Defect, or an Inequality of Perfections in the Works of God: for the very nature of created Beings neceſſarily requires it, and we may conceive the place of this Malicious Principle to be abundantly ſupplied from hence, that they derive their Original from *Nothing*, (32.).

V. Fifthly,

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perhaps in other Beings, but, from theſe only which we perceive and experience in him. If theſe cannot be alter'd and improved conſiſtently with each other *, nor ſubjected to any general Laws more ſuitable to his preſent circumſtances, and productive of more good to the whole Syſtem †, then, all Arguments built on this Topic againſt the Divine Attributes, muſt fall to the Ground. Theſe and the like Suppoſitions therefore, *viz. that the ſame Degree of Pleaſure might be communicated to us ſucceſſively for a hundred Years*; if underſtood of one uniform Cauſe producing it: *That our Pleaſures*, meaning *ſenſitive* ones, *might not depend upon the Fibres of the Brain*, —and, *That theſe Fibres ſhould not wear out at all* ‖,—or, if theſe Fibres did not wear out, *that the Pleaſure ſhould never decay*, are all unreaſonable Suppoſitions: They offend againſt the Rule laid down above, and always to be remember'd, of taking the whole of human Nature as it is; of conſidering our preſent Body and Spirit, and the obvious Properties of each, and the known Laws of their Union together. All ſuch Objections therefore are beſide the Queſtion; and founded upon the old abſurdity of reducing us to a different Claſs of Beings, when (as will appear preſently) all conceivable Claſſes and Orders are already full.

Thus much for one Query about the manner of Creating things, *viz.* Whether any ſhould have been fix'd immutably in a certain Degree of Perfection: Our Author proceeds to examine the other, *viz.* Whether all things could and ought to have been at firſt created in the *ſame* Degree of Perfection?

(31.) That is *Indefinite*, or greater than any aſſignable Number; for neither the Univerſe itſelf, nor any thing that belongs to it, can be properly and abſolutely Infinite, as our Author maintains in his Note F, and we have largely proved from *Cudworth*, *&c.* in the former Chapter.

(32.) It is ſcarce neceſſary to obſerve, that this muſt all along be underſtood only *Materially*, i. e. that theſe things were not produced from any matter *præ-exiſtent*, but were made ἐξ ἐκ ὄντων, and brought into Being from mere *Non-Exiſtence*. For the poſſibility of which, and the Opinion of the Antients on this Subject, ſee *Cudworth*, C. 5. §. 2. p. 738, *&c.* The other Senſes of the Words, *viz.* That any thing can come from nothing, *cauſally*, or be produced *by* nothing, or *by itſelf*, or *without* an *Efficient Cauſe*, are manifeſtly abſurd, as is demonſtrated at large in the ſame excellent Section. For an Illuſtration of our Author's Notion before us, ſee *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*.

* *See* Note 42. † *See* Note 37. ‖ *See* Bayle's *Dict.* p. 2487.

Things neceſſarily are of unequal Perfections with regard to their Attributes; but it is agreeable to the higheſt Goodneſs to create thoſe which are leaſt perfect, if they are no hindrance to the number or convenience of the more Perfect ones.

V. Fifthly: 'Tis plain, that Creatures are not only unequally imperfect in reſpect of their *Parts* and *Under-parts*, and ſo on, which by continual Sub-diviſion, approach in a manner to nothing; but a neceſſary inequality ariſes among them alſo in reſpect of their *Attributes*. For a conſcious or thinking Subſtance is more perfect than one that wants Senſe or Underſtanding. If it be ask'd, How is it agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to have created theſe alſo? I anſwer, If the Creation of theſe be no impediment to the production of the more perfect; if neither the Number nor Happineſs of the more perfect be diminiſhed by the Creation of thoſe that are leſs perfect, why will it be unfit to create theſe too? Since God does what is beſt to be done, nothing more or greater can be expected from the moſt benevolent and powerful Author of Nature. If therefore it be better, *cæteris paribus*, that theſe more imperfect Beings ſhould exiſt, than not, it is agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs, that the beſt that could be ſhould be done. If the Production of a leſs perfect Being were any hindrance to a more perfect one, it would appear contrary to the Divine Goodneſs, to have omitted the more perfect and created the leſs; but ſince they are no manner of hindrance to each other, the more the better, (33).

VI. An

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Life, Part 2. Vol. 1. C. 6. §. 2. p. 446, 447. 1ſt Edit. " God is the *Cauſe* of *Perfection* on-
" ly, but not of Defect, which ſo far forth as
" it is *natural* to *created Beings* hath no *Cauſe*
" at all, but is merely a *Negation* or *Non-entity*.
" For every *created* thing was a *Negation* or *Non-*
" *entity* before ever it had a *poſitive* Being, and
" it had only ſo much of its *primitive* Negation
" *taken away* from it, as it had *poſitive* Being
" conferr'd upon it; and therefore, ſo far forth
" as *it is*, its *Being* is to be attributed to the
" *Soveraign Cauſe* that produced it; but ſo far
" forth as it is not, its not being is to be at-
" tributed to the *Original Non-entity*, out of
" which it was produced. For that which
" was once Nothing, would *ſtill* have been
" Nothing, had it not been for the *Cauſe* that
" gave *Being* to it, and therefore, that it is ſo
" far Nothing ſtill, *i. e. limited* and *defective*,
" is only to be attributed to its own *primitive*
" Nothingneſs. As for inſtance, If I give a
" poor Man a hundred pounds, that he is
" worth *ſo much* Money is wholly owing to
" *me*, but that he is not worth a hundred
" *more*, is owing only to his own Poverty,
" and juſt ſo, that I have ſuch and *ſuch Per-*
" *fections* of Being is wholly owing to *God*
" who produced me out of Nothing; but
" that I have ſuch and *ſuch Defects* of being,
" is only owing to that *Non-entity* out of which
" he produced me."

The ſame Notion is alſo largely diſcuſs'd in *Eilhardi Lubini Phoſphorus*, &c. Chap. 6, 7, and 17. From whom it appears, that moſt of the ancient Philoſophers meant no more than this by their *Evil Principle*.

(33.) A good Illuſtration of this occurs in Dr. *J. Clarke*'s Diſcourſe on *Nat. Evil*, p. 289, &c. Now from the Suppoſition of a Scale of Beings

VI. An Inſtance will make this more clear, Suppoſe that God made the World *finite*; ſuppoſe that *Spirits*, or pure immaterial thinking Beings, are the *moſt perfect* Species of Subſtances: ſuppoſe, in the laſt place, that God created as many of this ſort as were convenient for the Syſtem he had made, ſo that if there were more, they would incommode one another; yet there would be no leſs Room for Matter, than if there were none at all. This Suppoſition is by no means abſurd; for ſince theſe may be conceiv'd without *local Extenſion*, and have no relation to *Space* or *Place*, as Bodies have * in whatever Number they were created, they would contribute nothing at all

This confirm'd by an Inſtance of Matter, which is no Impediment to pure Spirits.

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Beings gradualy deſcending from *Perfection* to *Non-entity*, and compleat in every intermediate Rank and Degree (for which ſee Note 35.) we ſhall ſoon perceive the abſurdity of ſuch Queſtions as theſe, Why was not Man made more perfect? Why are not his Faculties equal to thoſe of Angels? Since this is only asking why he was not placed in a quite different Claſs of Beings, when at the ſame time all other Claſſes are ſuppoſed to be already full. From the ſame Principle alſo, we gather the Intent of the Creator in producing thoſe ſeveral inferior Orders under our View. They who imagine that all things in this World were made for the immediate uſe of Man alone, run themſelves into inextricable Difficulties. Man indeed is the Head of this lower part of the Creation, and perhaps it was deſign'd to be abſolutely under his command. But that all things here tend directly to his own uſe, is, I think, neither eaſy nor neceſſary to be proved. Some manifeſtly ſerve for the food and ſupport of others, whoſe Souls may be neceſſary to prepare and preſerve their Bodies for that Purpoſe, and may at the ſame time be happy in a Conſciouſneſs of their own Exiſtence. 'Tis probable, that they are intended to promote each others Good reciprocally: Nay, Man himſelf contributes to the Happineſs, and betters the Condition of the Brutes in ſeveral reſpects; by cultivating and improving the Ground, by watching the Seaſons, by protecting and providing for them, when they are unable to protect and provide for themſelves ‖. Others of a much lower Claſs, may, for ought we know, enjoy themſelves too in ſome degree or other; and alſo contribute to the Happineſs even of ſuperior Beings, by a diſplay of the Divine Attributes in different ways, and affording ample matter of Reflection on the various Ranks and Degrees of Perfection diſcoverable in the animal World; wherein the higheſt order may with pleaſure contemplate numberleſs Species infinitely below them: and the lower Claſs can admire and adore that Infinity of Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs and Power which ſhines forth in ſo many Beings vaſtly above them. They may conduce to the Beauty, Order, and Benefit of the whole Syſtem, the general Good of which was the aim of its Creator, and with regard to which, every part is chiefly to be eſteem'd †. They may have Ten thouſand Uſes beſide what relates to Man, who is but a very ſmall part of it: Several Inſtances might be given, which would make this very probable; at leaſt, the contrary, I think, cannot ever be proved. See C. 4. §. 2. Subſ. 4, 5.

* *See* Note 13.

‖ *See* Chubb's *Supplement, &c.* p. 12. *and Dr.* J Clarke, p. 284, 285.

† *See* Cudworth, p. 875, 876.

either to the filling up of Space, or excluding Bodies out of it, yet they would have a certain *Syſtem* or *Society* among themſelves, which might require a determinate Number, which if it were exceeded, they muſt become troubleſome to one another, by too great a Multitude in a finite World. Nay, if the World were ſuppoſed to be *infinite*, and as many ſuch Spirits created as were poſſible, yet would they be no impediment to Matter, nor Matter to them, neither would their Number be leſs, nor their Conveniencies fewer, becauſe Matter did or did not exiſt. Since then material and immaterial Beings conſiſt ſo well together, is it not agreeable to the greateſt Goodneſs to have created both? Let Matter be ſtupid and devoid of Senſe, as it is; let it be the moſt imperfect of all Subſtances, and next to nothing, (ſince not to perceive its Exiſtence is little different from Non-exiſtence) 'tis better to be even ſo, than not at all; for Exiſtence is, as we ſaid, the Foundation, or firſt Degree of Perfection, and the next, as it were, to this, the ſecond, is perception of Exiſtence. But you'll ſay, Why did not God add this ſecond Degree to Matter? I anſwer, if that could, it is probable it would, have been done: But ſince we ſee that Matter is in itſelf a paſſive, inert Subſtance, we muſt believe that its Nature would not admit of *Senſe*, or if it had been capable of Senſe, that greater Inconveniencies would have flow'd from thence, than if it had been made inſenſible, as it is, (34.).

However

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(34.) *Matter*, as ſuch, is at preſent incapable of, or has Properties totally inconſiſtent with thought and ſelf-motion, (as is at large demonſtrated by the Authors referr'd to in Note 13.) it is therefore in a Degree below Animals, or (as our Author ſays) next to Nothing. But yet, ſuch as it is, 'tis firſt, abſolutely neceſſary to many Animals, and ſecondly, would not be ſo convenient to their uſes, if it could think. It is the *Baſis* or *Support* of Animals in this our Syſtem; it is, as we may ſay, the *caſe* and *covering* of their ſeveral Souls; it ſerves for the *clothing* of that Caſe, for their *Food*, their *Defence*, and various uſes. But were it all Life, or conſcious (not to inſiſt on the Abſurdities of ſuch a Suppoſition in itſelf) what Miſery and Confuſion would ariſe? If all were Animals, what muſt theſe Animals ſubſiſt on? If they were of the ſame Nature with ſuch as we are acquainted with, they muſt alſo be ſuſtain'd after the ſame manner, *i. e.* they muſt live by *Food*, and conſequently live upon, and continually torment and conſume one another; and conſequently more Happineſs would be loſt than got by ſuch Life, which is as plentiful at preſent *, as ſeems agreeable to the Syſtem. If Matter, as Matter, were endow'd with the Power of *Self-Motion*,

* *See* Note 39.

However, without this, there would be a kind of *Void* in the Univerſe, and ſomething wanting which might exiſt: but it was better that there ſhould be Matter than nothing at all, and ſince one Side was to be choſen, the Divine Goodneſs preferr'd Matter, becauſe that was the greater Good. For, ſince it is no hindrance to the multiplication or convenience of thinking Beings, nor diminiſhes the number of the more perfect, 'tis plain it adds to the perfection of the Univerſe, and whatever it be, tho' the moſt imperfect thing in Nature, 'tis gain to the whole. It was therefore agreeable to the greateſt Power and Goodneſs to have created this alſo; nor need we the *Demiurgus* of the antient Heretics to produce it, as if unworthy of the great and good God. The Evils of Imperfection then muſt be permitted in the Nature of things; and inequality of Perfections muſt be permitted alſo, ſince it is impoſſible that all the Works of God ſhould be endow'd with equal Perfections.

VII. If you ſay, God might have omitted the more imperfect Beings, I grant it, and if that had been beſt he would undoubtedly have done it. But it is the part of infinite Goodneſs to chooſe the very beſt; from thence it proceeds therefore, that the more imperfect Beings have Exiſtence; for it was agreeable to that, not to omit the very leaſt Good which could be produced. *Finite* Goodneſs might poſſibly have been exhauſted in creating the greater Beings, but *Infinite* extends to all. The infinite Power and Goodneſs of God then were the Cauſe why imperfect Beings had Exiſtence together with the more perfect. 'Tis plain therefore that the Syſtem of the World may be the *Work of a Deity*, tho' it *has this Fault*. Nay, that it was

'Tis leſs agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to have omitted, than to have created, theſe more imperfect Beings.

N 3 created

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Motion, what uſe could we put it to? What clothing or Habitations? What Inſtruments or Utenſils could we make of it? But this, I think, needs no farther Explanation. Matter then, in its preſent State, as united with, and ſubſervient to, ſuch Spirits as we conceive ours to be, is in general more conducive to the Good and Happineſs of the whole, than it would be in any other conceivable manner of Exiſtence. To ask yet why ſome certain Portions or Syſtems of it might not have been made more perfect, or why it was not farther ſublimated, refined, and ſo unaccountably modify'd, as to be render'd capable of Thought; is the abſurd Queſtion above mention'd, *viz.* why was it not made ſomething elſe, or removed into a higher Claſs? when at the ſame time there appears ſo much reaſon for the Exiſtence of ſuch a thing as this now is; and all the ſuperior Claſſes are concluded to be full. What reaſon there it for this laſt concluſion may be ſeen in the following *Note*.

created is evident for this very Reaſon, becauſe it is *imperfect*; for if it were *Self-exiſtent*, it would be *abſolutely perfect*. (35.)

NOTES.

(35.) The chief Argument of the foregoing Chapter is beautifully illuſtrated by Mr. *Addiſon* in the *Spectator*, N°. 519. As frequent uſe will be made of this Obſervation concerning the *Scale* of *Beings*, I hope the Reader will excuſe my tranſcribing ſo much of the above mention'd Paper as is neceſſary to explain it.

" Infinite Goodneſs is of ſo communicative " a Nature, that it ſeems to delight in the conferring of Exiſtence upon every Degree of " perceptive Being. As this is a Speculation " which I have often purſued with great " pleaſure to my ſelf, I ſhall enlarge farther " upon it, by conſidering that part of the " *Scale* of *Beings* which comes within our " Knowledge. There are ſome living Creatures which are raiſed juſt above dead Matter. To mention only the Species of Shell-Fiſh, which are formed in the faſhion of a " Cone, that grow to the ſurface of ſeveral " Rocks, and immediately die upon their being ſever'd from the place where they grow. " There are many other Creatures, but one remove from theſe, which have no other Senſes beſides that of feeling and taſte. Others " have ſtill an additional one of Hearing. others of Smell, and others of Sight. It is " wonderful to obſerve, by what a gradual progreſs the World of Life advances thro' a prodigious variety of Species, before a Creature " is form'd that is compleat in all its Senſes; " and even among theſe is ſuch a different Degree of Perfection, in the Senſe which one " Animal enjoys beyond what appears in another, that tho' the Senſe in different Animals be diſtinguiſh'd by the ſame common " denomination, it ſeems almoſt of a different " Nature. If after this we look into the ſeveral inward Perfections of Cunning and " Sagacity, or what we generally call Inſtinct ‖, " we find them riſing after the ſame manner " imperceptibly one above another, and receiving additional Improvements according " to the Species in which they are implanted. " This Progreſs in Nature is ſo very gradual, " that the moſt perfect of an inferior Species " comes very near to the moſt imperfect of that " which is immediately above it. The exuberant and overflowing Goodneſs of the ſupreme Being, whoſe Mercy extends to all " his Works, is plainly ſeen, as I have before " hinted, from his having made ſo little Matter, at leaſt what falls within our Knowledge, " that does not ſwarm with Life: nor is his " Goodneſs leſs ſeen in the Diverſity than in " the Multitude of living Creatures. Had he " only made one Species of Animals, none of " the reſt would have enjoy'd the Happineſs " of Exiſtence, he has therefore ſpecified in " his Creation every Degree of Life, every " Capacity of Being. The whole Chaſm in " Nature, from a Plant to a Man, is filled up " with diverſe kinds of Creatures, riſing one " over another, by ſuch a gentle and eaſy aſcent, that the little tranſitions and deviations from one Species to another, are almoſt inſenſible. This intermediate Space is " ſo well husbanded and managed, that there " is ſcarce a Degree of Perfection which does " not appear in ſome one part of the World of " Life. Is the Goodneſs or Wiſdom of the " Divine Being more manifeſted in this his " Proceeding? There is a Conſequence, beſides thoſe I have already mentioned, which " ſeems very naturally deducible from the foregoing Conſiderations. If the Scale of Beings riſes by ſuch a regular Progreſs, ſo high " as Man, we may, by a parity of Reaſon, ſuppoſe that it ſtill proceeds gradually thro' " thoſe Beings which are of a ſuperior Nature " to him; ſince there is an infinitely greater " Space and Room for different Degrees of " Perfection between the Supreme Being and " Man, than between Man and the moſt deſpicable Inſect. This Conſequence of ſo great " a variety of Beings, which are ſuperior to " us, from that variety which is inferior to us, " is made by Mr. *Locke*, in a paſſage which I " ſhall

‖ *To which we may add,* Will *and* Liberty. *See* Bayle's *Dict.* p. 2609, 2610.

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" ſhall here ſet down, after having premiſed, " that notwithſtanding there is ſuch Infinite " Room between Man and his Maker, for the " creative Power to exert itſelf in, it is im- " poſſible that it ſhould ever be filled up, ſince " there will be ſtill an Infinite gap or diſtance " between the higheſt created Being and the " Power which produced him."

The fine Paſſage there cited from Mr. *Locke*, occurs in the 3d Book of his Eſſay, Chap. 6. §. 12.

See alſo Notes 38, 39.

From the foregoing Obſervation, that there is no manner of *Chaſm* or *Void*, no Link deficient in this great Chain of Beings, and the reaſon of it, it will appear extremely probable alſo, that every diſtinct Order, every Claſs or Species of them, is as full as the Nature of it would admit, and God ſaw proper. There are (as our Author ſays) perhaps ſo many in each Claſs as could exiſt together without ſome *inconvenience* or *uneaſineſs* to each other. This is eaſily conceivable in Mankind, and may be in ſuperior Beings, tho', for want of an exact knowledge of their ſeveral Natures and Orders, we cannot apprehend the manner of it, or conceive how they affect one another; only this we are ſure of, that neither the Species nor the Individuals in each Species, can poſſibly be Infinite; and that nothing but an *Impoſſibility* in the Nature of the thing, or ſome greater *inconvenience*, can reſtrain the exerciſe of the Power of God, or hinder him from producing ſtill more and more Beings capable of Felicity. When we begin to enquire into the Number of theſe and the Degrees of their Perfection, we ſoon loſe ourſelves, and can only refer all to the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs: from our previous Notices of which Attributes, we have the higheſt reaſon to conclude, that every thing is as perfect as poſſible in its own kind, and that every Syſtem is in itſelf full and complete.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Natural Evil.

SECT. I.

Of Generation and Corruption.

A Creature cannot complain of its Fate, tho' it be leſs perfect than others.

I. IT appears from the foregoing Obſervations, that created Beings muſt neceſſarily be *defective*, i. e. ſome muſt want the Perfections which others have, and that it was impoſſible for them to enjoy either an abſolute or equal Perfection; alſo, that there is no occaſion for an Evil Principle oppoſite to Infinite Goodneſs and Power. And from hence we may affirm, that God, tho' infinitely good and powerful, could not ſeparate things from the concomitant Evils of Imperfection, and did not eſteem it unbecoming himſelf to create the Good, tho' that brought ſome Evils along with it, ſo long as theſe Evils are leſs than the Good with which they are connected. Nor can the Creature juſtly complain of its Condition, if it have not all, or equal Perfection, with ſome others; ſince 'twas neceſſary that it ſhould fill the Station wherein it was placed, or none at all. This we have ſhewn ſufficiently, I think, in the former kind of Evils, *viz.* thoſe of *Imperfection.*

The Origin of things from Matter, is the ſource of Natural Evils, as their

II. The ſame muſt be attempted in the ſecond kind, *viz.* the *Natural.* Now, as all created Beings are made out of Nothing, and on that

riſe from Nothing is the Cauſe of thoſe of Imperfection.

that account are neceſſarily imperfect; ſo all natural things have a relation to, or ariſe from, *Matter*, and on this account are neceſſarily ſubjected to natural Evils: nor is the riſe of all created Beings from Nothing a more fruitful and certain Cauſe of the Evils of Imperfection, than the riſe of all natural things from Matter is of natural Evils, (36.). If therefore we can ſhew that theſe Evils are ſo neceſſarily connected with this Origin that they cannot be ſeparated from it, it follows, that the Structure of the World either ought not to have been framed at all, or that theſe Evils muſt have been tolerated without any Imputation on the Divine Power and Goodneſs. But it is better that they ſhould be as they are, ſince they could not be more perfect. Let us examine the particular Sorts of natural Evils, and if there be nothing in them which could be removed without greater damage to Nature, and introducing a larger train of Evils, the Divine Goodneſs may ſecurely applaud itſelf, ſince it has omitted no manner of Good, nor admitted any Evil which could poſſibly be prevented, *i. e.* hath done in every thing what was beſt.

III. God has accompliſh'd this in the Creation of *Matter*, as we ſaid before, nor has he been leſs beneficent in what relates to the *Motion* of Matter. In the firſt place, Matter, tho' in itſelf unactive, is nevertheleſs capable of Action, *viz. local Motion*, for Motion is the Action that belongs to Matter. But 'tis better that it ſhould act as far as it is capable, than be entirely ſtill and ſluggiſh: if it were without Motion, rigid and fix'd in the ſame place, we cannot conceive what benefit it could be of either to itſelf or any thing elſe: But when 'tis put into Motion, it may be of uſe, as is plain from Experience, tho' not always without a Mixture of Evils: But Action is, *cæteris paribus*, preferable to Inactivity; it is therefore agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to produce Motion in Matter, if the Good ariſing

Matter is uſeleſs except it have Motion.

NOTES.

(36.) From hence it may be obſerv'd, that there was ſome Foundation for that old and almoſt univerſal Notion, that all natural Evils aroſe from *Matter*; which in effect they do, but not from it as an eternal independent Cauſe, or the Evil Principle of the *Manithees*, as will be ſhewn below. See *Bayle*'s Dict. p. 978.

from thence do but over-ballance the Evil, ſo long as no Evils are permitted which are ſeparable from Motion, nor ſuch as can affect Spirits, which are purely immaterial.

Such Motion was to be rais'd in Matter, as might ſeparate it into Parts. Hence the Generation and Corruption of Bodies naturally ariſes.

IV. Now, if it be granted that God could, conſiſtently with his Goodneſs, both *create Matter* and put it into *Motion*, it neceſſarily follows, that its Motions muſt interfere with one another. If you ſay that Matter might move uniformly and altogether, either in a *direct Line* or in a *Circle*, and the contrariety of Motions by that means be prevented: I anſwer; The whole Maſs of Matter would be no leſs rigid and uſeleſs with ſuch a Motion as this, than if it were entirely at reſt; it would neither be more fit for Animals, nor more adapted to the uſes which it now anſwers. Such a Motion therefore was to be excited in it, as would ſeparate it into parts, make it fluid, and render it an Habitation fit for Animals. But that could not be without contrariety of Motion, as any one that thinks of it at all will perceive: and if this be once admitted in *Matter*, there neceſſarily follows a *Diviſion* and *Diſparity* of parts, *Claſhing* and *Oppoſition*, *Comminution*, *Concretion* and *Repulſion*, and all thoſe Evils which we behold in *Generation* and *Corruption*. God could indeed have removed all theſe from Matter, by taking away its Motion, but they are either to be tolerated, or Matter muſt remain fix'd and immoveable in the ſame Situation. Some may aſk, why God would not produce ſuch Motion in Matter as migh render all its Concretions ſo perfect as not to be liable to *Diſſolution* or *Corruption*. For, ſince the Power of God is infinite, nothing on his ſide hinders this from being done, what hinders therefore on the ſide of Matter? I anſwer; Its *Motion* and *Diviſibility*. For, if you ſuppoſe any ſort of Motion in Matter, it muſt neceſſarily be either *uſeleſs*, as we ſaid before, or in *oppoſite Directions*. The mutual claſhing of theſe Concretions could therefore not be avoided, and as they ſtrike upon one another, whether we ſuppoſe them hard or ſoft, a concuſſion of the parts, and ſeparation from each other, would neceſſarily be produced: But a Separation or Diſſipation of the parts is *Corruption*. This therefore could not be avoided without violence done to the Laws of Motion and the Nature of Matter. For, to hinder moveable things from interfering, and the

Parts,

Parts which are ſeparable in themſelves, from ſeparating by mutual repulſions, would require a *perpetual Miracle*, (37.).

V. Secondly; Since it is proper that Matter ſhould be put into Motion, 'tis better that this ſhould be done according to ſome certain Laws, and in an orderly Courſe, than at random, and as it were by chance. For by this means, the Syſtems compoſed of Matter will have both more durable and more regular Periods. The firſt Evil ariſing from Matter was, we ſaid, the *jarring* of Elements; from whence comes their Corruption and Diſſolution, Inſtability and Viciſſitude. It may be ſurpriſing, that all theſe ſhould proceed from a ſtable, fix'd and uniform Good. But we have made it appear, that Matter could not move at all without theſe, and it was more eligible that the World ſhould be liable to them, than deſtitute of Animals. And that theſe Evils ſhould not multiply beyond Neceſſity, the Divine Goodneſs has taken care, by reſtraining its Motion under certain Laws, ſo as to make it ſteady, and as conſtant as could be; ſo that the Machines compoſed of it might be as little ſhock'd with contrary Motions as poſſible, and endure for a long time; nay, ſome of them in certain places and circumſtances for ever. For if no parcels of Matter were directed by any certain and determinate Rule, ſuch a confuſed Motion would jumble every thing together, nor could any thing laſt for ever ſo ſhort a time. On this account God eſtabliſh'd certain Laws of Motion, and perpetual Rules; and framed

Motion under certain Laws tends more to the preſervation of things, than if it was left at random: hence God has diſtributed Bodies into various Syſtems.

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(37.) That is, there could be no general preeſtabliſh'd *Laws of Nature* but God muſt continually interpoſe, and effect every thing by his own direct and immediate Power: The bad conſequences of which are very obvious. There could be no *Arts* and *Sciences*, no *Skill* or *Induſtry*; no regular Methods of providing for our Bodies, or improving our Minds in the Knowledge of things. All which evidently preſuppoſe, and are entirely founded on, ſome ſettled, certain Laws of the Univerſe diſcoverable by us.

" We are ſo far acquainted (ſays the Author " of the *Religion of Nature Delin.* p. 96.) " with the *Laws* of *Gravitation* and *Motion*, " that we are able to calculate their Effects, " and ſerve ourſelves of them, ſupplying up- " on many occaſions the defect of Power in " ourſelves by *Mechanical* Powers, which ne- " ver fail to anſwer according to the Eſta- " bliſhment, *&c.*" What the known Laws of Nature are, ſee in *Cheyne's Phil. Prin. Keil's Introd. to Phyſ.* &c. Concerning the neceſſity of the preſent Laws of Motion, and the fitneſs of them to attain the intended Ends, ſee Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 92, *&c.* and 150, 158.

the great Maſs of Beings into certain Machines and Syſtems, which have ſuch an exact correſpondence, as to contribute their mutual Aſſiſtance towards preſerving the Motion and Order preſcribed by the Deity. Neither was it convenient that Matter ſhould every where conſiſt of the ſame kind of parts; but rather that it ſhould be in one place very fluid, ſimilar and homogeneous, ſuch as we believe the *Æther* to be; in another, ſolid and compact, as the Earth is, and perhaps the Stars; in another, mix'd with heterogeneous Particles, ſuch as we find the Air and Water.

It appears from Light and other Phænomena, that the Syſtem of this World is the very beſt and moſt beautiful.

VI. We muſt confeſs, that ſuch a Maſs as the Earth is, ſeems not ſo beautiful, or ſo fit for Motion, as the pure fluid Æther, 'tis alſo more liable to Corruption and Changes; yet it is moſt certain, that the Earth was not conſtituted in this manner for no reaſon at all, or unneceſſarily: perhaps the *Mundane* Syſtem could no more conſiſt without theſe ſolid Maſſes, than the human Body without Bones. No ſober Man doubts, but God could have diſpoſed this Material World into other Syſtems; and of what kind ſoever theſe had been, our Reaſon could never have comprehended the contrivance of them. For, ſince our Planetary Syſtem is incomprehenſible to us, much more will the Fabric of the whole Univerſe be ſo; but, as far as we do underſtand the diſpoſition of it, all is well, elegant and beautiful: and if, among all the Phænomena of Nature, we were only acquainted with Light, that would ſhew us the juſt and admirable Structure of it. It is reaſonable therefore to believe, that this is the very beſt, and attended with the leaſt Inconveniencies.

'Tis raſh to affirm that Matter might be diſtributed into better Syſtems, ſince we do not thoro'ly underſtand the preſent.

VII. You'll ſay that ſome particular things might have been better. But, ſince you do not thoroughly underſtand the whole, you have no right to affirm thus much. We have much greater Reaſon to preſume, that no one part of it could be chang'd for the better, without greater detriment to the reſt, which it would either be inconſiſtent with, or diſfigure by its Diſproportion *. For we have ſhewn before, that all manner of Inconveniencies could not be avoided, becauſe of the Imperfection of Matter, and the Nature of Motion. That State of things was therefore preferable, which was attended with the feweſt and leaſt Inconveniencies. And who but a very raſh, indiſcreet Perſon will affirm, that God has not actually made

* *See* Note 42.

made choice of this? Nay, who can do it with any ſhadow of Reaſon, unleſs he throughly underſtands both this and that other which he would prefer to it? Whoever pronounces upon them before this, gives Sentence before he has look'd into the Cauſe, and is at the ſame time both a partial and an incompetent Judge.

It concern'd us the more to have this well explain'd, that being convinc'd of the Convenience or *Meliority* of the whole Material Syſtem, we may more eaſily perceive the Origin of thoſe Evils which neceſſarily follow from the *Contrariety* of Motion, and the *Corruption* of things.

SECT. II.

Concerning Animals and the Variety of them.

Matter does not ſeem to be made for its own ſake, ſince it is not Self-conſcious, 'tis therefore deſign'd for the uſe of Animals.

I. SInce Matter is not Self-conſcious, nor able to enjoy itſelf, nor capable of receiving any benefit from itſelf, it follows, that it was not made for itſelf, but for ſomething elſe, to which it was to be ſubſervient in Senſation, Thought, or Fruition. We find by Experience, that Matter can be thus ſerviceable to a thinking Being, tho' ſtupid and inſenſible itſelf: 'Tis probable therefore that God deſign'd and directed all Matter to this end as far as was poſſible. Hence comes the Union of ſenſible and thinking Beings with the Particles of Matter, as we experience in ourſelves. The ſame may be ſaid of all its parts, as far as the order and conſtitution of things allow'd. There is nothing therefore in vain, nothing idle, nor any Region without its Animals. For ſuppoſing, as we ſaid, ſo many pure Spirits, ſeparate from Matter, to be made as were convenient; as theſe occupy no Place *, there would be no leſs Room for other thinking ſenſible

* *See* Note 13.

Subſtances devoid of Matter to exerciſe their Faculties, and enjoy themſelves, which for the future let us call Souls, (38.).

'Tis probable that Animals vary according to the variety of thoſe regions which they are deſtin'd to inhabit: Therefore the Æther and Air, in all probability, have their proper inhabitants, as well as the Earth.

II. Now, ſince the Structure of this viſible World conſiſts of various Bodies, *viz.* pure Æther, Air, Earth, *&c.* 'tis highly probable, as we ſaid before, that each of theſe has its proper Inhabitants, *viz.* by the Union of Souls with the Particles of Matter. Without ſuch an Union, we cannot apprehend how there ſhould be either Æthereal or Aerial Animals. For the moſt fluid Bodies, if not united to an immaterial Soul, or compacted together, would be immediately diſſolv'd, and every blaſt of Wind would diſſipate ſuch Animals: either then theſe vaſt Fields of Air or Æther muſt be entirely deſtitute of Inhabitants, which very few will believe, who behold every clod of Earth ſtock'd with Animals, or furniſh'd after ſome ſuch Manner as we con-

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(38.) "God, if he pleaſed, could have made "nothing but immortal Spirits: and he could "have made as many of theſe as there are indi- "vidual Creatures of all ſorts in the World; "but it ſeem'd good to the wiſe Architect, to "make ſeveral Ranks and Orders of Beings, "and to diſplay his Power and Goodneſs and "Wiſdom, in all imaginable variety of Crea- "tures; all which ſhould be good in their "kind, tho' far ſhort of the perfection of An- "gels, and immortal Spirits. He that will "build a Houſe for all the Uſes and Purpoſes "of which an Houſe is capable, cannot make "it all Foundation, and great Beams and "Pillars; muſt not ſo contrive it, as to make "it all Rooms of State and Entertainment: "but there muſt of neceſſity be in it meaner "Materials, Rooms, and Offices, for ſeveral "uſes and purpoſes, which, however inferior "to the reſt in Dignity and Degree, do yet "contribute to the beauty and advantage of "the whole: So in this great Frame of the "World, it was fit there ſhould be variety "and different Degrees of Perfection in the "ſeveral parts of it: and this is ſo far from "being an impeachment of the Wiſdom and "Goodneſs of him that made it, that it is an "evidence of both. For, the meaneſt of all "God's Creatures is good, conſidering the "Nature and Rank of it, and the end to which "it was deſign'd; and we cannot imagine "how it could have been order'd and framed "better, tho' we can eaſily tell how it might "have been worſe: and that if this or that had "been wanting, or had been otherwiſe, it had "not been ſo good; and thoſe who have been "moſt converſant in the contemplation of na- "ture, and of the Works of God, have been "moſt ready to make this acknowledgment *, "But then if we conſider the Creatures of "God with relation to one another, and with "regard to the whole frame of Things, they "will all appear to be very good; and not- "withſtanding this or that kind of Creatures "be much leſs perfect than another, and there "be a very great diſtance between the Per- "fection of a Worm, and of an Angel, yet "conſidering every thing in the ſame Order "which it hath in the Creation, it is as good "as could be, conſidering its Nature and "Uſe, and the Place allotted to it among the "Creatures." *Tillotſon*, Serm. 91. p. 683. Vol. 2. Fol. See alſo *Ray* on *the Creation*, Part 2. p. 423. 4th Edit.

* v. g. *Boyle, Wilkins, Cheyne, Derham, Grew, Ray, Newentyt*, &c.

conjecture. (39.) If you ſay, here's Room for pure Spirits, I anſwer; Since theſe do not fill up Place, nor have any Relation to it, 'tis the ſame thing wherever they be, and Material Subſtances have nothing at all to do with them: It is not therefore neceſſary to ſuppoſe ſuch large tracts of Air or Æther void of Animals, in order to make Room for theſe, for which it would be no leſs commodious, if repleniſh'd with, than if deſtitute of Animals. If then this be granted us, we muſt affirm, that there is as great variety of Souls, as of Animals, and that it is one Species which exerts its Operations by the help of Æthereal Matter, and another which ſtands in need of Aereal, and a third of Terreſtrial. Neither will every Element be fit for every Animal, but each will have its proper Inhabitants: Nor can there be any juſt cauſe of Complaint that they are uneaſy out of their proper Element, that Men cannot live any while commodiouſly in Æther, nor perhaps Æthereal Animals upon the Earth: For 'tis ſufficient

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(39.) We have a beautiful Deſcription of what our Author here conjectures, in the *Spectator*, N°. 519. "If we conſider thoſe parts "of the Material World which lye the near- "eſt to us, and are therefore ſubject to our "Obſervations and Enquiries, it is amazing "to conſider the Infinity of Animals with "which it is ſtock'd. Every part of Matter "is peopled; every green Leaf ſwarms with "Inhabitants. There is ſcarce a ſingle hu- "mour in the Body of a Man, or of any o- "ther Animal, in which our Glaſſes do not "diſcover myriads of living Creatures. The "Surface of Animals is alſo covered with o- "ther Animals, which are, in the ſame man- "ner, the Baſis of other Animals that live up- "on it; nay, we find in the moſt ſolid Bodies, "as in Marble itſelf, innumerable Cells and "Cavities that are crowded with ſuch imper- "ceptible Inhabitants, as are too little for the "naked Eye to diſcover. On the other hand, "if we look into the more bulky parts of "Nature, we ſee the Seas, Lakes and Rivers, "teeming with numberleſs kinds of living "Creatures: we find every Mountain and "Marſh, Wilderneſs and Wood, plentifully "ſtocked with Birds and Beaſts, and every "part of Matter affording proper neceſſaries "and conveniences for the Livelihood of Mul- "titudes which inhabit it. The Author of "the *Plurality of Worlds* draws a very good "Argument from this Conſideration, for the "*peopling* of every Planet; as indeed it ſeems "very probable from the analogy of Reaſon, "that if no part of Matter which we are ac- "quainted with, lies waſte and uſeleſs, thoſe "great Bodies which are at ſuch a diſtance "from us, ſhould not be deſart and unpeopled, "but rather that they ſhould be furniſhed "with Beings adapted to their reſpective Si- "tuations. *Exiſtence* is a Bleſſing to thoſe Be- "ings only which are endowed with Percep- "tion, and is in a manner thrown away upon "dead Matter, any farther than as it is ſubſer- "vient to Beings which are conſcious of their "Exiſtence. Accordingly we find, from the "Bodies which lie under our Obſervation, "that Matter is only made as the Baſis and "Support of Animals, and there is no more of "the one than what is neceſſary for the Exi- "ſtence of the other." See alſo Dr. *Scott's* Works, Vol. 2. Diſcourſe 15. p. 308, &c. Fol.

cient if every one nouriſhes its proper Inhabitants, according to the Nature and Conſtitution of each.

The Earth, as being the leaſt part of the mundane Syſtem, is not to be chiefly regarded; but yet is not made to no purpoſe, or without deſign.

III. That is a fooliſh Objection therefore of the *Epicurean Lucretius* (40.), that the World owes not its Original to a Divine Power and Goodneſs, becauſe Mountains, Woods and Rocks, large Fenns, and the Ocean cover ſo great a ſhare of it; that the *burning heat*, viz. of the *Torrid Zone*, and the *eternal Froſt*, viz. of the two *Frigid*, take up almoſt two Parts of it; ſince the Sea, the Rocks, Winds, and Mountains, are not entirely uſeleſs in their preſent Situation; for this was requiſite for the good of the Univerſe, and the order of the Mundane Syſtem. Neither was the Earth or its Inhabitants to be regarded in the firſt place. For, ſince it is but a ſmall Part of the whole, and almoſt a Point, where would have been the Wonder if it had not been fit for any Inhabitants at all? if it did but promote the good of the whole, while itſelf was barren and empty. If this had been the Caſe, it would not have proved an uſeleſs part of the World, any more than a Nail is of a Man's Body; and it is as abſurd to deſire that all parts of the Univerſe ſhould immediately afford Habitation to Animals, as that every Part and Member of an animated Body ſhould by itſelf conſtitute an Animal; 'tis ſufficient if every particular Member conſpire with the reſt, and exerciſe its own proper Function, and conſequently that the Earth, which is a member of the Univerſe, have its peculiar uſe in promoting the Good of the whole. If therefore the whole Earth was ſerviceable, not to preſerve Animals, but only Motion, nothing could be objected from thence againſt the Goodneſs of its Author. Neither would it appear ſtrange to any that conſiders the Immenſity of the Works of God, and how minute a Portion of them the Earth is, if it were entirely deſtitute of Inhabitants: nor would it therefore be in vain. How much more then may we admire the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God therein, who has fill'd the whole and every part of it with Life.

IV. He

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(40.) See Dr. *Bentley*'s Eighth Serm. §. 10. p. 329. 5th Edit. or *Bates* on *the Exiſtence of God*, &c. Ch. 1, 2, and 3. or *Cockburn*'s Eſſays, 1ſt Part, Eſſ. 7. par. 5, &c. and 2d Part, Eſſ. 4. par. 5, &c. and the *Authors* mentioned in Note 42.

IV. He knew beſt what Creatures every part of it was fit for, and has aſſign'd to each its proper place, as is evident to every Obſerver: The Mountains, the Woods, the Rocks, the Seas, have their proper Inhabitants, which they ſupply with Nouriſhment. The Syſtem of the World required a Globe of ſolid Matter ſuch as the Earth is, and we have reaſon to believe that this is, as it were, a Wheel in the great Automaton, without which its Motion would be very imperfect. But beſides this principal End, the Divine Wiſdom ſaw that it might ſerve for Nutriment to ſeveral kinds of Animals, that no manner of Good therefore might be omitted which was conſiſtent with the primary End, he filled it with all thoſe Animals that it was capable of, nor could the Earth afford Suſtenance to any ſuperior or more proper Beings. God has given thoſe parts to the Brutes which were unfit for Men; and that there might be nothing uſeleſs, which yet could not be alter'd without detriment to the whole, he has adapted Animals to every Part and Region of it; and ſince the Habitations could not conveniently be converted into any other form, he provided ſuch Animals as wanted, and were agreeable to theſe Habitations. Hence Mountains, Woods and Rocks give Harbour to wild Beaſts, the Sea to Fiſhes, the Earth to Inſects. Neither ought we to complain that the whole Earth is not of uſe to Man, ſince that was not the principal End it was made for, but on the contrary, Man was for this reaſon placed upon the Earth, becauſe it afforded a convenient Receptacle for him. And what if it had been totally unfit for Man? Would it therefore have been in vain? By no means. On the contrary, we are certain that God would have given it other Inhabitants, to whoſe Maintenance it might have been ſubſervient. (41.)

The Earth may be conceiv'd as a Wheel in this Automaton of the World, without which its motion would be defective: in the interim it affords an habitation and food to Animals.

V. Thoſe

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(41.) Our Author's Argument here might be carry'd much farther, and the Infinite Wiſdom of the Creator demonſtrated, not only from his having made nothing in vain, or uſeleſs in *itſelf*, but alſo from the diſtinct and *various* relations which every thing bears to *others*, and its contribution to the good of the whole: from the double, the *manifold* apparent *Uſes* of almoſt every thing in Nature.

Thus the Mountains mention'd in the Objection of *Lucretius*, and which many Moderns alſo have miſrepreſented as deformities of Nature, have not only their own peculiar Inhabitants *, but alſo afford to other Animals the moſt

See §. 5. par. 7. *of this Chap. or* Derham's *Phyſico Theol.* B. 3. C. 4.

The Earth is made not for Man alone, but for the Univerſe: to think otherwiſe favours of human pride.

V. Thoſe therefore who urge the Unfitneſs of certain Parts of the Earth for the Suſtenance of Man, as a Fault and Defect of the Divine Skill in making them, are oblig'd to prove that the Earth was made for the ſake of Mankind only, and not of the Univerſe, and that every thing in the World is uſeleſs which does not immediately tend to the Uſe of Man. But this is abſurd, and what no one would object, who is not blinded with Pride and Ignorance †. We ought rather to admire the Power and Goodneſs of God, who has ſo temper'd his Works, tho' they be immenſe and infinitely various, that there is nothing in them which exiſts not in the very beſt manner with reſpect to the whole, and which he has not repleniſh'd with its proper Inhabitants. And ſince the Variety of the conſtituent Parts and Regions of the Earth is no greater than the Nature of the whole Machine

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moſt commodious Harbour and Maintenance, the beſt Remedies and Retreats. To them we owe the moſt pleaſant Proſpects, the moſt delicious Wines, the moſt curious Vegetables, the richeſt and moſt uſeful Metals, Minerals, and other Foſſils; and, what is more than all, a wholſome Air, and the convenience of navigable Rivers and Fountains.

The Ocean, beſides the ſupport of its own Inhabitants (which are, in all probability, as numerous and various as thoſe of the Earth) provides alſo vaſt Quantities of Vapours, which refreſh and fructify the Earth itſelf, and nouriſh and ſupport its Inhabitants, producing Springs, Lakes and Rivers. The leſſer Seas, Fenns and Lakes, are ſo admirably well diſtributed throughout the Globe, as to afford ſufficient Vapours for Clouds and Rains to temper the Cold of the Northern Air, to cool and mitigate the Heats of the Torrid Zone, and refreſh the whole Earth with fertile Showers: As is fully proved by the excellent Author above mention'd *.

As to the variety of Uſes which the ſame thing is render'd capable of, and manifeſtly deſign'd for, by its All-wiſe Author, ſee the ingenious *S. C's Impartial Enquiry into the Exiſtence, &c. of God*, p. 80. "To obtain a great "number of Ends by as few means as may be, "is the higheſt point of Wiſdom. But nothing "can be imagin'd more admirable in this re"ſpect, than the preſent frame of things. Thus "tho' the human Body is compoſed of a great "variety of Parts, yet how much more nume"rous are their Uſes? How many are the U"ſes of the Hand, which directed by Rea"ſon is inſtead of all other Inſtruments? How "many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, the "Ear, and the Tongue? And if we take a "deeper View, and look into the minuter parts "of which theſe are compounded, what can be "more admirable than the Variety of Aims "and Intentions that may be obſerv'd in "each? The ſeveral Uſes of the Structure "and Poſition of each ſingle Muſcle have "been computed by *Galen* in his Book *de Formatione Fœtus*, to be no leſs than ten. The "like may be obſerv'd with reference to the "Bones and other ſimilar Parts, but eſpecially "with reſpect to the Members of ſuch as are "heterogeneous or diſſimular." p. 81.

The ſame is ſhewn at large by Dr. *Grew, Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 1. C. 5. par. 13, 14, *&c.* or *W. Scott* on *the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God*, Serm. 1. p. 15, *&c.* or *Wilkins Princ. of Nat. Relig.* C. 6.

† *See* Note 33.

* *Phyſico Theol.* B. 2. C. 5.

Machine required, nor the Species of Animals fewer than the Food would ſupply, we muſt conclude that there is nothing deficient or redundant in it. (42.)

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(42.) Hence I think we may ſafely conclude with our Author in general, that there could have been no partial alteration of this Syſtem but for the worſe, as far as we know, at leaſt not for the better. They who hold that there might have been a total one, that the whole Scheme of things might poſſibly have been alter'd or revers'd, and that either the direct contrary, or a quite different One, would have been equally, or more worthy of God; the Men, I ſay, that hold this, are oblig'd to ſhew the poſſibility of conceiving it, and to explain the manner how it may be, before we are oblig'd to believe them. They muſt ſhew, that the ſame things which are now conducive to our Happineſs, and conſequently the Objects of our Love, might as eaſily have tended to our Miſery; and conſequently have been as reaſonably the Objects of our Averſion; that bitter might have been ſweet, and ſweet bitter; that the ſame Paſſions, Objects, Exerciſes, and Inclinations, *&c.* which now create Pleaſure in us, might have produced a different, a quite contrary effect, or no effect at all. This they are oblig'd to do, and when they have done all this, and completed their Syſtem, and made a total alteration of things, as they imagine, for the better, they are at laſt only got to the above mention'd abſurdity of putting this Syſtem into a higher *Claſs*, whereas all the different Claſſes in every conceivable Degree of Perfection, were ſuppoſed to be entirely filled at the firſt. We muſt therefore take things as they are, and argue only from the preſent Nature of them, collectively. In which View we ſhall find no poſſible alteration of any thing but what would produce greater Inconveniences, either in itſelf or others, to which it bears a ſtrict Relation. Inſtances of this kind are every where to be met with: particular proofs of it in the natural World, occur in Dr. *Bentley*'s *Boyle*'s *Lect.* particularly with regard to the five Senſes of the human Body, p. 95, 96. ſee alſo *Locke* on *Humane Underſtanding*, B. 2. C. 23. §. 12. with reſpect to the figure and ſtature of it, in *Grew*'s *Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 1. C. 5. §. 25, *&c.* and as to the ſeveral Parts of it all over *Boyle*, *Cheyne*, *Derham*, *Newentyt*, *Ray*, *Cockburn*, *Edwards*, *W. Scott*, or *Pelling*.

The ſame might eaſily be ſhewn in the immaterial World, and in the moſt exceptionable Part of it; *viz.* the Soul of Man, its Knowledge, Freedom, Affections *.

On this occaſion I ſhall take the liberty to borrow a Section from Mr. *Maxwell*'s general Remarks on *Cumberland*, C. 5. "The *Nature* "*of things* in the natural World is ſo exactly "*fitted* to the natural *Faculties* and Diſpoſitions "of Mankind, that were any thing in it other- "wiſe than it is, even in Degree, Mankind "would be leſs happy than they now are. "Thus the dependence of all natural Effects "upon a few *ſimple Principles*, is wonderfully "advantageous in many reſpects. The De- "grees of all the ſenſible Pleaſures are exactly "ſuited to the uſe of each: ſo that if we en- "joy'd any of them in a greater degree, we "ſhould be leſs happy; for our Appetites of "thoſe Pleaſures would by that means be too "ſtrong for our Reaſon; and, as we are fra- "med, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment "of them, ſo as to prejudice our Bodies. And "where we enjoy ſome of them in ſo high a "degree, as that it is in many caſes very diffi- "cult for the ſtrongeſt to regulate and mode- "rate the Appetites of thoſe Pleaſures, it is in "ſuch Inſtances where it was neceſſary to coun- "terpoiſe ſome diſadvantages, which are the "conſequences of the purſuit of thoſe Plea- "ſures. Thus the pleaſing Ideas which ac- "company the Love of the Sexes, are neceſſa- "ry

* *See Sir* M. Hale's *Prim. Orig. of Mank.* C. 2. *De Homine*, p. 52.

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" ry to be poſſeſs'd in ſo high a degree, to bal-
" lance the *Cares of Matrimony*, and alſo the
" Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex.
" The ſame may be ſaid of our *Intellectual*
" *Pleaſures*. Thus did we receive a greater
" Pleaſure from Benevolence, Sloth would be
" encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. And
" were the Pleaſures of our Inquiries into the
" Truth greater, we ſhould be too ſpeculative
" and leſs active. It ſeems alſo probable, that
" the Degree of our Intellectual Capacity is
" very well ſuited to our Objects of Knowledge,
" and that had we a greater degree thereof, all
" other things remaining as they are, we ſhould
" be leſs happy. Moreover, it is probably ſo
" adapted to the inward frame of our Bodies,
" that it could not be greater, without either
" an alteration in the Laws of Nature, or in
" the Laws of Union between the Soul and
" Body. Farther; were it much greater than
" it is, our thoughts and purſuits would be ſo
" ſpiritual and refin'd, that we ſhould be taken
" too much off from the ſenſible Pleaſures.
" We ſhould probably be conſcious of ſome
" Defects or Wants in our Bodily Organs, and
" would be ſenſible that they were unequal to
" ſo great a Capacity, which would neceſſarily
" be follow'd by uneaſineſs of Mind. And
" this ſeems to hold in the Brute Creation:
" For, methinks it would be for the diſadvan-
" tage of a Horſe to be endued with the Un-
" derſtanding of a Man: ſuch an unequal U-
" nion muſt be attended with continual diſquie-
" tudes and diſcontents. As for our Pains,
" they are all either Warnings againſt Bodily
" Diſorders, or are ſuch as, had we wanted
" them, the Laws of Nature remaining as they
" are, we ſhould either have wanted ſome Plea-
" ſures we now enjoy, or have poſſeſs'd them
" in a leſs degree. Thoſe things in Nature
" which we cannot reconcile to the foregoing
" opinion, as being ignorant of their Uſe,
" we have good reaſon from Analogy to be-
" lieve, are really advantageous, and adapted
" to the Happineſs of Intelligent Beings of the
" Syſtem: tho' we have not ſo full and com-
" plete a Knowledge of the entire Syſtem, as
" to be able to point out their Particularities.
" From theſe Obſervations we may *conclude*,
" that all the various Parts of our Syſtem are
" ſo admirably ſuited to one another, and the
" whole contrived with ſuch exquiſite Wiſ-
" dom, that were any thing, in any part there-
" of, in the leaſt otherwiſe than it is, without
" an alteration in the whole, there would be a
" leſs Sum of Happineſs in the Syſtem than
" there now is."

See alſo the Ingenious Author of *the Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions*, p. 179, 201, 202.

But this will be more fully conſidered in the 4th Section.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of Death.

I. WE know by Experience, that Souls united to Bodies move them ſome way or other; *viz.* by Thought and Volition: for thus we move our own. And 'tis probable, that the Gravity, Solidity, and Hardneſs of our Bodies, together with the Reſiſtence of the adjacent ones, are the Cauſes why we cannot move them every way as we pleaſe.

'Tis probable that the Solidity of our Bodies is the cauſe why we cannot move them whither we pleaſe.

II. A Soul then united to a portion of Æthereal, uniform, and perfectly fluid Matter, free from the Impediment of Gravity and Reſiſtence, may in all probability move its Body whitherſoever it pleaſes. Such a Body therefore would be perfectly obſequious to the thought and will of the Soul that inhabits it: and if it receiv'd any detriment from the neighbouring Bodies, it could repair it by its Will alone; at leaſt ſo long as the Æther continued in its Fluidity and Purity. Unleſs the Animal therefore will'd the contrary, its Body would be *incorruptible*, and always fit for Union, *i. e. immortal.* If any one object, that the Bodies of the Bleſſed, which we call *Cæleſtial*, need no Motion or Change of Condition, ſince they enjoy continual Pleaſure; for no one moves or changes his State, but in order to remove ſome preſent Uneaſineſs. I anſwer; Theſe Bodies are not therefore immortal becauſe they are naturally incorruptible (for that would be incompatible with the Nature of that Matter whereof they are compoſed) but becauſe they are put into ſuch Places and Circumſtances by the Deity, that they can, even with Pleaſure, foreſee and prevent all ſuch things as might tend to introduce either *Corruption or Pain.* Neither does their Pleaſure or Happineſs conſiſt in Reſt properly ſo call'd, but in Activity, in ſuch Acts and Exerciſes of their Faculties as they chooſe: Now, ſince they may exerciſe themſelves perpetually according to their own

A Soul united to a portion of Æthereal Matter, *&c.* can move it whither it will, and preſerve its Union: ſuch a Body therefore is immortal.

own Choice, and there is nothing to hinder them, they may be perpetually happy; as will be declared below. All which are different in ſolid Bodies.

The Body of a terreſtrial Animal is a kind of Veſſel, which may be broke, the humours may flow out, and the circular motion ceaſe. Such Animals then are naturally mortal.

III. We cannot certainly determine what Life is in theſe Animals which have ſolid Bodies, but we ſufficiently apprehend *where* it is, from certain Marks and Tokens. For where there is a circular motion of the Fluids, there is Nutrition and Increaſe, there is, as I conjecture, ſome ſort of Life. Now, 'tis evident, that this circular motion may be interrupted by the force of adjacent Bodies: the ſolid Body of an Animal is a kind of Veſſel in which the humours have a flux and reflux thro' certain ducts and channels framed by Divine Skill, in the motion of which Life conſiſts. Now this Veſſel may be broke in pieces by the impulſe of other Bodies, ſince by the native imperfection of Matter it is capable of Diſſolution; but when the Veſſel is broken, the Fluids therein contain'd muſt neceſſarily flow out, the circular motion muſt ceaſe, and together with it animal Life. Such Animals therefore as have ſolid Bodies, are by Nature Mortal, and cannot laſt for ever, without violence done to the Laws of Nature, of Matter, and Motion. There muſt then have been either none at all created, or ſuch as are naturally Mortal. The imperfection of Matter could not ſuffer it to be otherwiſe. For the hard and ſolid parts belonging to theſe Bodies are of ſuch a frame as muſt neceſſarily be ſhaken and ſeparated by others of the ſame bulk and hardneſs. Every thing therefore that conſiſts of ſuch kind of Parts, may be corrupted and diſſolved. (43.) Therefore the Divine Power and Goodneſs did the very beſt

NOTES.

(43.) This point is very well illuſtrated, by Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 245, *&c.* whoſe Reaſoning is entirely built upon Sir *Iſ. Newton*'s Experiments. "Human Bodies, as "well as thoſe of all other Animals, and of "Plants, are compounded of very different "Materials, fix'd and volatile, fluid and ſolid; "as appears by the reſolution of them into "their conſtituent Parts; and they are nouriſh'd in the ſame manner, *viz.* by attraction. For, as a Spunge by Suction draws in "Water, ſo the Glands in the Bodies of all "Animals, draw different Juices out of the "Blood, according to the particular Nature "and conſtitution of each of them: So long "therefore as the nouriſhment is proper to aſſimilate itſelf to the ſeveral parts of the Body, as it approaches them in its ſeveral channels; or, ſo long as the ſolid particles (ſuppoſe of Salts, which are abſolutely neceſſary "to the preſervation of all Creatures) retain "their form and texture; ſo long Life is preſerv'd and maintain'd. And when the nouriſhment becomes unfit to aſſimilate; or the "ſaline

beſt even in creating Beings that were mortal: for an Animal ſubject to Death is better than none at all.

IV. But God, you'll ſay, created Men at firſt immortal, as we underſtand by ſacred Hiſtory: Mortality is not therefore an inſeparable attendant on ſolid Bodies. I anſwer; It does not appear to us of what ſort the Bodies of Mankind were before the Fall, and conſequently nothing can be argued from thence againſt the neceſſary Mortality of all terreſtrial ones. Farther, we ſhould remember that our firſt Parents were naturally mortal, but that God covenanted with them for Immortality as matter of Favour, and upon particular Conditions. (44.) Not

This Hypotheſis reconciled with ſacred Hiſtory, concerning the immortality of the firſt Man.

NOTES.

" ſaline particles (which towards the Center " are very denſe, and therefore capable of " ſtrongly attracting the Fluids to them) loſe " their power of Attraction, either by being " divided into leſs particles (as they may be " by their watry parts inſinuating themſelves " into their Pores with a gentle heat) or elſe " by having thoſe watry Parts violently ſepa- " rated from them: in either of theſe Caſes all " their Motion will ceaſe, and end in Corrup- " tion, Confuſion and Death. And this is a- " bundantly confirm'd by Experience, in that " every thing which is corrupted or putrify'd " is of a black Colour; which ſhews, that the " component Particles are broken to Pieces, " and reduced ſo ſmall, as to be unable even " to reflect the Rays of Light, Thus we ſee, " that *Death*, or the Diſſolution of the Body, " is the neceſſary Conſequence of thoſe Laws " by which it is framed and generated: and " therefore is not in itſelf properly an *Evil*, a- " ny more than that Fabric can be ſtiled *ill*, " the Materials, or manner of building of " which, would not permit it to laſt a thou- " ſand Years, nor was originally intended to " continue half ſo long." See the latter part of Note 56.

(44.) See *Curcellæi Inſt. Rel. Chriſt.* L. 3. C. 8. §. 12, 13, 20, *&c.* p. 110. or *Limborch, Theol Chriſt.* L. 2. C. 24. §. 10. p. 137, 138.

From hence, I think, it will appear, that all the Objections drawn from the Hiſtory of our firſt Parents in their State of Innocence, as often urg'd by Mr. *Bayle* againſt the preſent Queſtion, are inconcluſive: Since whatever State they were created in, it was extraordinary, ſupernatural, and peculiar to them, as the firſt of human Race: and what, their Creator knew, would at length turn to the ſame which Mankind is in at preſent. Nay, it is ſcarce poſſible to conceive how they could have been preſerv'd and propagated, govern'd and directed by any general Laws of Nature (which yet are neceſſary to the whole Syſtem *) in any other Condition than they now are. Not to ſpeak here of their moral Part, if they were compoſed of the ſame Materials of which all their Poſterity conſiſt, they muſt have been at leaſt naturally Mortal; tho' God might, if he had ſeen it proper, have interfered in ſome preternatural way, and thereby alter'd the circumſtances of their Mortality †. And accordingly the Sentence pronounced upon *Adam*, (Gen. 2. 17.) *In the Day that thou eateſt thereof thou ſhalt dying Dye.* or ſhalt *die a Death*, might not imply that he ſhould never have died at all had he not eaten; but that he ſhould die both a more *ſpeedy* and a more *painful* Death that otherwiſe he might have done: as that emphatical Phraſe often ſignifies in Scripture. See more of this in §. 8. par. 6. and N. 56, and at the end of this Chapter.

* *See* Note 37. † *See* Sherlock *on Death*, Ch. 2. §. 1.

Not that they ſhould have continued upon Earth for ever; but that God promiſed to tranſlate them at a proper time by his eſpecial Favour, and preſerve them in a place fit for the enjoyment of Eternity: as we believe he did with *Enoch* and *Elias*. But as ſoon as this Covenant with God was broken by Sin, Man was reſtor'd to his Native Mortality, and ſubjected to thoſe other Inconveniencies to which the order of Nature, and the chain of Natural Cauſes, render'd ſuch Bodies as theſe of Mankind obnoxious. For tho' God has not ſo far tied himſelf up to the Laws of Nature, but that he may in many Caſes ſuſpend and ſuperſede them, yet this is not done frequently, nor to be expected for the ſake of Sinners. God can indeed preſerve Man from *actual Death*, but that a ſolid Machine conſiſting of heterogeneous Parts, ſuch as the human Body is, ſhould not be *naturally Mortal* is impoſſible: 'Tis a Contradiction therefore that Man, in the preſent State of things, ſhould be by Nature immortal.

SECT. IV.

Of the Paſſions.

Our Souls require Bodies of a peculiar *Craſis*, when that is diſorder'd or removed, the operations of the Soul are either hinder'd or deſtroy'd.

I. SUppoſing the Union of a thinking or ſenſitive Soul with Matter, its Thought and Will muſt neceſſarily be affected by the Motions of that, as Body muſt be again by theſe. For, ſince the Soul is of ſuch a Nature as to require Matter of a peculiar *Craſis* and *Figure*, in order to diſcharge its Functions, it follows, that when this Diſpoſition is faulty, or quite fails, the Operations of the Soul muſt be impeded, or entirely ceaſe; nor can it poſſibly be otherwiſe while the Soul and Body are of ſuch a Nature as they really are.

The Soul and Body admit of a mutual Sympathy: hence it is

II. Since therefore it is no diminution of the Divine Goodneſs to have aſſign'd ſuch a Nature to them, as was ſhewn before; we muſt alſo admit of a mutual Sympathy between them. Now, if they mutually

the firſt care of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm.

tually affect each other, the conſequence will be, that it is the principal buſineſs of the Soul to preſerve the Body from harm: In order to this, 'tis neceſſary that the Soul ſhould have a perception of what is good for, or prejudicial to, the Body; and this could not be more effectually procured, than by providing that thoſe things which tend to its preſervation ſhould communicate an agreeable Senſation to the Soul, and what is pernicious, a diſagreeable one. For, otherwiſe, the firſt thing we met with might deſtroy us, while we were not apprehenſive, or regardleſs of it; nor ſhould we be ſolicitous to avoid a River or a Precipice. (45.)

III. 'Tis neceſſary therefore that the Soul and Body ſhould affect each other mutually, that the impairing or Diſſolution of the Body ſhould create uneaſineſs, which, by its importunity, might recall the Soul that was indiſpoſed or otherwiſe engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought it to ceaſe urging, till what was hurtful be removed: without this Importunity perhaps the ſtrongeſt Animal would not laſt even a Day. The Senſe then of Pain or Uneaſineſs produced in the Soul upon the Mutilation or Diſſolution of the Body is neceſſary for the preſervation of Life in the preſent State of things. It may be proved from the ſame Principles, that the averſion to, or dread of, *Death* is not in vain, ſince it cannot even be conceiv'd how a frail and mortal Body, toſſed by continual Motions, and tumbled among other hard Bodies, ſhould eſcape

The ſenſe of Pain is neceſſary to preſerve Life, as alſo the dread of Death.

NOTES.

(45.) This Subject is very well handled by Dr. *J. Clarke*, on *Nat. Evil*, p. 256, *&c.* See alſo Mr. *Hucheſon* on *the Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions*, p. 51, 52. or *Watts* on *the Uſe and Abuſe of them*, §. 13, *&c.*

I ſhall tranſcribe a Paſſage from the Author laſt mention'd. "The Paſſions are deſign'd "for the Service of the Body, becauſe they a-"waken not only all the animal Powers, but "the Thoughts and Contrivances of the mind, "to prevent whatſoever is hurtful to the Bo-"dy, and to procure what is pleaſant and uſe-"ful for its Support and Safety; that is, in "more compendious Language, to *obtain Good*, "or *avoid Evil*. While our Body is in ſuch a "feeble State, ſurrounded with Dangers, and "liable to ſo many troubleſome Accidents, "Diſorders, and Death, God has not only "furniſh'd us with the *Senſations of Pleaſure* "and *Pain*, to give us ſpeedy Notice of what "hurts or relieves the Body, but he has alſo "given us the Paſſions of Joy and Sorrow, of "Deſire and Averſion, to aſſiſt in this Work, "that the Body may be better provided with "what is neceſſary to its Health and Life, and "may be better guarded againſt the Danger of "Wounds and Bruiſes, Diſtempers and Death."

Thus much for the uſe of what our Author calls *the* Sympathy *between Soul and Body, the Paſſions, Affections*, &c. with reſpect to the *Body*. Concerning the uſe and neceſſity of them in regard to the *Mind*, ſee Note 47.

ſcape Diſſolution, if the Soul which moves that Body were not fore-warn'd to avoid Death by the natural horror of its approach. (46.)

IV. Now

NOTES.

(46.) To this *Bayle* objects *, " That the " Conſequences above mention'd might as rea- " dily and certainly be avoided by the ſole " attraction of Pleaſure encreas'd or diminiſh'd " in certain Proportions. Would not a Fore- " taſte of more exquiſite Pleaſure in removing " your Chair from a great Fire, make you " quit the vicinity of this great Fire, without " any neceſſity for the feeling inconvenience? " Another Expedient is, That the Soul, in the " very nick of time ſhould have a clear Idea of " the peril which environs her Machine, that " this Idea be attended with the ſame Prompt- " neſs of the Animal Spirits which now ac- " companies the Senſation of Pain; we ſhould " then be always as far from Danger as was " neceſſary, in the ſame manner as we fly from " it at preſent."

We reply, that according to the preſent frame of human Nature in general (which Syſtem ought always to be taken together) neither of theſe Expedients would anſwer the end propoſed. As to the former, this Author has often obſerv'd in his Dictionary †, that a little Pain is able to counterballance a great deal of Pleaſure; that one hour of Sickneſs is more poignant than ſeveral Days of Health. And, p. 1053. That four Afflictions, mix'd with twenty Felicities, would be ſufficient to engage a Man to wiſh an alteration of his condition.

Whence it follows, that ſuch an encreaſe of Pleaſure could not make us avoid the many Miſchiefs incident to the Body, ſo readily and certainly, as the Excitements of Pain. A moderate degree of Pleaſure often ſatisfies the whole Man, and makes him content to forfeit a ſuperior Happineſs, or regardleſs of undergoing an infinitely greater Miſery to come: But the ſmalleſt ſenſitive Pain immediately urges him to deſire its removal. Four degrees of Miſery therefore will, according to *Bayle* himſelf, move a Perſon more effectually, than twenty degrees of Happineſs; and conſequently, ſince all kinds of Miſery cannot be avoided, the preſent Method of Providence is the beſt, as it avoids the moſt and greateſt. As to the ſecond Expedient, tho' it were granted, that a clear Proſpect of enſuing Miſery would prove as effectual an Excitement of our Endeavours to prevent it as a preſent Uneaſineſs, yet the Mind, in order to have a clear Idea of theſe Perils which environ the Body, muſt alſo have a complete Knowledge of the ſeveral properties and effects of all the circumambient Bodies, which I believe, will be eſteem'd ſomething too much for a Soul placed in this inferior Claſs of compound Beings. And, laſtly, in anſwer to what he frequently urges, that there will be no need of ſuch a Method of preventing Death and Miſery in the future State of the Bleſſed, where we expect pure unmix'd Felicity; and conſequently there was no abſolute Neceſſity for them here; we need only refer the Reader to the Obſervations in Notes 30 and 35. *viz.* that there are ſeveral different Syſtems of rational Beings, one above another, which we believe to be gradually growing up, and aſcending after each other, and acquiring new Degrees of Happineſs and Perfection to all Eternity: and therefore, when we ſpeak of the future State of the Bleſſed, we ſuppoſe them exalted to a far nobler kind of Exiſtence, or placed in a quite different Claſs, and conſequently endow'd with different Faculties from theſe which we experience here below: and therefore, to argue from one to the other, is only confounding quite different Orders of created Beings: and ſuppoſing that what is poſſible and agreeable in one, may and ought to be ſo in another, and, by the ſame way of reaſoning, alike in all. This Argument then drawn from that State of our Fore-Father in Paradiſe, or us in Heaven, is always inconcluſive. *See* Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 257, *&c.*

* *Reponſe aux Queſtions d'un Provincial*, Fol. p. 650.

† Under the Article *Xenophanes*, particularly at p. 3051.

IV. Now the reſt of the Paſſions are Conſequences of Pain, Uneaſineſs, and dread of Death; *viz.* Anger, Love, Hatred, *&c.* An Animal in the preſent State of things, muſt therefore either be obnoxious to theſe, or quickly periſh. For 'tis impoſſible that the Sould ſhould have a diſagreeable Senſation, and not be angry at the Cauſe which produces it: and ſo of the reſt. The reſt of the Paſſions are connected with theſe.

V. God could have avoided all this by ordering that the Soul ſhould not be affected by the Motions of the Body; or at leaſt, that every thing done therein ſhould be agreeable: But how dangerous this would be to Animals, any one may underſtand, who recollects how very ſhort their Lives muſt be, if they died with the ſame Pleaſure that they eat or drink or propagate their Species. If upon tearing the Body, the Soul had either no Senſation at all, or a pleaſant one, we ſhould be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, nor would it be more injurious to kill a Man than to ſcratch him. And thus Mankind would quickly fail. We muſt then either have been arm'd with theſe Paſſions againſt Death, or ſoon have periſh'd: But the Divine Goodneſs choſe that Animals ſhould be ſubject to theſe, rather than the Earth be entirely deſtitute of Inhabitants. (47.) The Paſſions could not be avoided otherwiſe, than by ordering that the Soul ſhould not be affected with the Motions of the Body: By theſe means Animals would be very ſhor lived.

NOTES.

(47.) Beſides the Health and Preſervation of the Body, the Paſſions in general are neceſſary to the Happineſs and Well-being of the *Soul* alſo: Wherein, beſides the immediate Pleaſure which ariſes from the very Exerciſe of them, and their Power to alter even the Nature of things, or at leaſt, their Relations to us, and often make that eaſy and agreeable which would otherwiſe be diſtaſtful and intolerable: they are farther neceſſary to urge and excite the Mind to laudable Enterpriſes, and ſo ſupport it in the execution of them; to fix and fortify it againſt all Difficulties and Dangers, and enable it to proceed and perſevere in the conſtant purſuit of ſtill higher Degrees of Happineſs and Perfection. "*The Soul* (ſays Mr. *Addiſon* *) *conſider'd abſtractly from its Paſſions, is "of a remiſs and ſedentary Nature, ſlow in its "Reſolves, and languiſhing in its Executions. "The uſe therefore of the Paſſions is, to ſtir up "and put it upon Action, to awaken the Under-"ſtanding, to enforce the Will, and to make the "whole Man more vigorous and attentive in the "proſecution of his Deſigns.*" See alſo the *Spectator* N°. 408.

For a particular Account of all the Paſſions, and their *final Cauſes*, and the Neceſſity of each, ſee Mr. *Hutcheſon*'s incomparable *Eſſay*, §. 2. p. 48, 50. *&c.* and §. 6. p. 179. or *Watts* on *the uſe and abuſe of them*, §. 13. or *Chambers*'s *Cyclopedia*, under the Word *Paſſion*, or *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Part 2. C. 1. §. 2. par. 3. But what relates to this Subject will come more properly under the Head of *Moral Evil.*

* *Spect.* N°. 255.

It is not contrary to the divine Goodneſs to permit theſe Inconveniencies, ſince they could not be avoided without greater.

VI. Behold now how Evils ſpring from and multiply upon each other, while infinite Goodneſs ſtill urges the Deity to do the very beſt. This moved him to give *Exiſtence* to Creatures which cannot exiſt without *Imperfections* and *Inequality*. This excited him to create *Matter* and to put it in *Motion*, which is neceſſarily attended with Separation and Diſſolution, Generation and Corruption. This perſuaded him to couple Souls with Bodies, and to give them mutual Affections, whence proceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with the reſt of the Paſſions, yet all of them, as we have ſeen, are neceſſary.

God therefore compared the Good in things with the Evils which neceſſarily attend them; and tolerated thoſe Evils which were inſeparable from the Good.

VII. For, as *created Exiſtence* neceſſarily includes the Evil of Imperfection, ſo every Species of it is ſubject to its own peculiar Imperfections; that is, to Evils. All the Species of Creatures then muſt either have been omitted, or their concomitant Evils tolerated: the Divine Goodneſs therefore put the Evils in one Scale and the Good in the other: and ſince the Good preponderated, an infinitely good God would not omit that becauſe of the concomitant Evils; for that very Omiſſion would have been attended with more and greater Evils, and ſo would have been leſs agreeable to infinite Goodneſs.

The Axiom about not doing Evil for the ſake of Good, does not take place where the leaſt Evil is choſen.

VIII. The leaſt Evil, you'll ſay, ought not to be admitted for the ſake of the greateſt Good. (For to affirm that God does Evil that Good may come of it, is Blaſphemy.) Neither does the Diſtinction between *Moral* and *Natural* Evil help any thing toward the Solution of this Difficulty: For what we call *Moral* Evil, as ſhall be ſhewn below, is that which is forbidden; now nothing is forbidden by God but generally, at leaſt, on account of the *Inconveniencies* attending the forbidden Actions: Theſe *Inconveniencies* are *Natural* Evils, therefore *Moral* Evils are prohibited on account of the *Natural* ones, and for that Reaſon only are Evils, becauſe they lead to *Natural* Evils. But that which makes any thing to be ſuch, is itſelf much *more ſuch*: therefore the *Natural*, you'll ſay, are greater Evils than the *Moral*, and cannot with leſs Blaſphemy be attributed to God. Granting all this to be true, yet tho' Evil is not to be *done* for the ſake of Good, yet the *leſs* Evil is to be choſen before the *greater*: And ſince Evils neceſſarily ſurround you whether you act or not, you ought to prefer that Side which is attended with the leaſt. Since therefore God was compell'd by the neceſſary Imperfections of created Beings, either to abſtain from creating them at all, or to bear with the Evils conſequent

upon

upon them; and ſince it is a leſs Evil to permit thoſe, than to omit theſe: 'tis plain that God did not allow of Natural Evils for the ſake of any *Good*; but choſe the leaſt out of ſeveral Evils; *i. e.* would rather have Creatures liable to *Natural Evils*, than no Creatures at all. The ſame will be ſhewn hereafter concerning Moral Evils.

SECT. V.

Of Hunger, Thirſt, *and* Labour.

I. A Terreſtrial Animal muſt, as we have ſaid, neceſſarily conſiſt of mix'd and heterogeneous Parts; its Fluids alſo are in a perpetual Flux, and a kind of Ferment. Now 'tis plain that this cannot be without the Expence of theſe Fluids, and Attrition of the Solids; and hence follows *Death* and *Diſſolution*, except theſe be repair'd: a new Acceſſion of Matter is therefore neceſſary, to ſupply what flies off and is worn away, and much more ſo for the Growth of Animals.

The parts of the Body fly off: it ſtands in need therefore of Reparation, *viz.* by Food.

II. But Animals have particular *Conſtitutions*, and cannot be nouriſhed by any ſort of Matter: ſome *Choice* therefore muſt be made of it, to which they are to be urg'd by an Importunity ſtrong enough to excite their Endeavours after it. Hence *Hunger* and *Thirſt* come to affect the Soul; Affections that are ſometimes indeed troubleſome, but yet neceſſary, and which bring more Pleaſure than Pain along with them.

Choice muſt be had in Food, ſince all things are not equally proper.

III. But why, ſay you, are we oblig'd to *labour* in queſt of Food? Why are not the Elements themſelves ſufficient? I anſwer; they are ſufficient for ſome Animals: but Mankind required ſuch a diſpoſition of Matter as was to be prepared by various Coctions and Changes, and that

The Materials of Food are ſoon corrupted: they cannot therefore be procured without Labour.

daily, becauſe 'tis ſoon liable to Corruption, and if kept long, would be unfit for Nutriment. Hence Labour becomes neceſſary to provide Victuals in this preſent ſtate of things: neither could Hunger, or Thirſt, or Labour *, (which are reckon'd among *Natural* Evils) be prevented without greater Inconveniencies. The Divine Goodneſs therefore had the higheſt Reaſon for affixing theſe to Animals.

Every Animal is placed by God where it may have its proper Nouriſhment, hence almoſt every herb maintains its proper Inſect.

IV. Now, as Animals require different ſorts of Food, as was ſhewn, according to their different Conſtitutions, ſo God has placed every one of them where it may find what is proper for it: on which account there is ſcarce any thing in the Elements but what may be Food for ſome. Every Herb has its Inſect which it ſupports. The Earth, the Water, the very Stones, ſerve for Aliment to living Creatures †.

Some Animals are produced for Food to others, and would not have exiſted on any other terms.

V. But ſome ſtand in need of more delicate Food: Now God could have created an *inanimate* Machine which might have ſupplied them with ſuch Food; but one that is animated does it much eaſier and better. A Being that has Life is *(cæteris paribus)* preferable to one that has not: God therefore animated that Machine which furniſhes out proviſion for more perfect Animals; which was both graciouſly and providently done: for by this means he gain'd ſo much Life to the World as there is in thoſe Animals which are Food for others: for by this means they themſelves enjoy ſome kind of Life, and are of Service alſo to the reſt. An Ox, for inſtance, or a Calf, is bred, nouriſhed, and protected for ſome time, in order to become fit Food for Man. This certainly is better and more eligible, than if the Matter of its Body had been converted into an inanimate Maſs, ſuch as a Pompion, or continued in the ſtate of unform'd Clay. Nor is it hardly dealt withal, by being made for the Food of a more noble Animal, ſince it was on this Condition only that it had Life given, which it could not otherwiſe have enjoy'd. Matter which is fit for the Nouriſhment of Man, is alſo capable of Life; if therefore God had denied it Life, he had omitted a Degree of Good which might have been produced without any Impediment to his principal Deſign: which does not ſeem very agreeable to infinite Goodneſs. 'Tis better

* *See* Note 51. † *See* Notes 35 and 39.

ter therefore that it ſhould be endow'd with Life for a time, tho' 'tis to be devoured afterwards, than to continue totally ſtupid and ſluggiſh. The common Objection then is of no force, *viz.* That inanimate matter might have been prepared for this Uſe; for 'tis better that it ſhould be animated; eſpecially as ſuch Animals are ignorant of Futurity, and are neither conſcious nor ſolicitous about their being made for this Purpoſe. So that ſo long as they live, they enjoy themſelves without anxiety; at leaſt they rejoyce in the preſent Good, and are neither tormented with the Remembrance of what is paſt, nor the Fear of what is to come; and laſtly, are kill'd with leſs Pain than they would be by a Diſtemper or old Age. Let us not be ſurpris'd then at the Univerſal War as it were among Animals; or that the Stronger devour the Weaker, for theſe are made on purpoſe to afford Aliment to the others. (48.)

VI. As

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(48.) What is here laid down will, upon Examination, be found to be perfectly conſiſtent with our Obſervation in Note 34.

As the Point before us is ſet in a very good Light by Dr. *J. Clarke**, I ſhall not ſcruple to tranſcribe the whole Paragraph. "If we "conſider the effect of Animal Creatures being "thus made Food for each other, we ſhall find "that by this means there is the more Good "upon the whole: For under the preſent Circumſtances of the Creation, Animals living "in this manner one upon another could not "have been prevented, but a much greater Evil would have follow'd. For then there "could not have been ſo great a Number, nor "ſo great a Variety of Animals as there are at "preſent, ſome of which are ſo very minute, "and the Quantity of them ſuch, that, mixing "themſelves with Herbs and Plants, and Grain, "on which themſelves feed, and with the Water and Liquids which they drink, they muſt "neceſſarily be devour'd by other larger Animals who live upon the ſame Food, without ſo much as being ſeen or any way perceiv'd by them. It is therefore much better "upon the whole, that they ſhould live upon "one another in the manner they now do, "than that they ſhould not live at all. For if "ſuch Animal Life is to be eſteem'd ſuperior "to not exiſting at all, or to a vegetable Life; "and the more there is of ſuch Animal Life, "the more of Good there is in the World; it "is evident that by this means there is Room "for more whole Species of Creatures, at leaſt "for many more individuals of each Species, "than there would otherwiſe be; and that "the variety of the Creation is hereby much "enlarged, and the Goodneſs of its Author "diſplayed. For the Conſtitution of Animal "Bodies is ſuch as requires that they ſhould "be maintain'd by Food: Now if this Food "can be made capable of Animal Life alſo, it "is a very great Improvement of it. A certain "Quantity of Food is neceſſary for the preſervation of a determinate Number of Animals: which Food, were it mere vegetable, "would perhaps ſerve for that Purpoſe only: "but by being ſo form'd as to become Animal, "tho' it be in a lower Degree, and the enjoyment of Life in ſuch Creatures leſs, yet is it "more perfect than unform'd Clay, or even "than the moſt curious Plant. Thus the A-

"nimal

* *Diſcourſe concerning* Natural Evil, p. 289.

All parts of the Earth could not have afforded Nouriſhment and Reception for Men, whatever ſituation they had been placed in.

VI. As for the *Difficulty* of procuring Food, and the *Want* of it in ſome Places, 'tis to be obſerv'd that the ſtate of the Earth depends upon the light and heat of the Sun; and tho' we do not perfectly underſtand the Structure of it, yet we have reaſon to conjecture, (G.) that it is carried about its Axis by a *Diurnal*, and about the Sun by an *Annual* Motion: that its Figure is a Sphæroid deſcribed by the Revolution of a Semi-Ellipſe about a conjugate Axis; and that this proceeds from the Laws of Motion and Gravitation. Now in ſuch a Situation, ſome Parts of it muſt neceſſarily be unfit for ſuch Inhabitants as Men, ſince the Paralleliſm of its Axis is preſerv'd in the annual Motion, and the Revolution about the ſame Axis in the diurnal. If theſe ſhould undergo the very leaſt Alteration, the whole Fabric of the Earth would be diſorder'd; the Ocean and Dry Land would change Places to the detriment of the Animals. Since therefore neither the annual nor diurnal Motion of the Earth could be alter'd without harm; 'tis plain, that ſome parts of the Earth muſt neceſſarily be leſs convenient for the habitation of Mankind, namely thoſe about the Poles; and that others muſt require much Labour to make them convenient, as we find by Experience in our own Climate; but it will evidently appear to any conſidering Perſon, that in what ſituation or motion ſoever you ſuppoſe the Earth to be, either theſe or worſe Evils muſt be admitted; 'tis in vain therefore to complain of theſe Inconveniencies which cannot be avoided without greater. (49.)

VII. Neither

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" nimal Part of the Creation has its ſeveral De-
" grees of Life, and as much Variety in it as
" is to be found in the inanimate and vegeta-
" ble Part; ſo that in this reſpect there is ſo
" far from being any juſt ground of Complaint,
" that the Wiſdom and Contrivance of the A-
" nimal World is admirable, and plainly ſhews
" the excellency of the whole, and the ſubſer-
" viency of all the Particulars, in order to ob-
" tain the greateſt Good that they are capable
" of."

See alſo the beginning of the *Spectator*, N°. 519.

(G.) What is ſaid about the Motion of the Earth ſhould be looked upon as an Hypotheſis only, and not a fundamental Principle; that the Argument might have the ſame Succeſs, whether the Earth ſtood ſtill or moved; and our aſſurance of the Divine Goodneſs may not ſeem to depend on the Conjectures of Mathematicians.

(49) Thus if the *Figure* of the Earth were chang'd into a perfect *Sphere*, the Equatorial Parts muſt all lie under Water. If it were of a *Cubic*, *Priſmatic*, or any other *Angular* Figure, it would neither be ſo *capacious* for habitation, nor ſo fit for *Motion*, nor ſo commodious for the Reception of *Light* and *Heat*, for the circulation of the *Winds*, and the *Diſtribution* of the *Waters*; as is obvious to any one that is acquainted

VII. Neither are *Earth-quakes, Storms, Thunder, Deluges* and *Inundations* any ſtronger Arguments againſt the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God. Theſe are ſometimes ſent by a juſt and gracious God for the Puniſhment of Mankind; but often depend on other natural Cauſes, which are neceſſary, and could not be removed without greater Damage to the whole. Theſe Concuſſions of the Elements are indeed prejudicial, Of *Earth-quakes, Lightning* and *Deluges.*

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quainted with the firſt Elements of Natural Philoſophy, and is at large demonſtrated by Dr. *Cheyne*, Mr. *Derham*, *Ray*, &c. If its Situation were removed, its Conſtitution muſt be alter'd too, or elſe, if placed conſiderably farther from the Sun, it would be frozen into Ice, if nearer, 'twould be burnt to a Coal. If either its annual or diurnal Motion were *ſtopp'd, retarded*, or *accelerated*, the uſeful and agreeable Viciſſitudes of *Summer* and *Winter*, *Day* and *Night*, would ceaſe, or at leaſt ceaſe to be ſo uſeful and agreeable as they now are. The immoderate length or ſhortneſs of the Seaſons would prove pernicious to the Earth, and the ſtated times of Buſineſs and Repoſe would be as incommodious to its Inhabitants: as diſproportionate to the common affairs of Life, and the various Exigences of Mankind †. If, in the laſt place, we alter the *Inclination of the Earth*'s Axis, the like Inconveniencies will attend the *Polar* Parts: if we deſtroy the *Parallelism* of it, beſides deſtroying at the ſame time the uſeful Arts of Navigation and Dialling, we bring upon us much worſe Conſequences: A Deſcription of ſome few of them from Dr. *Bentley*'s Sermon above cited may perhaps not be diſagreeable. " We all know, from the very " Elements of Aſtronomy, that this inclin'd " poſition of the Axis, which keeps always the " ſame Direction, and a conſtant Parallelism " to itſelf is the ſole Cauſe of theſe grateful " and needful Viciſſitudes of the four Seaſons " of the Year, and the Variation in length of " Days. If we take away the *Inclination*, it " would abſolutely undo theſe Northern Na- " tions, the Sun would never come nearer us " than he doth now on the 10th of *March*, or " the 12th of *September*. But would we ra- " ther part with the *Parallelism*? Let us ſup- " poſe then that the Axis of the Earth keeps " always the ſame Inclination towards the Bo- " dy of the Sun: this indeed would cauſe a " variety of Days, and Nights, and Seaſons, " on the Earth; but then every particular " Country would have always the ſame diver- " ſity of Day and Night, and the ſame Conſti- " tution of Seaſon, without any alteration. " Some would always have long Nights and " ſhort Days, others again perpetually long " Days and ſhort Nights: One Climate would " be ſcorch'd and ſwelter'd with everlaſting " *Dog-Days*, while an eternal *December* blaſted " another. This ſurely is not quite ſo good " as the preſent Order of Seaſons. But ſhall " the Axis rather obſerve no conſtant Inclina- " tion to any thing, but vary and waver at " uncertain times and places? This would " be a happy Conſtitution indeed! There " would be no Health, no Life nor Subſiſtence " in ſuch an irregular Syſtem: By thoſe ſur- " priſing Nods of the Pole, we might be toſs'd " backward or forward, in a Moment, from " *January* to *June*, nay, poſſibly, from the " *January* of *Greenland*, to the *June* of *Abeſſi- " nia*. It is better therefore, upon all accounts, " that the Axis ſhould be continued in its " preſent Poſture and Direction; ſo that this " alſo is a ſignal Character of Divine Wiſdom " and Goodneſs.

See alſo *Cheyne*'s *Phil. Princ.* C. 3. §. 24, 25, 26, *&c.*

† *See Dr.* Bentley's *laſt Sermon*, p. 312, *&c.* 5th Edition.

prejudicial, but more Prejudice would ariſe to the Univerſal Syſtem by the abſence of them. What the genuine and immediate Cauſes of them are I dare not determine: they ſeem in general to derive their Origin from the unequal heat of the Sun, from the Fluidity, Mutability, and Contrariety of things *. To theſe we may add the Aſperity and Inequality of the Earth's Surface, without which, nevertheleſs the whole Earth, or the greateſt Part of it, would be uninhabitable. For inſtance, we complain of the Mountains as Rubbiſh, as not only diſfiguring the Face of the Earth, but alſo as uſeleſs and inconvenient; and yet without theſe, neither Rivers nor Fountains, nor the Weather for producing and ripening Fruits could regularly be preſerv'd †. In Mountainous Countries we blame Providence for the Uncertainty of the Weather, for the frequency of Showers and Storms, which yet proceed from the very Nature of the Climate, and without which all the Moiſture would glide down the Declivity, and the Fruits wither away. The Earth then muſt either not be created at all, or theſe things be permitted. (50.)

VIII. The

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(50.) The ſeveral Objections mention'd in this Paragraph are ſolidly refuted by Dr. *J. Clarke* in his Treatiſe on *Natural Evil*, part of which I ſhall take the Liberty to inſert as uſual, and refer the Reader to the Book itſelf for the reſt.

Having deſcribed the Nature and Uſe of the Air's *Elaſticity*, and the *acid*, *nitrous*, and *ſulphureous* Particles with which it is impregnated, which are the Cauſe of *Fermentation*, he proceeds to account for Earthquakes, *&c.* p. 190. "Thus the internal Parts of the Earth being "the only proper Place for containing ſo large "a Store of Sulphur and Nitre, and Minerals "as is required for ſo many thouſand Years as "the Earth in its preſent State has, and may "yet continue: it muſt neceſſarily be, that "when that *Fermentation* is made in ſuch ſub"terraneous Caverns as are not wide enough "for the particles to expand themſelves in, or "have no open Paſſage to ruſh out at, they "will, by the forementiou'd Law, ſhake the "Earth to a conſiderable diſtance, tear thoſe "Caverns to pieces; and according to the "depth of ſuch Caverns, or Quantity of Materials contain'd in them, remove large pieces of the Surface of the Earth, from one "place to another, in the ſame manner, tho' to a "much higher degree than artificial Exploſions "made under Ground; the effect of which is "ſenſible to a great diſtance. If it happens "that theſe Fermentations are in places under "the Sea, the Water mixing with theſe Materials, increaſes their Force, and is thereby "thrown back with great violence, ſo as to "ſeem to riſe up into the Clouds, and fall "down again ſometimes in very large drops, "and ſometimes in whole *Spouts*, which are "ſufficient to drown all that is near them. If "the *Fermentation* be not ſo violent, but ſuch "only as raiſes large Vapours or Steams, which "can find their way thro' ſmall occult paſſages of the Earth; theſe near its Surface, by "their continual Expirations, are at firſt the "Cauſe of gentle Winds; and theſe afterwards "by their continual Increaſe, become perhaps "Storms, and Whirl-winds, and Tempeſts, "which many times deſtroy the Fruits, tear up

* *See* Note 50. † *See* Note 51.

VIII. The ſame muſt be ſaid of the *Lakes* and the *Ocean*. For 'tis manifeſt, that Fruits, Vegetables, *&c.* which are the Food of Animals, depend upon Moiſture, and that this is exhaled from the Sea, and watry places, by the Sun; and ſince the Showers and Dews thus elevated, are not more copious than ſuffice for the Vegetation of Plants, 'tis plain that the Seas and Lakes do not exceed what is neceſſary, and could not be diminiſhed without detriment to the whole. Vain therefore is the Complaint of *Lucretius*, who arraigns all theſe as *faulty*. Neither was the Earth too narrow, nor needed it too much Labour to ſuſtain its Animals: For it was ſufficient for thoſe Animals which God had given it *. But when they multiply above the proportion of their Food, 'tis impoſſible that it ſhould be ſufficient; it would not be enough if it were all converted into Food. For a certain Proportion is to be obſerv'd between the Proviſion and the Eaters, which if the Number of Animals exceed, they muſt at length neceſſarily

The Number of Animals to be nouriſh'd, was to be proportioned to the Food, and not the Food to the Animals.

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" up the Trees, and overthrow the Houſes: " But if they be ſtill more gentle, there being " always ſome ſulphureous Exhalations, eſpe- " cially if the Earth be dry, they then aſcend " along with the lighter Vapours, into the up- " per Region of the Air, where, when a large " Quantity of them is gathered together, they " ferment with the acid Nitre, and taking " Fire, cauſe Thunder and Lightning, and o- " ther Meteors. This, as far as can be gathe- " thered from Experience and Obſervation of " the Works of Nature, is the Origin and " Cauſe of thoſe Imperfections and Evils, " which the preſent Conſtitution of the Air, " and the Laws of Motion obſerved by thoſe " Particles mix'd with it, unavoidably ſubject " it to. They are the natural and genuin ef- " fects of the Regulation it is under, and with- " out altering the primary Laws of it (that is, " making it ſomething elſe than what it is, or " changing it into another Form: the Reſult " of which would be only to render it liable " to Evils of another kind, againſt which the " ſame Objections would equally lie) or in a " ſupernatural manner, hindering it from pro- " ducing ſuch Effects, it is impoſſible to pre- " vent them. And if we add to this, that theſe " Evils are the feweſt that in the Nature of " things could be, without hindering a much " greater Good: that they are in the moſt con- " venient Parts, and the moſt guarded againſt " doing Miſchief that could be; and that there " are alſo good Uſes to be made of them; we " ſhall have no Reaſon to complain of, or find " fault with them. Were the Quantity of Sul- " phur and Nitre much diminiſh'd, there would " not be ſufficient to fill the Region of Air " for the purpoſes of Vegetation and Life; " but the Ground would grow barren, and the " Animals would waſte and die: And if there " were a much greater Quantity, the contrary " Effect would happen, the Earth would be " too fat, the Plants would grow too groſs, " and the Animals would be ſuffocated and " choaked. The Temperature is therefore as " exact as it could be, all Circumſtances con- " ſider'd; and the ſmall Inconveniencies are " nothing, compared with the general Good." See alſo the Word *Earth-quake* in *Chambers's Cyclopedia.*

* *See* Derham's *Phyſ. Theol.* B. 4. C. 11.

ceſſarily periſh with Hunger. Want of Proviſion then ought not to be made an Objection: for if the Number of Creatures to be provided for be enlarged above this Proportion, the greateſt Plenty would not ſuffice; if this Proportion betwixt the Food and Animals be kept up, the leaſt would be ſufficient. 'Tis our own fault therefore, not God's, if Proviſions fail; for the Number of Men may be confined within the bounds preſcribed by Nature, as might eaſily be ſhewn, if it were worth our while.

The hundredth part of Mankind which might live upon the Earth, does not yet inhabit it:

IX. But there's no need of Artifice on this Occaſion; for by our fault things are come to this Paſs, that even the hundredth part of thoſe Eatables which might be had, don't meet with any to conſume them. The Divine Beneficence has therefore dealt bountifully with Mankind in reſpect of Proviſions.

Vain therefore is the Complaint about Seas and Deſarts.

'Tis abſurd for any one to deſire a different place or Station from that which is allotted him; ſince he was made to fill that place, and would otherwiſe have had none at all.

X. 'Tis to be obſerv'd in the laſt place, that Animals are of ſuch a Nature as to delight in Action, or the Exerciſe of their Faculties, nor can we have any other Notion of Happineſs even in God himſelf *. Since then the Faculties of both Body and Mind are to be exercis'd in order to produce Pleaſure, where's the wonder if God deſtin'd that Exerciſe in part for procuring of Food, and connected this Pleaſure with it, (51.). The infinite Power of God was able to produce Animals of ſuch

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(51.) Beſide the Neceſſity there is for labour, in order to reſtrain Man in his preſent State from an Exceſs of Folly and Wickedneſs, (which our Author conſiders in the two laſt Paragraphs of this Chapter) the uſe and advantage of it appears alſo from the manifeſt tendency it has to preſerve and improve the Faculties of both Body and Mind. If uſed in a moderate Degree, it preſerves our Health, Vigour, and Activity; gives us a quick Senſe and Reliſh of Pleaſure, and prevents a great many Miſeries which attend Idleneſs. This is well deſcribed by the *Guardian* N°. 131. and the *Spectator*, N°. 115. "I conſider the Body as a Syſtem "of Tubes and Glands, or, to uſe a more ru- "ſtic Phraſe, a bundle of Pipes and Strainers, "fitted to one another after ſo wonderful a "manner, as to make a proper Engine for the "Soul to work with. This Deſcription does "not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones, "Tendons, Veins, Nerves, and Arteries, but "every Muſcle, and every Ligature, which is "a Compoſition of Fibres, that are ſo many "imperceptible Tubes or Pipes interwoven on "all ſides with inviſible Glands or Strainers. "This general Idea of a human Body, with- "out conſidering it in the Niceties of Anato- "my, lets us ſee how abſolutely neceſſary *La- "bour* is for the right Preſervation of it. There "muſt be frequent Motions and Agitations, to mix,

* *See* Ch. 1. §. 3. par. 9. *and* Ch. 5. §. 1. Sub. 4.

ſuch Capacities; and ſince the Creation of them was no Inconvenience to other Beings who might exerciſe themſelves in a more noble Manner, may not the infinite Goodneſs of God be conceiv'd to have almoſt compelled him not to refuſe or envy theſe the Benefit of Life? Some of this kind were to be created, ſince there was Room left for them in the Work of God, after ſo many others were made as was convenient. But you may wiſh that ſome other Place and Condition had fallen to your Lot; perhaps ſo: but if you had taken up another's Place, that other, or ſome elſe, muſt have been put into yours, who, being alike ungrateful to the Divine Providence, would wiſh for the Place which you now have occupied. Know then that it was neceſſary that you ſhould either be what you are, or not at all. For ſince every other Place and State which the Syſtem or Nature of Things allow'd, was occupied by ſome others, you muſt of neceſſity either fill that which you now are in, or be baniſh'd out of Nature. For, do you expect that any other ſhould be turn'd out of his Order, and you placed in his Room? that is, that God ſhould exhibit a peculiar and extraordinary Munificence toward you to the prejudice of others. You ought therefore not to cenſure, but adore the Divine Goodneſs for making you what you are. You could neither have been made otherwiſe, nor in a better Manner, but to the Diſadvantage of ſome others, or of the whole.

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" mix, digeſt, and ſeparate the Juices contain'd " in it, as well as to clear and cleanſe the Infi- " nitude of Pipes and Strainers, of which it is " compoſed; and to give their ſolid Parts a " more firm and laſting Tone. Labour or Ex- " erciſe ferments the Humours, caſts them in- " to their proper Channels, throws off Redun- " dancies, and helps Nature in thoſe ſecret Di- " ſtributions, without which the Body cannot " ſubſiſt in its Vigour, nor the Soul act with " Chearfulneſs. I might here mention the " Effects which this has upon all the Faculties " of the Mind, by keeping the Underſtanding " clear, the Imagination untroubled, and refi- " ning thoſe Spirits that are neceſſary for the " proper Exertion of our Intellectual Facul- " ties, during the preſent Laws of Union be- " tween Soul and Body. It is to a Neglect " in this particular that we muſt aſcribe, the " Spleen which is ſo frequent in Men of ſtu- " dious and ſedentary Tempers, as well as the " Vapours to which thoſe of the other Sex are " ſo often ſubject."

He proceeds to illuſtrate both the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, from his having fitted and obliged us to this Labour and Exerciſe, which is ſo neceſſary to our well-being: which Obſervation will help us to account for the ſecond and third Evil ariſing from the *Fall*, mentioned in §. 9. par. 5. The Fitneſs of a State of Labour for fallen Man, is ſhewn at large by *Sherlock* on *Judgment*, C. 1. §. 8. p. 179. and Mr. *D'Oyly* in his *firſt Diſſertation*, C. 9. p. 98, *&c.* 2d Edition.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Concerning Propagation *of the Species*, Child-hood, *and* Old-Age.

Animals may be repair'd three ways; 1ſt. If Death were prevented by Omnipotence: 2dly, by Creation: 3dly, by Propagation.

I. FRom what has been ſaid it appears, that Animals which have ſolid Bodies are naturally mortal; tho' the Earth therefore were at firſt fully ſtock'd with them, yet their Number being continually diminiſh'd by Death, it would at length be quite deſtitute of Inhabitants. There might, it ſeems, have been a threefold Remedy for this Evil: Firſt, if God by his Omnipotence ſhould prevent the Natural Effects of the mutual Percuſſion of ſolid Bodies, *viz.* the Corruption and Diſſolution of themſelves, and the Change or Effuſion of their Fluids. For from theſe the Deſtruction of Animals neceſſarily ariſes, as theſe do from the Compoſition of Bodies, and their acting on each other. Secondly, by leaving Nature to itſelf, and letting it act by Univerſal Mechanic Laws; and when theſe brought on a diſſolution of Animal Bodies, that others be ſubſtituted in their Room by Creation. Thirdly, by ordering that an Animal ſhould generate its like, and provide another to ſupply its Place when it declined.

This third Method is the beſt, becauſe it can be effected without doing violence to the Laws of Nature.

II. Who does not ſee that this laſt is the beſt Method of preſerving a conſtant Number of Inhabitants upon the Earth? For 'tis the ſame thing, *cæteris paribus*, with regard to the Syſtem, whether the Earth have theſe Inhabitants which it has at preſent, or others equal in Number and Perfection: but it is not the ſame thing whether the Laws of Nature be obſerv'd or violated *. In the former Methods God muſt have interfered every Moment by his abſolute Power, he muſt have done

* *See* Note 37.

done infinite violence to the Laws of Nature, and confounded all the Conſtitutions and Orders of things, and that without any Benefit; nay with extraordinary detriment to the whole in the main. For ſince the univerſal Laws of Motion are the beſt that could poſſibly be eſtabliſh'd, they would ſeldom be revers'd without damage to the whole *. Neither does it become the Wiſdom of God to have left his Work ſo imperfect as to want continual mending even in the ſmalleſt Particulars. 'Twas better therefore for it to be made in ſuch a manner as we ſee it is, *viz.* that a new Offspring ſhould be propagated out of the Animals themſelves, and by themſelves.

III. And herein we may admire the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs which hath ſo prudently and effectually contrived this End. For it has implanted in all Creatures (as we ſee) a ſtrong and almoſt irreſiſtible appetite of propagating their kind, and has render'd this act of propagation ſo uſeful and agreeable to them who perform it, that Poſterity becomes dearer to many than Life itſelf, and if it were left to their Choice, they would rather die than loſe their Offspring and the Rewards of Love: nay there is ſcarce one that would not protect its Young at the hazard of its own Life. God has therefore, by one ſingle Law, and a ſort of Mechaniſm, repleniſh'd the Earth with living Creatures, and provided that a ſufficient Number ſhould never be wanting, without the Intervention of a Power, which would be irregular, and an Imputation on the Skill and Wiſdom of the Architect. Who would not prefer ſuch a piece of Mechaniſm, where one Machine generates another, and continually produces a new one in its turn, without any new and extraordinary Intervention of the Artificer, before one which would immediately and every Day require his aſſiſtance and amendment?

The Divine Goodneſs and Wiſdom admirable in the contrivance of it.

IV. This Method, you'll ſay, is fit enough for the Brutes, many of which muſt neceſſarily die, not only by the Law of their Nature, but alſo for the ſake of others, for whoſe uſe they were created to ſerve as Food. But Man is hardly dealt withal, who from his very Infancy is troubled with Fear and Dread more bitter even than Death; and who frequently foretaſtes, and by ruminating, thoroughly digeſts, whatever bitterneſs there is in Death itſelf. Neither does the Hope or Care of Offspring, nor the Enjoyment of theſe Pleaſures, compenſate for ſo many

Why Men are tormented with the continual dread of Death, while Brutes are not at all concern'd about it.

* *See* Note 37.

many Miſeries and Evils: The Divine Goodneſs might therefore have either conceal'd from Man his Mortality, or elſe removed that innate Terror ariſing in our Minds from the proſpect of Death, which is always dreadful. (52.)

This is a ſign that the preſent Life is a prelude to a better.

V. 'Tis to be confeſs'd indeed, that theſe are indications that Man has ſome relation to Immortality, and that the State in which he is placed at preſent is not entirely natural to him, otherwiſe he would not be ſo uneaſy in it, nor aſpire ſo eagerly after another. The preſent Life of Men is therefore either aſſign'd them for a time, by way of Puniſhment, as ſome think, or by way of *Prelude* to, or *Preparation* for a better, as our Religion teaches, and our very Nature perſuades us to hope and expect. This is preſumed, you'll ſay, and not proved. Be it ſo. But if by the Suppoſition of a future State this Difficulty may be ſolv'd, and Providence vindicated, when it is arraign'd as dealing hardly with Mankind, who is ſo fooliſh as to be willing to call in queſtion the Power and Goodneſs of God, rather than admit of ſo probable an Hypotheſis? To which we may add, and believed by almoſt all Mankind. But if it were not ſo, God has beſtow'd other Benefits of Life upon us, which, in our own Judgments, are not at all inferior to the preſervation of Life; and this appears from hence, that we often prefer theſe Benefits to Life itſelf, which we ſhould never do, if we did not ſometimes eſteem them dearer to us.

To

NOTES.

(52.) A ſufficient anſwer to this Objection may be found in the laſt Chapter of Dr. *Sherlock*'s admirable Treatiſe on *Death*. I ſhall inſert a little of it. "There are great and wiſe "Reaſons why God ſhould imprint this averſion to Death on human Nature; becauſe it "obliges us to to take care of ourſelves, and "to avoid every thing which will deſtroy or "ſhorten our Lives: this in many Caſes is a "great Principle of Virtue, as it preſerves us "from all fatal and deſtructive Vices; it is a "great inſtrument of Government, and makes "Men afraid of committing ſuch Villanies as "the Laws of their Country have made capital; and therefore, ſince the natural Fear of "Death is of ſuch great advantage to us, we "muſt be contented with it, tho' it makes the "thoughts of Dying a little uneaſy; eſpecially "if we conſider, that when this natural Fear "of Death is not encreas'd by other Cauſes, "it may be conquer'd or allay'd by Reaſon "and wiſe Conſideration." p. 329. 4th Edition.

For a farther Account of both the rational and irrational Fear of Death, what it is, and what it ought to be, the Ends and Effects, and alſo the Remedies of it, ſee *Norris*'s excellent Diſcourſe on *Heb.* 2. 15. *.

* *Practical Diſcourſes*, vol. 4th.

To come to a concluſion: Without an univerſal confuſion of Nature, without violence offer'd to the Laws and Order of it, the ſame Animals could not prolong their Life for any conſiderable time, it remained therefore that ſome ſupply the Place of others ſucceſſively, and that the *Species* be perpetuated, ſince the *Individuals* could not, leſt the whol eAnimal kind ſhould prove a thing of but one Age's Duration.

'Tis expedient for Men to be born weak and helpleſs, hence the foundation of ſocial Life, &c.

VI. From hence it appears, that the Race of Mortals is to be perpetuated by the propagation of their Species; and ſince every Animal is in a perpetual Flux, and may either increaſe or decay, it was proper to proceed from leſs Beginnings to greater; for by this means the new Offſpring would be leſs burthenſome to the Parents, and the *Young* and *Old* agree better together. I confeſs indeed Men are born defenceleſs and unable to protect themſelves, and leſs qualified to provide for themſelves than any other Animals: But God has aſſign'd us Parents, Guardians, and Faithful Guides, ſo that we are never more happy than when under their Protection. Hence *Childhood*, bleſs'd with the ſimple enjoyment of good things, and void of Care, becomes more pleaſant to us than any other Age. Hence alſo comes Reverence and Relief to the Aged, hence proceeds Comfort to the *Mature*, and Support to the *Decrepit*. Nay the Seeds and Principles of Social Life are all laid in this appetite of Generation. To this propenſion we owe almoſt all the benefits of Society. Nothing therefore could be more deſirable to Creatures mortal (as we are by the neceſſary Condition of terreſtrial Matter) and obnoxious to Miſeries, than to be born after ſuch a manner as in the firſt Part of Life, while we are tender, unacquainted with things, and put under the Guardianſhip of others, to enjoy the Sweets without the Care; in the *middle*, to pleaſe ourſelves as much in taking care of others; and in the *decrepit*, feeble Age, to be aſſiſted in our turn by others whom we have educated. This Part of the Divine OEconomy is ſo far therefore from needing an Apology, that it is rather a *Demonſtration* of his Goodneſs. The Race of Men was to be repair'd, ſince Death could not be prevented without a greater Evil; and that Reparation is order'd in ſo wiſe and beneficent a way, that nothing can be more worthy of the Divine Power and Goodneſs, nothing deſerve greater Admiration.

The chief Appetites are thoſe of Self-preſervation, and propagation of the Species.

VII. Now theſe two Appetites, *viz.* of *Self-preſervation*, and the *Propagation* of our Species, are the primary, the original of all others. From theſe ſpring Pleaſure and an agreeable Enjoyment of things; from theſe come almoſt every thing that is advantageous or deſirable in Life. But all theſe are mingled with ſome Evils, which could not be avoided without greater.

SECT. VII.

Of Diſeaſes, Wild-Beaſts, *and* Venomous Creatures.

Bodies are liable to diſſolution, and humours to corruption; hence Pains and Diſeaſes.

I. WE muſt obſerve (as before *) that our Bodies conſiſt of ſolid and fluid Parts, and that theſe ſolid Members may be either cut or broken to Pieces, disjointed, or otherwiſe render'd unfit for Motion: whence *Weakneſs*, *Languiſhing* and *Torments*; that the Fluids alſo are liable, not only to Conſumption, but Corruption too, to Ebullition, by too intenſe Heat, or Stagnation by Cold: whence proceed various Maladies and Diſeaſes.

The ſtrength of poiſons and ſuch Juices as are noxious to Animals, ariſes from the contrariety of things which could not be removed, without taking away Motion.

II. Now there are certain Juices in the Earth which we inhabit, from a mixture of which ariſe Changes and Coagulations. There are other Bodies alſo which fly aſunder with greater violence when mix'd. Thus Milk, by the infuſion of a little Acid, turns to Cheeſe and Whey: thus Spirits of Wine and Gun-powder, when touched by the Fire, run into Flame; and there is nothing to hinder the ſame from coming to paſs in the Blood and Humours of a human Body. Now thoſe

* Sect. 13.

thoſe things which, by being mix'd with them, reſolve, coagulate, or render them unfit for Circulation, we call Poiſonous. And if we conſider thoſe contraries by which we are nouriſh'd, and in the Struggle or Oppoſition of which Nature conſiſts, 'tis ſcarce conceivable how theſe ſhould not often happen. Nor can all contrariety be taken away, except Motion be taken away too, as we have ſhewn; nor could all theſe things that are contrary to our Conſtitution be removed, except ſome Species of Creatures were extinct, or never created; that is, our Security muſt have been purchaſed at too dear a Rate. For if every thing that is in any reſpect repugnant to us were removed, it would coſt either the whole Syſtem, or ourſelves, more Evil than we receive from it at preſent, as will ſufficiently appear to any one that enumerates the Particulars.

III. 'Tis to be obſerv'd, that the Parts of this mundane Syſtem which are contiguous to us, *viz.* the Air, Waters, and the Earth itſelf, are liable to Changes; nor could it poſſibly be otherwiſe, if the whole Machine, of which theſe are but ſmall Parts, be thoro'ly conſider'd: nor could theſe Changes, eſpecially the ſudden ones, always agree with the Temperature of the Humours of human Body. For they enter into the very conſtitution of the Body, and infect its Fluids according to the Laws of Nature: whence it is that the due Craſis of the Blood, and Health of the Body, depend upon the temperature of the Air and Weather. Hence ariſe *peſtilential* and *epidemical* Diſeaſes; nor could they be avoided, unleſs the Animals had been made of a quite different Frame and Conſtitution. Nay, whatever State they had been placed in, they would have been ſubject either to theſe, or others no leſs pernicious. For Marble, and the very hardeſt of Bodies, are diſſolv'd by the viciſſitude of heat and cold, moiſt and dry, and the other Changes which we are inſenſible of; how much more the humours and animal Spirits of Man, on a right temperature of which Life depends. God might indeed, by a favour peculiar to us, have expell'd all the contagions ariſing from theſe alterations, or provided that they ſhould not hurt us. But what reaſon have ſuch Sinners as we now are, to expect it. 'Tis more agreeable to the Juſtice of God, to leave the Elements to themſelves; to be carried

Of epidemical Diſeaſe

according to the Laws of Motion, for our Puniſhment, (53.). Neither ought we to wonder that God denies the Guilty a Favour, which even the Innocent have no Right to: nay, we ought to think that he has inflicted a very light Penalty on rebellious Man: for ſince the Natural Evils we are forc'd to ſtruggle with, are for the moſt part of ſuch a nature as could not be warded off, but by the particular extraordinary favour of the Deity, God ſhould ſeem rather to have reſumed a free Gift, than inflicted a Puniſhment, when he is pleas'd to permit them.

Rocks and Deſarts are given not to Man but other Animals for their Habitation.

IV. If the Earth had been made for the uſe of Man alone, we might have expected that there ſhould be nothing in it that was prejudicial or uſeleſs to him; but ſince it was made, as we have obſerved *, for the Benefit of the Univerſe, Man is placed therein, not becauſe it was created for him only, but becauſe it could afford him a convenient Habitation; for God muſt be ſuppoſed in this caſe not to have adapted the Place to the Inhabitants, but the Inhabitants to the Place. If therefore Man can dwell commodiouſly enough in theſe Regions of the Earth which are fit for his Purpoſe, he muſt allow God in his Goodneſs to give the Earth as many other Inhabitants as it can ſuſtain conſiſtently with the Good of Men. Neither is he to repine, that the Rocks and Deſarts, which are of no uſe to Men, ſupply the *Serpents* and *Wild-Beaſts* with Coverts. But theſe, you'll ſay, ſometimes invade the Countries which are moſt delightful, and beſt ſtored with conveniencies for human Life, deſtroy the fruits and cultivated

NOTES.

(53.) Our Author's Argument here ſeems to be framed rather in compliance with the common forms of ſpeaking, than in ſtrict conformity to his own Scheme of the τὸ βέλτιον, or abſolute *Meliority* in things: which Syſtem maintains that God is ſtill infinitely beneficent, or as kind as poſſible to all, or diſpenſes every thing for the very beſt in the main. Tho' what is here introduced by way of Puniſhment, may, if rightly underſtood, be defended as an inſtance of the greateſt poſſible Kindneſs; ſince the only end of all the Divine Judgments is either the Correction and Amendment of the Offenders themſelves, or admonition to others, or both: and conſequently is a means of the greateſt Good to Mankind in general, and the very beſt diſpenſation towards them in this degenerate corrupt Eſtate, and the moſt proper method of fitting them for, or directing and drawing them to a better. And if all this can be effected by the ſame general Laws of Nature, which alſo bring Plenty, Health and Happineſs to the World, here is a double demonſtration of the abſolute Wiſdom and Goodneſs of its Author.

* Chap. 3. Note 33.

vated Fields, and kill the Men themſelves by *Bites* and *Poiſons*. I grant it; but it may be queſtion'd whether it has been always ſo.

V. For in the firſt Place, this Evil might have had its Origin from Man himſelf; *viz.* Rage might be given to the Lion, and Venom to the Serpent, for the Puniſhment of Mankind, and this antient Hiſtories both ſacred and prophane declare. But ſince this Queſtion was firſt agitated by ſuch as either denied reveal'd Religion, or at leaſt were ignorant of it, I would not call that in to our aſſiſtance, nor make any other uſe of it than as a bare Hypotheſis.

Antient Hiſtories declare, that Wild-Beaſts and venomous Creatures were made for the puniſhment of Mankind.

VI. We may affirm then in the ſecond Place, that theſe things happen thro' the fault of Men, who, by Wars and Diſcord, make fruitful and rich Countries void of Inhabitants to till them, and leave them to the poſſeſſion of Wild-Beaſts and venomous Inſects: Since therefore they neither cultivate them themſelves, nor allow other Perſons to do it, what wonder is it, if God, for the reproach of Men, give them up to be inhabited by Brutes, Wild-Beaſts and Inſects? Thoſe Parts which we have deſerted belong by right to them, nor do they otherwiſe multiply more than is proper.

'Tis the fault of Mankind that theſe multiply: Countries laid waſte by War, *&c.* to the diſgrace of Man, of right belong to them.

VII. Thirdly: 'Tis no more repugnant to the Divine Goodneſs to have made an Animal, by the bite of which a Man might be deſtroy'd, than a Precipice. There's nothing in the whole Earth but what may hurt or kill a Man, if it be not uſed with caution: Meat, Drink, Water, Fire. Muſt theſe then not be created becauſe they may hurt a Man? Nor is it more difficult to be aware of Poiſons and Wild-Beaſts than of theſe: Nay, ſcarce one is killed by Poiſon, or torn by Wild-Beaſts, of a thouſand that die by the Sword; and yet we don't at all blame the Divine Goodneſs for this. It may be ſaid, that Iron, Earth, Water, Meats and Drinks, are neceſſary, and on that account the Evils attending them may be tolerated. And who will undertake to aſſure us that venomous Animals and Wild-Beaſts are not neceſſary *? Muſt we reckon them entirely uſeleſs becauſe we do not know the uſe of them? Muſt we ſay that every Wheel in a Clock is made for no manner of Purpoſe, which a Ruſtic underſtands not the deſign of? But ſuppoſe we grant that theſe are of no Service to us, yet do they not pleaſe and enjoy themſelves †?

We may more eaſily avoid Wild-Beaſts and venomous Creatures, than other Inconveniences of Life, about which we never quarrel with Providence.

VIII. You

* *See* Note 54. † *See* Note 33.

All Animals are under the divine Care: to think otherwiſe ſavours of Pride.

VIII. You may urge that theſe are not worth the Notice of the Divine Providence. Thus indeed proud Mortals, admirers of themſelves alone, deſpiſe the Works of God: But 'tis not ſo with the Divine Goodneſs, which choſe that ſome Inconvenience ſhould befal Mankind, rather than a whole Species be wanting to Nature.

Wild-Beaſts and venomous Creatures are of uſe to Men.

IX. If you inſiſt that a Lion might have been made without Teeth or Claws, a Viper without Venom: I grant it, as a Knife without an Edge; but then they would have been of quite another Species, and have had neither the nature, nor uſe, nor genius, which they now enjoy. In ſhort, I ſay, once for all, they are not in vain. The very Serpents, tho' a Race hateful to us, have their uſes; among the reſt, they gather the Poiſon out of the Earth, (54.). Nor is the Country leſs habitable where they are than where they are not. Now, *cæteris paribus*, Animals ought to multiply; for Life is a Perfection, and ſince it is as noble a one as Matter will admit of, 'tis preferable to none at all. 'Tis therefore the Work and Gift of God, wherever he has beſtow'd it, and does not ſtand in need of an *Evil Principle* for its Author.

NOTES.

(54.) For an account of the various ends and uſes of theſe noxious Animals, poiſonous Plants, Minerals, *&c.* ſee *Derham*'s Anſwer to the above mention'd Objection, in his *Phyſ. Theol.* B. 2. Ch. 6. with the References, and *Ray* on the *Creation*, Part 2. p. 432, *&c.* 4th Edition, or *Chambers*'s *Cyclopædia*, under the Word *Poiſon*.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man.

I. SInce Man (nay every created Being) is neceſſarily of a limited Nature *, 'tis plain that he cannot know every thing. The moſt perfect Creatures therefore are ignorant of many things: Nor can they attain to any other Knowledge than what is agreeable to their Nature and Condition: innumerable Truths therefore lie hid from every created Underſtanding. For perfect and infinite Knowledge belongs to God alone; and it muſt be determin'd by his Pleaſure, what degree every one is to be endow'd with: for he only knows the nature and neceſſity of each, and has given what is agreeable thereto. *Ignorance* is therefore an *Evil* of *Defect*, and no more to be avoided than the other kind of *Imperfection*; for an imperfect Nature (as that of all Creatures is) underſtands alſo imperfectly.

Human Underſtanding is neceſſarily ignorant of many things.

II. As to human Knowledge, 'tis confeſs'd that we acquire it by the Senſes, and that certain Characters denote, not ſo much the *Natures*, as the *Uſes* and *Differences* of things †. Now, ſince things very different internally, have ſometimes the ſame external Marks, we muſt of neceſſity be often doubtful, and ſometimes deceiv'd by the Similitude of the Marks.

We are ſometimes forced to make uſe of conjectures, therefore we may not only be ignorant, but alſo miſtake.

Neither is it ſufficient to the avoiding of Error, that we ſuſpend our aſſent in doubtful Caſes, for 'tis often neceſſary for us (eſpecially if we have to do with other Perſons) to act upon conjecture, and reſolve upon action, before we have thoro'ly diſcuſs'd the Point, or diſcover'd the Truth: on which account it is impoſſible that we ſhould totally

* *See* Note 28.

† *For a right Underſtanding of this Section, review our Author's* Note A.

totally avoid Errors. God muſt therefore either have made no ſuch Animal as Man is, or one that is liable to Errors. As Contrariety reſults from Motion, which is as it were the action of Matter, ſo a poſſibility of Error is conſequent upon the Action of a finite Underſtanding.

God could not guard us always from Errors without violence done to Nature.

III. If any one reply, that God can immediately reveal the Truth to us in ſuch Caſes: I anſwer, he may ſo, nor can it be denied that he has done, and will do it ſometimes: but that this ſhould be done always, would be a violence repugnant to the Nature and Condition of Man, and could not poſſibly be done without more and greater Evils ariſing from an interruption of the courſe of Nature. Now we muſt diſtinguiſh between thoſe Errors which we fall into after our utmoſt diligence and application, and ſuch as we are led into by careleſneſs, negligence, and a depraved Will. Errors of the former kind are to be reckon'd among Natural Evils, and not imputable to us: for they ariſe from the very State and Condition of the Mind of Man, and are not to be avoided, unleſs God would change the Species of Beings, and order that different things ſhould not affect the Senſes in the ſame manner, that is, that there ſhould be no more Species nor Individuals, than there are Senſations in us: for if the Number of theſe exceed the Deſcrimination or Combination of our Senſations, variety of them muſt neceſſarily produce either the very ſame Senſations in us, or none at all, and a great many anſwer to the ſame Senſation, ſo that we muſt certainly be ſometimes impoſed upon by the ſimilitude of things. Either then the Diſtinctions of our Senſations muſt be multiplied *in infinitum*, or the infinite variety of ſenſible Objects taken away. But 'tis evident that neither could have been done in this preſent State. We muſt therefore bear the Inconvenience, not only of being ignorant of innumerable things, but alſo of erring in many Caſes.

Man is not therefore miſerable becauſe expoſed to Errors.

IV. To this it may be replied, that Error is a Defect in that part of Man, in the perfection of which his Happineſs chiefly conſiſts; if therefore he may naturally fall into Errors, it follows, that Man may be naturally miſerable without his fault. But I anſwer: Any particular Evil does not bring Miſery upon us, otherwiſe every Creature would be miſerable, as of neceſſity labouring under the Evils of *Imperfection*. He only therefore is to be denominated *miſerable*,

rable, who is oppreſſed with more and greater Evils than his Good can requite with Happineſs. So that upon ballancing the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies of Life, it were better for him not to be than to be.

V. 'Tis to be obſerv'd alſo, that God has in his Wiſdom and Goodneſs ſo temper'd our preſent State, that we very ſeldom, if ever, fall into grievous and pernicious Errors without our own fault. But if this ever come to paſs, as ſoon as the Evil preponderates, Life is taken away together with the benefits of Nature. Now 'tis to be eſteem'd an Happineſs, and an Argument of the Divine Goodneſs, that the Natural Benefits of Life cannot be taken from us, but Life is taken alſo. Life then can be a burden to none; nor is it neceſſary that any one ſhould withdraw himſelf from natural Evils, by voluntarily putting an end to his Life. For if theſe Evils be ſuch as take away the Benefits of Life, they alſo bring it to an end. God produced all things out of nothing, and gave us Being without our Advice, he ſeems therefore obliged in Juſtice not to ſuffer us to be reduced to a State that is worſe than Non-entity. (55.) When therefore any State is overwhelmed with Evils which outweigh the Good, 'tis reaſonable that God ſhould remit us to our former State, that is, let us return to nothing. Neither ought we to accuſe the Divine Power and Goodneſs which has beſtow'd as many Bleſſings and Benefits upon us, as either the whole Univerſe or our own Nature would admit of; and ſince it was impoſſible but that ſome time or other, upon the increaſe of Evils, his Gift (*viz.* Life) muſt become burdenſome, when this happens he breaks off its thread.

Thoſe Errors which we fall into without our fault are ſeldom pernicious.

VI. But

NOTES.

(55.) It would be ſo indeed if this were our only State: but as it is at preſent, I fear many have nothing but the hopes and expectations of another to ſupport them under almoſt complete Miſery; to comfort and encourage them to undergo Evils infinitely greater than all the benefits of Life: Evils, which make Life itſelf an Evil, and (as our Author ſays) put them into a State worſe than nothing. Witneſs the long and acute Torments of numerous Martyrs, the Pains of Confeſſors, the Labours of common Galley-Slaves, *&c.* But the leaſt hint of this is ſufficient, and the common anſwers to it very ſatisfactory: as will perhaps appear from the References to the laſt Chapter of the Appendix to this Book, where this Queſtion comes more properly under conſideration.

Our Knowledge is adapted to our State.

VI. But Man, you'll ſay, is ignorant of thoſe things which it was his greateſt Intereſt to know, namely, of Truths that are neceſſary to the attainment of Felicity. It was convenient for our preſent State to underſtand theſe; and who will affirm that God has not beſtow'd upon us all the Knowledge which is agreeable to our State? We ought therefore never to be deceiv'd about ſuch Truths as theſe, while we apply all proper diligence to the Search. I anſwer; If this be underſtood of the Happineſs due to us in this Life, 'tis very true; nor is our Underſtanding ever ſo far miſtaken, as not to inform us of the Truths neceſſary to this kind of Happineſs, if proper care be not wanting. But, ſuch Happineſs ought to ſuffice us, as may ſerve to make Life a Bleſſing, and better than the abſence of it. A greater indeed was promiſed to the firſt Man by a *gratuitous Covenant*, (56.) but

NOTES.

(56.) Tho' the firſt Man might have been created more perfect in all his Faculties than any of his Poſterity (which, as ſome think, cannot be eaſily proved from the account we have of him in *Geneſis* *) Tho' this knowledge might have been at firſt much clearer, as coming entire and adult from the immediate hand of his Creator; yet it ſeems highly probable, that this could not have been propagated in a natural way, that is, by any general pre-eſtabliſh'd Laws, as our preſent Faculties are, but Mankind, as a ſucceſſive Body, muſt neceſſarily have been left to the known Rules of Propagation, and the preſent Meth d of improving their Intellects, and deriving all their Notices from the common Sources of Senſation and Reflection. And ſo our bountiful Creator may be ſuppoſed to have deprived Mankind of no Bleſſings he could, conſiſtent with his other Attributes, and the order of the Creation, poſſibly have beſtow'd. Nay, why may not he be thought to have converted even this neceſſary, unavoidable Imperfection in us, compared with the firſt *Adam*, into a greater Perfection ariſing both from our notions of his Fall, and the conſequences of it, and of the wonderful Remedy prepared for it, and promiſed in the ſecond *Adam*? We ſeem to be made more highly ſenſible of the infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, and more thankful for our Condition, from our knowledge of his juſt permiſſion of ſo deſerv'd a Fall; and his gracious undeſerv'd *Exaltation* of us again to a ſuperior State, than if we had conceiv'd the Miſery attending human Nature to be (as perhaps moſt of it was) a neceſſary conſequence of our being created in this inferior Claſs. But whether this Notion be allow'd or not, the Scheme of Providence relating to *Paradiſe*, &c. as deliver'd in Holy Scripture, if taken altogether, can be no juſt Objection againſt the moral Attributes of God. He created Man entirely innocent, and abſolutely free, which Freedom was abſolutely neceſſary to his Happineſs (as will appear under the head of Moral Evil.) He gave him the Means and Abilities to complete his Happineſs, and placed him in a World every way ſuited to his Condition. This Liberty made it poſſible for him to loſe that Innocence, tho' he had but one ſingle opportunity of doing it †, and

* *See* Bayle *under the Word* Adam, *Remark* D. *And* Curcellæi *Inſtit. Rel. Chriſt.* l. 3. C. 8. p. 108, *&c.* And *Diſſert. de Pecc. Orig.* §. 11. *or* Epiſcopius *Inſt. Theol.* l. 4. C. 6, 7. p. 358, 359.

† *See* Nichols's *Conference with a Theiſt*, p. 220, 221. 1ſt Edition.

but when that was once broken by Sin, he and his Poſterity were remanded to thoſe imperfect Notices which could be had from an imperfect Underſtanding, and the Information of the Senſes; which yet are not in the leaſt to be deſpiſed, neither had Man a Right, nor could

NOTES.

and it was highly reaſonable and neceſſary that he ſhould have that ‖. This one Opportunity he embraced, (which it does not ſeem poſſible for God himſelf, tho' he foreſaw it, to have prevented, conſiſtently with that Freedom he had for good reaſons given him, and determin'd thus to exerciſe) and ſo alter'd his Nature and Circumſtances, and conſequently made it neceſſary for God alſo to change his Place and Condition, and to withdraw ſuch extraordinary favours as his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs might otherwiſe have thought proper to beſtow. Thus, with his Innocence, Man loſt all Title to a Continuance in Paradiſe, and of conſequence became naturally liable to the common Evils and Calamities of a tranſitory Life, and the Pains attending its Concluſion. Thoſe that deſcended from him, and partook of the ſame Nature, muſt neceſſarily partake of the ſame Infirmities; in particular, they muſt inherit *Corruption* and *Mortality*. Which Evils, tho we now lament them as the chief Parts of our Fore-fathers Puniſhment, yet could not in the preſent Circumſtances of things be prevented; nor indeed, were ſuch a Prevention poſſible, would it be in the main deſirable; as will appear immediately: nay theſe, by a moſt wonderful Scheme of Providence, are infinitely outweigh'd, and made the means of bringing us to much greater Happineſs, by Faith in him who was promiſed from the Beginning, and hath in theſe latter Days brought *Life* and *Incorruptibility* to Light. "Since the Fall of Man (ſays the incomparable *Sherlock* on *Death*; "p. 101.) Mortality and Death is neceſſary to "the good Government of the World: no-"thing elſe can give a check to ſome Men's "Wickedneſs, but either the Fear of Death or "the Execution of it: ſome Men are ſo out-"ragiouſly wicked, that nothing can put a "ſtop to them, and prevent the Miſchief they "do in the World, but to cut them off: this "is the Reaſon of Capital Puniſhments among "Men, to remove thoſe out of the World "who will be a Plague to Mankind while "they live in it. For this reaſon God de-"ſtroy'd the whole Race of Mankind by a De-"luge of Water, excepting *Noah* and his Fa-"mily, becauſe they were incurably wicked: "For this reaſon he ſends Plagues and Fa-"mines, and Sword, to correct the exorbi-"tant Growth of Wickedneſs, to leſſen the "number of Sinners, and to lay Reſtraints on "them. And if the World be ſuch a Bedlam "as it is under all theſe Reſtraints, what would "it be were it filled with immortal Sinners!

And again, p. 105. "When Man had ſin-"ned, it was neceſſary that he ſhould die, be-"cauſe he could never be completely and per-"fectly happy in this World, as you have al-"ready heard: and the only poſſible way to "make him happy, was, to tranſlate him into "another World, and to beſtow a better Im-"mortality on him: This God has done, and "that in a very ſtupendous way, by giving his "own Son to die for us; and now we have "little reaſon to complain that we all die in "*Adam*, ſince we are made alive in Chriſt, "*&c.*"

A great many more Arguments on this Subject may be ſeen in the ſame Book, Chap. 3. § 2. All which muſt be obſerv'd to relate chiefly to the Government of Man *after* his Fall: the Fall itſelf will be accounted for in the next Chapter. See Note 106.

‖ *See Dr.* J. Clarke *on Moral Evil.* p. 211. &c. *and* Limborch *Theol. Chriſt.* L. 3. C. 2. § 2. *and* Jenkin's *Reaſon. of the Chriſt. Relig.* vol. 2. C. 13. p. 253, 254. 5th Edition.

he naturally attain to greater Perfection. For when the Faculties of our Souls were injured, and the health and vigour of our Bodies impair'd by our own Vices, as well as thoſe of our Parents; our natural Perfections muſt neceſſarily be impaired alſo. For ſince our Knowledge is to be acquired by Care, Induſtry and Inſtruction, if Mankind had continued innocent, and with diligent care communicated true Notions of things to their Poſterity; and had not infected their Offſpring by Example, Inſtruction, or any Contagion attending Propagation, we ſhould have been leſs liable to Errors; nay free from pernicious ones; and have enjoy'd a more perfect Knowledge of things. For our native intellectual Faculty would have been ſtronger, and being better furniſh'd both with the Means and Principles of Science than we now are, we ſhould more eaſily have prevented the Occaſions of Error. All pernicious Errors therefore, at leaſt in Matters of Neceſſity, are to be imputed to our own Guilt, or that of our Parents *.

We prefer Life, with all its inconveniencies, before Death.

VII. If any be ſo ungrateful as to murmur ſtill, and affirm, that he would not accept of Life on theſe Conditions, if he might but have his Choice; and that himſelf is the beſt Judge of his own Intereſt, and he no Benefactor that obtrudes a Gift upon a Man againſt his Will: that conſequently he owes no thanks to God on accountof Life which Life he would refuſe: We muſt reply; that thus indeed impious Men and Fools are uſed to prate, but this does not come from their Hearts and Conſciences. For none are more afraid of Death, none more tenacious of Life, than they that talk thus idly. A great many of them profeſs that they don't believe a future Life, and if ſo, they may reduce themſelves to the wiſh'd-for ſtate of Annihilation as ſoon as they pleaſe, and caſt off that *Exiſtence* which is ſo diſagreeable. No Perſon therefore, except he be corrupted in his Judgment, and indulges himſelf in Error, can ſeriouſly prefer Non-exiſtence to the preſent Life. (57.)

VIII. But

NOTES.

(57.) " Self-murder is ſo unnatural a Sin, " that 'tis now-a-days thought reaſon enough " to prove any Man diſtracted. We have too " many ſad Examples what a diſturbed Imagi- " nation will do, if that muſt paſs for natural " Diſtraction; but we ſeldom or never hear, " that

* *For what relates to the Doctrine of* Original Sin, *&c. ſee the latter end of the next Section, and* Note 58.

VIII. But if any one think ſo from his Heart, he is not fallen into this Opinion from any natural Evil, but from others which he brought upon himſelf by *wrong Elections.* We ſee many Perſons weary of Life, but 'tis becauſe of their bad Management, leſt they ſhould be ridiculous for miſſing of Honour, of Riches, or ſome empty End which they have unreaſonably propoſed to themſelves. But very few have been excited to Self-murder by any natural and abſolutely unavoidable Evil or Error. Life therefore, of what kind ſoever it is, muſt be look'd upon as a benefit in the judgment of Mankind, and we ought to pay our grateful acknowledgments to God, as the powerful and beneficent Author of it. Nor will it be any prejudice to the Divine Goodneſs, if one or two throw Life away in deſpair. For it is to be ſuppoſed, that this proceeds not from the greatneſs of any natural Evil, but from Impatience, from ſome depraved Election; of which more hereafter. For none of the Brutes which are deſtitute of Free-will, ever quitted its Life ſpontaneouſly, thro' the uneaſineſs of Grief, or a Diſtemper. If any Man therefore has killed himſelf voluntarily, we muſt conclude that he did this, as all other wicked Actions, by a depraved Choice.

Some put themſelves to Death, not on account of natural, but voluntary Evils.

IX. As to the ſecond ſort of Errors, into which we are led, not by nature, but careleſneſs, negligence, curioſity, or a depraved will, the number of theſe is greater, and their effects more pernicious: nay 'tis theſe only which load and infeſt Life with intolerable Evils, ſo as to make us with that we had never been. But ſince they come upon us thro' our own fault, they are not to be reckon'd among *Natural Evils*, but belong to the third kind, *viz.* the *Moral*, to which we haſten: But we muſt firſt ſum up what has been deliver'd in this Chapter.

Thoſe Errors which we fall into by our own fault, are to be reckoned among Moral Evils.

NOTES.

* that mere external Sufferings, how ſevere ſoever, tempt Men to kill themſelves. The Stoics themſelves, whoſe Principle it was to break their Priſon when they found themſelves uneaſy, very rarely put it into practice: Nature was too ſtrong for their Philoſophy. and tho' their Philoſophy allow'd them to die when they pleas'd, yet Nature taught them to live as long as they could; and we ſee that they ſeldom thought themſelves miſerable enough to die. *Sherlock* on *Providence*, C. 7. p. 249, 250. 2d Edition. See alſo Note 104. and Ch. 2. par. 7.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Containing the Sum of what has been ſaid on Natural Evils.

The whole Univerſe one Syſtem, of which every thing is a part.

I. IN order to give the Reader a better view of what has been ſaid already, we muſt conceive this whole World as one Syſtem, whereof all particular things are the parts and Members, and every one has its place and office, as the Members have in our own Body, or the Rafters in a Houſe, the Doors, Windows, Chambers and Cloſets: Neither is there any thing uſeleſs or ſuperfluous in the whole: and in order to unite all more cloſely together, nothing is ſelf-ſufficient, but as it is qualified to help others, ſo it ſtands in need of the help of others for its more commodious Subſiſtence. And tho' in ſo immenſe a Machine we do not clearly perceive the connection or mutual dependence of the parts in every reſpect, yet we are certain that the thing is ſo. In many Caſes 'tis ſo evident, that he will be eſteem'd a Mad-man who denies it. Since therefore the World is to be look'd upon as one Building, we muſt recollect, how many different parts, and how various, ſo grand, ſo magnificent an Edifice ſhould conſiſt of. We may deſign a Houſe, divided into Halls, Parlours and Cloſets; but unleſs there be a Kitchen too, and places ſet apart for more ignoble, more uncomely Offices, 'twill not be fit for Habitation. The ſame may be affirm'd of the World and the frame of it. God could have filled it all with Suns: but who will engage that ſuch a Syſtem would be capable of living Creatures, or proper to preſerve Motion. He could have made the Earth of Gold, or Gems: But in the mean while *deſtitute* of *Inhabitants.* He that has lived a Day or two without

without Food, would prefer a *Dunghill* to ſuch an Earth. God could have created Man *immortal*, without Paſſions, without a Senſe of Pleaſure or Pain; but he muſt have been without a *ſolid Body* alſo, and an inhabitant of ſome other Region, not the Earth. He could have made the whole human *Body* an *Eye*, but then it would have been unfit for Motion, Nutrition, and all the other functions of Life. He could have taken away the contrariety of *Appetites*, but the contrariety of Motions (nay Motion itſelf) muſt have been taken away with it. He could have prevented the fruſtrating of Appetites, but that muſt have been by making them not *oppoſite*; for 'tis impoſſible that contrary Appetites, or ſuch as deſire what is at the ſame time occupied by others, ſhould all at once be ſatisfied. He could, in the laſt place, have framed Man *free from Errors*, but then he muſt not have made uſe of Matter for an Organ of Senſation, which the very Nature of our Soul requires.

If the whole and all its parts be taken together, none could be changed but for the worſe.

II. In ſhort, if the mundane Syſtem be taken together, if all the Parts and Seaſons of it be compared with one another, we muſt believe that it could not poſſibly be better; if any part could be changed for the better, another would be worſe; if one abounded with greater Conveniencies, another would be expoſed to greater Evils; and that neceſſarily from the natural Imperfection of all Creatures. A Creature is deſcended from *God*, a moſt *perfect Father*; but from nothing as its *Mother*, which is Imperfection itſelf. All finite things therefore partake of nothing, and are nothing beyond their Bounds. When therefore we are come to the bounds which nature has ſet, whoever perceives any thing, muſt neceſſarily perceive alſo that he is deficient, and ſeek for ſomething without himſelf to ſupport him. Hence come Evils, hence oppoſition of things, and, as it were, a mutilation in the Work of God. Hence, for the moſt part, Men fear and deſire, grieve and rejoyce. Hence Errors and Darkneſs of the Mind. Hence Troops of Miſeries marching thro' human Life: whether theſe grow for the puniſhment of Mortals, or attend Life by the *neceſſity* of Nature; that is, whether they proceed from the conſtitution of Nature itſelf, or are external and acquired by our Choice. Nor need we the bloody *Battle* of the *Ancients*, nor the *malicious* God of the *Manichees* for Authors of them. Nor is it any Argument againſt the Divine Omnipotence, that he could not free a Creature

'Creature in its own Nature neceſſarily imperfect, from that native Imperfection, and the Evils conſequent upon it. He might, as we have often ſaid, have not created mortal Inhabitants, and ſuch as were liable to Fears and Griefs: nor, as will be declared below, ſuch as by their depraved Elections might deſerve Puniſhments: but with regard to the Syſtem of the whole, 'twas neceſſary that he ſhould create theſe or none at all: either the Earth muſt be repleniſh'd with theſe, or left deſtitute of Inhabitants. Nor could any of the foregoing particulars be omitted, but that very Omiſſion would bring along with it much greater Evils.

Hence the Error of the Epicureans who knew only the leaſt and worſt part of it.

III. From hence ſprang the Error of the *Epicureans*, who pretended that this World was unworthy of a good and powerful God. They, we may believe, knew only the leaſt part, and as it were the Sink of the World *viz.* our *Earth.* They never conſidered the good and beautiful part of Nature, but only contemplated the Griefs, Diſeaſes, Death and Deſtruction of Mortals, when they denied that God was the Author of ſo many Evils: In the interim they forgot that the Earth is in a manner the Filth and Offscouring of the *Mundane Syſtem:* and that the Workmanſhip of God is no more to be condemn'd for it, than a Judgment is to be form'd of the beauty of an Houſe from the Sink or Jakes. They were ignorant alſo that the Earth was made in the manner it now is, not for itſelf alone, but in order to be ſubſervient to the Good of the whole; and that it is filled with ſuch Animals as it is capable of, with a due Subordination to the Good of the Univerſe, and the Felicity of Souls that inhabit the purer and brighter Parts of this Fabric, *viz.* the *Æther* and the *Heavens.* Theſe are as it were the Gardens, Parks, and Palaces of the World; this Earth, the *Dunghill*, or (as ſome will have it) the Work-houſe. Nor is it a greater wonder that God ſhould make theſe, than the *Inteſtines*, and leſs comely, but yet neceſſary Parts of human Body. Laſtly, they are unmindful that more and greater Good is to be found here than Evil, otherwiſe they themſelves would reject Life: and he that has more good than Evil is not miſerable except he will. If therefore we would compare the Good things with the Evil: if we could view the whole Workmanſhip of God: if we thoro'ly underſtand the Connections, Subordinations,

dinations, and mutual Relations of things, the mutual aſſiſtance which they afford each other; and laſtly, the whole ſeries and order of them; it would appear that the World is as well as it could poſſibly be; and that no Evil in it could be avoided, which would not occaſion a greater by its abſence.

IV. We have endeavour'd to clear up theſe Points, and I hope effectually, as to this kind of Evil. For, upon the ſuppoſition of our Principles, which, by the way, are commonly acknowledg'd, ſome natural Evils muſt inevitably be admitted; and if even one could ariſe in the Work of an infinitely wiſe and good God, there's no occaſion for the *Bad Principle* as the Origin of Evil, for Evil might have exiſted notwithſtanding the Divine Omnipotence and Infinite Goodneſs. The difficult Queſtion then, *Whence comes Evil?* is not unanſwerable. For it ariſes from the very nature and conſtitution of created Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction. And tho' we be not able to apply theſe Principles to all particular caſes and circumſtances, yet we are ſure enough that they may be applied. Nor ſhould we be concern'd, that we are at a loſs to account for ſome particulars; for this is common in the Solution of almoſt all natural Phænomena, and yet we acquieſce. For preſuppoſing ſome Principles, ſuch as Matter, Motion, *&c.* tho' we are ignorant what Matter and Motion are in any particular Body, yet, from the variety of theſe, we take it for granted that various Compoſitions and Qualities proceed. In like manner alſo we are perſuaded, that from the various kinds of Imperfection neceſſarily inherent in things, various Species of Evils ariſe, tho' in ſome the manner in which this comes to paſs does not appear, agreeable to what we experience in Light and Colours; we are certain that Colours ariſe from the different diſpoſition, refraction and reflection of Light; but yet none can certainly tell how it is reflected or refracted when it forms a blew, a green, or any other Colour: So that I dare affirm, that the Origin of natural Evil is more eaſily aſſign'd, and more clearly and particularly ſolv'd, than that of Colours, Taſtes, or any ſenſible Quality whatſoever.

Hence a reply to the Difficulty, *Whence comes Evil?* Since it ariſes from the very nature of created Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction.

V. I confeſs, that according to this Hypotheſis, Natural Evils proceed from the original Condition of things, and are not permitted by God,

This reconciled with the *Moſaic* Hiſtory, which does not attribute all kinds of natural Evil to the fall of the firſt Man.

God, but in order to prevent greater, which ſome perhaps may think repugnant to ſacred Hiſtory, and the Doctrine of Moſes. For they will have it, that the abuſe of Free-will was the Cauſe of all natural Evils, and that when God created every thing good and perfect in its kind, it was afterwards corrupted by Sin, and ſubjected to natural Evils: but this is aſſerted without Proof. For the Scripture no where teaches that there would have been no manner of natural Evil, if Man had not ſinned. God indeed made all things good and perfect in their kind, that is, he created and ſtill preſerves every thing in a ſtate and condition ſuitable to the whole Syſtem of Beings, and which it need have no Reaſon to repent of except it will. But neither the Goodneſs of God, nor the Perfection that belongs to the Nature of things, required that all natural Evils ſhould be removed: for ſome created Beings have Evils inherent in their very Natures, which God muſt of neceſſity either tolerate or not create thoſe things in which they do inhere. If therefore the ſacred Hiſtory be carefully examined, it will appear that ſome kinds of Evils are attributed to the Sin of the firſt Man, but others not. Of the former kind are, *firſt*, the *Mortality* of Man, who would otherwiſe have been immortal by *Grace*. *Secondly*, the *Barrenneſs* of the Earth, and growth of *noxious* and *unprofitable Plants* in the Room of ſuch as were fit for *Food*, for the puniſhment of Mankind. *Thirdly*, that hard *Labour* neceſſary for providing Food, which is a conſequence of the former. *Fourthly*, that *impotent Affection* and Neceſſity of Obedience whereby *Women* are made ſubject to *Men*. *Fifthly*, the pains of *Child-birth*. *Sixthly*, the *Enmity* between Man and the Serpentine kind. *Seventhly*, Baniſhment out of Paradiſe, *i. e.* as appears to me, an Expulſion out of the State of Grace, in which the Favour of God had placed Man above what was due to his Nature. Theſe, and ſome others, are expreſly enumerated as puniſhments of the Firſt Fall. (58.) But beſides theſe there

NOTES.

(58.) For an account of the Scripture Hiſtory relating to the Fall of *Adam*, and the conſequences of it, both upon himſelf and his Poſterity, ſee *Ibbot*'s *Boyle*'s *Lect.* Serm. 5. 2d Set. *Rymer*'s *general Repreſentation of reveal'd Religion*, Part 1. C. 4. and Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Moral Evil*, p. 224, *&c.* or *D'Oyly*'s four Diſſertations, C. 1. p. 3. Note b, and C. 9. p 97, *&c.* or Bp. *Taylor*'s *Polemical Diſcourſes*, p. 614, 615, 623. See alſo *Limborch*'s *Theol. Chriſt.* L. 3. C. 3, 4, 5. or *Epiſcopius de Libero Arbitrio*, *&c.* or *Curcellæi Rel. Chriſt. Inſtit.* L. 3. C. 14, 15, 16, and his *Diſſert. de Pecc. Originis.*

there are many conſequent upon the neceſſity of Matter, and concerning which the Scripture has nothing to induce us to believe that they aroſe from Sin.

VI. 'Tis to be obſerv'd farther, that theſe are not permitted by God to no purpoſe, but for the good of the Univerſe, and at the ſame time of Man himſelf. For as to Mortality, it was by no means expedient for the Syſtem, that a ſinful Creature ſhould enjoy Immortality, which was not owing to its nature, but granted by an extraordinary favour of the Deity. Nay, God ſeems to have forbidden our firſt Parents the uſe of the Tree of Life out of mere Compaſſion, leſt if their Life ſhould by virtue of it be prolonged, they ſhould live for ever miſerable. Even this Puniſhment, as all others, contributes to the reſtraint of bad Elections, and the preparation of a new way to Happineſs. For when Man tranſgreſſed, and a perverſe abuſe of his Free-Will was once introduced, there would have been no end of Madneſs if the Divine Goodneſs had continued to preſerve Life, underſtanding an eaſy Food, and the other Gifts of the Primæval State, to the abuſers thereof, as well as to the Innocent. 'Tis notorious how exorbitant bad Elections are even amongſt the Cares and Labours which Mortals undergo in providing the Neceſſaries of Life; and how pernicious ſtrength of Parts becomes, when, upon a corruption of the Will, it degenerates into Cunning: how much more intolerable then would it be if the Fear of Death were away; if the ſame facility of procuring Food, the ſame vigour of Intellect, which our Firſt Parents enjoy'd were continued to their corrupt Poſterity. (59.)

The Evils which do ariſe from thence are permitted for the good of the Univerſe, and alſo of Man himſelf.

VII. Nay, to confeſs the truth, it could not poſſibly continue; for, let there be never ſo great Plenty of Proviſion, it might be all corrupted by the voluntary Act of one Man. When our Firſt Parent had therefore once tranſgreſſed, what hopes could he conceive of his Poſterity? Or, by what Right could they claim theſe ſupernatural Gifts of God? certainly by none. All then are made mortal, not only thro' the *Juſtice*, but the *Goodneſs* of God. For, while Men are obligʼd

Mortality, Hunger, Thirſt, Diſeaſes, &c. are for the good of the World in this corrupt Eſtate.

NOTES.

(59) See *Sherlock* upon *Death*, C 2. §. 1. par. 3, 4, and C 3. §. 3. As to the Vigour of our Firſt Parent's Intellect, ſee the Authors referr'd to in the beginning of Note 56, particularly Mr. *D'Oyly*'s firſt Diſſert. C. 9.

lig'd to ſtruggle with Hunger, Thirſt, Diſeaſes and Troubles, few of them are at leiſure to run quite mad, and leap over all the bounds of Nature by their depraved Elections. 'Tis better therefore for us to undergo all theſe Inconveniencies, than to be left to ourſelves without reſtraint in this corrupt Eſtate. For by that means we ſhould bring upon ourſelves ſtill greater Evils. But theſe belong to reveal'd Religion, and this is not a proper Place to treat on them at large. (60.)

NOTES.

(60.) Thus our Author has, I think, ſufficiently accounted for all ſorts of Natural Evil; and demonſtrated the τὸ βέλτιον, or Meliority of things in the Univerſe, taking the whole (as we always ought) together: at leaſt, he has laid down ſuch Principles as may be eaſily and effectually applied to that excellent End. He has clearly proved, and cloſely purſued this one ſingle Propoſition thro' all the above mention'd Particulars, *viz.* that *not one of thoſe Evils or Inconveniencies in our Syſtem could poſſibly have been prevented without a greater*: which is an ample Vindication, an evident Proof of all the Divine Attributes, in the original Frame and Government thereof. And indeed this ſeems to be the beſt and moſt convincing, if not the only proper Method of handling the Argument and examining the Works of God, ſo as to attain a due ſenſe of, and regard for the Author of them. Which Maxim therefore, we conclude from the numberleſs inſtances of its apparent Validity, ought to be allow'd, and may be ſafely inſiſted on, tho' by reaſon of our great ignorance of Nature, it cannot always be ſo clearly applied. However it has been already applied ſucceſsfully to the Solution of the moſt material Difficulties in the preſent Queſtion, as may appear more fully from the Authors referr'd to in the foregoing Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of Moral Evil.

Introduction, containing the Subſtance of the Chapter.

HAVING given ſome Account of *Natural* Evils, the *Moral* come next under conſideration: we are now to trace out the Origin of theſe, and ſee of what kind it is, whether they flow from the ſame Source with the Natural, *viz.* the neceſſary *Imperfection* of created Beings; or we are to ſeek for ſome other entirely different from it.

By *Moral* Evils, as we ſaid before, are underſtood thoſe Inconveniencies of Life and Condition which befall ourſelves or others thro' wrong Elections. For it is plain that ſome inconveniencies happen without our knowledge, or againſt our Wills, by the very Order of natural Cauſes; whereas others come upon us knowingly, and in a manner with our Conſent (when we chooſe either theſe themſelves, or ſuch as are neceſſarily connected with them.) The Moral are to be reckon'd among the latter kind of Inconveniencies; and he muſt be eſteem'd the Cauſe of them, who knowingly, and of his own accord, brings them either upon himſelf or others by a depraved or fooliſh Choice.

But,

But, in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils more fully underſtood, we muſt conſider in the

1ſt Place, *What the Nature of Elections is.*
2dly. *That our Happineſs chiefly depends upon Elections.*
3dly. *What kind of Elections may be ſaid to be made amiſs, or* fooliſhly.
4thly. *How we come to fall into depraved or* wicked *Elections.*
5thly. *How ſuch Elections can be reconciled with the Power and Goodneſs of God.*

SECT. I.

Concerning the Nature of Elections.

SUBSECT. I.

A View of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from Compulſion only, but not from Neceſſity.

That it is not eaſy to underſtand or give a true repreſentation of the Opinions concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from Compulſion only, others from Neceſſity alſo.

I. IF there be any thing obſcure and difficult in Philoſophy, we are ſure to find it in that Part which treats of Elections and Liberty. There is no point about which the Learned are leſs conſiſtent with themſelves, or more divided from each other. Nor is it an eaſy Matter to underſtand them, or to give a certain and true repreſentation of their Opinions. I think they may be diſtinguiſh'd into two Sorts, both admitting of a Liberty; One of them from external *Compulſion*, and not from internal *Neceſſity*; but the other from both.

II. As

II. As far as I can understand the Opinion of the former, it is this: First, they observe that there are certain *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature, which are not to be esteem'd useless, but contributing toward our Preservation, as was shewn before; and that some things are naturally agreeable, some contrary to these Appetites: that the *former*, when present, please and impress a delightful Sense of themselves; the *latter* displease and create uneasiness. These therefore are called incommodious, troublesome and Evil; and those commodious, convenient and Good.

The Authors of the former Opinion suppose that there are Appetites implanted in us by Nature: what is agreeable to these is called good; the contrary, Evil.

III. Secondly, That Nature has given us *Reason*, a *Mind* or *Intellect*, whereby to distinguish Conveniencies from Inconveniencies, Good from Evil. And since these may be consider'd by the Mind in a three-fold Respect, hence also arise three kinds of Good and Evil; namely, *Pleasant*, *Profitable* and *Honest*.

Things are agreeable to the Appetites in a three-fold respect. Hence three kinds of good.

IV. For if Good be consider'd only with regard to the Appetite, which is delighted with the Enjoyment of it, and acquiesces in it, 'tis called *Pleasant*.

That which is actually agreeable to the Appetite is called Pleasant.

V. But if it be not agreeable to the Appetite of itself, but only *connected* with something else which is of itself agreeable, or produces Pleasure, and on that account only be desirable, then 'tis called *Profitable*. For tho' the Appetite cannot come at the immediate Enjoyment of it, yet the Mind makes use of it in order to procure those things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is esteem'd *convenient*, *i. e.* Good.

That which is connected with some thing which is of itself agreeable, is called profitable.

VI. But, since that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be repugnant or less agreeable to others; and that which pleases now, may have some things connected with it, which may be displeasing afterwards, there is need of enquiry and deliberation, in order to procure an absolute Good, *i. e.* one which, all Appetites and Times consider'd, will afford as great, as certain and durable a Pleasure or Delight as possible. For this end therefore was the Mind or Understanding given us, that we might be able to determine what appears fittest to be done upon a view of all such things as create pleasure or uneasiness for the present or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Understanding to be the best, if there be no Error in the Case, must be look'd upon as *Honest*. For that is honest which is agreeable to a rational

That which is judg'd by the Understanding to be the best, all things consider'd, is absolutely good, and called Honest.

tional Agent; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reaſon itſelf directs, that, all things conſider'd, we ſhould prefer that which brings the greater, the more certain and more durable Advantages.

Inſtances in Health, Medicines, and ſuch things as are agreeable to the Rational Appetite.

VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon theſe three kinds of Good to be *Moral* ſo far as they reſpect Man, becauſe they fall under the Government of Reaſon. But ſince all things cannot be always had together, a compariſon muſt be made between them, and that embraced which appears to be the beſt. Now the kinds may be compared together, as well as the particulars of each kind. For inſtance, Health is a thing pleaſant in itſelf, and deſirable above all things that relate to the Body, but for the preſervation of it Medicines muſt be ſometimes taken, which of themſelves are far from being agreeable to the Appetite, but as they are means to an End which is in itſelf delightful, they are ſaid to be profitable, and on that account fit to be choſen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and more durable than thoſe of the Body; if therefore they cannot be had without the Loſs of Health, or even Life, right Reaſon dictates, that Health, or even Life muſt be deſpiſed in regard to theſe. For this appears to be the moſt convenient, all things conſider'd, and on that account is *honeſt:* and as Goods of a different kind may be compared together, ſo may alſo particulars of the ſame kind, as any one will find that conſiders it.

He that can act as his own Judgment directs, is free according to theſe Men.

VIII. As to *Liberty*, the Men of this Sect will have it to conſiſt in this, that among all thoſe Goods an Agent can embrace that which pleaſes him beſt, and exert thoſe Actions which his own Reaſon approves: For, according to theſe Men, he that can follow his own *Judgment* in Matters is free. For example, he that is ſound in Body, and has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be removed, is at liberty to walk: for he can if he *will*, and nothing but his will is wanting to exert that Action.

But they ſuppoſe that we are determin'd to chooſe either from the goodneſs or diſagreeableneſs of objects,

IX. But as to the Actions of the *Will* itſelf, namely, to will, or to *ſuſpend* the Act of Volition, they think that it is determin'd to theſe, not by itſelf, for that is impoſſible, but from without. If you aſk from whence? They anſwer, from the *Pleaſure* or *Uneaſineſs* perceiv'd by

perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senſes; and that therefore we are not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are ſubject to the determination of the Will.

by the Underſtanding or the Senſes; but rather, as they imagine, from the preſent or urgent *Uneaſineſs:* ſince therefore theſe are produced in us *ab extra*, not from the Will itſelf, and are not in its power, but ariſe from the very things; 'tis manifeſt, according to theſe Men, that we are not free to *will* or *not to will*, at leaſt from *Neceſſity*, with regard to the immediate Acts of the Will. Some of them therefore expreſly deny that Liberty belongs to Man with regard to theſe Acts, or that an Election can be ſaid to be free, or Man himſelf in that reſpect: They will have it therefore, that *Liberty* belongs to us properly with reſpect to the *inferior* Faculties which are ſubject to the Government of the Will, and diſcharge their Functions when the Man himſelf has willed: that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleaſes; but not to will; for he receives the Will to walk from elſewhere: nevertheleſs, he that can do what he wills, according to them, is free, tho' he be neceſſarily determin'd to will. (61.)

X. If

NOTES.

(61.) The moſt remarkable Defenders of this Opinion, among the Moderns, ſeem to be *Hobbs*, *Locke*, (if he be conſiſtent with himſelf*) *Leibnitz*, *Bayle*, the *Authors* of the *Philoſophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, and of *Cato's Letters*. But in order to have a more diſtinct Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all profeſſing to treat of *Human Liberty*, *Free-will*, *&c.* Let us in the firſt place recite the ſeveral Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and obſerve to which of them Liberty is or may be apply'd. Theſe are commonly diſtinguiſh'd into *Perception*, *Judgment*, *Volition* and *Action*. The two former are generally *neceſſary*, or at leaſt always *paſſive*: For I cannot help ſeeing a Light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judging that two and two make four, whenever I think of that Propoſition; tho' I may hinder that Perception by ſhutting my Eyes, as well as prevent that Judgment by refuſing to think of the Propoſition. The Will then may properly enough be ſaid to influence or impede theſe†, but this does not make them leſs *paſſive* in themſelves; nay, the more it does influence them, the more evidently they are ſo. The third will appear to be the exerciſe of a *Self-moving Principle*, and as ſuch, cannot properly be moved or influenced by any thing elſe. The laſt is the exerciſe of the *inferior Powers*, the actual production of Thought or Motion: this is generally directed by, and an immediate conſequence of Volition, on which account ſeveral Authors have confounded them together; but tho' they be properly both Acts of the Mind, yet they are certainly diſtinct ones: the former is an ability of chooſing ſome particular Thoughts or Motions, the other is a power of producing theſe Thoughts or Motions purſuant to the act of choice, or of putting that choice in execution. A careful diſtinction between theſe will help us to judge of all ſuch Authors as have either uſed them promiſcuouſly or been content to treat of the laſt only, as moſt of thoſe Perſons have that are cited in the 14th and following Pages of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*.

Theſe

* *See* Note 65. † *See* Note 82.

If this be ſo, all our Actions are abſolutely neceſſary.

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of our Elections, there's no doubt but all our Actions are really and truly neceſſary. For as to the proper Actions of the Will, to will or ſuſpend the Act of Volition, the Men whom we are ſpeaking of, give up Liberty with reſpect to theſe, while they aſſert that it does not belong to them. For they are of Opinion, that when any thing is propoſed by the Underſtanding to

NOTES.

Theſe two laſt then being the only active *Powers*, or rather the only *Powers* at all, are the only proper ſubjects of Liberty: to which again it is variouſly apply'd. With regard to the *Will*, ſome content themſelves with aſſerting its Freedom from external *Compulſion* only, from being forced contrary to its own bent and inclination; and indeed it would be very ſtrange to ſuppoſe it otherwiſe: For to ſay that it may be drawn a contrary way to that which the Mind prefers and directs, is to ſay, that it may tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man may will a thing againſt his Will, or be oblig'd to will what at the ſame time he does not will: but then ſuch a Freedom as this equally belongs to the two former Powers, which cannot be forced to perceive or judge otherwiſe than they do perceive or judge, otherwiſe than as Objects appear, and their own Natures require; it may be apply'd to any thing the moſt neceſſary, nay the more neceſſary the better. Others therefore have contended for an abſolute exemption of the Will from all imperceptible Byaſs or Phyſical Inclination, from all internal neceſſity, ariſing either from its own frame and conſtitution, the impulſe of ſuperior Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reaſons, Motions, *&c.* which appear'd to them the very eſſence of human Liberty, the ſole Foundation of Morality. And indeed theſe ſeem to be the only Perſons that ſpeak out, and to the Point, as ſhall be ſhewn in the following Notes.

Laſtly, a great many will confine their Idea of Liberty to *Action* only, and define it to be a power of either actually taking up or laying down a Thought, of beginning Motion or ſtopping it according to the preference of the Mind or Will. But if this be all the Liberty we have, 'tis of ſmall conſequence, ſince we are conſcious that in *fact* all ſuch Actions, ſuppoſing the Organs to be rightly diſpoſed, follow the determination of the Will; and alſo, that *in reaſon* they are no farther *moral*, nor we accountable for them than as they do ſo; we muſt therefore go up higher than this before we come at any valuable Liberty, and the main Queſtion will be, Whether Man is free to think or reſolve upon, to will or chooſe any thing propoſed, as well as to exert his other Faculties in conſequence of ſuch a Reſolution, Will, or Choice. This is the only Point worth diſputing, and indeed if Liberty be not here 'tis no where. For if the Mind be abſolutely determin'd to chooſe in a certain manner in any given Circumſtances, its other ſubordinate Faculties can ſcarce be ſuppoſed to be undetermin'd; but the ſeveral Actions which depend thereon will all follow by neceſſary conſequence. Nay, upon this Hypotheſis there is properly no ſuch thing as choice or action in Man; but all are Paſſions propagated in a chain of neceſſary Cauſes and Effects. And indeed all who ſuppoſe any external Determination of the Will (meaning always a neceſſary and irreſiſtible one) whether they place it in the *Deſire of Goood*, *Anxiety* for the abſence of it, or the *laſt Determination of the Judgment*, are involv'd in the ſame conſequence, how many Steps ſoever they may take to remove the Difficulty. For it is equal to me, if what I call my Choice or Action be neceſſary, wherever that Neceſſity be placed. 'Tis the ſame thing whether I be acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate Cauſe, or drawn on by ſeveral ſucceſſively. Suppoſe, v. g. that I am neceſſitated to obey the laſt reſult of my own Judgment. From the *Exiſtence of things* follow certain *Appearances*, thoſe

to be done, we either will it, or ſuſpend the Act of Volition concerning it, according to the proſpect of Happineſs or importunity of the Uneaſineſs which appears to the Mind, in the preſent State and Circumſtances; by theſe therefore our Election, according to them, is determin'd.

That human Actions are free, not from Neceſſity, but Compulſion.

XI. But when the Election is made, if we can effect what we will, then they ſay we are free, in reſpect of ſuch Actions, not from neceſſity, but only from Compulſion; for it is plain that nothing but our will is wanting, and ſuppoſing us to will them, they neceſſarily follow. For inſtance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but his own Will, ſuppoſing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but that he muſt walk, nor can he reſt while this continues. If therefore, according to them, all acts of the Will are neceſſary (as being determin'd from without itſelf, *viz.* by the convenience or inconvenience of things or circumſtances) the actions of the inferior faculties will be no leſs neceſſary, for they will depend on the ſame circumſtances and acts of the Will, which, as they are neceſſary, theſe actions will be neceſſary alſo. (62.) Tho, according to them, therefore,

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thoſe *Appearances* cauſe certain *Perceptions*, i. e. of pleaſure or pain; theſe *Perceptions* form a *Judgment*, this *Judgment* determines the *Will*, this *Will* produces *Action*. All this is fix'd and inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally neceſſary, and 'tis all one to me on which my Determinations hang: 'Tis as good to take them from the firſt as laſt, ſince the ſuppoſed choice or action is as much out of my power, or as incapable of being alter'd or prevented by me, as the exiſtence of external things. 'Tis eaſy to obſerve how deſtructive this and the like Schemes muſt prove, as well of Morality as Liberty, both which muſt ſtand and fall together, and can, I think, only be ſecured effectually upon the Principles laid down by our Author; of which in their proper place.

See alſo Mr. *Chubb*'s Reflections on *Natural Liberty*. *Collection of Tracts*, p. 379, *&c.* or Notes 65, 68, 82.

(62.) To call an Action *neceſſary*, is properly ſpeaking to affirm, that it is no Action: For by the Word *Action* we mean an immediate effect of what is metaphorically ſtiled a *Self-moving Power*: or, the exerciſe of an ability which a Being has to begin or determine either *thought* or *Motion*. Now, the Idea of this Power in any Being, and of ſuch exereiſe of it, is directly repugnant to that of *Neceſſity*, which ſuppoſes the *Thought* or *Motion* to be already begun or determined, and to be obtruded on this Being by ſomething elſe, and conſequently implies a Negation of any ſuch Self-moving Power in this Being, or of its exerciſe by this Being in the Caſes above mentioned. "To be an *A-*"*gent* (ſays Dr. *Clarke*,*) ſignifies to have a "*Power of beginning Motion*, and *Motion* can-"not begin *neceſſarily*, becauſe *Neceſſity of Mo-*"*tion* ſuppoſes an Efficiency ſuperior to, and "irreſiſtible by the thing moved, and conſe-"quently

* *Remarks on the* Philoſophical Enquiry, p. 6.

fore there be no *Compulſion* of the Will, yet there is *Neceſſity*, from which Neceſſity nothing in the World will be free; nay a great many of them openly profeſs to believe that this is the Caſe.

XII. Now, from this Hypotheſis, which they extend to the Divine as well as Human Will, the following Corollaries ſeem deducible. Firſt, that nothing in Nature could be done otherwiſe than it is. For, the whole Series of things being as it were connected together by Fate, there's no Room for Chance or Liberty, properly ſo call'd: *Contingency* then is removed out of Nature.

According to their opinion there is no *contingency* in things, nor could any thing be done otherwiſe than it is.

XIII. Secondly; That nothing more can be underſtood by wicked or wrong made Elections, than that they are prejudicial to the Elector or ſome others; which Senſe is very remote from the vulgar one; for

By Evil they underſtand nothing more than hurtful.

NOTES.

" quently the *beginning of Motion* cannot be in " that which is moved neceſſarily, but in the " ſuperior Cauſe, or in the efficiency of ſome " other Cauſe ſtill ſuperior to that, till at length " we arrive at ſome *Free Agent*." Where, tho' the Doctor's Definition of Agency ſeems to be imperfect, that Word generally including the power of beginning *Thought* as well as *Motion* (which are two diſtinct Species of Action, and proceed from different Powers, tho' they be often confounded together, and comprehended under the ſame general term) yet it ſhews us an evident contradiction in theſe two Words *neceſſary Agent*, in either Senſe: Unleſs he uſes the Word *Agent* in both Senſes together, and then his Reaſoning will be falſe, ſince what is acted on and determin'd by another in regard to its *Thought*, *Will*, &c. and in that Senſe *mov'd by a ſuperior Efficiency*, may yet have a power of beginning real corporeal Motion (which is a quite different ſort of Action) in conſequence of ſuch pre-determin'd Thought, Will, &c. and in that ſenſe be an *Agent*, tho' not a moral one. But what ever the Dr. might mean by the Word *Agent*, his Argument will hold in either of theſe two Senſes ſeparate, *viz.* that nothing can be ſaid to *act* either in thinking or moving, which does does not properly *begin* the Thought or Motion, but is put into Thought or Motion by ſomething elſe, and alſo, that every thing cannot be ſo put either into Thought or Motion; and therefore, that there muſt be ſome firſt Cauſe of both Thought and Motion.

And will not the ſame Argument hold equally for ſome firſt Cauſe of *Exiſtence?* If the Dr. can ſuppoſe a firſt Cauſe of all Thought and Motion (as he does here, and we think very reaſonably) why may he not alſo ſuppoſe a firſt Cauſe of all *Exiſtence*; and ſo entirely exclude that *antecedent Neceſſity* which he has often Recourſe to as a kind of ſupport of the exiſtence of the firſt Cauſe, but is oblig'd to exclude from its Will and Actions? Is it harder to conceive how an Eternal Independent Being, or Firſt Cauſe, may exiſt without any antecedent Neceſſity, than how it can will or act without any?

But to return to the chief Deſign of this Note. We ſee how neceſſary it is for us to fix the preciſe meaning of the Word *Action* in a Controverſy of this kind, and if the Signification of it as laid down above be allow'd, then neceſſary Action is the ſame as paſſive Action, or beginning a thing and not beginning it at the ſame time, and in the ſame reſpect; in which terms every one perceives it to be a contradiction.

for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for being hurtful, but for being hurtful without Neceſſity, and becauſe they are made otherwiſe than they ought to have been: In this Hypotheſis then there is no Election made amiſs. (63.) Nor can any thing be ſaid to be done otherwiſe than it ought to be: for what could not poſſibly be done otherwiſe, is certainly done as it ought; ſince it is done according to the exigence and neceſſary order of things.

XIV. Thirdly; By the ſame Principle all Evil wou'd be in the ſtricteſt ſenſe *Natural*, for it would derive its Origin from natural and neceſſary Cauſes. The diſtinction then would be loſt between natural and moral Evil, as commonly underſtood. There would be no Moral Evil at all. For that only is reckon'd Moral by the common conſent of Mankind, of which the Man himſelf is properly the Cauſe; but no body looks upon himſelf as properly the Cauſe of a thing which he could not avoid, or to which he was neceſſitated by natural Cauſes, and ſuch as were antecedent to the Will. For every one blames himſelf only on this account, becauſe he was of himſelf neceſſarily the Cauſe of Evil to himſelf or others. Thoſe Inconveniences which come by Neceſſity, he looks upon as Miſeries, as Misfortunes, but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay the Hatred of God himſelf, and whatever we eſteem baſe in Villanies (as well as the diſgrace and puniſhment attending them) muſt be placed to the account of human Miſery and Unhappineſs, but by no means reckon'd criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of God, to his Juſtice, Purity or Goodneſs, than Heat or Cold.

Villanies are to be placed to the account of human Miſery, and not look'd upon as crimes, properly ſo call'd.

XV. Fourthly; When therefore we blame a Thief, Adulterer, Murtherer, or perjur'd Perſon, when theſe Crimes are arraign'd as ſcandalous; this is not done becauſe they have deſerv'd it, or becauſe theſe things are in themſelves really ſhameful or culpable; but becauſe that Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Perſons or others from the

A Maleſactor is reprov'd, not becauſe he deſerv'd it, but becauſe reproof may drive him from Evil.

NOTES.

(63.) *Leibnitz* declares it to be his ſettled Opinion *, "That whenever we reſolve or will "contrary to an evident Reaſon, we are car-"ried by ſome other Reaſon ſtronger in appea-"rance." If this be always the Caſe, we certainly can never will amiſs or unreaſonably, ſince that Reaſon which appears to be the ſtrongeſt ought always to determine us.

* *Remarques ſur le Livre de l'Origine du Mal.* p. 483.

the like Elections. And this is the only Reaſon why we reproach a Thief, *&c.* and not a ſick Perſon, with Infamy; becauſe Reproach may cure a Thief, *&c.* but can do no Good to a ſick Perſon.

Puniſhments are apply'd as Medicines to the Sick; neither are Laws uſeleſs, ſince they prevent Vice.

XVI. Fifthly; Malefactors are puniſh'd, not becauſe they deſerve Puniſhment, but becauſe it is expedient, and Laws are made uſe of to reſtrain Vices, as Medicines to expel Diſeaſes; Men ſin therefore after the ſame manner as they die, *viz.* becauſe an effectual Remedy was not apply'd. And yet Laws are not entirely uſeleſs, ſince they prevent ſome Vices, as Medicines protract the Deaths of ſome diſeaſed Perſons: and a Perſon infected with the Plague may be as juſtly cut off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of avoiding the Contagion. (64.)

We are oblig'd to be grateful only in proſpect of a future Benefit.

XVII. Sixthly; We are oblig'd to repay good Offices, ſince by being thankful we may excite the Benefactor to continue or increaſe his Benevolence, and alſo induce others to do us Service. And hence it comes to paſs, that we are oblig'd to be grateful towards God and Men, but not to the Sun or a Horſe, namely, becauſe God and Men may be excited by thanks to ſome farther Beneficence, whereas the Sun or a Horſe cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit receiv'd, but only to one that may be receiv'd; nor are we oblig'd to be grateful towards a moſt generous Benefactor for what is paſt, but only for the proſpect of what is to come. All ſenſe of Gratitude then, as commonly underſtood, is deſtroy'd, for the Vulgar reckon him a cunning, not a grateful Perſon, who returns one favour merely out of hopes of another.

According to this Opinion, human Happineſs is impoſſible.

XVIII. Seventhly; If this Opinion be true, we muſt deſpair of human Felicity, for it will not in the leaſt be in our own Power, but entirely ſince it depends upon things which are not in our Power.

NOTES.

(64.) All this, and a great deal more to the ſame purpoſe, is expreſly aſſerted (as indeed 'tis a neceſſary conſequence of their Hypotheſis) by *Hobbs* *, by the Author of the Philoſophical Enquiry, *&c.* p. 91, *&c.* and much the ſame by *Bayle*, Critical Dictionary, p 2609, *&c.* The bare recital of ſuch Principles will, I hope, be judg'd a ſufficient refutation of them.

* *See his Treatiſe on* human Liberty, *or Bp.* Bramhall's *Works*, p. 678.

entirely depend on external Objects. Our Happineſs (if there be any) muſt, according to them, be conceiv'd to ariſe from the perfect fruition of thoſe things which are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the contrary to theſe are preſent, or the agreeable abſent, we muſt neceſſarily be uneaſy, and while we ſtruggle with Anxieties we cannot be happy. According to this Hypotheſis therefore it follows, that our Happineſs neceſſarily requires ſuch an Enjoyment as we have ſpoken of, and that this is at the ſame time impoſſible. For who can hope that all external things (with which he has to do) ſhould be ſo temper'd as in every reſpect to anſwer his Wiſhes, ſo as never to want what he deſires, or be forced to endure any thing contrary to his natural Appetites? If Happineſs ariſes from the Enjoyment of thoſe things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which can move Deſire by their innate, or at leaſt apparent Goodneſs; if alſo the Will is neceſſarily determin'd to theſe, according to the Judgment of the Underſtanding, or Importunity of Appetites, every Man muſt neceſſarily want a great many things which he has choſen, and bear a great many which he willingly would not, than which nothing is more inconſiſtent with Felicity. For we cannot poſſibly conceive any State of Life wherein all things anſwer to the natural Appetites. In vain then do we hope for Happineſs, if it depend upon external Objects.

Its conſequences are hard, and tho' the Argument from conſequences be generally a bad one, yet theſe bring ſome prejudice againſt an Opinion which ſeems to be attended with them, eſpecially if they be acknowledged.

XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, muſt ſeem hard and repugnant to the common Notions of Men, and cannot be believ'd without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confeſs indeed, that, for the moſt part, one cannot argue well againſt an Opinion from its conſequences, ſince a great many things are true which have conſequences hard enough: not to mention how eaſily we miſtake in deducing conſequences. But yet when theſe are acknowledged by the Authors themſelves; and, if believ'd, would prove detrimental to Morality, they bring no ſmall prejudice againſt an Opinion which is attended with them, and recommend us to ſome other as more probable, tho' it be not ſupported by any ſtronger Reaſons.

All thoſe who declare that the Will is paſſive in its Operations will be eſteemed to be of the ſame Opinion with the former, and are preſſed with the ſame conſequences.

XX. 'Tis to be obſerved alſo, that among the foregoing Authors I reckon thoſe who declare that the Will is determin'd by the laſt Judgment

ment of the Underſtanding *, which has taken with a great many Philoſophers; and, in ſhort, all who maintain that the Will is *paſſive* in Elections. For theſe muſt be eſteem'd to have the ſame Sentiments of Liberty with the former, which way ſoever they explain their Opinion; as may appear from hence, that moſt of 'em expreſly deny that *Indifference* belongs to the Nature of the Will; their Opinion therefore is attended with the ſame conſequences as the former. (65.)

SUBSECT.

NOTES.

(65.) As Mr. *Locke* has particularly labour'd the point before us, and ſeems to defend by turns the ſeveral Principles which our Author attacks here and in the following Section, we ſhall examine a little into his Method of treating the Subject. Having firſt of all defin'd Liberty to be "A power in any Agent to "do or forbear any particular Action, accor-"ding to the Determination or Thought of "the Mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd "to the other ‖." He takes a great deal of pains to prove, that ſuch Liberty does not belong to the Will: which is very certain, granting his ſenſe of Liberty to be the right and only one, ſince by his Definition it is evidently ſubſequent to the choice or preference of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of ſuch choice by an inferior faculty †. But then, beſide this Idea of Liberty, which is nothing to the preſent Queſtion, there is another previous and equally proper one, which regards the very determination, preference or direction of the Mind itſelf, and which could not poſſibly be overlook'd; he proceeds therefore to ſtate the Queſtion concerning that, which he would not have to be put, whether the Will be free? but whether the Mind or Man be free to will? both which I think amount to much the ſame thing with common Underſtandings, ſince in the firſt place we only ask, Whether this Will be properly an active power? (*i. e.* as oppoſed to Mr. *Locke*'s paſſive Power) and in the ſecond, Whether the Mind be *active* in exerting this Power call'd Will? and both which will be equally improper Queſtions with regard to his former ſenſe of the Word *Free*, i. e. as only applicable to the Actions ſubſequent on Volition. However, he goes on in the ſecond place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free "To Will or not to Will, when any "Action is once propoſed to his Thoughts, as "preſently to be done." In which reſpect he determines that a Man is not at liberty, becauſe he cannot forbear Willing *; which, if taken abſolutely (not to mention its inconſiſtency with his notion of ſuſpenſion ††) tho' it comprehends (as he ſays) moſt Caſes in Life, yet is not of the leaſt Importance. For, what does it ſignifie to me that I muſt neceſſarily take one ſide or the other, right or wrong, ſo long as I can chooſe either of them indifferently? If I can will or chooſe either of the two, here's full room for the exerciſe of Liberty; and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. *Locke*'s next Queſtion. The Anſwer to which ſeems pretty eaſy, tho' perhaps not ſo reconcilable with his Hypotheſis. However, inſtead of meddling with it, he ſlips this abſurd Query into its Room, *viz.* Whether a Man be at Liberty to will which of the two he pleaſes? or, which is the ſame, Whether he can Will what Wills? Sect. 25. ‖‖. and then, inſtead of telling us in which Caſes the Will is free, or the Man free to Will, or whether he be ſo in any Caſe at all (as might have been expected) he goes on to give us another Explanation of the word Liberty, which is ſtill confined to Action, and conſequently foreign to the preſent Queſtion.

In

* *Againſt this Notion ſee* Sect 5. Subſect. 2. par. 13.
‖ C. *Of Power*, §. 8. † *See* Note 6.. * §. 23, 24. †† §. 56. l. 14, *&c.*
‖‖ *See Mr.* Strutt's *Remarks on* Locke's *Chapter of Power*, p. 38, *&c.*

SUBSECT. II.

An Opinion is propoſed in general, aſſerting Liberty from Neceſſity as well as Compulſion.

I. THIS Opinion determines almoſt the ſame with the former concerning the Goodneſs or agreeableneſs of Objects to the Appetites, nor is there much difference in what relates to the diſtinction of Good into Pleaſant, Profitable, Honeſt: Except that it refers Honeſt the Appetites, to Good, Pleaſant, Profitable and Honeſt; but determines this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, *viz.* that the one is determin'd by its bodily Appetite, the other by himſelf.

This agrees with the former in moſt caſes, eſpecially in thoſe relating to

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In the next place he defines the Will over again *. "Which (ſays he) is nothing but a "power in the Mind to direct the operative "Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reſt, as far "as they depend on ſuch direction." By which Words if he mean, that this Power of directing the operative Faculties, is properly *active* (in the ſenſe above mention'd) or Phyſically *indifferent* to any particular manner of directing them, *i. e.* is an ability to direct them either to Motion or Reſt, without any natural Byaſs to determine it (or to determine the mind to determine it) toward one ſide always rather than the other: If, I ſay, he intends to imply thus much in this definition of Will, then may Freedom be juſtly predicated of that ſame Will (or of the Mind in the exerciſe of it) not indeed his kind of Freedom, *i. e.* that of *acting*, which belongs to another Faculty; but Freedom in our ſenſe of the Word, *i. e.* a certain phyſical Indifference, or Indeterminateneſs in its own exerciſe; which is what moſt Men underſtand by *Liberum Arbitrium*; and whether there be ſuch a Liberty as this in human Nature, would here have been a very proper Queſtion. For if there be, then we have got an abſolutely ſelf-moving Principle which does not want any thing out of itſelf to determine it, which has no phyſical connection with, and of conſequence, no neceſſary Occaſion for that grand Determiner *Anxiety*, which he has afterwards taken ſo much pains to ſettle and explain, and which ſhall be conſider'd by and by. But here he flies off again, and inſtead of determining this, which is the main point of the controverſy, and wherein Liberty muſt be found, or no where, as we obſerv'd in Note 61. I ſay, inſtead of ſtating and determining this great Queſtion, Whether the Will, or the Mind be abſolutely independent upon, and phyſically indifferent to all particular Acts, Objects, Motions, *&c.* or neceſſarily require ſome foreign Mover; he ſeems to take the latter for granted, and immediately proceeds to the following Queſtion, *What*

* §. 29.

Honeſt to the Duty which a Man owes to God, himſelf and other Men, as a Member of Intellectual Society, rather than to the natural Appetites; and thinks that we are to judge of the Agreableneſs of things from that, rather than from theſe. As to the Election which the Will makes on account of theſe, it aſſerts that this proceeds from the Will itſelf, and that a free Agent cannot be determin'd like natural Bodies by external Impulſes, or like Brutes by Objects. For this is the very difference betwixt Man and the Brutes, that theſe are determin'd according to their bodily Appetites, from whence all their Actions become neceſſary, but Man has a different Principle in him, and determines himſelf to Action.

That the chief Good is neceſſarily deſir'd, but others are not,

II. This Principle whereby Man excells the Brutes is thus explain'd by the Defenders of the following Opinion, if I take their Meaning right:

because they may be repreſented by the Underſtanding in different reſpects.

NOTES.

What determines the Will? The Meaning of which, ſays he *, is this, " What moves the " Mind in every particular inſtance to deter- " mine its general power of directing to this " or that particular Motion or Reſt?" This Mr. *Locke* calls, for ſhortneſs ſake, *determinating the Will*; and declares, that what thus determines it either firſt to continue in the ſame ſtate or action, is only the preſent *Satisfaction* in it: or ſecondly to change, is always ſome *Uneaſineſs* †. By which Words if he only meant, that theſe Perceptions are the common *Motives*, *Inducements*, or *Occaſions* whereupon the Mind in fact exerts its power of willing in this or that particular Manner; tho' in reality it always can, and often does the contrary (as he ſeems to mean by ſpeaking of a *Will* contrary to Deſire ‖, of raiſing Deſires by due Conſideration *_*, and forming Appetites †† ; of a Power to ſuſpend any Deſires, to moderate and reſtrain the Paſſions, and hinder either of them from determining the Will and engaging us in Action ‖‖: Then, as we ſaid of him before, he is only talking of another Queſtion, and what he has advanc'd on this head may readily be granted, at leaſt without any prejudice to human Liberty. For, in this ſenſe to affirm, that the Will or Mind is determin'd by ſomething without it, is only ſaying, that it generally has ſome *Motives* from without, according to which it determines the above mention'd Powers, which no Man in his Senſes can diſpute.

But if he intended that theſe Motives ſhould be underſtood to rule and direct the Will abſolutely and irreſiſtibly in certain Caſes. That they have ſuch a neceſſary influence on the Mind, that it can never be determin'd without or againſt them; in ſhort, that the Soul of Man has not a phyſical Power of willing, independent of, and conſequently indifferent to all Perceptions, Reaſons and Motives whatſoever; which the general driſt of his Diſcourſe ſeems to aſſert, particularly §. 47, 48, 49, 50. where he confounds the Determination of the Underſtanding with the exertion of the ſelf-moving Power throughout. As alſo §. 5. where he aſſerts, " That all the Liberty we have or " are capable of lies in this, that we can *ſuſ- " pend* *_* our Deſires, and hold our Wills " unde-

* §. 29. † *Ibid.* ‖ §. 30. *_* §. 46. †† §. 53. ‖‖ §. 47, 50, 53.
_ *Concerning which Suſpenſion ſee* Note 68.

right: In the firſt place, they declare that there is ſome *Chief Good*, the Enjoyment of which would make a Man completely happy; this he naturally and neceſſarily deſires, and cannot reject it when duly repreſented by the Underſtanding. That other things which offer themſelves have a Relation to this Good, or ſome Connection with it, and are to be eſteem'd Good or Evil, ſo far as they contribute to, or hinder our obtaining it; and ſince there is nothing in Nature but what. in ſome reſpect or other, either promotes this End, or prevents it; from this Indifference they declare, that we have an Opportunity of rejecting or embracing any thing. For tho' we can chooſe nothing but under the Appearance of Good, *i. e.* unleſs it be in ſome manner connected with the Chief Good, as a Medium or Appendant; yet this does not determine the Choice, becauſe every Object may

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" undetermin'd, till we have examin'd the " Good and Evil of what we deſire; what " follows after that, follows in a Chain of " Conſequences link'd one to another, all de- " pending on the laſt Determination of the " Judgment." And when he ſpeaks of Cauſes not in our Power, operating for the moſt part *forcibly* on the Will, §. 57, *&c.*

If from theſe and the like Expreſſions, I ſay, we may conclude this to have been his Opinion, *viz.* that all the Liberty of the Mind conſiſts ſolely in directing the Determination of the Judgment, after which Determination all our Actions (if they can be call'd ſuch *) follow neceſſarily: then I believe it will appear, that at the ſame time that he oppoſed the true Notion of Free-Will, he contradicted common Senſe and Experience as well as himſelf. For in the firſt place, is it not ſelf-evident, that we often do not follow our own Judgment, but run counter to the clear conviction of our Underſtandings, which Actions accordingly appear vicious, and fill us immediately with regret and the ſtings of Conſcience. This he allows, §. 35, 38, *&c.* to make Room for his *Anxiety*. But, upon the foregoing Hypotheſis, How can any Action appear to be irregular? How can any thing that is conſequent upon the final Reſult of Judgment, be againſt Conſcience, which is nothing elſe but that final Judgment †? Nay, upon the ſuppoſition of our being inviolably determin'd in willing by our Judgment (and, according to Mr. *Locke*, our Conſtitution puts us under a neceſſity of being ſo, §. 48.) it would be really impoſſible for us to will amiſs, or immorally, let our Judgments be never ſo erroneous; " The " Cauſes of which (as he alſo obſerves, §. 64.) " proceed from the weak and narrow conſti- " tution of our Minds, and are moſt of them " out of our Power." Farther, there are innummerable *indifferent* Actions which occur daily, both with reſpect to abſolute chooſing or refuſing; or to chooſing among things abſolutely equal, equal both in themſelves and to the Mind, on which we evidently paſs no manner of Judgment, and conſequently cannot be ſaid to follow its Determination in them. To will

* *See* Note 62.

† *See* Limborch *Theol. Chriſt.* L. 2. C. 23. §. 16. *and for an Anſwer to the latter part of* Locke's 48th Sect. *ſee the ſame* Chap. §. laſt.

be varied, and repreſented by the Underſtanding under very different Appearances.

Tho' therefore the Will follows ſome Judgment of

III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is propoſed which is not the Chief, the Will can *ſuſpend* * the Action, and command the Underſtanding the Underſtanding, yet it is not neceſſarily determin'd by it.

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will the eating or not eating of an Egg is a Proof of the former; to chooſe one out of two or more Eggs apparently alike is a proverbial Inſtance of the latter: both which are demonſtrations of an active or ſelf-moving Power; either way we determine and act when the Motives are entirely equal, which is the ſame as to act without any Motive at all. In the former Caſe I perceive no previous Inclination to direct my Will in general, in the latter, no Motive to influence its Determination in particular; and in the preſent Caſe, not to perceive a Motive is to have none (except we would be ſaid to have an Idea without being conſcious of it, to be anxious and yet inſenſible of that Anxiety, or ſway'd by a Reaſon which we do not at all apprehend.) Neither is it neceſſary to a true Equallty or Indifference here, that I be ſuppoſed to have no Will to uſe *any Eggs at all* (as the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, &c. abſurdly puts the Caſe) for, granting in the firſt place, that I have not a Will to uſe any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed nonſenſe to ſuppoſe afterwards that I ſhould chooſe any one; but, let me have never ſo great an Inclination to eat Eggs in general; yet that general Inclination will not in the leaſt oblige me to chooſe or prefer one Egg in particular †, which is the only point in queſtion. Numberleſs Inſtances might eaſily be given, where we often approve, prefer, deſire and chooſe, and all we know not why: where we either chooſe ſuch things as have no manner of Good or Evil in them, excepting what ariſes purely from that Choice; or prefer ſome to others, when both are equal. Means to the ſame End: in which Caſes the Judgment is not in the leaſt concern'd, and he that undertakes to oppoſe the Principle by which our Author accounts for them, muſt either deny all ſuch Equality and Indifference, or grant the Queſtion. But one Inſtance is as good as a thouſand, and he that deſires more, may find them deſcrib'd in the cleareſt manner by Dr. *Cheyne* ‖. Now to urge, that ſuch Elections as theſe are made on purpoſe to *try* my Liberty, which End, ſay ſome, becomes the Motive, is in effect granting the very thing we contend for, *viz.* that the Pleaſure attending the exerciſe of the Will is often the ſole reaſon of Volition. Beſides, that Motive (if it can be call'd ſuch) is one of the Mind's own making; and to be able to produce the Motive for Action, is the ſame thing with regard to Liberty, as to be able to act without one. If by *trying* our Liberty be meant, an Experiment to aſſure us that we really have ſuch a Power; we anſwer, that there can be no reaſon for trying it in this ſenſe, becauſe we are ſufficiently conſcious of it before any ſuch Trial.

" The Mind (ſays the Author of the *Eſſay on* " *Conſciouſneſs*, p. 208.) before ever it exerts its " Will or Power of chooſing, is conſcious, and " knows within itſelf, that it hath a Power of " Choice or Preference, and this is a neceſſary Condition of willing at all, inſomuch " that the very firſt time I had occaſion to exert my Will, or make uſe of my elective " Power, I could not poſſibly exerciſe it, or " do any voluntary Act without knowing and " being conſcious to myſelf [before hand] " that I have ſuch a Faculty or Power in myſelf.

* *See* Note 68.

† *See* Leibnitz's *fifth Paper to Dr.* Clarke, N°. 17. and 66.

‖ *Phil. Principles*, &c. Ch. 2. §. 13.

derſtanding to propoſe ſome other thing, or the ſame under ſome other Appearance: which may be always done, ſince every thing except the chief Good is of ſuch a Nature, that the Underſtanding may apprehend ſome reſpect or relation wherein it is incommodious. Notwithſtanding therefore that the Will always does follow ſome Judgment of the Underſtanding, which is made about the ſubſequent Actions,

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" ſelf. A thing that ſeems at firſt ſight very " ſtrange and wonderful; to know I have a " power of acting before ever I have acted, or " had any trial or experience of it: But a " little Reflection will quickly ſatisfy any one " that in the nature of the thing it muſt be " ſo, and cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe; and " which is peculiar to this Faculty: For we " know nothing of our Powers of Perceiving, " Underſtanding, Remembring, *&c.* but by " experimenting their Acts, it being neceſſary " firſt to perceive or think, before we can " know that we have a Power of perceiving or " thinking." The Author proceeds to ſhew, that this *Fore-conſciouſneſs* of a power of *willing* or chooſing does moſt clearly demonſtrate that the Mind in all its Volitions *begins* the Motion, or acteth *from itſelf* †.

To argue ſtill that ſome *minute* imperceptible Cauſes, ſome particular Circumſtances in our own Bodies, or thoſe about us, muſt determine even theſe ſeemingly indifferent Actions, is either running into the former abſurdity of making us act upon Motives which we don't apprehend; or ſaying, that we act mechanically, *i. e.* do not act at all: and in the laſt place, to ſay that we are determin'd to chooſe any of theſe trifles juſt as we *happen* to fix our Thoughts upon *it* in particular, at the very inſtant of Action, is either attributing all to the ſelf-moving Power of the Mind, which is granting the Queſtion; or elſe referring us to the minute and imperceptible Cauſes above mention'd; or elſe obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning Word *Chance* inſtead of a Phyſical Cauſe, which is ſaying nothing at all. How hard muſt Men be preſs'd under an Hypotheſis when they fly to ſuch evaſive ſhifts as theſe! How much eaſier and better would it be to give up all ſuch blind, unknown, and unaccountable Impulſes, and own what both common Senſe and Experience dictate, an Independent, Free, Self moving Principle, the true, the obvious, and only ſource of Action?

With regard to Mr. *Locke*'s Inconſiſtencies, I ſhall only add one Obſervation more, *viz.* that he ſeems to place the Cauſe (Motive, or whatever he means by it) of his Determination of the Will after the Effect. The Cauſe of that Determination is, according to him, *Anxiety*; this he ſometimes makes concomitant, ſometimes conſequent upon Deſire; and §. 31. he ſays the one is ſcarce diſtinguiſhable from the other.

But this ſame Deſire appears to me to be the very Determination of the Will itſelf; what we abſolutely deſire we always will, and *vice verſa*, whether it be in our Power to purſue that Will, and produce it into Act or no; and indeed Deſire ſeems to be no otherwiſe diſtinguiſhable from Volition, than as the latter is generally attended with the Power of Action, which the former is conſider'd without. This I think is all the Diſtinction that they are capable of, which yet is only nominal: Nor do his Inſtances in §. 30. prove that there is any real Difference between 'em. Thus when I am oblig'd to uſe perſuaſions with another, which I wiſh may not prevail upon him, or ſuffer one Pain to prevent a greater, here are two oppoſite Wills, or a weak imperfect Volition conquer'd by, and giving way to a ſtronger: I will or deſire that this Man may not be prevail'd upon, but yet I will or deſire more powerfully and effectually to uſe theſe perſuaſions with him: Or rather, here is but one actual

† *Eſſay* on *Conſciouſneſs*, p. 209. 210.

tions, yet it is not neceſſarily determin'd by any, for it can ſuſpend its Action, and order ſome other Judgment, which it may follow. Since therefore it can either exert or ſuſpend its Act, it is not only free from Compulſion, but alſo indifferent in itſelf, with regard to its Actions, and determines itſelf without neceſſity.

This Opinion eſtabliſhes Liberty, but yet there are ſome things not

IV. It muſt be confeſs'd, that this opinion eſtabliſhes Liberty, and on that account is more agreeable to reaſon, experience, and the common ſenſe of Mankind, yet ſome things in it ſeem to be preſum'd and not explain'd clearly enough.

ſufficiently explain'd in it.

Such a Liberty as this ſeems to be of more prejudice than benefit to Mankind.

V. For, in the firſt place, 'tis ſaid that the Will *determines itſelf*; but we are not informed how that is poſſible, nor what uſe ſuch a Power would be of, were it admitted: nay, it ſeems rather prejudicial than beneficial to Man. For that Goodneſs which it is ſuppoſed to purſue, is in the things themſelves, and ariſes from their connection with the chief Good; it is not therefore to be form'd, but diſcovered

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actual Deſire or Will in the Caſe, and the other is only Hypothetical. Thus I ſhould will to be cured of the Gout, if the cure would not throw me into greater Pain; but in the preſent circumſtances I do not really will it, nor exert any one act which may ſerve to remove it: nay, in this Caſe, I will or deſire to bear the Gout rather than a worſe Evil that would attend the removal of it. His Axiom therefore, that wherever there is pain, there is a deſire to be rid of it, is not abſolutely true.

Again, I ſhould refuſe a painful Remedy or diſagreeable Potion, if I could enjoy perfect Health without them; but as I manifeſtly cannot, I chooſe the leſs Evil of the two. Nor can I indeed be properly ſaid to chooſe or deſire both in the preſent Circumſtances, or, to will one and deſire the contrary, ſince I know that only one of them is poſſible, which therefore I now certainly will or deſire, tho' I ſhould as certainly have will'd the contrary had it been equally poſſible. Theſe then and the like Inſtances are not ſufficient to prove any oppoſition between Will and Deſire, except the latter be only taken for a mere paſſive Appetite or Affection of the Mind: in which ſenſe the Words *chooſe, prefer*, &c. muſt then be very improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I believe Mr. *Locke* here ſets the Word *Deſire* to ſignify what we commonly mean by *Will*, as he does in §. 48. where 'tis call'd *the Power of preferring*: and puts Volition into the place of *Action*; as ſeems probable from his deſcription of Willing in the 28th and 30th Sect. as alſo, C. 23. §. 18. where he defines the Will to be a *Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought*. And the ſame Notion, I think, runs thro' all his Letters to *Limborch*. To conclude, whatever he means by Deſire, he manifeſtly poſtpones it to Volition in §. 56. "When a Man "(ſays he) has once choſen a thing, and there"by it is become a part of his Happineſs, it "raiſes deſire, and that proportionably gives "him uneaſineſs, which determines his Will, "and ſets him at work in purſuit of his choice "on all occaſions that offer." If *choſen* ſtand here

covered by the underſtanding. If then the underſtanding performs its Duty right, it will diſcover what is beſt: but it is our Advantage to be determined to that which is beſt; it had therefore been better for Man, if Nature had given him up abſolutely to the determination of his Judgment and Underſtanding, and not allow'd that Judgment to be ſuſpended by the power of the Will. For by that means he would have obtain'd his End with greater certainty and eaſe. I grant, that if a Man were abſolutely determin'd in his Actions to the beſt, there would be no room for virtue, properly ſo call'd; for virtue, as it is commonly underſtood, requires a free Act, and this Liberty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue; and with good reaſon, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleaſes: (For thus it would be impoſſible to attain the end of chooſing, *i. e.* to pleaſe ourſelves, without Liberty, ſince that very thing which pleaſes in Actions, *viz.* Liberty, would be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which the Underſtanding can diſcover, be the very beſt before or independent of our Choice, it were proper for us to be neceſſarily determin'd to it; for the fruition of it, howſoever obtain'd, would make us happy, and be ſo much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not dependent

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here for *willed*, his uſual Method of explaining the Cauſe of Volition is inverted, and the Effect comes firſt; or, if choſen be made only to ſignify *deſired*, he muſt ſuppoſe deſire to raiſe itſelf, which is bad again. How can theſe Words be underſtood in any Senſe conſiſtent with §. 31 and 71. and with his whole Hypotheſis? *

Dr. *Clarke*'s Argument for abſolute Freedom, becauſe all Motives or Senſations are mere abſtract Notions, and have no phyſical power ‖, ſeems not concluſive, or at leaſt not clear. For who knows, ſay the Fataliſts, how far reaſons, motives, *&c.* may affect a Spirit? Why may not one immaterial Subſtance determine another by means of thought, as well as a material one can move another by means of Impulſe? Nay, his adherent Mr. *Jackſon* grants †, "that "abſtract Notions will, by a forcible and ir- "reſiſtible impulſe, compel the Mind to move "the Body whether it will or no." Which impulſe, if it were conſtant, would ſufficiently acquit the Maintainers of Neceſſity. But that there can be no ſuch forcible impulſe, will, I hope, appear below, where it will be ſhewn to be both agreeable to reaſon to ſuppoſe that there are Self-active Beings, which, as ſuch, muſt have a phyſical power of reſiſting what we call the moſt cogent Motives: and to be confirm'd by Experience, that our own Minds exert ſuch a Power; which is ſufficient for our purpoſe. For an Explanation of the true Notion of Liberty, ſee the following Subſections of this Chapter, and Note 82.

* *See our Author's* Subſect. 3d. par. 6.
‖ *Remarks on the* Philoſophical Enquiry, p. 10.
† *Defence of human Liberty*, p. 198.

dependent upon *Chance*, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a manner ſuppoſed to be: nor need we much regard the *Glory* ariſing from a well made Choice; ſince the fruition of the greateſt Good would give us Happineſs without it; nay ſuch Glory would be vain and deſpicable in competition with the greateſt Good. Hence it appears, that Free-will, according to this Hypotheſis, cannot be reckon'd any Advantage.

It only takes place in doubtful matters, and then 'tis of no uſe or importance.

VI. Secondly; If it be ſaid, that the Underſtanding is dubious in many Caſes, and ignorant of what is the beſt, and in theſe Liberty takes place; neither does this clear the Matter. For if the things to be done be Good or Evil in themſelves, but unknown to the Intellect, there's no help in the Will; nor does its Liberty aſſiſt us in diſcovering or obtaining the better Side; if they be indifferent, it is no matter what we do, ſince the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies are equal on both Sides. If then we admit of Liberty in theſe Caſes, it will be of no uſe or importance to Life or Happineſs: Nay, it muſt be eſteem'd an Imperfection, as deriving its Origin from the Imperfection of the Underſtanding. For if the Underſtanding could certainly determine what were beſt to be done, there would be no room for Liberty. (66.)

We are left in doubt concerning the Way which leads

VII. Thirdly; They are not well agreed what this *Chief Good* is, from the connection with which the Underſtanding muſt judge of the Goodneſs of other things, as may appear from the various and contradictory Opinions about it. (67.) We muſt neceſſarily therefore fluctuate, to Happineſs, and can have no help from Liberty.

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(66) Theſe, with ſome of the following conſequences attending ſuch a confuſed Hypotheſis of Liberty, are well urg'd by Mr. *Locke* (tho' I think they return upon himſelf) in his *Chapter of Power*, §. 48, 49, 50. and in the *Philoſoph. Enquiry*, p. 63, &c. and ſeem to be unavoidable in any other Scheme but that of our Author; who ſuppoſes, that in moſt Caſes all the Goodneſs of an Act or Object entirely depends upon, and is produced merely by our chooſing it; and of conſequence Liberty, or a power of chooſing, is according to his Principles, ſo far from being unneceſſary, or an Imperfection, that it is our nobleſt Perfection; and conſtitutes the greateſt part of our Happineſs: For an Explanation of this, ſee §. 2. of this Chapter.

(67.) This uncertainty about the *Summum Bonum* is own'd and well accounted for by Mr. *Locke*, B. 2. C. 21. §. 55. "Hence it was "that the Philoſophers of old did in vain en- "quire, whether *Summum Bonum* conſiſted in "Riches or Bodily Delights, or Virtue, or "Contemplation? And they might have as "reaſonably

fluctuate, and be ſolicitous, and rebel againſt Nature itſelf, which has neither granted us a certain End, nor certain Means thereto, but left us anxious and uncertain about the way which leads to Happineſs; neither is there any help here in our Liberty, ſince it is blind, and can do nothing towards bringing us back into the right path.

VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confeſs'd by all, that Good in general is what agrees with every one, and what all things deſire. Every Good then anſwers to ſome Appetite, and according to theſe Authors, Objects are good on account of a natural and neceſſary conformity which they have to our Appetites. The Underſtanding therefore does not make good, but finds it in the things themſelves: and when it judges any thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, according to them, muſt neceſſarily be in reſpect of ſome natural Appetite. All the Good then which is in things will be the Object of ſome Faculty or Appetite, *i. e.* of the Underſtanding, Senſe, *&c.* But all theſe are determin'd by Nature in regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which they relate, *i. e.* in regard to their *Pleaſantneſs*, or Agreeableneſs; and as to the relation which they bear to each other, *i. e.* as to their *Profitableneſs* and *Honeſty*, they are to be judg'd of by the Underſtanding, and directed when and in what manner they muſt give place to each other, or afford their mutual Aſſiſtance. Free-will then appears to be of no manner of uſe; for if it certainly follow the decree of reaſon it is not free, at leaſt from neceſſity, ſince that very reaſon which it follows is not free: if it does not neceſſarily follow that, we had better be without it, for it perverts every thing, and diſturbs the Order of Nature, which is the very beſt and fitteſt to be follow'd, ſuch a Liberty as this would therefore

Since that is good which is agreeable, and this is to be judg'd of by the Underſtanding, if the Will follow this Judgment it is not free, if it does not, it acts againſt reaſon. We had better therefore be without ſuch Liberty.

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" reaſonably diſputed, whether the beſt reliſh " were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or " Nutts, and have divided themſelves into " Sects upon it. For as pleaſant Taſtes de- " pend not on the things themſelves, but their " agreeableneſs to this or that particular Palate, " wherein there is great variety; ſo the grea- " teſt happineſs conſiſts in the having thoſe " things which produce the greateſt Pleaſure; " and in the abſence of t. oſe which cauſe any " diſturbance, any pain. Now theſe to diffe- " rent Men are very different things." To the ſame purpoſe are the 3d and 4th obſervations in the *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 33. which may ſerve to confirm the Notion which our Author propoſes in the next Subſection, *viz.* that moſt of the Good or Agreeableneſs in things ariſes not from their own Natures, but our choice of them, or that Objects are not choſen becauſe they are good, but are generally good only becauſe they are choſen.

fore be prejudicial to Mankind; it would make them liable to do amiſs, and produce no kind of Good to compenſate for ſo great an Evil.

If the Will could ſuſperd its act contrary to the Judgment of the Underſtanding, it would run directly into Evil, it ſeems therefore neceſſary for it to act at the time and in the manner which the Underſtanding directs.

IX. Fifthly, It is ſuppoſed that the Judgment of the Underſtanding concerning the Goodneſs of any thing, is a condition without which the Will is not directed to the Object, but yet that it can either exert or ſuſpend its act about any Good whatſoever. Let us ſuppoſe then that the Underſtanding has determin'd it to be good to exert ſome certain Action, and Evil to ſuſpend it; while this Judgment continues, if the Will can ſuſpend its Act, it chooſes Evil; if it cannot, it is not free. You'll ſay, it can command the Underſtanding to change its Judgment; let it be ſo. But it is evident, that the Man ſuſpends his Action before he can command the Underſtanding to change its Judgment, *i. e.* he ſuſpends the Action while the Judgment determines that it is Evil to ſuſpend. He therefore chooſes that directly which his Reaſon judges to be Evil, which ſeems to overthrow their whole Hypotheſis. (68.)

X. I confeſs

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(68.) Farther, if the Mind can ſuſpend the Satisfaction of any urgent deſire (which Mr. *Locke* allows *, and therein places all its Liberty) then it can as eaſily quite ſtop, or run counter to any natural Appetite, ſince no greater Power ſeems to be requiſite for the one than for the other. If we can hinder the Will from being determin'd by any deſire of abſent Good without any appearance of greater Good on the other Side, which might raiſe an oppoſite deſire able to counterballance it, as our Author has ſhewn that we can; then we ſhall be equally able to prevent its following even the ultimate determination of the Judgment, without any reaſon for ſo doing; and conſequently good, whether abſolute or comparative, is neither the adequate efficient Cauſe, nor a neceſſary Means or Motive to the determination of the Will. This act of ſuſpenſion therefore muſt either be ſolely founded in the ſelf-moving Power of the Mind, and of conſequence be naturally independent on all Motives, Reaſons, *&c.* and an inſtance of the Mind's abſolute Freedom from any external Determination; which is, I believe, a contradiction to Mr. *Locke*'s general Hypotheſis; or elſe itſelf muſt be determin'd by ſome external Cauſe, and then it will be difficult to make it free in any ſenſe. Let us obſerve how Mr. *Locke* endeavours to reconcile theſe two Notions together. Our Liberty, according to him, is founded in a general abſolute Inclination of the Mind to Happineſs, which obliges us to ſuſpend the Gratification of our Deſire in particular caſes, till we ſee whether it be not inconſiſtent with the general Good. "The ſtronger Ties, ſays he, "§. 51. we have to an unalterable purſuit of "Happineſs in general, which is our greateſt "Good, and which, as ſuch, our Deſires al"ways follow, the more are we free from any "neceſſary determination of our Will to any "particular Action, and from a neceſſary com"pliance with our Deſire ſet upon any parti"cular, and then appearing preferable good, till

* Book 2. C. 21. §. 47, and 50.

X. I confeſs, they offer ſome Solutions here, but ſuch as are ſo ſubtle, ſo obſcure, and ſo much above the comprehenſions of the Vulgar, that moſt Perſons have taken a diſtaſte to them, given up the cauſe of Liberty as deſperate, and gone over to the former Sect: but if any one will undertake either to give a more clear and full Explication of the common Opinion, or bring Solutions of thoſe Difficulties which occur in it, he will find me ſo far from being his Adverſary, that he may expect my aſſent, encouragement and aſſiſtance. This indeed were very much to be wiſh'd, but in the mean time I ſhall try, as far as I am able, whether theſe things cannot be explain'd more clearly in another manner.

There are Anſwers offer'd to theſe difficulties, but they are far from being clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion.

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" till we have duly examin'd whether it has a " tendency to, or be inconſiſtent with our real " happineſs." And again, §. 52. " Whatever " Neceſſity determines to the purſuit of real " Bliſs, the ſame neceſſity, with the ſame force, " eſtabliſhes Suſpence, Deliberation and Scru- " tiny, of each ſucceſſive deſire, whether the " ſatisfaction of it does not interfere with our " true Happineſs, and miſlead us from it." If by the Word *Neceſſity* he means abſolute *phyſical Neceſſity* (which it muſt be, if it be any at all, or any thing to the preſent purpoſe) he has diſcover'd a pretty odd foundation for his Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us towards Happineſs in general, be abſolute and irreſiſtible, as his Words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and conſequently prove as bad a ground for Suſpenſion as for Liberty. But in truth this Suſpenſion is neither founded in any Neceſſity of purſuing Happineſs in general, nor is itſelf an original power of the Mind diſtinct from that of Volition, but only one particular exerciſe or Modification of it: " 'Tis willing (as " the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry* right- " ly obſerves) to defer willing about the mat- " ter propoſed," and is no otherwiſe different from the common caſes of willing and chooſing except that it is the moſt evident demonſtration of the Mind's perfect Liberty in willing, and ſo obvious that Mr. *Locke* could not get over it, and therefore ſtiles it the ſource of all our Liberty, *&c.* §. 47. tho' he ſoon explains it away again, by endeavouring to force it into his Syſtem.

SUBSECT. III.

Another Notion of Liberty and Election is propoſed.

The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End by exerciſe, which is the greateſt perfection of them, and their beſt Eſtate.

I. IN order to make my meaning better underſtood, we muſt obſerve, in the firſt place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and Appetites implanted in us by Nature, which are directed to certain Actions: and when theſe exert their proper Actions about Objects, they produce a grateful and pleaſant Senſation in us. The exerciſe of them therefore pleaſes us; and from hence probably all our Pleaſure and Delight ariſes; conſequently our Happineſs, if we have any, ſeems to conſiſt in the proper exerciſe of thoſe Powers and Faculties which Nature has beſtow'd upon us: for they appear to be implanted in us for no other end, but that by the uſe and exerciſe of them thoſe things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at reſt, or enjoy themſelves, otherwiſe than as thoſe things are produced by or in them, for the production or reception of which they are deſign'd by Nature. Now every Power or Faculty is directed to the proſecution of its proper Acts. They attain their End therefore by Exerciſe, which muſt be eſteem'd the greateſt Perfection, and moſt happy State of any Being. For that is a State of Happineſs, if any ſuch can be conceiv'd, wherein every thing is done which pleaſes, and every thing abſent which diſpleaſes; neither does it ſeem poſſible to imagine a more happy one.

There is a certain agreeableneſs fixt by Nature between ſome Appetites, *&c.* and their Objects, whereby they act upon the preſence of them, and ceaſe from Action upon the Removal of them.

II. Secondly, It is to be obſerv'd, that among our Appetites, Faculties and Powers, ſome are determin'd to their Operations by Objects peculiar to them. For upon the preſence of their Objects they neceſſarily exert their Actions, if rightly diſpos'd, and ceaſe from Operation upon their abſence, and have no tendency towards any other Objects but their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing but Light, Colours, *&c.* and, upon the Removal of theſe, its Action

tion (69.) ceaſes. The Underſtanding itſelf diſtinguiſhes thoſe Objects which are communicated to it by the Senſes, or perceiv'd by reflection from one another, diſpoſes and repoſits them in the Memory; but yet has certain bounds which it cannot exceed: and ſo of the reſt. There is therefore a certain natural Fitneſs, a fixt conformity between theſe Powers and their Objects, on which account they exert their Actions upon the preſence of the Objects, and pleaſe themſelves in Exerciſe: but are uneaſy at the preſence of thoſe things which hinder it. If then there be any natural force in any Object to promote or hinder the exerciſe of any Power or Faculty, that Object is to be eſteem'd Good or Evil in regard to it.

III. Thoſe Objects which thus promote or impede the Action, are ſufficiently diſtinguiſh'd from each other by the Power or Faculty itſelf; thoſe that are abſent or future, are judg'd of by the Underſtanding, and what the Mind determines to be the beſt in them that we are oblig'd to purſue. He that does otherwiſe diſobeys the Law of Reaſon. If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus determin'd to their proper Objects, it would ſeem an Imperfection for Man to be free, and he would have been much more happy without ſuch a Liberty: for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of the greateſt Evils, *viz.* a Power of doing amiſs.

Liberty would be of diſſervice to an Agent endow'd with ſuch Appetites, &c. as theſe only.

IV. It ſeems not impoſſible to conceive a Power of a quite different Nature from theſe, which may be more indifferent in reſpect of the Objects about which it exerts itſelf*. To which no one thing is naturally more agreeable than another, but that will be the fitteſt to which it ſhall happen † to be apply'd: Between which and the Object, to which it is determin'd, by itſelf or by ſomething elſe, there is naturally no more ſuitableneſs or connection than between it and any other

We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there is naturally no other agreeableneſs but what may ariſe from the determination of the Power itſelf.

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(69.) It may be obſerv'd here once for all, that our Author ſeldom uſes this Word *Action* in a ſtrict Philoſophical Senſe (according to which theſe ſhould rather be call'd Paſſions) but generally takes the vulgar expreſſions, when they will ſerve to explain his meaning.

* *See* Sect. 5. Subſect. 2. par. 12 and 15.

† *That this Word is not intended to imply what we commonly mean by* Chance, *ſee* par. 18.

other thing, but all the *Suitableneſs* there is, ariſes from the *Application* or *Determination* itſelf. For as the Earth is no Man's Right by nature, but belongs to the prime Occupant, and the Right ariſes from that very Occupation; ſo there may poſſibly be a Power to which no Object is by Nature peculiarly adapted, but any thing may become ſuitable to it, if it happen to be apply'd; for its Suitableneſs proceeds from the Application, as we ſaid before. Now it does not ſeem any more abſurd for a Power to create an Agreeableneſs between itſelf and an Object, by applying itſelf to that Object, or that to itſelf, than for a Man to acquire a Right to a thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil Laws, ſome things are forbidden becauſe they are inconvenient, others are inconvenient and Evil becauſe forbidden; ſo it may be in Powers, Faculties and Appetites; *viz.* ſome may be determin'd by the natural Suitableneſs of the Objects, and in others, the Suitableneſs to the Objects may ariſe from the Determination. For this Faculty may be naturally inclin'd to Exerciſe, and one Exerciſe be more agreeable than another, not from any natural fitneſs of one rather than the other, but from the Application of the Faculty itſelf: for another would often be no leſs agreeable, if it had happen'd to be determin'd to that. Nothing hinders then but that there may be ſuch a Power or Faculty as this, at leaſt with reſpect to very many Objects. (70.)

V. Fourthly,

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(70.) Our Author's Notion of *Indifference* has been groſly miſunderſtood by all his Adverſaries, who have accordingly rais'd terrible Outcries againſt it, as deſtroying the eſſential, and immutable diſtinction between Good and Evil; ſubverting Appetites, making Reaſon and Judgment uſeleſs, and confounding every thing. We ſhall juſt obſerve here, that if it be apply'd to the *whole Man*, it cannot poſſibly be extended, nor was deſign'd by our Author to include all manner of external Objects, Actions, and Relations of things, as they ſeem to have underſtood it. For every Man in his Wits muſt be ſufficiently ſenſible, that all things don't affect him in the ſame manner, even before he has will'd any of them. I cannot be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, or Reſt, when I am Hungry, Thirſty, or Weary. Some natural Objects are agreeable, and produce pleaſure in me, and others the contrary, whether I will or no; and the ſame may be ſaid of the *moral Senſe*. Nay our Author every where allows their full force to what he calls the *Appetites*; and aſſerts that whatever contradicts them muſt be attended with Uneaſineſs. 'Tis not an abſolute indifference therefore of the *Man* or Mind in general, nor of the *Senſes*, Perception or Judgment, which he contends for; but it relates wholly to that *particular Power* of the Mind which we call *Willing*, and which will appear to be in its own Nature, or *Phyſically indifferent* to acting or not acting, notwithſtanding all theſe different Affections or Paſſions of the Mind rais'd by the different Objects. Let a thing ſeem never ſo pleaſant and agreeable, never ſo reaſonable, fit, and eligible

V. Fourthly, If then we ſuppoſe ſuch a Power as this, 'tis plain, that the Agent endow'd with it cannot be determin'd in its Operations by any præexiſtent Goodneſs in the Object; for ſince the agreeableneſs between it and the Objects, at leaſt in moſt of them, is ſuppoſed to ariſe from the Determination, the agreeableneſs cannot poſſibly be the Cauſe of that Determination on which itſelf depends. But the congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodneſs in it, therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at leaſt in theſe Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embrac'd it, nor Evil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power to the Object is prior to the Goodneſs and the Cauſe of it, this Power cannot be determin'd by that Goodneſs in its Operations.

Such a Power as this cannot be determin'd by any *Goodneſs* in Objects, ſince the Goodneſs of 'em depends upon the determination.

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be granted to exiſt, cannot be determin'd by any *Uneaſineſs* ariſing from the things about which it is converſant. For it is ſuppoſed to be indifferent, not only in reſpect of external Objects, but alſo of its own Operations, and will pleaſe itſelf,

Nor by any *Uneaſineſs*.

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gible to us, yet there is ſtill a natural poſſibility for us to will the contrary, and conſequently the bare *Power of willing* is in itſelf indifferent to either Side; which is all the indifference that our Author contends for. Now ſuch an Indifference as this Mr. *Locke* allows to be in the *operative* Powers of Man, tho' he confines it, I think, improperly, to them alone*. "I have the ability, ſays he, to move my hand, "or to let it reſt, that operative Power is in- "different to move or not to move my hand: "I am then in that reſpect perfectly free. My "Will determines that operative Power to "reſt, I am yet free, becauſe the Indifferency "of that my operative Power to act or not to "act ſtill remains; the Power of moving my "hand is not at all impair'd by the determi- "nation of my Will, which at preſent orders "reſt, the Indifferency of that Power to act "is juſt as it was before, as will appear, if "the Will puts it to the trial, by ordering the "contrary." The ſame, I think, may be apply'd to the *Will* itſelf in regard to Motives, *&c.* with much more Juſtice than to theſe operative Powers. Nay theſe can ſcarce be call'd indifferent to Action after the determination of the Will; but follow inſtantly (as we obſerv'd in Note 61.) in moſt Caſes when they are in their right State. What I Will or Reſolve to do, that I certainly effect if I have Power to do it, and continue in the ſame Will or Reſolution. However, this Indifference of the operative Powers is what can never conſtitute Morality (as was obſerv'd in the ſame place) ſince their Operations are no farther moral than as they are conſequent upon, and under the direction of the Will.

There muſt then be another Indifference prior to them, in order to make even the exertion of them indifferent, or free in any ſenſe.

For a more complete View of this Queſtion, ſee *Epiſcop. Inſtit. Theol.* L 4. C 6. and *Tract. de Libero Arbitrio.* There's alſo a good defence of our Author's Notion of Indifference in *P. a Limborch, Theol. Chriſt.* L. 2. C. 23. §. 20, *&c.*

* B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 71.

ſelf, whether it accepts the thing or rejects it; whether it exerts this Act or another. Theſe Objects then will neither pleaſe nor diſpleaſe till this Indifference be removed, but it is ſuppos'd to be removed by the Application or Determination of the Power itſelf; therefor Anxiety does not produce but preſuppoſe its Determination. Let us ſuppoſe this Power to be already determin'd (it matters not how) to embrace a certain Object, or to exert the proper Actions relating to it, *Deſire* manifeſtly follows this Determination, and Deſire is follow'd by an Endeavour to obtain and enjoy the Object purſuant to the Application of the Power. But if any thing ſhould hinder or ſtop this Endeavour, and prevent the Power from exerting thoſe Operations which it undertook to diſcharge in relation to the Object, then indeed Uneaſineſs would ariſe from the hindrance of the Power. Anxiety would therefore be the *Effect* of the Determination of this Power, but by no means the *Cauſe* of it *.

Nor by the *Underſtanding*

VII. Sixthly, Suppoſing ſuch an Agent as this to be endow'd alſo with Underſtanding, he might make uſe of it to propoſe Matters fit to be done, but not to determine whether he ſhould do them or not. For the Underſtanding or Reaſon, if it ſpeak Truth, repreſents what is in the Objects, and does not counterfeit what it finds not in them: Since therefore, before the Determination of this Power, things are ſuppos'd to be indifferent to it, and no one better or worſe than another; the Underſtanding if it performs its Duty right, will repreſent this Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more eligible than another; For the Underſtanding directs a thing to be done no otherwiſe than by determining that it is better; as therefore the Goodneſs of things, with reſpect to this Power, depends upon its Determination, and they are for the moſt part good if it embraces, evil, if it rejects them, 'tis manifeſt that the Judgment of the Underſtanding concerning things depends upon the ſame, and that it cannot pronounce upon the Goodneſs or Badneſs of them, till it perceives whether the Power has embraced or rejected them. The Underſtanding therefore muſt wait for the Determination of this Power, before it can paſs a Judgment, inſtead of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that Underſtanding before it can be determin'd.

VIII. Seventhly,

* How far this Argument will affect Mr. *Locke*'s Hypotheſis of *Anxiety*, may be obſerv'd from the latter part of Note 65.

VIII. Seventhly, But tho' this Power cannot be determin'd in its Operations by any Judgment of the Underſtanding, yet the Underſtanding is neceſſary, in order to propoſe Matters of Action, and to diſtinguiſh poſſible ones from thoſe that are impoſſible. For tho' the Goodneſs of things with reſpect to the Agent, proceeds from his Determination, yet the Poſſibility or Impoſſibility is in the things themſelves, and this Agent ſtands in need of the Underſtanding to diſtinguiſh between Objects, leſt it light upon Abſurdities, and ſo create itſelf Uneaſineſs. Not that an Object is therefore Good becauſe 'tis poſſible; for if it were rejected it would be Evil; nor will it be immediately diſagreeable becauſe impoſſible, for, attempting an Impoſſibility may be pleaſing to us, (for we may prefer the exerciſe of this Power, which is the thing that pleaſes us, as we ſaid before) but he that makes this Attempt, muſt neceſſarily be unhappy in the Event; for ſince the thing which the Power undertakes is impoſſible to be done, Uneaſineſs muſt neceſſarily follow the hindrance of its Exerciſe, and the final Diſappointment of its End.

Yet ſuch an Agent has need of underſtanding in order to diſtinguiſh poſſible things from impoſſible.

IX. This then muſt be aſſign'd as the *firſt Limitation* of ſuch a Power, *viz.* that it confine itſelf to Poſſibilities, and there needs no other, if the Agent be of infinite Power, in order to the obtaining of its End.

If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other Limitation.

X. Eighthly, But if the Agent's Power be finite, it has need alſo to conſult its Abilities, and not determine itſelf to any thing which may exceed them, otherwiſe it will be as much diſappointed in its Endeavour as if it had attempted abſolute Impoſſibilities. And this is the *ſecond Limitation* of this Power. It is impoſſible, you'll ſay, for an Appetite to purſue ſuch things as the Underſtanding evidently declares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I anſwer, the Senſes and natural Appetites are gratify'd with their Objects, and pleaſe themſelves, tho' Reaſon remonſtrate againſt them, and condemn that pleaſure as pernicious. How much more eaſily then may this *factitious Appetite*, which ariſes in the Agent from Application only, be conceiv'd to delight in its Good, tho' the Underſtanding oppoſe it, and condemn that Delight as fooliſh and of ſhort Duration. Why Nature granted ſuch a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the Good of the whole, will be ſhewn afterwards.

But an Agent of finite power muſt alſo conſult his Abilities.

Such an Agent cannot be determin'd by his other Appetites.

XI. Hitherto we have either conſider'd this Power alone in the Agent, or as join'd with the Underſtanding. But the Agent endow'd with it, may alſo have other Powers and Appetites which are determin'd to their Objects by a natural Congruity; yet neither can it be determin'd in its Operations by theſe Appetites. Theſe, when rightly diſpos'd, muſt neceſſarily exert their Operations upon the preſence of their Objects; but it is not at all neceſſary that they ſhould delight and pleaſe themſelves in theſe Operations. For inſtance, a bitter and nauſeous ſavour is diſagreeable to the Taſte: but tho' this be felt, yet urgent Hunger makes it pleaſant, Importunity of Appetite overcoming the Diſagreeableneſs of the Savour. This Pleaſure indeed is not pure, but mix'd and diluted proportionably to the Exceſs of the prevailing Appetite. For, ſuppoſe that there are three Degrees of Uneaſineſs from the Hunger, and two from the Bitterneſs, the Agent, to avoid three, muſt neceſſarily bear two, which being deducted, there remains only one Degree of ſolid Pleaſure; whereas if he had met with ſuitable and ſweet Food, there would have been three.

This Power is ſuperior to all the Appetites, and ſubdued by none.

XII. Since therefore the Pleaſure which ariſes from the Satisfaction of theſe natural Appetites, may be overcome by a ſtronger Appetite, there's no Reaſon to doubt but this Power which is indifferent to Objects may overcome all the other Powers and Appetites. For all theſe are limited by their Objects, and therefore have certain Bounds and Meaſures in their Operations; but this Power has no Bounds *, nor is there any thing wherein it cannot pleaſe itſelf, if it does but happen to be determin'd to it. Now ſince the natural Appetites themſelves may be contrary to each other (as we have ſhewn) and one of them be overcome by the Exceſs of another, how much more eaſily may this Power be conceiv'd to go againſt theſe Appetites, and ſince it is of a very different and ſuperior kind, 'tis probable that it can conquer all others, and be itſelf ſubdued by none.

It ſeems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have ſomething to

XIII. Nay we may imagine it to be given for this very End, that the Agent might have wherein to pleaſe itſelf, when thoſe things which are agreeable to the natural Appetites cannot be had, as it very often delight himſelf in when the natural Appetites muſt neceſſarily be fruſtrated.

* i. e. *in its* Objects, *ſee* Note 71.

often happens. As the natural Powers and Appetites receive Pleaſure and Pain from Objects, they muſt neceſſarily be deprived of Pleaſure, and undergo Pain, according to the Laws of Motion, and the order of external things. Since then they are often fruſtrated, they muſt render the Agents poſſeſs'd of them liable to Miſery, as well as make them capable of Happineſs: But the Agent can have this always to delight itſelf in; and 'tis an advantage to it to be able to quit the other Appetites, and pleaſe itſelf in reſtraining them, or acting contrary to them. For ſince every Faculty is ſatisfy'd in its exerciſe, the Strength of this cannot be more ſignally diſplay'd in any thing, than in running counter ſometimes to all the Appetites. For this muſt either be ſometimes done, or the Agent muſt be deſtitute of all manner of Good, and remain entirely miſerable; namely when, according to the Laws of Nature, ſuch things muſt be endured as are quite contrary to the Appetites *.

XIV. And from hence it is very evident how deſirable ſuch a Power as this would be: for if it happen to be determin'd to ſuch things as are agreeable to the Appetites, it augments, it multiplies the Enjoyment; but if it ſhould be determin'd to undergo thoſe things which are repugnant to the Appetites, and which it muſt neceſſarily bear ſometimes, it might diminiſh, nay quite remove the Uneaſineſs, or convert it into Pleaſure. (71.)

This Power, by its acceſſion, encreaſes the pleaſure of the other Appetites; by oppoſition, removes, or at leaſt alleviates the pain.

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(71.) This is not much more than what *Locke* aſſerts † in anſwer to the Enquiry, "Whether "it be in a Man's power to change the Pleaſantneſs and Uneaſineſs that accompanies any "ſort of Action? And to that, ſays he, 'tis "plain in many caſes he can. Men may "and ſhould correct their Palates, and give "a reliſh to what either has, or they ſuppoſe has none. The reliſh of the Mind "is as various as that of the Body; and "like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a miſtake to think that Men cannot change the "diſpleaſingneſs or indifference that is in Actions into Pleaſure and Deſire, if they will "but do what is in their Power." But it is objected by *Leibnitz*, againſt our Authors Notion, that if it could create Pleaſure by an arbitrary Determination and bare Election, it might for the ſame reaſon produce Happineſs *in infinitum* ‖, and then how could we be ever miſerable except we choſe to be ſo? Which Argument ſeems to be founded on a miſtake of our Author's meaning, as if he had intended to aſſert, that all the good and agreeableneſs in every

* viz. *in painful Remedies, diſagreeable Potions,* &c. *ſee* Subſect. 5. par. 9.
† B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 69. ‖ *Eſſais de Theodicee,* p. 466, 467.

The reſt of the Appetites are not to be balked unneceſſarily.

XV. It muſt be confeſs'd, that ſome kind of ſtruggle will be hereby excited in this Agent; but a ſtruggle attended with ſome Pleaſure, tho' it be qualify'd and not perfectly pure, is better than to be under abſolute Miſery. Nay, the conſciouſneſs of a Power to pleaſe itſelf againſt the bent and Inclination of the natural Appetites, may excite a greater Pleaſure than could ariſe from the fruition of thoſe things which would, if preſent, gratify theſe Appetites. Yet this Agent is oblig'd to have ſome regard to the Appetites, and not to diſturb them unneceſſarily, nor reſtrain them from a due enjoyment of their proper Objects. He that does this will bring upon himſelf uneaſineſs, and a needleſs conteſt. Tho' therefore it be not at all proper that ſuch a Power ſhould be abſolutely determin'd by the natural Appetites yet it is fit that they ſhould perſuade it, and that ſome regard be had to them in its Determinations. And this may be reckon'd its *third Limitation.*

Such an Agent as this is Self-active.

XVI. Ninthly, An Agent poſſeſs'd of ſuch a Principle as this would be *Self-active*, and capable of being determin'd in its Operations by itſelf alone. Now there is ſometimes an abſolute neceſſity for it to be determined; for when any thing is propos'd to be done immediately,

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every thing or action, proceeds abſolutely and entirely from our Will: and alſo, that this will is as unlimited in its *Exerciſe* as in its *Objects*, and conſequently that we might have any way, and at any time, as much Happineſs as we pleaſed, purely by willing it; all which Propoſitions are as falſe as they are foreign to the Intention of our Author, who inſiſts only upon this, that the act of willing, like the exerciſe of all our other Faculties, is in itſelf delightful to a certain Degree. This, when apply'd to an Object which is in itſelf agreeable, muſt add to the Pleaſure ariſing from it; when determin'd to a contrary one (both which kind of Objects he always ſuppoſes) muſt deduct from the Pain; when to an indifferent one, it muſt make that poſitively agreeable, by conferring ſo much abſolute and ſolid Happineſs.

But ſtill this exerciſe of the Will, and of conſequence the Pleaſure attending it, muſt in all finite Creatures be eſſentially and neceſſarily *finite*, as well as the exerciſe of all their other Powers: and tho' it has no bounds as to the number and kind of its Objects, yet it muſt be limited as to its own Nature and the degree of its exerciſe. This appears to me eaſily conceivable, and matter of experience. We find ourſelves generally able to turn our thoughts to any Object indifferently, but does any Perſon from hence imagine, that he can fix his thoughts upon any particular Object, with an unlimited Intenſeneſs, or think *infinitely?* granting the Words Intention and Remiſſion to be applicable here in any tolerable ſenſe: which will perhaps, upon Examination, appear very doubtful. However, it is evidently no good conſequence to infer, that becauſe I can will, or chooſe a thing abſolutely and freely, therefore I can will it *in infinitum*. May I not as juſtly be ſaid to perceive or underſtand a thing *in infinitum*, becauſe I perceive or underſtand it at all?

ly, it muſt neceſſarily either act or ſuſpend its action, one of them muſt neceſſarily be *; but when either of them is done, the Power is determin'd by that very act; and no leſs force is requiſite to ſuſpend than to exert the act, as common ſenſe and experience may inform any one †. A determination then about a thing once propoſed to be done, is unavoidable; and ſince it can neither be determin'd by any Good or Evil pre-exiſtent in the Objects, nor by the natural Powers or Appetites, nor by their Objects; it muſt of neceſſity either continue undetermined, or elſe determine itſelf. But tho' it be naturally free from any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires, that it ſhould be determin'd on every particular occaſion; and ſince there is nothing external to do this, it remains that it determine itſelf. We ſhall call th's Determination an *Election*; for as it is naturally indifferent to many things, it will pleaſe itſelf in electing one before another.

XVII. Nor is it a proper Queſtion to aſk, What determines it to an Election? For if any ſuch thing were ſuppos'd, it would not be indifferent, *i. e.* 'tis contrary to the Nature of this Agent, that there ſhould be any thing at all to determine it. In relation to a *paſſive Power* ††, which has a natural and neceſſary connection with the Object, the preſence of which determines it to act, we may reaſonably enquire what that Good is which may determine it to exert any particular action; but it is not ſo in an *active* Power, the very Nature of which is to *make* an Object agreeable to itſelf, *i. e.* good, by its own proper act. For here the Goodneſs of the Object does not precede the act of Election, ſo as to excite it, but Election makes the Goodneſs in the Object; that is, the thing is agreeable becauſe choſen, and not choſen becauſe agreeable: we cannot therefore juſtly enquire after any other cauſe of Election than the Power itſelf.

Is determin'd by himſelf, and things are not choſen becauſe they pleaſe him, but pleaſe him becauſe they are choſen.

XVIII. If theſe things be true, you'll ſay, this Agent will be determin'd by *Chance*, and not by *Reaſon*; but in reality here's no room for Chance, if by Chance be underſtood that which happens beſide the intention of the Agent; for this very Election is the Intention of the Agent, and it is impoſſible that a Man ſhould intend beſide his Intention. As for *Reaſon*, he that prefers a leſs Good to a greater, muſt be judg'd to act unreaſonably; but he that makes that a greater Good by chooſing

Yet he is not determin'd by Chance.

* See *Locke*, B 2. C 21. Sect. 23, 24. † *See* Note 63.
†† See *Locke*, Ch. 21. Sect 2.

chooſing it, which, before his choice, had either no Good at all in it, or a leſs, he certainly chooſes with reaſon. You may urge that *Contingency* at leaſt is to be admitted; if by this you mean, that this Agent does ſome things which are not at all neceſſary, I readily own a Contingency, for that is the very Liberty I would eſtabliſh.

Is the true Cauſe of his Actions.

XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that ſuch an Agent as this, if it be allow'd that there is ſuch an one, is the true *Cauſe* of his actions, and that whatever he does may juſtly be imputed to him. A Power which is not Maſter of itſelf, but determin'd to act by ſome other, is in reality not the *efficient* Cauſe of its actions, but only the *inſtrumental* or *occaſional* (if we may uſe the term of ſome Philoſophers) for it may be ſaid that the thing is done in it, or by it, rather than that it does the thing itſelf. No Perſon therefore imputes to himſelf, or eſteems himſelf the Cauſe of thoſe actions to which he believes himſelf to be neceſſarily determin'd: If then any inconvenience ariſe from them, he will look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime; and whatever it be, he will refer it to the Determiner. Nor will he be angry with himſelf, unleſs he be conſcious that it was in his power not to have done them: but he cannot be conſcious of this (except thro' ignorance and error) who is determin'd by another. For no others ought to be look'd upon as true Cauſes, but ſuch as are *free*. For thoſe that operate neceſſarily, are to be conceiv'd as *paſſive*, and we muſt recur to ſome other which impoſes that neceſſity on them, till we arrive at one that is free, where we may ſtop. Since then the Agent endowed with this Power, is determin'd by himſelf and no other, and is free in his Operations, we muſt acquieſce in him as a real Cauſe, and he ought to be eſteem'd the Author of whatever he does, either well or ill.

s capable of Happineſs.

XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifeſt that ſuch an Agent as this is capable of *Happineſs*. For that Perſon muſt be happy who can always pleaſe himſelf, but this Agent can evidently do ſo. For ſince things are ſuppoſed to pleaſe him, not by any neceſſity of Nature, but by mere Election, and there is nothing which can compel him to chooſe this rather than another; 'tis plain that the Agent endow'd with this Power may always chooſe ſuch things as it can enjoy, and refuſe, *i. e.* not deſire, or not chooſe thoſe things which are impoſſible to be had. And from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that whereby

whereby things become agreeable to the Appetites, be eſtabliſh'd by Nature, or effected by the Agent himſelf. For if Good and Evil proceed from Nature, and be inherent in Objects, ſo as to render them agreeable or diſagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happineſs of this Agent will alſo depend upon them; and unleſs the whole Series of things be ſo order'd, that nothing can happen contrary to his Appetites, he muſt fall ſhort of Happineſs. For his Appetites will be diſappointed, which is the very thing that we call Unhappineſs. But if Objects derive their agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs from the Choice, 'tis clear that he who has his Choice may always enjoy the thing choſen, unleſs he chooſe impoſſibilities, *&c.* and never have his Appetite fruſtrated, *i. e.* be always happy. Not that *all* things are indifferent with reſpect to this Power, for it admits of ſome Limitations, as was obſerv'd, beyond which it muſt neceſſarily deviate from Happineſs.

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be obſerv'd, that Agents, whoſe Felicity depends upon the agreement of external Objects to their Appetites, ſtand in need of a perfect and almoſt infinite Knowledge, to comprehend diſtinctly all the relations, habitudes, natures and conſequences of things; if they come ſhort of it, it is impoſſible but that they muſt often fall into pernicious Errors, and be diſappointed of their Deſires, that is be often miſerable: Hence anxiety and diſquiet of Mind muſt neceſſarily ariſe, and they would be agitated with continual doubts and uncertainty, leſt what they chooſe ſhould not prove the beſt. Theſe Agents then were either to be created without a proſpect of Futurity, or to be endow'd with a perfect Underſtanding; if neither were done, they muſt of neceſſity be very miſerable; for we can ſcarce conceive a greater Miſery than to be held in ſuſpence about Happineſs, and compell'd to chooſe among Objects not ſufficiently known, in which nevertheleſs a miſtake would be attended with unavoidable Miſery. There's none but is ſufficiently apprehenſive how anxious, how ſolicitous, how miſerable it muſt be to hang in ſuch a doubt as this; but if the agreeableneſs of things be ſuppoſed to depend upon *Election*, a very imperfect underſtanding will ſerve to direct this Agent, nor need he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he do but diſtinguiſh poſſible things from impoſſible, thoſe things which are pleaſant to the Senſes from them that are unpleaſant, that which is agreeable to the Faculties from what is diſagreeable, and conſult his

An imperfect underſtanding is ſufficient for his happineſs, if he do but diſtinguiſh between poſſibilities and impoſſibilities, things agreeable and diſagreeable to the ſenſes, and conſult his Abilities.

his own Abilities, *viz.* how far his power reaches; (all which are eaſily diſcovered) he will know enough to make him completely happy. Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done be the very beſt; for if the Election be but made within theſe bounds, that will become the beſt which is choſen.

Tho' Liberty would be a prejudice to other Agents, yet it is a ſure foundation of Happineſs to this, whoſe convenience depends not on Objects, but Election.

XXII. He that enjoys this Principle of pleaſing himſelf in his Choice cannot reaſonably complain of Nature, tho' he have but a very imperfect Underſtanding; for there will always be Objects enough ready to offer themſelves within theſe bounds, upon which he may exerciſe his choice, and pleaſe himſelf: that is, he may always enjoy Happineſs. Tho' Free-will then be of no uſe, as was ſaid before, to an Agent capable of being determin'd only by the convenience of external things, nay, tho' it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert Reaſon and produce Sin; yet to an Agent whoſe convenience does not depend upon the things, but the choice, it is of the greateſt Importance, and as we have ſeen, the ſure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence it appears how valuable and how deſirable ſuch an active Principle as this would be.

These things are clear enough, tho' they may appear to be a little too ſubtle.

XXIII. All this ſeems to be coherent enough, clear enough, and eaſy to be underſtood, tho' ſome may look upon it as a little too ſubtle. It remains that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypotheſis, without any Foundation in fact, or there be really ſuch a Principle to be found in Nature. (72.)

NOTES.

(72.) For an Explanation of our Author's Principle of *Indifference*, above what has been ſaid in Note 70, and will be enlarg'd on in Note 82. we ſhall only obſerve here, that moſt of the objections brought by the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, p. 69, *&c.* are built upon the old blunder of confounding this Indifference as apply'd to the Mind, in reſpect of its Self determining Powers of *willing* or *acting* with another, which is falſly referr'd to the paſſive Powers of *Perception* and *Judgment*, with reſpect to the former Faculties all things are phyſically indifferent or alike, that is, no one can properly affect, incline or move them more than another; with regard to the latter, moſt things are not indifferent, but neceſſarily produce Pleaſure or Pain, are agreeable or diſagreeable, whether we chooſe them or not: Our Author is to be underſtood only in relation to the former, in this and the following Sections, tho' he often uſes general terms.

SUBSECT.

SUBSECT. IV.

That there is an Agent who is pleas'd with Objects only becauſe he chooſes them.

I. WE have ſeen in the former Subſection, that ſome things are adapted to the Appetites by the conſtitution of Nature itſelf, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodneſs or Agreeableneſs in the things, by conforming itſelf to them, or adapting them to it: hereupon things pleaſe this Agent, not becauſe they are good in themſelves, but become good becauſe they are choſen. We have demonſtrated before, how great a Perfection, and of what uſe ſuch a Power would be, and that there is ſuch a Power in Nature appears from hence, *viz.* we muſt neceſſarily believe that *God* is inveſted with it. *God* is ſuch an Agent as this.

II. For in the firſt place, nothing in the Creation is either Good or Bad to him before his Election, he has no Appetite to gratify with the Enjoyment of things without him. He is therefore abſolutely *indifferent* to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm from any of them. What then ſhould determine his Will to act? Certainly nothing *without* him; therefore he determines himſelf, and creates to himſelf a kind of Appetite by chooſing. For when the Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the effectual procuring of that which he has choſen, as if he was excited to this Endeavour by a natural and neceſſary Appetite. And he will eſteem ſuch things as tend to accompliſh theſe Elections, Good; ſuch as obſtruct them, Evil. Becauſe nothing external is either good or bad to him before Election.

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Cauſe of Good in the Creatures, whereon they depend, as almoſt every one acknowledges. For created Beings have all that they have from the Will of God; nor can they be any thing elſe than what he will'd. 'Tis plain then that all theſe are conformable and conſonant to his Will, either efficient or permiſſive, and that their original Goodneſs is founded in this Conſo- Becauſe his own Will is the Cauſe of Goodneſs in the Creatures.

nancy. And ſince all things proceed from one and the ſame Will, which cannot be contrary to itſelf, as it is reſtrain'd within its proper bounds by infinite Wiſdom, 'tis alſo certain that all things are conſiſtent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as poſſible to the preſervation of itſelf and the whole Syſtem; which we muſt reckon their *ſecondary Goodneſs.* All the Goodneſs then of the Creatures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it, for we cannot apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themſelves, ſince they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine Will: and they were as far from being good with regard to God himſelf, till upon willing their Exiſtence, he, by that act of Election, both conſtituted them Good in relation to him; and, by an unity of Will, made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Caſes, by his Goodneſs and Wiſdom, and the immediate conſequence of this is, that things pleaſe God, *i. e.* are *Good.* For many things are not at all agreeable to his Goodneſs and Wiſdom, becauſe he did not will them, and while he does not will any thing, it cannot be good.

From whence it appears undeniably, that his Will could not be determin'd to Election by any Goodneſs in the Creatures. For before that Election which is declared to be the Cauſe of Goodneſs in created Beings, nothing could be either Good or Bad; but when the Election is made, that only is Evil which obſtructs the execution of it; and that Good which promotes it. The Goodneſs of things is therefore to be determin'd by their agreeableneſs to the Divine Will, and not that by the agreeableneſs or goodneſs of things.

They are not to be minded who declare that this Goodneſs determines the Will of God.

IV. Thirdly, We muſt not therefore attend to ſuch as declare that God chooſes things becauſe they are Good, as if Goodneſs and the greater Good, which he perceives in Objects, could determine his Will. (73.) If the Matter had ſtood thus, it does not ſeem poſſible for the

NOTES.

(73.) This Notion is advanc'd by Dr. *Clarke* in his *Demonſtration of the Divine Attributes,* Prop. 12. and afterwards explain'd, as far as it ſeems capable of Explanation, in his *Evidences of Natural and Reveal'd Religion,* Prop. 1. The ſame is inſiſted on by *Leibnitz, Grotius,* Mr. *Chubb,* and many others. We have enquired a little into it already in X i. ſee more in Note 75, *&c.*

the World to have been made at all. For they who acknowledge God to be the Author of it, confeſs alſo, that he is abſolutely and completely happy in himſelf, and does not ſtand in the leaſt need of other things. Now it is inconceivable how external things can be of uſe to God, who comprehends in himſelf all things which tend to perfect Happineſs. He muſt of neceſſity therefore be indifferent to all external Objects, nor can any reaſon be aſſign'd, with regard to the things themſelves, why he ſhould prefer one to another. 'Tis plain that things are made by God with Goodneſs, that is, with a certain congruity to his own Nature; but they are ſo far from being made on account of any agreeableneſs antecedent to the Divine Will, that, on the contrary, they are neceſſarily agreeable and pleaſant becauſe they are made by his free Choice. For ſince they are nothing in themſelves, they muſt of neceſſity have both their Exiſtence and their agreeableneſs from that Will, from which they ſolely proceed; and it is impoſſible but that they ſhould be conformable to the Will which effected them. For God, by willing, makes thoſe things pleaſing to him which were before indifferent.

V. Unleſs therefore we attribute to him ſuch a Power as has been deſcribed (namely, an ability to pleaſe himſelf, by determining himſelf to action, without any other regard had to the Quality of the Object, than that it is poſſible) it ſeems impoſſible that ever he ſhould begin to effect any thing without himſelf. For, as far as we can apprehend there can be no reaſon aſſign'd why he ſhould create any thing at all *, why a World, why at that particular time when it was created, why not before or after, why in this and no other Form: he receiv'd no advantage or diſadvantage from theſe, no benefit or harm; in ſhort, nothing that could move him to chooſe one before another. Except therefore we attribute to God an active power of determining himſelf in indifferent Matters, upon every particular Occaſion, and of pleaſing himſelf in that Determination according to his Choice; he would do nothing at all, he would be for ever indolent in regard to all external things, and the World could not poſſibly have been made, ſince no reaſon could be imagin'd, why a God abſolute-

If he had not a power of pleaſing himſelf in Election, he could never have made any thing.

* i. e. *no reaſon drawn from the particular Nature of the thing created.* *See* Note 74.

ly perfect in himself, and absolutely happy, should create any thing without him.

If he were moved by the Goodness of things to create the World, he would be a necessary Agent.

VI. Fourthly, If we suppose that there was a reason, and that God was moved by it to produce external things, 'tis manifest, that, according to this, all things will proceed from him necessarily. For he that is determin'd *ab extra* to do any thing, acts by necessity, he is passive, and must necessarily both do and suffer, not what he himself, but what the determining Cause has effected in him: But this Goodness (which is supposed to be in things antecedent to the Divine Election, and to determine it) is something External, with regard to the Will of God; if therefore that be the Cause which determines the Election, it follows, that the act of Election, and every thing which depends upon it is necessary.

But if things are good because he has chosen to make them, his whole Work will be free.

VII. But if things be good and agreeable to God for this only reason, because he has chosen to make them so, he himself will be at liberty, his whole Work will be free. The World will be produced, not by necessity, but choice; neither will it be impossible to be effected, tho' it be in itself unprofitable to the Deity, for he will have a complacency in his own Choice. And from hence it sufficiently appears of how great importance it is, that all the Goodness of the Creatures should depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon the Goodness of them, for we see that by this means Fate is destroy'd, and Liberty establish'd.

External things are in themselves absolutely indifferent to God, but he has a complacency in his Choice.

VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, you'll say, from the Objects of his Choice, why should he choose them? Is it not more probable that he should do nothing at all, than busy himself in things that are like to be of no benefit? It may be answer'd, That it is no more trouble to him to will things than not to will them; and hence it comes to pass, that when he wills them, they exist; when he retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. Which reason, as it supposes an indifference of things in respect of God, so it asserts his Liberty to produce or not produce them, and proves, that that will be agreeable to him which he shall choose. But we have a better yet at hand, *viz.* that God chose to create external things, that there might be something for him to delight in without himself. For every one receives Satisfaction from the Exercise of his Powers and Faculties.

Faculties. (74.) Now God is inveſted with infinite Power, which he can exerciſe innumerable ways, not all at once indeed (for all are not conſiſtent with each other) but ſuch as are conſiſtent are for the moſt part indifferent, nor is there any reaſon why he ſhould prefer one before another ††, it muſt therefore be his own Choice which makes one more agreeable than another; nor is it otherwiſe conceivable how a thing that is in itſelf indifferent to the Elector, ſhould prove more pleaſing than any thing elſe.

IX. Neither ought we to enquire for any reaſon of the Election, *i. e.* why he chooſes this rather than that; for upon ſuppoſition that there is a reaſon, the indifference would be deſtroy'd, and the Election

And determine himſelf to Action.

NOTES.

(74.) This reaſon is very conſiſtent with what our Author had deliver'd in C. 1. §. 3. par. 9, 10. where he aſſerted, that the end and intent of God in creating the World, was to exerciſe his ſeveral Attributes, or (which is the ſame thing) to communicate his Perfections to ſome other Beings: which Exerciſe or Communication could proceed from no other Cauſe beſide his own free Choice; and therefore he muſt be abſolutely and phyſically indifferent to it, in the ſame reſpect as Man was ſhewn to be indifferent towards any Action *, only with this diſparity, that Man, as a weak imperfect Agent, may eaſily be imagin'd to will Abſurdities or Contradictions, but God can never be ſuppoſed to will or act either inconſiſtently with his Nature and Perfections, or with any former Volition (as our Author obſerves in the 12th and following Paragraphs) and conſequently cannot be ſaid to be indifferent to ſuch things (as ſome have miſunderſtood our Author) any more than he is indifferent towards being what he is †. *Leibnitz* urges farther ‖, that it could not be in any ſenſe indifferent to God whether he created external things or not, ſince his *Goodneſs* was the Cauſe (according to our Author himſelf in the place above cited) which determin'd him to the Creation. But what do we mean by his *Goodneſs* here? Is it any thing more than an intent to exerciſe his Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate his Happineſs or Perfection? And is not this the very Determination or Election we are ſpeaking of? To ſay then that God is determin'd by his Goodneſs, is ſaying, that he determines himſelf; that he does a thing becauſe he is inclined to do it; 'tis aſſigning his bare Will and Inclination for a Cauſe of his Action; which is all that we contend for. Whereas they that would oppoſe us ſhould aſſign a *Cauſe* for that Will or Inclination itſelf, and ſhew a *natural* neceſſity for the operation of the Divine Attributes (for a *moral* one is nothing to the preſent Queſtion) a ſtrict phyſical connection between the Exiſtence of certain Perfections in the Deity, and their determinate Exerciſe. If therefore God had no other reaſon for the creation of any thing but his own Goodneſs, he was perfectly free and naturally indifferent, to create or not create that thing; and if he will'd, or was inclin'd to exert his Perfections thus freely, he muſt be as free and indifferent ſtill in the actual Exerciſe of them. As to the particular *manner* of his exerting them, ſee the following Note.

†† *Inſtances of this Indifference may be ſeen in our Author's Note* F, *and the* 5*th precedent Paragraph.*

* *See* Note 65, and 70. † *See* Note 75. ‖ *Remarques*, p. 473.

tion would not be free. For if we ſuppoſe that there is ſuch a thing as better and worſe in the Objects themſelves, who would affirm that the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God will not neceſſarily determine him to chooſe the better? For who can honeſtly poſtpone the better, and preſer the worſe? As then in indifferent Matters there can be no reaſon why one is choſen before another, ſo there is no need of any: for ſince the Divine Will is ſelf-active, and muſt neceſſarily be determin'd to one of the indifferent things, it is its own reaſon of Action, and determines itſelf freely. Nay ſo great is the Power of God, that whatever he ſhall chooſe out of infinite Poſſibilities, that will be the beſt, it matters not therefore which he prefers.

The difficulty of conceiving how a power can determine itſelf to action ought not to hinder our aſſent to the truth of the propoſition.

X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are ſtill unſatisfy'd how a Power can *determine itſelf*; *i. e.* you are ignorant of the *Modus*; but a thing muſt not be deny'd becauſe we do not know the manner how it is done, we are entirely ignorant how the Rays of the Sun produce the Idea of Light in the Mind by moving the optic Nerves; nor is it better underſtood how the Members of the Body can be moved by a Thought of the Mind, and at the Direction of the Will. Yet no body denys theſe things, becauſe he knows not the manner in which they are perform'd. If therefore it be manifeſt that the Divine Will does determine itſelf, we ſhall not trouble ourſelves much in enquiring how it can be.

'Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved by another, as by itſelf, we are prejudiced by being accuſtomed to material, *i. e.* paſſive Agents.

XI. But to confeſs the truth, 'tis no leſs difficult to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by another than by itſelf; but as we are accuſtom'd to material Agents *, all which are paſſive in their Operations, we are certain of the Fact, and not at all ſolicitous about the manner of it: whereas, if we conſider the thing thoroughly, we ſhall find ourſelves as far from apprehending how Motion is communicated from one Body to another, as how the Will can move itſelf: but there ſeems to be nothing wonderful in the one, becauſe it is obſerv'd to happen at all times, and in every Action, whereas the other is look'd upon as incredible, ſince it is ſeldom perform'd, *viz.* by the Will alone. And tho' both Reaſon and Experience prove that it is done, yet we ſuſpect ourſelves to be impoſed upon, becauſe we know not the manner of it. The ground of the miſtake is this, that ſince

* *See* Note 62 and 63.

ſince the Will is the only active Power which we are acquainted with, the reſt being all paſſive, we are not eaſily induced to believe it to be really ſuch, but form our Judgment of it from a Compariſon with other Agents, which ſince they don't move but as they are moved, we require a Mover alſo in the Will of God: which is very abſurd, ſince it is evident, that if there were no *active* Power in Nature, there could not be a *paſſive* one; and if nothing could move without a Mover, there would have been no Motion or Action at all †. For we cannot conceive how it ſhould begin. Now it is much harder to conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning, than how an Agent can move itſelf. Since then here are Difficulties on both Sides, neither ought to be deny'd, becauſe the manner of it is above human Underſtanding.

What is ſaid about indifference, with reſpect to the Will of God, takes place in his primary Elections.

XII. It is to be obſerv'd, that what we have ſaid concerning this Indifference of things in regard to the Divine Will, takes place chiefly in thoſe Elections which we apprehend to be the *Primary*, but not always in the ſubſequent ones. For ſuppoſing God to will any thing while that Election continues, he cannot reject either the ſame, or any thing neceſſarily connected with it, for that would be to contradict himſelf. In order to apprehend my Meaning the better, we muſt remember that the Divine Power can effect innumerable things equal in Nature and Perfections. For inſtance, we may conceive numberleſs Men equal to one another in all reſpects: and alſo numberleſs Species of rational Beings equally perfect, nothing but the Will of God could determine which of theſe he ſhould create firſt. But when it was determin'd to create Man ſuch as he now is, *i. e.* with the Faculties, Appetites, and integral Parts which he conſiſts of at preſent, it is impoſſible that God ſhould will or chooſe any thing repugnant to human Nature, while that Election continues.

God may have all things at once in his view which are connected with the thing choſen, and either will or refuſe them by one ſimple Act.

XIII. For when we conceive any thing propoſed to the Knowledge of God as fit to be done, he muſt alſo neceſſarily have under his Eye, as it were at the ſame Glance, all thoſe things that are neceſſarily connected with it, or conſequent thereupon to all Eternity;

† *See Dr* Clarke's *Demonſtrat. of the Attributes*, p. 82, 87, *&c. or* S. Fancourt's *Eſſay concerning Liberty, &c.* p. 28, 29, *and* Note 62.

and muſt will or reject them all by one ſimple Act. If therefore he determin'd to create Man, he muſt alſo be ſuppoſed to will that he ſhould conſiſt of a Soul and Body, that he ſhould be furniſh'd with Reaſon and Senſes, and that his Body ſhould be ſubject to the general Laws of Matter: for all theſe things are evidently included in the Choice to create Man.

As he is of infinite Goodneſs, he alſo wills the good of all things which he has determin'd to create, as far as poſſible.

XIV. Nay this primary Act of Volition muſt be ſuppoſed to contain not only thoſe things which have a neceſſary connection with what is choſen, but ſuch things alſo as tend to promote its benefit and happineſs, as far as they can be made conſiſtent with the benefit of the whole. For ſince God is infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he wills that his Creatures ſhould exiſt commodiouſly as much as that they ſhould exiſt at all. He therefore will'd ſuch things as are agreeable to the Natures, and tend to preſerve the Conſtitutions of his Creatures in the ſame Election whereby he determin'd to create them.

When the World therefore is once made, it is impoſſible that thoſe things ſhould pleaſe him which tend to the confuſion, *&c.* of his Work.

XV. We have ſaid before, that there is a double Goodneſs in things, the firſt and principal is that which renders them well-pleaſing to God, as they are conformable to his Will: the other is that whereby they agree with one another, whereby they afford each other mutual Aſſiſtance, whereby they promote the Convenience, Preſervation and Perfection of the whole: but both theſe proceed from the Choice and Will of God. For when the Deity had once determin'd to pleaſe himſelf in the Creation and Preſervation of the World, he muſt be ſuppoſed at the ſame time to have willed all ſuch things as contribute to the Benefit and Perfection of his Work, otherwiſe he would contradict himſelf, and thereby be the Cauſe of fruſtrating his own Election. For he is now ſuppoſed to have choſen that there ſhould be a World, that it ſhould continue as long as he himſelf had determin'd, that every Being ſhould attain the End aſſign'd to it, and all things act according to the Nature he had given them, and conſpire together to preſerve and perfect the whole. It is impoſſible therefore that he ſhould will the reverſe of all this, or that ſuch things ſhould pleaſe him as tend to the confuſion, mutilation, or detriment of his Work. For 'tis impoſ-

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ſible to conceive that he ſhould chooſe the Exiſtence of things, and yet refuſe the means neceſſary thereto. (75.)

XVI. When

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(75). This is a ſufficient Anſwer to *Leibnitz* who objects, that it will follow upon our Author's Principles that there is ſuch an abſolute Indifference in the Deity as muſt make him regardleſs whether the World were well or ill made; Mankind Happy or Miſerable, *&c.* Whereas our Author having made it appear that the Exerciſe of his Attributes, or Communication of his own Perfections, is the ſole End of his Action *, it follows that whenever he does act, he muſt act agreeably to that End; if he exerciſe theſe Attributes at all, the Effects of them muſt be conformable to the Cauſe. His abſolute Power can effect nothing which implies a mere defect of Power, his Infinite Goodneſs can produce nothing but Good or Happineſs in general, and his perfect Wiſdom muſt chooſe fit and proper means thereto. All this is included (as our Author ſays) in the very firſt Act of the Deity, or rather in his Will to act at all, and to ſuppoſe him to will at firſt, or to act afterwards in any reſpect contrary to this, is ſuppoſing him to will and act againſt his own Nature, and in contradiction to himſelf; or, which is the ſame, imagiuing an Effect to be quite different from, or contrary to its Cauſe. The *Moral* Perfections of the Deity are therefore immediate conſequences, or rather the genuin Exerciſe of his natural ones, and conſequently can never produce any thing in the main repugnant to them. And thus, I think, it may be ſhewn how all the Actions of the Deity muſt certainly be Good, Juſt, *&c.* without recurring to any ſuch *Fitneſſes* or *Relations* of things as are by ſome unaccountably ſuppoſed to be *antecedent* and abſolutely neceſſary to the determination of the Will of God himſelf.

But don't we, when we ſpeak of God's *Wiſdom* chooſing fit and proper means, evidently ſuppoſe, that ſome things are in themſelves good and eligible, and *vice verſa* even before any determination of the Deity about them? Where is the room for Wiſdom and Preference in God, if all things be alike and indifferent to him? I anſwer, firſt, If by things being in themſelves Evil, *&c.* be only meant, that ſome particular ways of acting may be conceiv'd, which would, if the Deity could be ſuppoſed to will them, be neceſſarily and eſſentially oppoſite, and have a tendency directly contrary to his preſent method of acting: we grant that ſome ſuch things may be imagin'd, but then it will be an abſurd and impoſſible ſuppoſition, that God ſhould ever will them, as he has already will'd the contrary; and therefore, in regard to him, they muſt ſtill be only imaginary. Nay they would be ſo far from being independent of, or antecedent to the Will of God in any ſenſe, that the very Eſſence and Idea of them would proceed entirely from, and preſuppoſe its Determination; ſince we can only conceive any Relations or Conſequences of things to be Good or Evil, ſo far as they are conſiſtent with, or contrary to the preſent Syſtem pre eſtabliſh'd by the Will of God. I anſwer in the ſecond place, that the primary Intent of the Creator being, as was ſhewn above, to communicate his Perfections to various Creatures (to which communication he was nevertheleſs abſolutely free and indifferent, and therefore could be determin'd to it by no external Cauſe) while that Intent continues, the neceſſary conſequence of it is, that Creatures be ſo made and conſtituted as to attain that End, and endow'd with ſuch Powers as will make them reſemble him as much as poſſible in their ſeveral States and Orders. All this is only proſecuting the ſame Volition, or continuing to communicate *himſelf*; and what we mean by chooſing *fit and proper means* for this, is only, that he is not a blind and unintelligent Agent, but conſcious of his own Nature and Operations, and therefore able to act in

* *See the laſt* Note.

When Man is made of ſuch a nature as requires him to be juſt, ſober, &c.

XVI. When therefore Man was made what he is, by that very Act of conſtituting him of ſuch a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, God alſo willed that he ſhould be pious, ſober, juſt and chaſt. Theſe and the like Laws of Nature then are immutable, *viz.* conformable to the Will of God, and contain'd in the very firſt Act of Election, wherein he determin'd to create Man. Nor is God at liberty not to will theſe during his purpoſe to continue Man ſuch as he is: For by this means the ſame thing would pleaſe him, as being agreeable to his firſt Choice of creating Man, which is ſuppoſed to ſtand yet, and diſpleaſe him, as being repugnant to another, which rejects the very ſame things that are contain'd in the firſt; that is, he would at the ſame time will and not will the ſame thing, which cannot be attributed to God.

God is not at Liberty not to will theſe things.

This is no bar to the Divine Liberty.

XVII. Yet he is never the leſs free, becauſe he cannot will that a Man be perjur'd, a Murtherer, *&c.* for he is no otherwiſe determin'd than by his own Choice; nor does a thing pleaſe or diſpleaſe him on any other account than becauſe it is agreeable or contrary to his Will. For while that Election of the Deity which conſtitutes me a Man (*i. e.* an Animal that is oblig'd to be pious, juſt and ſober) remains,

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in a certain *determinate manner*. Now ſuch determinate Action muſt produce a regular Syſtem, the ſeveral Parts whereof will be related to, and connected with each other, and by a mutual dependency render'd ſubſervient to the Good and Perfection of the whole. Tho' this whole Syſtem might at firſt perhaps be indifferent to the Agent in regard to ſeveral other Syſtems equally poſſible, and which might have been made equally perfect in its ſtead. It is not then as *Leibnitz* argues†, the natural and neceſſary Goodneſs of ſome particular things *repreſented by the Divine Ideas* which determines God to prefer them to all others, if underſtood of his *firſt* Act of producing them; but 'tis his own free, arbitrary Choice which, among many equal poſſibilities, makes ſome things *actually good*, and determines them into Exiſtence. When theſe are once ſuppoſed to exiſt, every thing or action becomes *good* which tends to their Happineſs and Preſervation. Hence alſo in reſpect to us certain conſequences and relations ariſe, which, by the very frame of our Nature and Conſtitution, or by certain Inſtincts, Affections, *&c.* we are directed to approve, and obliged to purſue, if we expect to be happy. Thus all *moral Obligation* is ultimately referr'd to the *Will of God*, which ſeems to be the only ſure and adequate foundation of it, and from which I think it may be deduced with much more clearneſs and conſiſtency than from that *Hypothetical Neceſſity* of the relations of things, which evidently preſuppoſes, as was obſerv'd before, and is itſelf only founded on the Will of God. See the *Preliminary Diſſertation*, and X i. and Note 76. *or* Puffendorf *of the Law of Nature and Nations*, B. 1. C 1. §. 4. Note 7. and B. 2. C. 3. §. 20.

† *Remarques*, p. 447.

mains, 'tis impoſſible that he ſhould will me to be perjur'd, or a Murtherer; nor can the latter Choice take place in God ſo long as the former ſtands, ſince it is repugnant to the former. When therefore we acknowledge that things are good, and aſſert that ſome Actions are grateful to God, and others odious; this is not becauſe we believe the Divine Elections to be determin'd by them, but becauſe we ſuppoſe them to be comprehended in the very firſt Act of his Will of creating things, and to be pleaſing or diſpleaſing to him, ſo far as they are agreeable or oppoſite to that Election. Nor does this deſtroy the Liberty of Good, that he muſt neceſſarily will theſe while he does will them: For every thing, while it is, neceſſarily is; but this Neceſſity is conſequent upon, and not antecedent to the Divine Will. The Divine Election therefore is not determin'd by the Goodneſs of things, but the Goodneſs and Fitneſs of them ariſes from that Election, and that is beſt for them which is moſt agreeable to that Choice of the Deity, whereby he will'd them to be what they are. From hence, I think, it appears ſufficiently, that God is ſuch an Agent as delights in things merely becauſe they are choſen. (76.)

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(76) To what has been ſaid on this ſubject in the precedent Notes, I ſhall only add here, that their Argument ſeems to be of very little force againſt our Author, who urge, that if all Good and Evil depended upon the *Arbitrary Will* of God, then it would not be impoſſible for God to will that Vice be Virtue, that two and two make five, *&c.* For allowing that God at firſt made all things what they are, and ſtill continues to them the ſame Exiſtence, (tho' perhaps no reaſon *a priori* can be aſſign'd why he made them in this rather than ſome other manner) Vice muſt be Vice, *&c.* that is, while things are as they are, the ſame Conſequences and Relations will reſult from them; and to ſuppoſe the contrary, is to ſuppoſe that things may be different, or have different conſequences, while they continue the ſame; or that they may be what they are and what they are not at the ſame time. Thus all the preſent *Relations* are evidently *ſubſequent* to the preſent Order of Nature, and muſt continue with it; and this conſequential Neceſſity is all the *Fitneſs* that I know of.

To ſtile this *Eternal* and *Immutable* can therefore only mean thus much, *viz.* ſuppoſe things to be at any time what they now are, and at the ſame time the very ſame conſequences would flow from them which we now find. Suppoſe a Set of Beings conſtituted like ourſelves, and framed with the like Capacities for Happineſs, and the ſame relative Duties muſt be incumbent on them in order to attain that Happineſs. If they be imperfect dependent Creatures, and perpetually ſtanding in need of each others aſſiſtance; if alſo they have ſuch Paſſions, Inſtincts and Inclinations as tend to unite them to each other, and oblige them to act in concert: if they be thus framed, I ſay, they will of conſequence be thus related, and ſubject to all the moral Obligations which we now are. But ſtill this neceſſity is only Hypothetical,

A Being endow'd with this Power is more perfect than one that wants it: yet this does not imply infinite Perfection, therefore it is communicable.

XVIII. Yet it is to be remark'd, that this ſelf-determining Power is not of ſuch a Nature as to imply infinite Perfection; for it may be conſiſtent with an imperfect Underſtanding, and other Appetites, as we have ſhewn before: There is no reaſon therefore for us to doubt whether a Creature may partake of it; if God were pleaſed to communicate it, there ſeems to be no contradiction in the thing for a Creature to be capable of it. Now that Being which has this gift beſtow'd upon it, will manifeſtly be more noble than the reſt, and a more perfect reſemblance of the Deity: ſince therefore God has created the leſs perfect Beings, we may, without any abſurdity, believe that he has not omitted the more perfect. Let us ſee then whether there be any Tokens of this Power among the Divine Works *.

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pothetical, and like the neceſſity of any certain Conſequence reſulting from certain Premiſes; which Premiſes being alter'd, a different, a quite contrary one will be equally neceſſary. Thus in the former Inſtance, if any rational Creatures be conſtituted ſocial Beings, they will indeed be obliged to act as ſuch; but let ſome be made independent of each other, and unſociable, endowed with, or ſo made as neceſſarily to *acquire* Paſſions, Inſtincts and Inclinations, quite oppoſite to the former, and their Duties will be quite the reverſe. The great Virtue of *Selfiſhneſs* will then occupy the place of *Univerſal Benevolence*, and that Method of Life perhaps produce the greateſt Sum of Happineſs to each individual, and conſequently be the moſt eligible to every one, which has now the direct contrary Effect. If ſuch a ſuppoſition be conceivable, 'tis ſufficient to ſhew that theſe Relations are not *abſolutely neceſſary in themſelves*, but only conditionally and conſequentially to the preſent Order of the Creation. See *Puffendorf*, B. 1. C. 2. §. 6. and the Note 2. p. 20.

If thoſe Authors who treat of the neceſſary Relations of things independent of the Will of God, mean only, that it was always impoſſible for God to prevent or alter them whenever the things themſelves were ſuppoſed to exiſt; this is a neceſſity which may very ſafely be granted, but will ſerve little to their purpoſe: 'tis a neceſſity which is applicable (as our Author obſerv'd above) with equal propriety to any thing. 'Tis juſt as much as to affirm that while a thing is, it neceſſarily is; while the whole is the ſame, the parts muſt be ſo too. If the Objection goes yet farther, and it be urg'd, that according to us it will not be impoſſible for God to change his *primary* Will of creating theſe things, and ſo to alter the whole Syſtem together. I anſwer, 'tis ſcarce worth diſputing whether ſuch a Chimerical Suppoſition be poſſible or not, ſince however things might have been at firſt, yet as they are now conſtituted, it does not at all ſhake the foundation of Morality, nor affect our preſent Duties to God, ourſelves, or one another: Theſe muſt all neceſſarily be what they now are,

* *For the* poſſibility *of ſuch a Power, and of its being* communicated, *ſee Dr.* Clarke's *Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God*, p. 82 *and* 85. 7th Edit. *For the* Perfection *of it, ſee* Note 82. *and* §. 2. *of this Chapter.*

SUBSECT. V.

That Man partakes of this Principle of pleaſing himſelf by Election.

I. IT appears, I think, from what has been ſaid, that there is ſuch a Principle as this in Nature, and that it is alſo communicable. We are now to enquire whether Nature has conferr'd it upon us: If we conſult our own Minds, we may poſſibly entertain a doubt whether we are always paſſive in our voluntary Acts: namely, whether the Goodneſs of Objects determines our Elections, according to the Degrees of it, which are, or are believed to be in them; or, to ſpeak more plainly, whether we always chooſe things becauſe they pleaſe us, or ſeem convenient; or whether they ſometimes appear indifferent in themſelves, or inconvenient before the Choice, and acquire their Goodneſs from it, and are for this reaſon only agreeable becauſe they are choſen. We have ſeen that there is in Nature ſuch a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience or Goodneſs in things by willing them; but, whether we partake of it or no is the doubt. Now, that we do partake of it may I think be evinced from the following Reaſons. Firſt, If we be conſcious of an inherent Liberty. Some reaſons are offer'd to ſhew this.

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are, while this Univerſal Syſtem continues as it is; which is ſufficient for our Purpoſe. Nay, I think, we may go a ſtep farther, and aſſert, that the foremention'd ſuppoſition is impoſſible. For God, ſuppoſing him to be good and wiſe, by once chooſing this Syſtem (whether the firſt Choice were neceſſary or indifferent) has demonſtrated to us, that it was at leaſt equally perfect with any other which might poſſibly have exiſted; otherwiſe that other would have been actually preferr'd to it: as therefore there can be no better Syſtem placed in the room of the preſent one, there can be no reaſon in Nature for this Change, and therefore there will be none, tho' ſuch a Phyſical Power of changing it were allow'd to be inherent in the Deity: Nor need we be ſo much afraid to allow that Being to be in the ſtricteſt ſenſe *Arbitrary*, which we have before proved to be *abſolutely perfect*.

Upon this Subject ſee *Puffendorf* of the Law of Nature, *&c.* B. 2. C. 1. §. 3. and C. 3. §. 4, 5. with the Notes.

berty. Secondly, If we experience in ourſelves thoſe Signs and Properties which have been declared to attend this Principle. Thirdly, If the Cauſes which are ſuppoſed to determine the Will be evidently inſufficient, or ariſe from Election, inſtead of producing it.

First, Experience.

II. As to the firſt; We experience in ourſelves a Principle of this kind, *i. e.* a free one, to ſuch a degree of certainty, that if our Minds be conſulted we can hardly doubt of it; and from hence it is, that all Men of all Nations, while they follow'd the Guidance of Nature, and attended to the Perceptions of their own Minds, have conſtantly aſſerted their Liberty, at leaſt in ſome particular Actions: nor has any one, unleſs he were forc'd to it, and as it were circumvented by Philoſophical Subtilties, ever deny'd, either that he was free, or that he could pleaſe himſelf in chooſing one or other out of many Objects preſented to him, tho' that which was preferr'd were no ways preferable to others in reſpect of any intrinſic worth.

The vulgar often judge better of matters of Fact than Philoſophers

III. In this therefore, as in many other Caſes, the Vulgar ſeem to be much wiſer, and to reaſon more juſtly than Philoſophers. For the Vulgar generally follow the natural Senſe of the Mind; and, tho' they be dull enough in forming long Deductions, yet in ſuch things as are the immediate Objects of Senſe and Experience, they are often more acute than Philoſophers themſelves. For theſe being either puff'd up with the Vanity of appearing wiſe above the Vulgar, or impos'd upon by their own Subtilty, often frame Monſters of their own, and deny things that are the moſt manifeſt: while they are ſtriving to purſue Truth thro' Coverts impervious and inacceſſible to human Wit, they leave her behind their Backs, and are blind in full Light. Hence ſome have deny'd Motion, and others Reſt, others Space †, others all Senſe in Brutes, and others all manner of Truth: and on the ſame account, ſome have deny'd Liberty, *viz.* becauſe they were not able to unravel the Difficulties in which they themſelves,

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† By the denyers of *Space* our Author ſhould only mean ſuch as deny that we have an *Idea* of it, not them who deny it to have a *real Exiſtence*, otherwiſe he himſelf will be one of the Philoſophers lately mention'd, ſince he has often aſſerted in C. 1. §. 2. (and I think with reaſon) that we may eaſily conceive it all away: whereas it muſt evidently be neceſſarily exiſtent, if it have any Exiſtence at all.

See Notes 5, 11, and 13.

ſelves, by their Subtilties, had involv'd it. The ignorant and unlearned do much better in ſlighting all ſuch Arguments, and judging of things ingenuouſly according to the dictate of their Senſes and Experience; and if their Judgments be taken we have clearly gain'd the Cauſe: for all theſe declare that they are conſcious of this free Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we have ſhewn, be well explain'd otherwiſe than we have done: The Senſe of our unprejudic'd Mind agrees with theſe, nor is the common Teſtimony of Mankind to be eſteem'd of little importance in a matter of Fact. (77.)

IV. Secondly,

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(77.) The Subſtance of what *Leibnitz* objects againſt this Argument *, amounts to thus much, *viz.* That it is no proof of the non-exiſtence of a thing becauſe the Vulgar don't perceive it; they are no Judges of any thing but what is perceiv'd by the Senſes; they believe the Air to be nothing when it is not mov'd; they know nothing of the ſubtle Fluid which cauſes Gravity, or of the magnetic Matter, much leſs of immaterial Subſtances: and therefore the ſeveral Cauſes of Action, the ſecret Springs, the Reaſons and Inclinations, may be all unknown to them, and yet we be abſolutely determin'd (as he believes we always are) either by the conſtitution of our own Bodies, or of thoſe about us, or by a thouſand little things which, upon due attention and reflection, we might be able to diſcover.---We reply, that tho' in many Caſes our not perceiving a thing be no Argument that it does not really exiſt, yet in ſome Caſes, in this particularly, it is: To feel no Pain, to be conſcious of no Idea, is to have none: and in like manner to perceive no motive or reaſon of Action, is the ſame as not to act upon any, or to perceive that we act without one. If any one (whether Philoſopher or Peaſant) be thinking upon a Subject, he muſt, at that inſtant, know the Subject that he is thinking on, or however, that he does think on ſomething: 'tis likewiſe ſelf-evident, that every reaſonable Man, when he reſolves upon ſome View, or follows an Inclination, muſt be conſcious of that View, or at leaſt be ſenſible that his Reſolution was form'd upon ſome View or other. In theſe Caſes therefore, and in all the modifications of Thought, not *to be*, and not to be *perceiv'd*, is the very ſame thing.

But beſide the abſurdity of being influenc'd by a Motive which we know nothing of; beſide the Impoſſibility of reconciling theſe imperceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty, (for which ſee Note 65.) we reply, ſecondly, that our Author does not conclude againſt the Exiſtence of a thing becauſe the Vulgar do not perceive and take notice of it, but on the contrary argues, that there muſt be ſuch a thing as a Liberty of Indifference, becauſe they do continually perceive and acknowledge it; becauſe they clearly perceive and experience it in themſelves, or at leaſt imagine that they do ſo; nay, becauſe they have as great Evidence of ſuch a ſelf-determining Power, as they have of any thing, even of their own Exiſtence: and conſequently they muſt either be deceiv'd in every thing, or not deceiv'd in this †. The preſent Argument is therefore built on matter of Fact, and will be concluſive here, tho' our Ignorance be never ſo great in other Caſes. Our aſſurance of a Truth which we do clearly perceive, is not the leſs for there being a great many other Truths which we do not perceive: and tho' our not perceiving a thing were no Argument that it does not exiſt, yet our actual perception of it is a Demonſtration that it does. It is not, therefore, *becauſe we do not conſider the Cauſes that communicate Motion to the Soul*,

* *Remarques*, p. 477.

† *See* Note 82.

'Tis proved that we partake of this Power, because we discover the Marks and Properties of it in ourselves

IV. Secondly, If we experience in ourselves the Signs and Properties which belong to this Power, it cannot be question'd but we have the Power itself: Now these are a Self-consciousness that we are the true Cause of our Actions; an Ability to act and please ourselves in contradicting our natural Appetites, our Senses and Reason. If it be evident from Experience that we can do these things, it will be too certain that we have such a Power as is able to please itself barely by Election.

In the first place, we impute our Actions to ourselves, whereby we own ourselves to be the true Causes of them. Hence it is that we distinguish Misfortunes from Crimes.

V. In the first place then, we have declared that a Being endow'd with this Principle is the only true efficient Cause of its Actions, and that whatever it does can be imputed to it only. Now all Men impute the Actions of their own Will to themselves, and esteem them truely and properly theirs, whether they be good or bad; which is a certain Sign that they do not perceive themselves to be determin'd from elsewhere to the Choice or Exertion of them, otherwise they would not look upon themselves as the Cause, but the Determiner. It cannot be otherwise than from a consciousness and firm persuasion of this Truth, that wrong Elections give us more trouble than such things as proceed from Ignorance and inevitable Error. 'Tis on this account only that a light Evil occasion'd by our own Choice grieves and afflicts us more than a very great one from the Action of another. If we expose ourselves to Poverty, Disgrace, or an untimely End, by an Act of Choice, our Conscience remonstrates against it, Remembrance stings us, and we cannot forgive ourselves, tho' we were secure both from human Punishment and the Wrath of God. But when the same Evils befal us by external Force or the Necessity of Nature, we bewail our Condition indeed, and complain of Fortune, but have none of that wounding Anxiousness, and vindictive Reproach of Conscience, which scourges those that become miserable

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Soul, or are not able to delineate the precise manner of that Communication, that we assert the Soul to be self-motive (as the Author of the late *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity* argues, p. 15.) But we assert that it is self-motive, because we *feel* it to be so, and have as great Evidence of it as we could expect or conceive ourselves to have, were it really so. And that Author unreasonably begs the Question, in supposing that there are such Causes and Communicators in a Case where he has, where he can have, no Evidence at all of them. But this *Dissertation* is fully confuted by Mr. *Jackson*, to whose excellent Answer I refer the Reader.

ſerable by their own fault. As therefore he that enjoys this Principle muſt neceſſarily blame himſelf if he bring any Inconvenience upon himſelf by his own Choice; ſo he that does blame himſelf, demonſtrates that he has this Principle. For as it is impoſſible but that he ſhould accuſe himſelf, who believes that he is the true cauſe of his own Miſery, ſo on the other hand, 'tis certain that he who does accuſe himſelf, thinks that he himſelf is the true cauſe of his Miſery: otherwiſe he would grieve, complain, and be angry with the Perſon that compell'd him to commit ſuch things as he finds make him uneaſy, but would never condemn himſelf as the Cauſe and Author of them, unleſs he were conſcious that he could have hinder'd them. If the grief ariſing from a Crime be diſtinct from that which is occaſion'd by a Misfortune, 'tis plain that this can be on no other account, than becauſe the Crime proceeds from a free Agent, *i. e.* one who determines himſelf to Action, but the Misfortune from a neceſſary one.

VI. 'Tis plain then from our *Conſcience* of Good and Evil Actions, that we have this active Principle in ſome reſpect within us. For we not only rejoice in ſuch things as are done well, and grieve at the contrary, but alſo impute them to ourſelves, and either blame or applaud ourſelves as the Authors and true Cauſes of them: which is the firſt and ſureſt Sign that our Minds are ſenſible of their Liberty, and that they could have pleas'd themſelves in doing otherwiſe than they have done. (78.)

This is a moſt certain Sign that we are conſcious of our liberty

VII. The

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(78.) 'Tis pleaſant to obſerve how the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry* endeavours to anſwer this Argument, by confounding the two Ideas of Sorrow and Self-accuſation; of a Misfortune and a Crime, as his great Predeceſſor *Hobbs* had done before. "Conſcience "(ſays he) being a Man's own Opinion of his "Actions, with relation to ſome rule, he "may at the time of doing an Action contrary to that rule, know that he creates "that Rule, and conſequently act with re"luctance, tho' not ſufficient to hinder the "Action. But after the Action is over, he "may not only judge his Action to be con"trary to that rule, but by the abſence of the "pleaſure of the Sin, and by finding himſelf "obnoxious to Shame, or by believing himſelf "liable to Puniſhment, he may really accuſe "himſelf; that is, he may condemn himſelf "for having done it, be ſorry he has done it, "and wiſh it undone, becauſe of the conſe"quences that attend it *." Where, not to "inſiſt upon the perpetual abuſe of the words, *do*,

* *Philoſophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, p. 105, 106.

The ſecond token of this Power, that it can go againſt the Appetites, &c.

VII. The ſecond Sign or Property of this Power is, that it is able to oppoſe the natural Appetites, Senſes and Reaſon, and can pleaſe itſelf in the Oppoſition. If we experience this Ability in ourſelves, we may be certain that we partake of ſuch a Power.

'Tis ſhewn that we can do this in regard to our Appetites.

VIII. With reſpect to the natural Appetites, we have ſaid before *, that this Principle, when it happens to be join'd with natural Appetites in the ſame Perſon, often runs counter to them, and pleaſes itſelf in reſtraining them; if we find that we can do this, 'tis a Sign that we have it. But who has not experienc'd this in himſelf? who has not ſometimes voluntarily ſuffer'd ſuch things as are hard, incommodious, and painful to the natural Appetites, and taken delight in ſuch Sufferance, as if that were ſome kind of Good ſuperior to the

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do, act, &c. which upon this Hypotheſis muſt have a Signification directly oppoſite to that which they now commonly bear; what can we mean by a Man's accuſing or condemning himſelf, when he is ſenſible that he has done nothing which he could have alter'd or avoided; or rather done nothing at all, but only ſuffer'd all the while from ſome other? He may indeed perceive and judge himſelf to be miſerable, and be ſorry that he is ſo, and wiſh himſelf otherwiſe; but what is all this to a Criminal Shame, Remorſe, and Self-conviction? Is this all that we underſtand by a *Guilty Conſcience?* Can he blame, reproach, or be angry with himſelf for being only what another made him, and what he knows he could not poſſibly help?

As this is matter of Fact and Experience, we appeal to the common Senſe of Mankind, whether the Ideas of Guilt, Remorſe, &c. be not entirely different, and evidently diſtinguiſhable from theſe? The ſame holds with regard to our blame or accuſation of another, as has been ſhewn at at large by Bp. *Bramhall*, to whoſe *Caſtigations* of *T. Hobbs* I muſt refer this Author. "I ask'd (ſays the Bp. †) why do "we blame free Agents? ſince no Man blameth Fire for burning Cities, nor accuſeth "Poiſon for deſtroying Men. Firſt, he returneth an Anſwer, *We blame them becauſe "they do not pleaſe us.* Why? May a Man "blame every thing that doth not pleaſe his "Humour? Then I do not wonder that *T. "Hobbs* is ſo apt to blame others without "Cauſe. So the Scholar may blame his Maſter for correcting him deſervedly for his "Good. So he who hath a vitious Stomach "may blame healthful Food. So a Lethargical Perſon may blame his beſt Friend for "endeavouring to ſave his Life. And now, "having ſhot his bolt, he begins to examine "the Caſe. *Whether blaming be any thing more "than ſaying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect.* Yes, moral blame is much more, 'tis "an Imputation of a Fault. If a Man be born "blind, or with one Eye, we do not blame "him for it: but if a Man has loſt his Sight "by his Intemperance, we blame him juſtly. "He enquireth, *May we not ſay a lame Horſe "is lame?* Yes, but you cannot blame the Horſe

* Subſect. 3. par. 11, 12.

† p. 762.

the Gratification of the Appetites. (79.) Nay the Pain itſelf ariſing from the Violence offer'd to theſe natural Appetites, if we do but chooſe to bear it, becomes in a manner agreeable, which would otherwiſe be very irkſome. From whence it is moſt apparent that this Pleaſure depends upon the Choice for while that continues, it continues too; when that is chang'd, 'tis gone. Now ſuch Elections as theſe are made every Day, and none can be ſo much a Stranger to himſelf, as not to be conſcious of them. (80.)

IX. It is to be obſerv'd farther, that we do not only embrace with pleaſure ſuch things as the Appetites refuſe, and reject ſuch things as they deſire, but alter, as it were, Nature itſelf, by an obſtinate Election, and make theſe Appetites purſue what they naturally avoid, and fly what by Nature they deſire. And this takes place not only in

That we can do it alſo in our Senſes, and in a manner change the nature of things by an obſtinate Election.

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" Horſe for it, if he was lam'd by another, " without his own Fault. *May not a Man ſay* " *one is a Fool or a Knave* (ſaith he) *if he be* " *ſo, tho' he could not help it?* If he made " himſelf a Sot, we may blame him; tho', if " he be a ſtark Sot, we loſe our Labour. But " if he were born a natural Idiot, it were " both injurious and ridiculous to blame him " for it. Where did he learn that *a Man may* " *be a Knave and cannot help it?* or, that Kna- " very is impoſed inevitably upon a Man with- " out his own fault? If a Man put fire to his " Neighbour's Houſe, it is the fault of the " Man, not of the Fire. He hath confeſs'd " formerly, that a *Man ought not to be puniſh'd* " *but for Crimes*, the reaſon is the very ſame, " that he ſhould not be blamed for doing that " which he could not poſſibly leave undone; " no more than a Servant whom his Maſter " hath chain'd to a Pillar, ought to be blam'd " for not waiting at his Elbow. No Chain " is ſtronger than the Chain of *Fatal Deſtiny* is " ſuppoſed to be."

See the ſame Author's Definitions of Liberty, Neceſſity, *&c.* with his Defence of them, " p. 756, *&c.* and his Reply to all *T. Hobbs*'s Evaſions (ſince tranſcrib'd by the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, p. 91, *&c.*) in his *Vindication*, p. 679, *&c.*

(79) To this *Leibnitz* anſwers, " That it is " only oppoſing or ballancing one Appetite " with another. We ſometimes bear Incon- " veniencies, and we do it with pleaſure, but " this is only by reaſon of ſome hope, or " ſome ſatisfaction which is join'd to the E- " vil, and which ſurpaſſes it." We reply, if by hope be meant an expectation of ſome future Good, 'tis plain that we can oppoſe and reſiſt any natural Habit without any ſuch Expectation, as may be experienc'd when we pleaſe, in Hunger, Thirſt, *&c.* The proſpect of the bare pleaſure of willing to do ſo cannot be the Good hoped for, ſince that is a ſure attendant on every ſuch Volition; all the ſatisfaction then which appears to be join'd with the Evil, and to counterballance it in any ſuch Caſes, can only be the pleaſure ariſing from the actual Exertion of the ſelf-moving Power, which is the thing our Author contends for. See the latter part of Note 65.

(80) 'Tis a common and juſt Obſervation, that Men as well as Children bear any Labour or Fatigue which they undertake voluntarily, with half the Uneaſineſs and Grief which the very ſame thing would give them, if they were forc'd to undergo it; which cannot, I think, be accounted for, but upon our Author's Principle.

in Appetites, but alſo in the Objects of the Senſes. Some things are naturally unpleaſant to them, ſome things bitter, nauſeous, deform'd, yet theſe are made tolerable by the force of Election, and by a change of the natural Propenſity, at length become Delights *. On the contrary, what was ſweet, beautiful, *&c.* being rejected by the Will, becomes at length diſagreeable. We could not poſſibly do this, if we had not a Power of pleaſing ourſelves by other Means, than the agreement of Objects to the Appetites and Senſes. For, whence comes it that ſuch things as are ſweet, comely, excellent, commodious; nay, all that are grateful to the Appetites and Senſes ſhould be rejected; and when once rejected, ſhould become irkſome and offenſive? On the contrary, whence is it that Griefs, Pains, Torments, nay Death itſelf ſhould be agreeable when voluntarily undergone, unleſs from this Principle which pleaſes itſelf in its Election? If it be granted that we have ſuch a Principle, it may be eaſily ſhewn how theſe things can be effected; for natural Good may, by the Power of it, be chang'd into Evil, and Evil into Good: for it has a Good in itſelf ſuperior to theſe, by the Power of which it can overcome and alter the Nature of them: but that this cannot admit of any other Explanation will be ſhewn below †.

That we can conquer not only our Appetites and Senſes, but alſo our Reaſon by the force of Election.

X. Theſe things are generally ſuppoſed to be done by the Power and Preſcription of *Reaſon*; and 'tis thought, that the Will is thereby directed to embrace things diſagreeable to the natural Appetites and Senſes: I confeſs this ſometimes is, and always ought to be done according to reaſon; for we have hinted above, that ſome regard ſhould be had to theſe things in Elections; but very often the Caſe is far otherwiſe. We have ſhewn before, that a Power which is capable of pleaſing itſelf by Election, cannot be determin'd by reaſon; for the Underſtanding depends upon it, rather than it upon the Underſtanding. 'Tis therefore the *third* Mark and Property of this Power, that it can run counter, not only to *Appetites* and *Senſes*, but alſo to *Reaſon*. If we can do this, we muſt own to our Sorrow, that we partake of it. But that we can, by the force of Election, conquer not only the Appetites and Senſes, but the Underſtanding too, daily

* *See Mr.* Locke's *Chapter of Power*, §. 69. *Tho' all this may be effected by the ſole Power of Election, and without the Reaſons which he there aſſigns for it.*

† *See the following Section.*

daily Experience teaches, and we have reaſon to lament that it can be prov'd by ſo many inſtances that we pleaſe ourſelves in Elections contrary to the natural propenſity of Senſes and Appetites, and at the ſame time againſt the dictate of Reaſon.

This appears from Inſtances.

XI. We have ſeen an Atheiſt ſupported by the Obſtinacy of a perverſe Mind, enduring Torments, Confinement, and Death itſelf rather than abjure his beloved Impiety: We have ſeen a great many Perſons voluntarily throwing away their Fortunes, Life and Soul, leſt they ſhould be diſappointed in a fooliſh Choice. We have beheld not a few diſregarding the Intreaty of their Friends, the Advice of their Relations, the Dictates of their own Mind, Dangers, Diſtreſſes, Death, the wrath of God, and the pains of Hell; in ſhort, deſpiſing all that is Good, or could appear to be ſo, when ſet in competition with ſuch things as, excluſive of the Goodneſs which they receive from Election, are mere Trifles, and worth nothing at all; ſuch as have no manner of Good, or pretence of Good in them. There have been Perſons, who knowingly, without any kind of hope, any kind of belief, have deſtroy'd themſelves and their Relations, and yet were in their right Mind, and conſiſtent with themſelves, if a right Mind may be judg'd of by ſober Words, and a ſerious tenor of Action. Did theſe Men follow Reaſon, or any other Good beſide the fruition of their Choice? We have ſhewn already that this Power may produce theſe and greater Abſurdities; for ſince it is ſuppos'd to be of ſuch a Nature as can alſo pleaſe itſelf in its Act, wherever it can exert that Act, it can pleaſe itſelf, even in oppoſition to the natural Appetites, the Senſes and Reaſon. If then ſuch a Principle be granted to be in us, it will not ſeem ſtrange that we ſhould be able to do things that are repugnant to theſe; if this be not allow'd, it cannot be made appear how ſo many Abſurdities, ſo many things diſagreeable to Reaſon, to Senſe; ſo many things contrary to the dictate of the Mind, ſhould every Day be committed by Mankind.

That the Underſtanding admits not only evil things for good, but Falſities for Truths, *viz.* being under ſubjection to the Will.

XII. Nay, which may ſeem more ſtrange, the Will appears to have ſo great a Power over the Underſtanding, that the latter is ſo far ſubdu'd by its Choice, as to take Evil things for Good, and forc'd to admit Falſities for Truths. Neither will this appear impoſſible to one

one who recollects that the Senſes are no leſs natural Faculties, and have by Nature as quick a Reliſh of their proper Objects, and can as well diſtinguiſh thoſe that are agreeable from them that are diſagreeable, as the Underſtanding. If therefore we ſometimes pleaſe ourſelves in chooſing what is repugnant to the Senſes, 'tis alſo poſſible for us to take pleaſure in embracing what is diſſonant to Reaſon. The Senſes are forced to admit and tolerate ſuch things as are diſguſtful to them, which things they take for agreeable by uſe, having as complete Enjoyment of them as of thoſe that are adapted to them by Nature *. The ſame may happen ſometimes to the Underſtanding, *viz.* to be compell'd by the Will to admit Falſities for Truths, to believe them thro' cuſtom, and at laſt make uſe of them ſeriouſly as Truths. Hence comes that common Saying, *that we eaſily believe what we eagerly deſire*; and ſome take a pleaſure in ſubduing not only Senſe but Reaſon too. I confeſs, he that does this, acts fooliſhly, and is much to blame; but from this very thing, that we act fooliſhly, that we are to blame, 'tis evident that we not only can but actually do pleaſe ourſelves in Elections, which are made contrary to Reaſon; and that the Judgment of our Underſtanding depends upon the Will, rather than that the Will is determin'd by it. From hence it is evident that all the Signs and Properties of this Self-pleaſing Power agree to us, and therefore we certainly partake of it.

'Tis prov'd that we have this Power from a conſideration of theſe reaſons which are ſuppoſed to determine the Will.

XIII. The ſame will appear thirdly, from conſidering the Reaſons which move us to the choice of theſe Abſurdities, according to the Opinion of thoſe Men who think that the Will is *paſſive* in Elections. For if, while they are labouring to aſſign Reaſons for theſe and the like Determinations, they produce nothing for Reaſons, but the very Elections themſelves, or their Effects, it will be apparent that they are in a Miſtake, and offer Effects for Cauſes; which will appear more fully from an Enumeration of thoſe Reaſons which are ſuppoſed to move the Will in ſuch Caſes.

Theſe are enumerated.

XIV. The Principal of theſe Reaſons are *Errors of the Underſtanding, Obſtinacy of the Mind, the force of Paſſions*, and *Madneſs*; on theſe

* *Nay generally more ſo*: *'Tis a common Obſervation, that ſuch things as were at firſt the moſt diſagreeable of all to the Palate, become by uſe the moſt delightful*: viz. *Wines, Tobacco, Olives*, &c.

theſe are charg'd all the unreaſonable, abſurd, and impious Actions of Men; theſe are eſteem'd the Cauſes of all ſuch Elections as cannot be allow'd to proceed from the intrinſic Goodneſs of the Objects which are choſen: but this is all groundleſs.

XV. For in the firſt place, as to *Errors of the Underſtanding*, 'tis certain that we ſometimes chooſe hurtful Objects by miſtake, which we often lament, but never impute to ourſelves, except we be conſcious that this Error was voluntary, *i. e.* in ſome reſpect ow'd its Origin to Election. Election then is prior to all culpable Error, for that depends upon it. 'Tis not therefore always by miſtake that we chooſe Abſurdities, but by chooſing Abſurdities we miſtake the Truth. But to confeſs the Truth, we are hurried on in an abſurd Election, tho' we ſee and know all that we are about to do: if then there be any Error, 'tis only this, that we judge it better to enjoy a free Election, than to be exempt from natural Evils. Hence it is evident, that there ariſes ſo much Pleaſure from Election as is able to impoſe upon the Underſtanding, and induce it to prefer that to all kinds of natural Good, nay to Life itſelf. But whether this be done erroneouſly or wiſely, 'tis the ſtrongeſt Argument that we have ſuch a Self-pleaſing Principle as this within us.

First, Errors of the Underſtanding: theſe are ſhewn to depend upon deprav'd Election rather than cauſe it.

XVI. Secondly, as for *Obſtinacy*, by which they ſuppoſe that we are moved to chooſe abſurd things; 'tis plain that this is nothing elſe but the perſeverance of a bad Election: neither can Obſtinacy and Perverſeneſs be explain'd otherwiſe than by Elections. If it be granted that things pleaſe us becauſe they are choſen, we ſee clearly enough what Obſtinacy is, *viz.* an unneceſſary adherence to an Election, and a Self-complacency in it contrary to the dictate of Reaſon, and with the loſs of natural Good. (81.) But if the Will be determin'd

Secondly, Obſtinacy: which is ſhewn to be nothing elſe but perſevering in a deprav'd Election.

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(81.) *Leibnitz* (in his Remarks frequently cited above) argues *, "That Obſtinacy is not "barely the continuance of a bad Election, "but a diſpoſition to perſevere in it, proceeding from ſome Good that a Man forms to "himſelf, or from ſome Evil which one ſuppoſes to attend the change. The firſt Election, ſays he, was made perhaps thro' *mere* "*Levity*, but the reſolution of adhering to it comes from ſome ſtronger Reaſons or Impreſſions." But if this be all that is meant by Obſtinacy, how come the World to fix ſo bad

* p. 482.

min'd from without, there will be no ſuch thing as Obſtinacy. By an obſtinate Perſon we ſhall only mean one that has continued a long time in a pernicious Error, without any Motive to change his Judgment. Now he that does this is miſerable indeed, but cannot be call'd in the leaſt degree obſtinate, according to the common Notion of Mankind.

Thirdly, The violence of Paſſions, *viz.* Deſire of Fame and Glory, *&c.* all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election.

XVII. Thirdly, ſince neither Errors nor Obſtinacy are ſufficient to explain the Nature of theſe Elections, they fly to the *Power of the Paſſions*; *viz.* the Deſire of Fame, or Glory; Anger, Hatred, *&c.* Theſe are the Cauſes, ſay they, why we chooſe abſurdly, and by them the Choice is determin'd. But Fame, or Glory have no manner of Good in them, eſpecially to thoſe who believe that they ſhall not exiſt after Death: why then are theſe Men content to purchaſe Glory with Life? Certainly from no other Cauſe beſide Election; 'tis by Election that we have form'd theſe Idols to ourſelves, and from thence they derive whatever Good is in them. To be talk'd of after Death, to mount upon the Wings of Fame, to extend our Name to diſtant Regions; theſe things pleaſe us on no other account but becauſe we will them. Obſcurity, Oblivion, Retirement will be as pleaſing

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bad a Notion to that Word? If it be a diſpoſition always proceeding from a proſpect of Good, or dread of Evil, and founded on ſecond thoughts and ſtronger reaſons: how can it ever be eſteem'd a Crime? Again, if the *firſt* Election can be made without any external Motive, (which he ſeems to allow by aſſigning *Levity* as the ſole Cauſe of it) why may not the perſeverance in it be ſo too? may not the ſame Cauſe be ſuppos'd to produce the ſubſequent Elections, as well as the firſt? In ſhort, *Leibnitz*, after all his ſeeming oppoſition to our Author on the head of Liberty, moſt evidently grants the Queſtion both here, and p. 480. where he affirms, that in effect we are able to change the Natures of things, and make theſe transformations above mention'd. "But this "(ſays he) is not as among the *Fairies*, by a "ſimple Act of that Magic Power, but becauſe "a Man darkens or ſuppreſſes in his Mind, "the repreſentations of the good or ill Qualities naturally join'd to certain Objects, and "becauſe we only regard thoſe which are agreeable to our Taſte, or our Prepoſſeſſions; "or even becauſe we join by force of thought, "certain Qualities, which are only found united by accident, or by our cuſtomary way "of conſidering them." Now what is it to darken or ſuppreſs the repreſentations of good or ill Qualities,--to regard ſome only and neglect others,--and to join Qualities to Objects by the force of thought,--but to exert this very Power in debate? Which often chooſes the fruition, or even the conſideration of ſome one out of many equal and indifferent Objects, and by that ſimple Act makes it agreeable to our Taſte, and joins ſuch Qualities to it as could neither proceed from Chance nor Cuſtom, nor any Aſſociation of Ideas whatſoever. See the Concluſion of this Subject in the following Note.

pleaſing to the Man that chooſes them, and have been ſo. Thoſe Perſons then who imagine that theſe determine Elections, take Effects for Cauſes. For theſe, which are nothing in themſelves, ſhew us that they acquire ſo much Goodneſs from Election as makes them overballance all kind of natural Good.

XVIII. The ſame muſt be ſaid of Anger, Hatred, Love and Deſpair, whereby many believe they are driven into Abſurdities. But in reality all that is abſurd and pernicious in theſe Paſſions proceeds from Election. Nature has given us Paſſions which are generally innocent, while ſolicited only by their proper Objects, and natural Opportunity, as we ſee in Brutes; but they are compell'd to change the natural Objects by the Power of Election: thus Anger and Hatred are excited by the Will, and apply'd not to ſuch things as are naturally hurtful: nor Love and Deſire to ſuch as are naturally deſirable, but to others of a quite different kind, with which they have no natural Congruity, ſuch as Fame and Glory after Death. Of this kind alſo are moſt of the Inſtruments of Luxury, which are commonly ſaid to pleaſe, purely by the ſtrength of *Fancy*, that is in reality, by Election. Hence it is that Men purſue with ſo great Eagerneſs, and ſuch an impetus of Paſſion, things which are in themſelves trifling, pernicious, and abſurd. Nay they barter away Life itſelf for Trifles, and when they cannot enjoy them, caſt off that in deſpair. 'Tis the Election itſelf which ſubſtitutes theſe things as fit to be proſecuted by theſe Paſſions inſtead of their natural Objects, and while they are hurry'd on, not according to the exigence of Nature, but the command of the Will, they confound every thing, tranſgreſs the bounds of reaſon and utility, and in deſpight of theſe, rage without limits or reſtraint.

The ſame is ſhewn of Hatred, Love, &c.

XIX. As for Envy and Revenge, they are not owing to Nature, but the Will, and ſetting aſide Election, are mere nothing. For whatever is pretended to the contrary, there can be no other account given why any one ſhould undergo Labours, Dangers, Griefs and Difficulties; why he ſhould loſe his Reputation, Family, Country, nay his Life, for the Satisfaction of his Envy or Revenge, but that he reſolv'd within himſelf, but that he *choſe* to ſatisfy them. 'Tis evident that the moſt unexperienc'd Perſon is ſufficiently convinc'd of this. But theſe, when once embrac'd by Election, become more agreeable than

Of Envy and Revenge.

thoſe things which Nature has made neceſſary. Thoſe abſurd Elections then are not made by the force of theſe Paſſions, but the abſurd and irregular force of theſe proceeds from the Elections.

Fourthly, *Madneſs*: 'ti prov'd on the contrary, that theſe Men are in their Senſes who chooſe abſurdly.

XX. They who perceive that theſe Cauſes are inſufficient, have recourſe to *Madneſs* and Phrenzy, in order to account for abſurd Elections: but this is playing upon Words, and taking Madneſs in a different Senſe from that wherein it is commonly underſtood. He that is ſo far diſorder'd in his Mind as not to be able to deduce one Idea from another, nor make Obſervations upon what he ſees, is look'd upon as a Mad-man, but theſe Men who do ſo many abſurd things enjoy the above mention'd Powers, and have their Underſtanding and Senſes ſtrong enough by Nature: what is it therefore which drives them into Abſurdities? The power and prevalence of the ſuperior Faculty, *viz.* the *Will*, which has a Good peculiar to itſelf, which it produces by Election. This it purſues regardleſs of all that Reaſon, the Body, the Condition, Appetites and natural Faculties require. For while it can provide for and pleaſe itſelf, it is not at all ſolicitous about any thing which may prejudice theſe, but has a certain Complacency in its own Exerciſe, and endeavours to augment its Happineſs by the purſuit of ſuch things as are repugnant to them. For the more Difficulties and Abſurdities it encounters, the more it applauds itſelf in a conſciouſneſs of its own Abilities; which ſeems to be the very thing that we call *Vanity* and Pride. Hereupon it compels the Senſes, Reaſon, natural Appetites, to be ſubſervient to its Elections: nor can he be call'd a Mad-man who acts againſt Reaſon, thro' the force of a ſuperior Faculty, any more than he that falls from a Precipice by the violence of a ſuperior impulſe. For it is not every one who acts againſt reaſon, that muſt immediately be look'd upon as Mad, but only he that acts abſurdly from ſome injury done to the underſtanding Faculty itſelf, or an Impediment to the Uſe of Reaſon; he that could have follow'd the dictate of Reaſon, and yet knowingly violated it, muſt not be reckon'd mad, but wicked, unleſs we will impoſe upon ourſelves by changing the cuſtomary Names of things.

All theſe things cannot be explained otherwiſe than by admitting a Principle of this kind in ourſelves.

XXI. If it be granted that we have this ſuperior Faculty, 'tis plain enough that all theſe things may come to paſs. For he that is endow'd

dow'd with it, will be able to pleaſe himſelf in the Proſecution of his Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and Mind; to the prejudice of Senſes, Appetites and Reaſon; which we often ſee done to our Amazement; but, unleſs we have this Faculty imparted to us, it does not ſeem poſſible for us to create Good to ourſelves by Election, and to prefer what is thus created to all natural Good whatſoever.

As much good ariſes from this Principle, ſo it is attended with this Evil, *viz.* a Power of ſinning.

XXII. Theſe things, I confeſs, ought not to be done; but if nothing could be done which ought not, there would be no ſuch thing as a Fault. As therefore much Good ariſes from this Principle, ſo there is this Evil alſo, that by it Crimes and Follies are committed: And it has this Inconvenience, that it can do what it ought not.

This miſtake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Underſtanding aroſe from hence, *viz.* that it would be imprudent in us to act without conſulting the Underſtanding.

XXIII. From theſe and other Arguments which might be brought, I think it is evident that God has given us a Principle of this kind, and that our Will is only determin'd by itſelf. They are miſtaken therefore who affirm that either the Appetites, Paſſions, or Underſtanding, determine Elections. What probably gave occaſion to the Miſtake was, that other things pleaſe or diſpleaſe us, *viz.* ſuch as are agreeable to the Appetites or Senſes, beſide thoſe which we chooſe: Now it being obſerv'd that we have regard to theſe in Elections, and do not chooſe any thing repugnant to them, but upon neceſſity, and that all Men are of Opinion, that the Judgment of the Underſtanding ought to be made uſe of in chooſing, and being accuſtom'd to this kind of Choice, we become at laſt perſuaded that it is abſolutely neceſſary, and that our Wills are always determin'd by ſome Judgment of the Underſtanding: at leaſt, that is is a Condition requiſite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing choſen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the contrary to all this is generally true, *viz.* that the Mind judges things to be good becauſe we have willed them, becauſe we have form'd an Appetite in ourſelves by ſome antecedent Election, and thoſe things which we embrace by this *factitious Appetite*, as we may call it, give us equal Pleaſure with that which we deſire by the Neceſſity of Nature.

We can act in order to ſhew our Liberty, which is prov'd to be the ſame as acting without any reaſon at all.

XXIV. Nay we chooſe Objects which are contrary to all the Appetites, contrary to Reaſon, and deſtitute of all Appearance of Good, perhaps for this only Reaſon, that we may aſſert our Liberty of Election. 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and he that does it, proves by an Experiment that he is free, and has a Power of pleaſing himſelf in Election. Nor can he be ſaid to be determin'd by the Judgment of the Underſtanding; for this reaſon is made by the Mind itſelf, and may ſerve equally for every Election, ſince it is drawn from the Indifference of the Will itſelf: and he who does any thing upon a reaſon which is made by himſelf, and is indifferent to either Side, muſt be eſteem'd to act in the ſame manner as if he had done it without any reaſon at all. 'Tis evident therefore that we have this Power, and make uſe of the Appetites and Senſes only as Spies and Informers; of Reaſon as a Counſellor; but that the Will is Maſter of itſelf, and creates pleaſure for itſelf in Objects by Election. (82.)

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(82.) Upon the whole it appears that the true deſcription of Free-will muſt include thus much. A Power of chooſing or not chooſing, or of chooſing either Side in any given Caſe; naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external or internal force, compulſion, or neceſſity; phyſically indetermin'd by either bodily Senſations, Appetites, *&c.* or mental Perceptions, Reaſon, Judgment. 'Tis an Ability of determining either among equal and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the purſuit of ſome before others that are entirely different from or contrary to them: or laſtly, of preferring the very conſideration of ſome unknown Objects to all the reſt; of deliberating upon, or attending to ſome particular Ideas, and reſolving to overlook others, tho' equally preſented to the Mind, and ſuppos'd to be of equal Importance.

All this is contain'd in the very Notion of a *Self-moving Power*; (tho' none perhaps have given ſo full and diſtinct an Explication of it as our Author) for that which in ſtrictneſs moves itſelf, is properly and phyſically independent of, and indifferent to all external Movers, as long as it continues to do ſo; what is determin'd in certain circumſtances by particular Senſations, Motives, *&c.* and cannot poſſibly be determin'd either without or againſt them, is ſo far, and in ſuch circumſtances, only moved, acted upon, and purely paſſive. If then there be any ſuch thing, properly ſpeaking, as an active Principle, it muſt be endow'd with ſuch an abſolute Indifference as our Author ſuppoſes: and when we ſpeak of the *ſtrongeſt Motives*, we don't mean ſuch as have the greateſt phyſical Influence or Weight in turning the ballance of the Will (ſince we ſuppoſe none of them to have any at all) but only ſuch as the Mind moſt commonly determines itſelf upon in fact; and to argue from ſuch determinations, that theſe Motives muſt have ſuch an Influence both abſolutely and comparatively, *i. e.* whether taken by themſelves, or in oppoſition to each other; is manifeſtly to beg the Queſtion, and ſtill to ſuppoſe that it cannot move or direct itſelf, notwithſtanding our moſt evident perception and experience

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experience of the contrary. And that we have ſuch experience, a little reflection on ourſelves will convince us. " I think (ſays *S. C.*) I may " appeal to any conſidering Man, whether he " be not in all ordinary Caſes ſenſible of an " ability of darting his thoughts upon any " particular Object, even antecedently to any " deliberation, and then, whether after deli- " beration about particular Objects he cannot " reſume his deliberation, and ſometimes vary " his Judgment; and whether, after the clear- " eſt Judgment, and moſt deliberate Choice of " particular things or actions, he be not ſtill " conſcious of a power of ſuſpending his prac- " tice, of reſuming the conſideration of the " Objects whenever he pleaſes, or of imme- " diately chooſing or practiſing the contrary, " without being determin'd by impreſſions " from without, or impediments from within. " But we have no clearer proof of our own Exi- " ſtence than *Conſciouſneſs*. and I conceive we " need not expect greater Evidence of any " thing than we have of our Exiſtence *."

If then our Mind has ſuch a power of ſelecting ſome particular Ideas out of many perceiv'd by the Underſtanding, and attending to them only without any previous apprehenſion of their nature and tendency, without any ſpecial Reaſon, Motive or Inclination, or any Inducement whatſoever to ſuch particular Choice; if the Mind, I ſay, does in ſome Caſes exert ſuch a power as this, then it is in theſe Caſes abſolutely free. It cannot here be directed by the Judgment, ſince it is ſuppos'd to act independently of it: nay it may be properly ſaid ſometimes to influence and direct, or rather to obſtruct and ſubvert the Judgment itſelf, for as much as it confines that to ſome particular Objects only, and of conſequence renders it partial, and precipitates it in the Choice of theſe, and withdraws others from it, which were abſolutely neceſſary to a compleat View of the Subject, and an exact determination about it. Hence the ſpring of all Errors, at leaſt all criminal ones, hence vitious, abſurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe. From the ſame Power alſo duely apply'd, proceeds the happy conſciouſneſs of Deſert, and in it is entirely founded all the reaſon of Reward. Its uſefulneſs then, and neceſſity, appears both for the eſtabliſhment of Morality, the ground of all rational Happineſs; and alſo, that we might always have wherein to pleaſe ourſelves, which (as our Author has ſhewn in the latter end of Subſect. 4.) otherwiſe we very often could not. Hence it appears I think ſufficiently, that this Power is one of our greateſt Perfections, tho' (like all other Perfections that come ſhort of Infinity) it be liable to the greateſt abuſe, and ſo capable of being turn'd into the worſt of Imperfections.

It remains to be enquir'd with our Author, whether all the Happineſs ariſing from it counterballances the Miſery, and conſequently, whether we and all other rational Creatures might not have been as well or better without it. But for this ſee §. 2. and 5.

We ſhall here only add a Word or two in vindication of this Principle, againſt the three principal Oppoſers of Liberty above mentioned. In the firſt place then, we don't aſſert that by this Power the Mind can chooſe Evil *as Evil*, or refuſe Good *as Good*, i. e. that the former, as ſuch is or can be a *Motive* for Choice, or the latter for Refuſal: But we ſay that it can chooſe the one and refuſe the other *without any particular Motive at all*; nay, in oppoſition to the ſtrongeſt Motive (*viz.* that Motive which preſents the greateſt Happineſs, and which it uſually does, and always ought to follow) purely by the force of its active and ſelf-moving Power †.

You'll ſay it does this to prove its own Power, and the pleaſure attending ſuch proof is the ſtrongeſt Motive in theſe Caſes. I anſwer, that granting this to be ſo (which yet is not very probable, as appears from what was obſerv'd from the *Eſſay on Conſciouſneſs* in Note 65.) yet this, as our Author obſerves, muſt be a Motive of its own creating, which, with reſpect to Volition, is the ſame as none at all. Nay this is the very thing we are endeavouring

* *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 42, 43. See alſo an *Eſſay on Conſciouſneſs*, p. 205, *&c.*

† *See* Jackſon's *Vindication of human Liberty*, p. 49, *&c. or the beginning of* E. Strutt's *Defence of Dr.* Clarke's *Notion*, &c.

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ing to prove, *viz.* that the Soul has a power of determining itſelf to will or to act, and of pleaſing itſelf in ſuch determination, without any other Motive or Reaſon but what is produced by itſelf, and follows that very determination; without any external Cauſe whatſoever; in which Power all its Liberty conſiſts, and the greateſt Part of its Happineſs, as will appear in the next Section.

Nor, ſecondly, will ſuch a Power as this only make us liable to miſtake the true Good which is in things (as the Author of the *Philoſoph. Enquiry* and *Leibnitz* argue) but on the contrary, it often *makes* true Good or Happineſs in thoſe things which of themſelves had none at all; and improves thoſe things which have, and alleviates thoſe which have the contrary Qualities; and of conſequence is not a mere *Imperfection*, but a very valuable and neceſſary Perfection. Our Author does not ſuppoſe us left to an abſolute, blind indifference in all Objects (as *Leibnitz* often urges) without any Guide or Direction in the Choice of them; which would indeed be an Imperfection; but affirms that the Mind or Man is ſenſibly and neceſſarily affected by ſome, and informed by his Underſtanding of the Nature and Effects of others, and ſo is ſufficiently directed to the Choice of theſe which are in themſelves good and agreeable to his Conſtitution, and *vice verſa*; yet ſtill with the reſervation of a full Power of following or not following that Guide, of neglecting or refuſing that Direction: Which *Power* therefore, even in theſe Caſes, remains ſtill unaffected. In other Objects, he ſhews that the *Man* is totally indifferent, which yet, by an arbitrary Choice, he can make to be no leſs conſtituent Parts of his Happineſs.

Whence, in the third place, a reply may be form'd to the common Queſtion, *What Benefit* is there in a Power of chooſing freely among things that are really indifferent, and exactly alike? We anſwer the Benefit of enjoying *any one* of them; which Enjoyment a Man could not poſſibly have without ſuch a Liberty, but muſt neceſſarily hang in perpetual Suſpenſe, without any Choice at all? This *Leibnitz* owns to be an unavoidable conſequence of his Opinion *, and to avoid this Abſurdity, is driven to a greater, *viz.* to deny that there are any ſuch indifferent and equal things in Nature †; the contrary to which has been abundantly evinc'd already with reſpect to both God and Man.

Laſtly, to the Argument againſt the *poſſibility* of ſuch a Liberty, ſo frequently repeated by the two Authors above mention'd, *viz.* that Actions done without any Motive, would be Effects without a Cauſe. We reply, in ſhort, that it is a plain *Petitio Principij*, in ſuppoſing Motives to be the real phyſical efficient Cauſes of Volition or Action, which we deny; and yet are far from ſuppoſing theſe Acts to be abſolutely without a Cauſe; nay we aſſign them another, and affirm that their only true and proper Cauſe is this ſelf-moving Power, and the only Cauſe of this is the Creator who communicated it.

On this Subject ſee Dr. *Clarke's Demonſtrat.* p. 136 *&c.* 2d Edit. or his *Remarks*, &c p. 28, *&c.* or *Chubb's farther Reflections on Natural Liberty. Collection of Tracts*, p. 388, *&c.*

* *Eſſais de Theodice*, p. 161, *&c.*
† *See his 4th Letter to Dr.* Clarke.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Where it is ſhewn that Happineſs conſiſts in Elections.

I. FROM what has been ſaid above, it appears that a Being endow'd with a Power of chooſing, is more excellent and perfect than one that is without it: For that which neither acts nor is acted upon, is the fartheſt from Perfection, ſince it is of no more uſe in Nature than if it were nothing at all; that which is purely paſſive in its Operations, is one degree more perfect, but that which has the Principle of its Actions within itſelf, ſince it approaches, as it were, nearer to God, and is more independent, is alſo more *of itſelf*, *i. e.* it ſeems to be made for its own ſake, and chiefly to reſpect its future benefit, and on that account to be more noble and perfect. Nor does it ſeem poſſible for a greater Perfection to be communicated than the fruition of ſuch a Principle. The more free any one is, and the leſs liable to external Motions, the more perfect he is: God has therefore multiply'd this kind of Creatures as far as the Syſtem and Order of his Work allow'd, and decreed, that ſuch as are paſſive in their Operations ſhould be ſubſervient to theſe.

The more free any Being is, the leſs he is expos'd to Motions from without, and meets with leſs inconvenience.

II. Since therefore Happineſs, according to the common Notion of it, is granted to ariſe from a due uſe of thoſe Faculties and Powers which every one enjoys; and ſince this Power of determining ourſelves to Actions, and pleaſing ourſelves in them, is the moſt perfect noble of all, the greateſt Happineſs will conſiſt in the Exerciſe of it, *i. e.* in Elections.

Happineſs ariſes from the proper uſe of the Faculties, *&c.* If therefore a Power of chooſing be the moſt

fect of all, whereby we are the moſt conſcious of our Exiſtencè, and our Approach towards God, our chief Happineſs will conſiſt in the proper uſe of it, nor can any thing be abſolutely agreeable to us but what is choſen. It is to be confeſs'd that many external Objects, many that are offer'd by the Senſes, pleaſe us; but if we look into the thing more narrowly, this will appear to ariſe from hence only, that theſe are as Motives which induce us to exert an Act of Election, whereby we embrace them as if they were agreeable to the natural Appetites: for tho' the Will cannot be determin'd to Election by any thing but itſelf, yet it may be *perſuaded to determine itſelf*, in order to avoid what is abſurd and diſguſtful to the Natural Appetites.

Election is the cauſe why things pleaſe us.

III. For 'tis certain that we make uſe of the Aſſiſtance of the Underſtanding in Elections, and hold it as a Light before us to diſtinguiſh Good from Evil; but we uſe it as a Judge and a Counſellor, not as a Sovereign and Dictator: and to ſpeak the truth, in order to avoid fooliſh and hurtful things, rather than to acquire what is good and agreeable. For whatever we chooſe will (as was ſhewn before) be *ipſo facto* good and agreeable, except it lead us into ſomething contrary to the Appetites, or otherwiſe abſurd. The Underſtanding therefore points out and admoniſhes us (as we ſaid before) to avoid theſe external Evils, or to embrace the Good: but till we have exerted an Act of Election about them, theſe do neither become abſolutely agreeable, nor the other odious. We have prov'd before that this is the Caſe, and it will be evident from Experience to any one that conſiders it. If then nothing pleaſe us but what is in ſome reſpect choſen, 'tis manifeſt that our Happineſs muſt be ſought for in Election.

He therefore that has a free power of chooſing, can always pleaſe himſelf.

IV. We have ſhewn above, that an intelligent Creature, which is merely paſſive in its Operations, cannot be made entirely happy: for as it is liable to external Motions, it muſt neceſſarily meet with hurtful as well as uſeful Objects; for all things cannot be uſeful. It remains therefore, that a Creature which is to be exempt from all kind of Grief ſhould have the Principle of his own Happineſs within him, and be able to delight himſelf, in what manner ſoever external things be diſpos'd, *i. e.* that he have the Government of his own Actions, and may pleaſe himſelf by willing either this or ſomething

thing elſe: Such an Agent as this is, will be ſatisfy'd with any Object that occurs; ſince Objects are not choſen by him becauſe they pleaſe him, but on the contrary, pleaſe him becauſe they are choſen. Whoever therefore has free Choice may make himſelf happy: *viz.* by chooſing every thing which befalls him, and adapting his Choice to things.

We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and ſo can attain Happineſs.

V. And it is by this Means only that Creatures ſeem capable of being made completely happy: for ſince the things themſelves are neceſſarily fix'd by certain Laws, and cannot be chang'd, it remains that the Elections be alter'd, in order to make them conformable to things, *i. e.* to the Will of God: for thus free Agents will have a Power in themſelves of attaining Happineſs. Hence it is that we are ſo frequently admoniſh'd in Holy Scripture to be *conformable to God**; on this Point our Salvation and Happineſs turn: And with good reaſon; for what is Happineſs if not to be in every thing as we will or chooſe? But he who chooſes to conform himſelf in all things to the Divine Will, muſt certainly be always what he would be, and will never be diſappointed in his Choice: however external things fall out, a Perſon thus diſpoſed may enjoy Happineſs, nor does any one ſeem to have been capable of it on other terms.

Care of the Body, and the natural Appetites diſturb Elections in this preſent ſtate, and hinder our Happineſs from being perfect.

VI. But perfect Happineſs, may ſome ſay, is not to be expected; for thoſe Beings which are united to terreſtrial Matter, muſt neceſſarily be affected with the Motions of it, as was ſhewn before, and cannot bear the diſſolution of the Body, or the impairing of its Organs (which yet are unavoidable) without ſome Pain and uneaſy Senſation. I confeſs, abſolute Felicity is by no Means to be hoped for in the preſent State: But yet the more our Elections are conformable to things, the more happy we are; if then our Elections were perfectly free, we ſhould alſo be at Liberty to enjoy perfect Happineſs: but ſince the care of our Bodies, and the natural Appetites diſturb our Elections, and ſometimes byaſs them to one Side, we cannot pleaſe ourſelves in Elections abſolutely, and without a Mixture of Uneaſineſs. For tho' they afford Delight, and even greater than the natural Appetites, yet they do not remove all manner of

* *Rom.* 12. 2. *Coloſſ.* 3. 1, 2, *&c.*

of Uneaſineſs, nor extinguiſh the ſenſe of Pain. While therefore we are in this State, we muſt acquieſce with a mix'd and imperfect Happineſs, ſuch as the preſent State of things affords; and it is plain that this, ſuch as it is, ariſes only from Elections. For tho' we cannot by mere Election always extinguiſh the Pain and Uneaſineſs which ariſes from our being forc'd to bear ſuch things as are diſguſtful to the natural Appetites, yet we can chooſe to bear theſe things, and pleaſe ourſelves in that Choice; the Conſciouſneſs of our Powers in bearing theſe ſurpaſſing the Uneaſineſs of Pain, nay perhaps augmenting the Pleaſure ſo far as that the Exceſs of it ſhall overcome the Pain ariſing from the fruſtrated Appetites, by ſo many Degrees as could have been obtain'd, if there had been no contrariety between them and the Election. For inſtance, if one feel two Degrees of Pain from a Diſtemper, and receive ſix Degrees of Pleaſure from an Election to bear it with Patience and Decorum; ſubſtracting two Degrees of Pain from theſe ſix of Pleaſure, he has four of ſolid Pleaſure remaining: He will be as happy therefore as one that has four Degrees pure and free from all Pain. If this be granted to be poſſible, we may be as happy with the natural Appetites, as if we had been without them, nor ſhall we have any reaſon to complain of them.

We have reaſon to admire the Divine Wiſdom which created an Appetite that has wherewith to pleaſe itſelf in its own Nature, howſoever external things be diſpoſed.

VII. And here, by the Way, we may admire the Divine Goodneſs and Wiſdom, which (ſince Objects are generally fix'd and confined under certain Laws) could create an Appetite that ſhould have wherewith to ſatisfy it within itſelf; and might render any State agreeable, barely by willing it. Now Free-Will has this Effect by accommodating itſelf to Objects, when the Objects themſelves cannot be chang'd. For the Man will be no leſs happy who chooſes what he knows will come to paſs, than he who brings that to paſs which he chooſes; the one may be always done, the other is often impoſſible: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happineſs. 'Tis hard to comprehend how he can fail of Happineſs who has it in his Power to pleaſe himſelf. This ſeems to have been the Opinion of the ancient *Stoics*, who had the ſame thoughts of Liberty with thoſe laid down above, but did not explain them diſtinctly, nor comprehend the whole Series of the Matter.

However

However, 'tis very plain that they placed Happineſs in the Uſe and Election of ſuch things as are in our own Power, which yet would be impoſſible, if we were not able to pleaſe ourſelves in Election. (83.)

NOTES.

(83.) Our Author's mentioning the *Stoics* here, might probably give *Leibnitz* his reaſon to ſuſpect him of maintaining all the abſurd Conſequences which that Sect are ſaid to have drawn from the above mention'd Principle. They indeed (if they be not greatly miſrepreſented) urg'd it ſo far as to aſſert, that nothing external could hurt or incommode us except we pleas'd: That all Good and Evil was entirely in our Power, and of our making, and conſequently that all outward things were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to our own Choice. Which Notions, being contrary to every Day's Experience in Pleaſure and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter was properly an Evil, or rather that there was any difference at all between them. This Doctrine is indeed liable to *Leibnitz*'s Objections of confounding all the diſtinctions of things,—of contradicting the natural Appetites,—making Reaſon and Underſtanding uſeleſs,—and ſubverting all the other Faculties of the Mind.—Theſe and the like Reflections, I ſay, are juſtly made upon the Doctrine of the *Stoics*, as they have generally expreſs'd themſelves, and overthrow a total, *abſolute Indifference* of the *Mind* to will in all Caſes; but are nothing at all to our Author, who never contended for it; but on the contrary, inſiſts upon a neceſſary, fix'd, and unalterable difference in the Natures of things, according to the preſent Syſtem; and has allow'd their full force, both to Reaſon and the natural Appetites, all over the laſt Section, as well as in the foregoing Chapters of this Book.

But this has been explain'd in the Notes above. For an application of this Sect. ſee §. 5 Subſect. 2. and the Notes to §. 5. Subſect. 3.

SECT. III.

Concerning undue *Elections.*

I. FROM hence it is ſufficiently evident what kind of Elections are to be called *undue* ones: For it appears that God has given us this Faculty of chooſing, that we may pleaſe ourſelves in the uſe of it, and be happy in the fruition of thoſe Objects which we chooſe. For it is Happineſs to obtain the things choſen, and Miſery to enjoy'd: This is done 1ſt. when ſuch things are choſen as are *impoſſible.*

To fall ſhort of what we chooſe is Miſery; we chooſe amiſs therefore when we chooſe what cannot be

to be fruſtrated and fall ſhort of them. Whenſoever therefore we make ſuch a Choice, as not to be able to enjoy the things choſen, 'tis plain that we chooſe fooliſhly and unduely: for we bring upon ourſelves unneceſſary Miſery, ſince we could have choſen otherwiſe with equal Pleaſure. Whoever then chooſes knowingly what he cannot obtain, or what may produce unneceſſary trouble to himſelf or others, he muſt be eſteem'd to chooſe unduely. And this may be done, firſt, If any one chooſe *Impoſſibilities*. It may ſeem ſtrange that any Perſon ſhould chooſe a thing which is impoſſible, knowing it to be ſo; but 'tis very probable that this has happen'd ſometimes, as was ſaid before *.

Secondly, When thoſe things are choſen which are *inconſiſtent* with each other.

II. Secondly, If he chooſe ſuch things as are *inconſiſtent* with each other: he that does this contradicts himſelf, and evidently cuts off all hopes of Enjoyment. When we will any thing, we muſt take all its neceſſary conſequences together with it. But all things here are of a mix'd kind, and nothing is pure from all degrees of Bitterneſs: we often therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreeable to the Appetites, and refuſe the reſt: but this is in vain, ſince the agreeable Parts cannot be ſeparated from the diſagreeable ones: we muſt therefore either chooſe or reject the whole. He that does otherwiſe cannot poſſibly ſatisfy himſelf, ſince he muſt bear with what he would not: He is therefore voluntarily unhappy by an undue Election.

Thirdly, If the things choſen be not in the power of the Elector.

III. Thirdly, he muſt be eſteem'd to chooſe unduely, who aims at ſuch things as he knows not to be *in his Power*. For it is a hazard whether he enjoys thoſe things that are not in his Power; and it is fooliſh to commit our Happineſs to Chance; while therefore it is in our Power to chooſe only ſuch things as we are certain of obtaining, we riſk our Happineſs, or throw it away when we purſue Uncertainties: Now we owe as much Happineſs to ourſelves as is in our Power, and ought to uſe our utmoſt Endeavours to attain it; but we loſe this by deſiring thoſe things which we know to be out of our Power.

Fourthly, If any chooſe that which is pre-occupy'd by the lawful Choice of others.

IV. Fourthly, That alſo is an undue Election, which obliges us to ſeize thoſe things that are lawfully *occupy'd* by the Elections of other Men.

* §. 1. Subſect. 5. par. 10, 11, 12.

Men. To be diſappointed of an Election is Miſery, as we ſaid before; to enjoy it, Happineſs. Every one therefore that is endow'd with a Power of chooſing, has a right to the enjoyment of the thing choſen, ſo far as is neceſſary to the Exerciſe of his own Faculties, and is no impediment to the Good of others. But he muſt be eſteem'd an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to himſelf what is common, or aſſume more and greater Advantages from the common Stock, than fall to his Share. Thoſe things then which are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of other Men, belong to the Chooſers, and cannot juſtly be taken from them: therefore he that covets them would have what is not his due: *i. e.* endeavours by an undue Election to rob others of their Right. This is to be referr'd in an eſpecial Manner to ſuch things as are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of the Deity; for theſe are to be eſteem'd by all as ſacred and prohibited: nor can any one meet with Succeſs that oppoſes himſelf to God, and chooſes what God diſapproves. For what God wills muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, but God wills the Happineſs of all Men as far as it is poſſible; therefore he that offends unneceſſarily againſt the Happineſs of any one, is ſuppos'd to offend againſt God, and to chooſe what is not his due.

V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for us to deſire thoſe things which are *hurtful* to ourſelves or others. By hurtful things I underſtand thoſe that lead to natural Evils, *viz.* ſuch as are prejudicial to the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been ſaid, that things pleaſe us becauſe they are choſen, but Reaſon perſuades us to abſtain from ſuch Elections as may prove pernicious to our own Minds, or thoſe of others, or ſuch as defraud the Appetites unneceſſarily: for we owe a Gratification to theſe Appetites, when it can be procured without greater Detriment. Therefore an Election oppoſed to theſe *gratis*, and without any reaſon, muſt be judg'd an undue one, becauſe it deprives us of the due Enjoyment of our Appetites.

Fifthly, When thoſe things which tend to Natural Evils, are choſen without any Neceſſity.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

How it is poſſible for us to fall into undue Elections *.

This is done five ways.

I. 'TIS difficult to comprehend, as was ſaid before, how one can fall ſhort of Happineſs who has it in his Power to pleaſe himſelf, yet if he chooſe in the foregoing Manner, or the like, he muſt neceſſarily fail of his Choice, and his Appetite be fruſtrated, *i.e.* he muſt be unhappy. But how is it poſſible, you'll ſay, that any one ſhould make ſuch a Choice? I anſwer, This may proceed firſt, from *Error* or *Ignorance*. Secondly, from *Inadvertency* or *Negligence*. Thirdly, from *Levity*. Fourthly, from a contracted *Habit*. Fifthly, from other *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature. Not that the Will can be determin'd by theſe or any thing elſe which is external; but that from hence it takes an handle and occaſion of determining itſelf, which it would not have had otherwiſe.

Firſt, By Error or culpable Ignorance

II. Firſt, As to the firſt of theſe, we have prov'd before that we are liable to Errors and Ignorance; and that this is to be reckon'd among the natural Evils. When therefore we are forc'd to chooſe among things not ſufficiently known, our Errors are not to be charg'd upon us, nor is it credible that God will ſuffer them to prove fatal to us. But when we are under no manner of Neceſſity, an Election often preſents itſelf to us in Matters ſufficiently underſtood, and

* *See* Locke's *Chapter of Power*, §. 57, &c.

and then we hurry on without a ſtrict and careful Enquiry, and chooſe Impoſſibilities, *&c.* and therefore are not entirely free from Fault, ſince we ought to deliberate and examine things before Election.

III. Secondly, Theſe undue Elections therefore happen thro' Inadvertency, for by due Care we might perceive the Good and Evil which is in Objects; but being negligent and ſupine, we are frequently impoſed upon, and ſuffer for our Negligence, by falling into the fore mention'd Inconveniencies. Secondly, By *Negligence.*

IV. As to the third, Since the Pleaſure of a free Agent conſiſts in Election, 'tis no wonder that he gives himſelf as large a Scope as he can in the Exerciſe of it. Neither will it be any thing ſurpriſing, if in this full Exerciſe of Election, he ſometimes tranſgreſs the Bounds preſcribed him by God and Nature; and light upon ſome things which are attended with no very proſperous Iſſue (*viz.* Abſurdities and Impoſſibilities) ſince he will attempt every thing. For he pleaſes himſelf in the Trial, tho' he be unfortunate in the Event; but this is no Excuſe; for every one is oblig'd to take care of himſelf, leſt he be too fond of indulging new Elections, and from Levity become unduely offenſive to himſelf or others. Thirdly, By giving too great Indulgence to the Exerciſe of Election.

V. Fourthly, We ſee that frequent Choice creates an Habit; this ſeems to proceed from hence, that as we delight in an Election often repeated, we are eaſily induc'd to hope that the ſame Pleaſure will always follow the ſame Act, whereupon we grow ſupine and negligent, and diſregard the Alterations of things; and he that does this may eaſily fall into ſuch Elections as will not be attended with Succeſs. Beſide, 'tis difficult for us to change thoſe Elections, the Delight of which is fix'd and, as it were, riveted in the Mind by frequent Experiment: Yet we are not excuſable for ruſhing upon abſurd and impoſſible things, in order to avoid the Uneaſineſs attending the Change of Election. And if we ſearch into the Caſe more narrowly, we ſhall find that moſt undue Elections ariſe from this unſeaſonable Perſeverance, all which come juſtly under the Cenſure of a culpable Obſtinacy. Fourthly, By *Obſtinacy*, or a *Habit.*

VI. Fifthly, It has been often hinted, that we conſiſt of a Soul and Body, that theſe are mutually affected by each other, and that from Fifthly, By the importunity of the natural *Appetites.*

from hence various Appetites ariſe in us, ſuch as the Preſervation of the Body, Deſire of Offspring, and the like; and whatever is an impediment to theſe, *that* we eſteem hurtful. If therefore we be not upon our Guard, we are hurried on, by the Importunity of them, to Abſurdities, or when we give a looſe to our Elections, we graſp at ſuch things as offer an unneceſſary Violence to them: hence ariſe an immenſe train of Uneaſineſſes to ourſelves and others; hence comes Violence and Injury to our Nature and the Natural Appetites, to which we owe at leaſt a moderate Indulgence: hereupon we raſhly and unlawfully ſeize thoſe things that are pre-occupied by the Elections or Appetites of other Men; nay, are not ſo cautious as to refrain from what is determin'd by the Will of God himſelf: from theſe and the like Occaſions it happens that we abuſe our Liberty, and by undue Elections bring natural Evils upon ourſelves or others. For as we are endow'd with Liberty in theſe and the like Caſes, we may either uſe it according to the dictate of Reaſon, or abuſe it: this Power ſeems to be included in the very Notion of created Liberty.

Why every thing ought not to be choſen, and why Elections are not eaſily chang'd

VII. It appears from hence how cautiouſly Elections ought to be made; for tho' nothing pleaſes us but what is choſen, yet we do not only take delight in *chooſing*, but much more in *enjoying* the things choſen, otherwiſe it would be the ſame thing whatever we choſe: we muſt take care then that our Elections be made of ſuch things as we may always enjoy. For if they be of periſhable Objects, or ſuch as are not in the leaſt anſwerable to the end of the Elector, he that chooſes them muſt neceſſarily grieve at the Diſappointment. He may avoid this, will ſome ſay, by changing his Election, when the thing choſen periſhes or fails; but it is to be obſerv'd, that Elections are not chang'd without a Senſe of Grief and Remorſe. For we never think of altering them till we are convinc'd that we have choſen amiſs. When therefore we are diſappointed of the Enjoyment of that which we have choſen, we deſpair, become miſerable, penitent, and conſcious of an Evil Choice, and then at laſt begin to alter our Choice, which cannot be done without an anxious and uneaſy Senſe of Diſappointment, and the more and longer we have been intent upon any Election, ſo much the greater Pain it will coſt us

us to be forced to change it. Hence proceeds the Difficulty which we feel in altering Elections; hence many had rather perſiſt in abſurd Elections than undergo the trouble of altering them: For things pleaſe us becauſe we will them, but to reject what we have once willed, is contradicting ourſelves, and cannot be done without a very diſagreeable ſtruggle and convulſion of the Mind: as any one may learn from Experience. (84.)

NOTES.

(84.) Any one that attentively conſiders the Workings of his own Mind, will ſoon be ſatisfy'd of the truth of all that our Author here advances; he will obſerve what difficulty and reluctance he feels in receding from what he has once firmly reſolv'd upon, tho perhaps he can perceive no manner of Good in it except what ariſes purely from that Reſolution. To make a Viſit at a certain time; to walk to any particular place; to recreate ourſelves with this or that kind of Diverſion; may be Actions in themſelves perfectly indifferent and trivial: but when once propoſed, even upon mere whim and caprice, and reſolv'd on with as little reaſon, they become often as much the Objects of our Hope and Deſire; the thoughts of proſecuting them give us as great pleaſure and ſatisfaction, and we are as unwillingly withdrawn from them, and as much diſappointed when we fall ſhort of the fancied enjoyment of them, as we ſhould be in Matters of the laſt Importance. Every Man that has taken the leaſt notice of what paſſes within him, is able to give numberleſs Inſtances of the truth of the foregoing Obſervation: which may ſerve to convince us how great the force and power of *Volition* is, and what excellent uſe it may be of in Life. How it ſupplies us with courage and conſtancy in the moſt arduous Undertakings, and enable us to ſurmount the greateſt Difficulties: how it qualifies and alleviates our Pain, and augments the Sum of our Happineſs; and makes us run contentedly the Round of low and otherwiſe tedious purſuits, and bear with pleaſure the otherwiſe inſupportable load of human Woes. This ſhews the great uſefulneſs and neceſſity of ſuch a Principle, and will lead us to conſider with our Author, in what a cautious manner it ought to be exerted, leſt it fall upon wrong and improper Objects, and thereby, inſtead of leſſening, increaſe our Miſery, and become itſelf the greateſt part of it. That this Principle of Liberty, tho' frequently attended with theſe conſequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the moſt beneficent Donor, muſt appear from a general computation of its Good and Evil Effects, with regard to the whole Syſtem, which will be the Subject of the following Sections.

SECT.

SECT. V.

How Evil Elections are conſiſtent with the Power and Goodneſs of God.

SUBSECT. I.

Propoſes the Difficulty, with a Preparative to the Solution of it.

The Evils of Free-Agents are not neceſſary, and therefore ſeem to be permitted by God voluntarily.

I. WE have ſhewn that moral Evils ariſe from undue Election; that Elections are free; and that it is not at all neceſſary for any one knowingly and willingly to purſue the worſe. Moral Evils cannot therefore be excuſed by neceſſity, as the natural ones, and thoſe of Imperfection are. 'Tis plain that created Nature implies Imperfection in the very terms of its being created (ſince what is abſolutely perfect is very God) either therefore nothing at all muſt be created, or ſomething imperfect: and that God, agreeably to what infinite Power and Goodneſs required, permitted no manner of Evil in Nature, the abſence whereof would not have introduced more or greater Evil. Since therefore Inconveniencies attend either the preſence or abſence of it, God made that which was attended with the leaſt. There are no Evils then which could poſſibly be avoided, and therefore they muſt be look'd upon as neceſſary, ſince the Imperfection of a Creature did not admit of pure and abſolute Good. But this Neceſſity does not appear in free Agents: For the Evils incident

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to them ſeem to proceed, not from imperfection of Nature, but *free Choice*, and are therefore permitted by God voluntarily, when neither the Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Univerſe require the permiſſion of them, that is, the World would be as well without as with them.

II. 'Tis to be obſerv'd, that God permitted the former kind of Evils becauſe they were inſeparable from things; either therefore the things muſt not have been created, or their inherent Evils tolerated. But Evil Elections have no neceſſary connection with the free Acts of the Will: neither does the Nature of Man require that he ſhould chooſe amiſs: nor does any benefit accrue to him from theſe Elections which could not be obtained without them, as it does in Hunger, Thirſt, Fear, and the reſt of the Paſſions; for without theſe Affections, as was ſhewn, the Animal would ſoon periſh; but no Evil would befal us (nay what Good would not?) if we always attended to Reaſon, and never choſe amiſs. Since therefore Man might bring the greateſt pleaſure to himſelf, and exerciſe his faculties by chooſing always well, how comes it to paſs that God ſuffers him to hurt himſelf and others unneceſſarily by Evil Elections? If it be ſaid that a Power of chooſing either Side is contain'd in the very Notion of Liberty; this muſt be allow'd, but yet there ſeems to be room enough for the Exerciſe of Liberty, tho' the Will were confin'd to the choice of what is lawful and convenient; what need is there then of ſuch a Power as may extend to the choice of Evil?

Moral Evils have no neceſſary connection with a free Nature, nor are of any advantage to it.

III. This ſeems to be the main ſtreſs of the Difficulty, here is the hardeſt point in this Affair, *viz.* Whence come Moral Evils; *i. e.* thoſe that are not neceſſary? If they be ſaid to be neceſſary, how are they free? If they be not neceſſary, why does God permit them? The latter ſeems repugnant to the Goodneſs of God, the former to the Nature of a free Agent.

Here then lies the ſtreſs of the Difficulty, *viz.* why did God permit thoſe Evils which are neither neceſſary nor uſeful?

IV. It muſt be confeſs'd, that we are leſs prepared for a Solution of this Difficulty than the former; for the Nature and Syſtems of the Intellectual World are leſs known to us than thoſe of the purely Material ones, and therefore are leſs prepared for an Anſwer to this Difficulty, than to the former.

We don't know ſo much of the Nature of thinking Beings as of

terial one: Material Objects ſurround us, and occupy all the Inlets to Knowledge, and are the only things that immediately affect our Senſes. They intrude upon us with an infinite Variety, and produce many and various Senſations in us. But of intellectual Beings of their Operations, or of the mutual connection between them, we have but very few, and thoſe very obſcure Notions, *viz.* ſuch as ariſe only from the reflection of our Underſtanding upon itſelf, or are collected by the uſe of Reaſon deducing one thing from another: For, of all intellectual Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately perceiv'd by us; nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the Notions ariſing from it, with them that proceed from other Sources: all our Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is derived from this alone. 'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in our Reaſonings about theſe and their Operations: and do not ſo clearly perceive the neceſſity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contrariety in the Motions of Matter; nor ſo eaſily apprehend what Inconvenience would follow from reſtraining the exerciſe of Liberty, as we ſee the conſequence of taking away the motion of Matter. We know that without Motion the whole Maſs of Matter would prove entirely uſeleſs, and that there would be no room for ſo many Animals as now we find receive their Origin and Subſiſtence from it; which is juſtly eſteem'd a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all the natural Evils ariſing from Matter and Motion: and we ſhould find the ſame thing in the prevention of the uſe of Free-Will, if we underſtood the Syſtem of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material World. But if we can ſhew that more Evils neceſſarily ariſe from withdrawing or reſtraining the uſe of Free-Will, than from permitting the abuſe of it, it muſt be evident that God is oblig'd to ſuffer either theſe or greater Evils. And ſince the leaſt of theſe neceſſary Evils is choſen, even infinite Goodneſs could not poſſibly do better.

The abuſe of Free-Will may be conceiv'd to have been prevented three ways, which are conſider'd in the three following Subſections.

V. Let us try then whether the abuſe of Free-Will could be prohibited with leſs detriment to the whole Syſtem, than what ariſes from the permiſſion of it. There are three Ways whereby God may be conceiv'd able to have prevented bad Elections; firſt, If he had created no Free Being at all. Secondly, If his Omnipotence interpoſe,

poſe, and occaſionally reſtrain the Will, which is naturally free, from any wrong Election. Thirdly, If he ſhould change the preſent ſtate of things, and tranſlate Man into another, where the occaſions of Error and incitements to Evil being cut off, he ſhould meet with nothing that could tempt him to chooſe amiſs.

SUBSECT. II.

Why God has created Free Agents.

I. AS to the firſt, 'Tis certain that God was not compell'd by any neceſſity to create any thing at all, he might therefore have prevented all Moral Evils, if he had not endow'd any Being with Free Choice; for ſo there would have been nothing that could ſin. But ſuch a monſtrous Defect and *Hiatus* would have been left in Nature by this means, *viz.* by taking away all Free Agents, as would put the World into a worſe Condition than that which it is in at preſent, with all the Moral Evils that attend it, tho' they were multiply'd to a much greater Number.

God might have prevented Moral Evils, if he had refuſed to create any free Being.

II. For in the firſt place, if we ſet aſide Free Agents, *i. e.* thoſe which have the Principle of Action within themſelves, there is properly nothing at all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely paſſive: there is indeed ſome kind of Action in Matter, *viz.* Motion; but we know that it is paſſive even with regard to that; 'tis therefore the Action of God upon Matter, rather than of Matter itſelf; for it does not move itſelf, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the whole World would be a mere *Machine*, capable of being turn'd any Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of itſelf. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itſelf exert one ſingle Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and ſtupid, as much as a Wheel or a Stone: it would continue ſluggiſh and incapable of Action, unleſs actuated by external force. Second Cauſes could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them, but all would be done entirely by the firſt. We need not ſay, how much

But without theſe the World would have been a mere Machine, and every thing paſſive.

much a World thus conſtituted would be inferior to the preſent, nor how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author.

Objection from theſe, who declare that the Underſtanding is active, tho' it is neceſſary as alſo God himſelf.

III. Man, you'll ſay, neceſſarily aſſents to this Propoſition, twice two make four; but tho' his Mind is neceſſarily driven to this Aſſent, and conſequently is not *free*, yet he is *active*: for it can ſcarce be ſaid that a Man is paſſive in giving his Aſſent *. The ſame may be affirm'd of God, who, tho' we ſuppoſe him to be abſolutely free in his primary Elections, yet when theſe are once fix'd, he muſt neceſſarily execute what he had decreed: nevertheleſs he is properly Self-active in all Caſes, conſequently there may be ſomething active in Nature, tho' there were nothing free.

Anſwer to the former part of the Objection.

IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis not very clear what may be the Cauſe of intellectual Aſſent; if the Object, then the Mind is merely paſſive in the Act of Underſtanding: nor is Aſſent imputable to it any more than Deſcent to a Stone; but if the Object be eſteem'd only a Condition upon which the Underſtanding acts, we ſhall want a Cauſe to determine the Underſtanding; for that cannot be ſuppoſed to determine itſelf, any more than the Fire determines itſelf to burn combuſtible Matter †. For no body judges the combuſtible Matter to be active when it is ſet on Fire, or that the Fire burns of itſelf without being kindled by ſomething elſe. The World then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechaniſm, where nothing moves itſelf, but every thing is mov'd by an external Cauſe, and that by another, and ſo on till we come at the firſt, namely God; who will be the only Self-active Being and muſt be eſteem'd the real Cauſe of all things: neither can any thing, whether well or ill done, be aſcribed to others.

Anſwer to the latter.

V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That Being muſt be denominated Free, who is held by no other tie than his own Election: But God is no otherwiſe oblig'd to execute his Decrees, therefore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely; and is purely active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he ſuffers nothing by neceſſity, nor from any other beſide himſelf, and is determin'd to act by his own Liberty.

VI. Secondly,

* *See* Note 61.

† *See our Author's* Note B.

VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the World in order to exerciſe the Powers he is poſſeſs'd of for the Good of the Univerſe; the Divine Goodneſs therefore delights and applauds itſelf in its Works, and the more any thing reſembles God, and the more 'tis Self-ſufficient, it is to be eſteem'd ſo much the more agreeable to its Author. But any one may underſtand how much a Work which moves itſelf, pleaſes itſelf, and is capable of receiving and returning a Favour, is preferable to one that does nothing, feels nothing, makes no return, unleſs by the force of ſome external Impulſe: any Perſon, I ſay, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there is between a Child careſſing his Father, and a Machine turn'd about by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between God, and ſuch of his Works as are endow'd with Freedom; there's room for a Covenant and mutual Love. For there is ſome ſort of Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in ſome meaſure return the benefits of the Creator, at leaſt make an acknowledgment for them; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceiv'd to be agreeable to God, this muſt certainly be ſo. One ſuch Action as this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of Motion; if then there had been no free Creatures, God muſt have been deprived of this Complacency, which is almoſt the only one worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis therefore as much agreeable to God that he ſhould have made ſuch Beings, as it is to the World that they ſhould be made: for if nothing of this kind had been created, the very beſt thing among the Creatures, and that which is moſt agreeable to the Deity, would have been wanting. 'Tis better therefore to permit the abuſe of Liberty in ſome than to have omitted ſo much Good. For the Defect and Abſence of ſuch Agents is to be eſteemed a greater Evil than all the Crimes which are conſequent upon the abuſe of Liberty.

God has a complacency in his Works, and if nothing were free, that would be wanting in them which is moſt agreeable to the Deity.

VII. Thirdly, From what has been ſaid, we learn, that ſome Evils which neceſſarily adhere to things, *viz.* Natural ones, and thoſe of Imperfection, did not hinder the Divine Goodneſs from creating the Good with which they were connected, ſince the exceſs of Good com-

are only

Neceſſary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much leſs thoſe which poſſible.

compenſated for the fewer and leſs Evils which were unavoidable: Thus God choſe ſuch Animals as were Mortal, afflicted with Hunger, Thirſt, and other Paſſions, rather than none at all. If then thoſe Evils which were *neceſſary* and foreſeen did not hinder God from creating the Good that was annext to them, how much leſs ſhould the *poſſible* Evils ariſing from the abuſe of Free-Will hinder his Goodneſs from creating Free-Agents? To enjoy free Choice is a greater Good than ſimple Life, but we willingly accept this latter with all the train of Natural Evils, how much more gratefully ſhould we embrace the Gift of Liberty, attended only with ſome Danger of Evils, but not with the Evils themſelves, as in the former Caſes, (85.)

Natural Evils are greater than Moral ones, and Free-Will a greater Good than the Natural Appetites.

VIII. Fourthly, It muſt be obſerv'd that Elections are therefore eſteem'd Evil, becauſe they lead us into Natural Evils. For if an Election contain nothing abſurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one. Hatred of God, Rebellion againſt his Commands, Murther, Theft, Lying, are Sins, becauſe they are hurtful to ourſelves or others, becauſe they deprive us of natural Good, and lead into Evil. Elections therefore are wrong and undue on account of the natural Evils which ſometimes attend them; Natural Evils then are greater than Moral *: For that which makes any thing bad muſt neceſſarily be worſe itſelf: But Free-Will is better than natural Appetites, and a Gift more worthy of the Deity, it is not therefore to be deny'd to the Creatures on account of the concomitant Evils, any more than the natural Appetites and Propenſities: both of them indeed ſometimes

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(85.) In relation to *us*, indeed, a Gift which is attended only with the poſſibility of ſome Inconveniencies, appears to be of more dignity and value than one that brings ſome degree of unavoidable Miſery along with it, and as ſuch it ought to be receiv'd with proportionable gratitude by us. But with reſpect to a Being who foreſees all the Abuſes of Free-Will, all the contingent Evils conſequent thereupon, are as certain as the natural and neceſſary ones, and therefore ought to be equally provided againſt. This Argument therefore about the *Contingency* of Moral Evil, ſo far as it relates to the Deity, need not be inſiſted on, ſince our Author allows the Divine Preſcience, and conſiſtently with that, offers reaſons ſufficient for the Vindication of the other Attributes of God in the preſent Caſe.

* *See* Chap. 4. §. 4. par. 8. *and* X i.

times lead us into the ſame Evils, but with this Difference, that the one, *viz.* the natural Appetite, loads us with Evils by neceſſity; but the other, *viz.* Free-Will, not of neceſſity, but only if we pleaſe. Theſe might have been avoided ſince they are contingent, but thoſe could not, ſince they force themſelves upon us againſt our Wills: As therefore it became God to create an Appetite which was join'd with neceſſary Evils; how much more agreeable was it to his Goodneſs to have endow'd us with Free-Will, by which theſe may be avoided, or at leaſt alleviated? If the natural Appetite be a greater Good than what theſe Evils which flow from it can overballance, and therefore worthy to be implanted in Animals by the Deity; how much more excellent a Good will Free-Election be, by which alone we become capable of Happineſs, tho' join'd with the danger of falling into Evils by abuſe?

IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worſe without Free-Will than with it, 'tis plain that Liberty diminiſhes inſtead of increaſing the Sum of Evils, and is beſtow'd upon us for that end. But how much more miſerable the State of Man would be without Liberty than it is with it, will appear to any one who conſiders what ſort of Creatures we ſhould be without Election. For if Man were not free, he would be driven by the Violence of Matter and Motion, and ſooner or later be quite overwhelm'd with thoſe natural Evils which neceſſarily ariſe from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But it is better to ſtruggle with ſome of theſe with Liberty, than all of them with neceſſity; the former is the Condition of Men, the latter of Brutes *. If by being deprived of Election we ſhould be freed from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God for giving it; but ſeeing that whether we be free or bound by the chain of Fate (while we have Bodies) we muſt neceſſarily endure thoſe Evils which are conſequent upon the affections of Bodies; (nay thoſe very Evils which we were afraid of falling into by a wrong Choice) 'tis in vain to deſire the abſence of Liberty, by relying upon which, and uſing it aright, we may avoid the moſt bitter part even of theſe neceſſary Evils.

The State of Man would be worſe if Free-Will were taken away.

X. For

* *Only in ſome Degree, ſee the Obſervation from* Bayle *in* Note 35.

Free Agents only are capable of perfect Happineſs, therefore it is better to enjoy Liberty.

X. For in the Sixth place, it is moſt manifeſt that the greateſt Good, and that whereby Men excel other Animals, is owing to Liberty. By the aſſiſtance of this we riſe above Fate, and when attack'd from without by adverſe Fortune, we find our Happineſs within ourſelves. Other Animals have nothing to oppoſe to a Diſtemper, Death, or Pain, nothing to delight themſelves in, except Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating their Species. But a free Agent, in the midſt of Pains and Torments, of Hunger and Thirſt, nay Death itſelf, has wherewithal to pleaſe itſelf, and to blunt the Edge of all theſe Evils. We complain of our Bodies, that by being tied to them, we are oblig'd to undergo very many and great Hardſhips; how much more full of Complaints ſhould we be if we were entirely ſubjected to them, and hurried into Evils without any Remedy or Relief? Is it not better for us to have our Happineſs in our own Power, than to be oblig'd to ſeek it elſewhere, nay rather to deſpair of it? Which Happineſs is only to be found in a Free Choice, as was ſhewn before. From hence it appears, I hope, ſufficiently, why God created Free Agents notwithſtanding the abuſe which they were liable to. For he choſe a Creature which would ſometimes do amiſs, rather than that every thing ſhould be drawn on by Fate, and a Chain of Neceſſity, into inevitable Evils. (86.)

XI. But

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(86.) Our Author having ſhewn in §. 2. that the greateſt part of our Happineſs conſiſts in this Principle of Election, here points out ſome of the many Inconveniencies that would attend the loſs of it. Firſt, If there was no ſuch thing as a free Agent, all would be mere Mechaniſm and neceſſary Effects of the firſt Cauſe, *i. e.* the beſt and nobleſt part of Nature would be cut off, that which of all others is moſt worthy of and agreeable to the Deity. There would be no Creatures capable of making any kind of return, of paying any reaſonable Obedience and Duty to God; no poſſibility for him to diſplay his Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Mercy in the Government of them, nor any means of bringing them to the ſublimeſt Degree of Intellectual Happineſs, *viz.* that which ariſes from Morality. Secondly, Thoſe paſſive Beings themſelves would be in a much worſe Condition than they now are. They would be deprived of all the Happineſs which they now enjoy from the choice of indifferent Objects; they would be neceſſarily expoſed to all the natural Evils ariſing from the general Laws of Matter and Motion, *viz.* Diſtempers of the Body, Inclemency of the Seaſons, Hunger and Thirſt, *&c.* which Liberty enables them frequently to guard againſt and avoid, and frequently to bear with pleaſure, and even to convert to their ſuperior Good: nay, they muſt inevitably undergo the greateſt part of thoſe very Evils which at preſent, by this Power, they have at moſt only a *poſſibility* of incurring. Thirdly, Without Liberty, the other moſt exalted Powers of the Mind would be entirely uſeleſs, and often aggravations of our

XI. But, you'll ſay, that you deſire the Pleaſure and Advantages ariſing from free Elections, but would not have the Power to Sin; *i. e.* you would have a Liberty reſtrain'd by Nature within certain bounds, ſo as never to extend to Evil. But it may be juſtly doubted whether this was poſſible in the preſent ſtate of things: For Free-Will is naturally an active Power, and determines itſelf to Action, and requires nothing more in Objects, than that they ſhould give occaſion for the Exerciſe of Elections; 'tis therefore active in its own Nature. Now whatſoever is limited by another admits of bounds, and is therefore paſſive with reſpect to the Limiter; it ſeems equally abſurd then for a Free Agent to be thus limited, as for Matter, which is in itſelf and of its own Nature paſſive, to determine itſelf to Action, and is perhaps no leſs impoſſible. (87.)

The benefits of Free-Will could not be had without a Power of Sinning.

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our Miſery. "A Faculty of Underſtanding "(ſays Dr. *Jenkin* *) without a Will to de- "termine it, if left to itſelf, muſt always "think of the ſame Object, or proceed in a "continued ſeries and connection of thoughts "without any Aim or End; which would be "a perpetual Labour in vain, and tedious "Thoughtfulneſs to no purpoſe: but if it "ſhould be ſometimes determin'd by ſome "thing external to new Objects, yet what uſe "of Reaſon could there be in Contemplations, "which were merely obtruded and forc'd up- "on the Mind?" And to foreſee a train of Evils, without any power of acting againſt and oppoſing them, muſt be only anticipating Miſery, and adding the future to the preſent, and a ſenſe of our Inability of ever helping ourſelves to both. Theſe Conſiderations are ſufficient to prove, that the want of Liberty in general would be an irreparable Damage to any conſcious Syſtem.

For a fuller Explication of them ſee Mr. *Jackſon*'s *Defence of human Liberty*, p. 79, *&c.* and *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Part 2. C. 4. §. 3. p. 318, *&c.* 8vo. or *Sherlock* on *Providence*, C. 7. p. 240. 2d Edit. or *D'Oyly*'s *Firſt Diſſertation*, C. 10. or Dr. *Jenkin* in the Chap. above cited.

The next Enquiry muſt be, what Conſequences would attend either the Limitation of this free Power to ſome *particular Objects*, or the Infringement and Suſpenſion of it on particular *Occaſions*.

(87.) If Matter were made *active*, it would be no longer *Matter*: in like manner if a ſelf-moving or active Being were render'd paſſive, it would be no longer what it is. Hence appears the abſurdity of ſuppoſing a Liberty, properly ſo call'd, to be determin'd to ſome particular ways of acting, 'tis the ſame as the Liberty of a Stone to ſome particular Ways of moving, *i.e.* no Liberty at all. The very Eſſence of Liberty includes an abſolute Phyſical Indifference to either Side in any given Caſe. Such a Liberty as this has been ſhewn to belong to Man in reſpect of *Willing*. He can will or chooſe any thing in Nature, he can alſo either chooſe or refuſe any thing, and therefore to determine his Will to ſome Objects, or incline it to one Side in any given Circumſtances, would be ſo far to deſtroy it. The Queſtion then is not, whether a Man might be neceſſarily inclin'd to ſome.

* *Reaſonableneſs of the Chriſtian Religion*, 2d vol. C. 12. p. 238. 5th Edit.

The Will could not be determin'd to Good by Objects, since the Goodneſs of them generally proceeds from Election.

XII. Secondly, If the Will were naturally reſtrain'd to chooſe Good only, it muſt have this reſtraint either from the *Object* or the *Underſtanding:* But neither could be done. If ſome things were in themſelves always Good, and others Evil, it might be poſſible indeed that the Will ſhould no more admit of Evil than the Sight does of Savours: But Moral Good and Evil are very frequently not abſolute things, but merely relative: for there is almoſt no Action which proceeds from Choice, but what may be Good or Evil upon a change of Circumſtances *. Even Natural Evils themſelves are ſometimes good and eligible. Free-Will then muſt needs be indifferent to all external Objects, and thoſe things which are now agreeable, become ſhortly diſagreeable, according to the infinite variety of Circumſtances and the Exigence of Affairs. The Will therefore cannot be determin'd to Good by Objects. Nay, to confeſs the Truth, we generally do not chooſe Objects becauſe they are Good, but they become Good becauſe we chooſe them. The Goodneſs of them therefore is for the moſt part determin'd by the Election, and not that by the Goodneſs. For we have ſhewn before †, that this is the Nature of an Elective Faculty, and ſuch it ought to be, otherwiſe we could not have the leaſt poſſibility of attaining Happineſs in ſo great a variety and uncertainty of outward things ‖.

The Intellect often finds nothing good in things, except that they help towards the attainment of an End.

XIII. Thirdly, The Will was no more capable of being determin'd perpetually to Good by the *Underſtanding*, than by Objects. For the Under-

Election, the Will therefore could not be determin'd to Good by the Underſtanding.

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ſome particular thing or act, and yet continue to have Free-Will; for that, I think, is a contradiction. But whether he ſhould have this preſent power of willing deſtroy'd on ſome particular Occaſions, or whether he ſhould be ſometimes alter'd and made what he now is not. Whether this Change of Man's Nature would in the main prove worthy of the Deity, or beneficial to the World, will be more fully examin'd in the following Subſection: our Author now proceeds to enquire *how* this determination could poſſibly be effected in the preſent State of things, and if, upon Enquiry into all the imaginable Methods of effecting it, they appear to be either inſufficient for the End propoſed, or attended with worſe Conſequences than the preſent Eſtabliſhment, this muſt be a very ſtrong Argument againſt them.

* *See* Turner's *Diſcourſe of the Laws of Nature, and the reaſon of their Obligation*, §. 23, 24. or *Puffendorf* of the *Laws of Nature*, &c. B. 1. C. 2. §. 6.

† Sect. 1. Subſect. 3.

‖ *See* par. 16 *and* 17 *of this Sect.*

Underſtanding acts neceſſarily, and repreſents nothing as Good but what proceeds from Objects; if therefore the Will were determin'd by it, it would neither be free nor always able to pleaſe itſelf. For the Underſtanding often repreſents all external things as ſad and unproſperous, and could never make us take natural Evils, ſuch as Death, Labours, Torments, for real Good, tho' it might induce us to bear them in proſpect of a farther End. But to endure a thing in view of a farther End, is to undergo preſent Miſery in hopes of future Happineſs; *i. e.* to weigh a preſent Evil againſt a future Good, and of two Evils to chooſe the leſs, which Reaſon indeed perſuades us to do, ſince it is neceſſary that it ſhould be done: but this helps nothing towards a Vindication of the Divine Goodneſs, which has impoſed this Neceſſity upon us: nor can he be happy by the Judgment of his own Underſtanding, who muſt undergo theſe things. But if it be granted that things pleaſe us, not becauſe the Underſtanding judges them to be eligible, but becauſe we reſolve to exerciſe our Free-Will in performing them, even theſe will become agreeable by Election, and the Underſtanding will perceive them to be made ſo, and not make them to be ſo. 'Tis not therefore the Office of the Underſtanding to govern the Will, but to diſcover means for the attainment of that which is choſen, and to give warning when it chooſes ſuch things as are abſurd or impoſſible: For the Underſtanding, as we ſaid before, judges that to be good which is agreeable to our Choice, except this lead us into Abſurdities. In order therefore to avoid Abſurdities, we make uſe of the Underſtanding as a Monitor, not a Maſter.

And from hence, I think, it appears how inconvenient it would be for the Choice to depend in all caſes upon the Underſtanding. For ſince the Judgment of the Underſtanding depends upon the Objects themſelves, and the natural congruity which they bear to the Appetites; if the Choice were to be determin'd by its Judgment, 'tis evident that we muſt neceſſarily want a great many things which the Underſtanding judges to be good, and could never hope for ſolid Happineſs, (88.) ſince

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(88.) That is, if every thing which the Underſtanding repreſented as good in itſelf, made a *neceſſary Part* of my Happineſs, I ſhould be always unhappy, ſince I could never attain to all the Good I ſaw. Whereas by this Power of willing, I cut off ſeveral of theſe apparent Goods,

ſince Objects are fix'd, as we ſaid before *, and can never anſwer to our natural Appetites in every Particular. In order therefore to the attainment of continual Happineſs, it was neceſſary that we ſhould be able to pleaſe ourſelves in ſome reſpect, independently of the Underſtanding, and by Election to conſtitute thoſe things good and agreeable to us, which the Underſtanding, if there had been no ſuch Election, would have pronounced offenſive, diſagreeable and painful: From hence it appears how fit it is that this Power ſhould be freed from the Government of the Underſtanding; but if it is freed, it could not be determin'd by it.

The Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God being equal to his Power, hinders him from chooſing amiſs.

XIV. Fourthly, It is to be obſerv'd that the Divine Power is Infinite, and that there are innumerable things poſſible to it, which are repugnant to one another, and deſtructive of each other, and cannot by any means be conſiſtent. If therefore God ſhould act according to the Infinity of his Power, without any regard to his other Attributes, he would effect nothing at all, or elſe immediately deſtroy what he had effected. His infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs therefore gave bounds and reſtraint to his Power, which would otherwiſe confound every thing; and theſe muſt of neceſſity be equally Infinite with his Power, otherwiſe infinite Evils muſt certainly ariſe from infinite Power. But a Creature, as his Elective Power neceſſarily extends farther than his Wiſdom and Goodneſs, is made naturally liable to fall ſometimes into Evils. 'Tis well known that Mathematicians ſometimes ſuppoſe a Line to be infinite in which they may take a Point wherever they pleaſe. Now ſince our Election may be made as we pleaſe,

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Goods, and only make ſuch to be conſtituent parts of my Happineſs as I chooſe, and if I choſe only ſuch as I could obtain, I might be always Happy. This Propoſition, *viz. that all Good does not make an Eſſential Part of our Happineſs, becauſe we do not will it*, is aſſerted by Mr. *Locke* †, and well urg'd as a Reaſon why the greater Good does not abſolutely determine the Mind: and the ſame, I think, might as juſtly be affirm'd of *Pain*, viz. That the removal of all Pain does not make a part of our preſent Happineſs, ſince we do not always abſolutely *will* or *deſire* to remove it. But on the contrary chooſe to bear it, and by that Choice, often produce a Pleaſure, which does more than counterballance it. See C. 5. §. 2. par. 6. *and* Note 65.

* Sect. 1. Subſect. 3. par. 2.
† *Chapter of Power*, §. 43.

pleaſe, the Wiſdom and Goodneſs whereby it is to be govern'd, ought to be infinite: for if the Line be finite, a Point may be pitch'd upon beyond it: and in like manner, if the Goodneſs and Wiſdom be finite, the Choice may be made without and beyond them, that is, amiſs. But ſince all created Wiſdom and Goodneſs muſt neceſſarily be finite, it follows that there wants a ſufficient reſtraint upon Elections, and that every *free* Creature is neceſſarily *defectible*. As then all created Beings are neceſſarily imperfect in general ſo every one has its own peculiar Defect. And this kind of Imperfection, *viz.* the Power of Sinning, is proper and peculiar to ſuch as enjoy Free-Will: nor can they be conceiv'd ſeparate from each other, any more than Contrariety from Motion. (89.)

But Man may chooſe amiſs ſince his Goodneſs and Wiſdom neither are nor can be adequate to his Power.

XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty ofpleaſing itſelf by Election cannot be determin'd to Good by *Objects*, in the ſame manner as the Sight is to Light, or Taſte to Savours, (ſince Goodneſs is not always an abſolute Quality in things, like Light and the Objects of Senſe) nor by the *Underſtanding*, ſince many things muſt be choſen in which the Underſtanding can perceive no manner of Good, except that they are capable of being choſen, and when choſen pleaſe, becauſe they exerciſe the Faculty. And tho' the Objects of Election are not Infinite, yet there are infinite reſpects in which Good or Evil may be produced: There's need then of infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs to direct the Choice, leſt it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature endow'd with Wiſdom is finite, it is not poſſible but that it may ſometimes do amiſs in chooſing.

XVI. Fifthly,

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(89.) As Motion without Contrariety would be of no uſe, ſo Liberty without a Power of doing amiſs, if ſuch a thing were poſſible, would be of no value: it would not have the good Effects and Ends for which Liberty was given: particularly it would not be attended with the happy conſciouſneſs of *Deſert*, or the Idea of receiving a Benefit, by way of reward, conferr'd upon us for having done what was right and good, and what we might as eaſily have not done. From which Idea, as including *Self-Approbation*, *&c.* we frequently feel a far more exquiſite Pleaſure, than from the intrinſic Value of the Benefit itſelf: Nay, without this Idea, to be loaded with Favours would prove even an Uneaſineſs to a generous Mind. This Notion will be farther explain'd and vindicated in the following Subſection; but for the Truth of it we muſt appeal to the conſtant Experience of the ingenuous part of Mankind.

'Tis better to be ſometimes deceiv'd with Pleaſure, than to be always ſolicitous.

XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confined to the Choice of thoſe things only which the Underſtanding declares to be good, or was reſtrain'd from chooſing till the Goodneſs of the Objects were apparent, we muſt of neceſſity heſitate in many things, and be anxious and ſolicitous in all. For ſince things are connected together by a long chain of Conſequences, it is impoſſible for us to form a right Judgment of the abſolute Goodneſs of them, without a foreknowledge of theſe Conſequences: we muſt therefore have been oblig'd to uſe all poſſible Diſquiſition before every Election, and ſuſpend the Choice where any ſuſpicion of Error or ground of Doubt ſhould appear: But ſuch a Diſquiſition and continual Solicitude would be a greater Bar to Happineſs than many Errors and natural Inconveniencies. For if the Will can produce Good to itſelf by chooſing, the Errors and Inconveniencies to which it is expos'd by a bad Choice, may be compenſated by the Pleaſure which ariſes from the Senſe of Liberty. But if we were oblig'd to all poſſible Enquiry, more inconvenience would be felt from that Oligation, than from ſome Errors in Election; nor would all of them be by this means avoided; for after all poſſible Examination, a finite Underſtanding may be deceiv'd. Evil Elections are to be avoided on account of the Uneaſineſs conſequent upon them, if therefore ſuch a Diſquiſition as is neceſſary to diſcover the Good, and a Suſpenſion of the Elective Faculty till that Good be diſcover'd, would bring greater Uneaſineſs than ſome wrong Elections, a Man will be more happy with a Power of doing amiſs, than if he were oblig'd to wait for the determination of the Underſtanding in every Caſe. For it is better that ſome Perſons ſhould ſometimes do amiſs, and ſuffer Uneaſineſs from the Conſcience of having done ſo, than that all Men ſhould in every Caſe be always afraid, uncertain, and ſolicitous, nay generally ceaſe from all manner of Action.

'Tis better to be in danger of Sinning, than to ceaſe from Election.

XVII. Such is the Nature of our Will that it can pleaſe itſelf in Election, and by its own Power make the things choſen agreeable, tho' in themſelves diſagreeable to the Appetites. And tho' this cannot be done at all times, and in every Object, yet it is better to run the hazard, than to be deprived of ſo uſeful a Faculty, or to be reſtrain'd from Election till an imperfect Underſtanding, ſuch as that of Man neceſſarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impoſſibility.

It

It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Happineſs from the Will itſelf; for if it depended on the Underſtanding, it would come with Difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could ſeldom enjoy it pure and unmix'd. 'Tis better therefore for us to be able to pleaſe ourſelves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and Conſequences, tho' with a danger of Sinning, than to ceaſe from Election, and be reſtrain'd from the Exerciſe of our Faculties, till a whole train of theſe were perfectly apparent, which if it could be at all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find that tries. (90.)

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(90.) All that *Bayle* objects to this *, is taken from the Nature of Good Angels, and Glorified Souls, who, according to him, are no leſs happy in themſelves, nor perform a leſs acceptable Service to the Deity for the want of it; and why therefore might not we?—To what was obſerv'd about the Inconcluſiveneſs of all ſuch Arguments as are drawn from Beings of a different Order in Note 46, we ſhall here add, firſt, that it is more than we are oblig'd to grant, that either Angels or Saints in Heaven are abſolutely devoid of Liberty. They may have more clear Impreſſions of Good and Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Underſtandings, fewer and leſs Temptations, *&c.* without being leſs free †; nay they muſt be more free, the more they are ſo qualify'd ‖. This way of reaſoning therefore proceeds upon a falſe, or at leaſt uncertain Hypotheſis.

Secondly, Tho' it ſhould be granted that theſe glorious Beings, ſuppoſing them all neceſſary, might have as ample Knowledge, as ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and conſequently be as happy in the Enjoyment of God and themſelves, as if they were all free; tho' they might have no occaſion to ſee or experience Vice, in order to their being fully acquainted with the Excellence of Virtue, and made ſenſible of the Infinite Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs of the Deity, ſhewn in the Government and Suppreſſion of the former, and in the Production and Improvement of the latter: Tho, I ſay, theſe exalted Beings could be ſuppoſed to have a thorough Intuition of all the Attributes of God without any ſuch manifeſtation of them in his Works; (againſt which Notion ſee *D'Oyly*'s *Firſt Diſſertation*, C. 8. *and Concluſion*, p. 123.) yet it does not ſeem poſſible for ſuch imperfect Creatures as *we* are, to attain unto this excellent Knowledge, and enjoy the happy Effects of it on any other Terms than the preſent; we could not ſure have had ſo lively an Idea of the *Mercy* of God, if there had never been any proper Objects of it. We could not have been ſo thoroughly conſcious of our Dependency or Danger; nor had ſo grateful a ſenſe of our conſtant Support, our frequent Deliverances, nor conſequently have arrived to ſo great a degree of Happineſs, either in this Life or the next, by any other Method, as will be further ſhewn in Notes 103, and 108. Either then theſe Happy Beings are ſtill perfectly free, which Freedom conſtitutes the greateſt part of their Happineſs; and let any

* *See his Anſwer to the Queries of a Provincial, and Crit. Dict. Article* Marchionites, *Remark* F. *&c.*
† *See A. Bp.* Daws's *5th Serm.* p. 73, 74.
‖ *See the beginning of* Note 95.

SUBSECT. III.

Why God does not interpoſe his Omnipotence, and occaſionally reſtrain the Will from depraved Elections.

More and greater Evils would ariſe from thence, than from the abuſe of Free-Will.

I. 'TIS evident from what has been ſaid, that it was agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to have created Free Agents, for without theſe the Syſtem of Nature would have been imperfect: nor could their Actions have been determin'd to Good by any natural Propenſity or Limitation, in the ſame manner as the Senſes are limited by Objects: But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for their Actions, and if he ſhould ſuſpend his Influence, they would not act at all. Since therefore he could ſo eaſily hinder the abuſe of Liberty, why does he ſuffer it? Why does he not reſtrain Elections when they tend to Vice and Abſurdity? We grant that this Objection cannot be ſatisfactorily anſwer'd, otherwiſe than by ſhewing that more and greater Evils would befal the Univerſe from ſuch an Interpoſition, than from the abuſe of Free-Will. In order to which it is to be conſider'd,

It would be as much Violence to prevent the Action of Free-Will, as the Motion of the Sun.

II. In the firſt place, That this cannot be effected without *Violence done to Nature.* 'Tis allow'd that Elections ought to be free, and that thinking Beings cannot otherwiſe be happy: God himſelf in creating them has determin'd, as it were by a Law, that they ſhould

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any Man try to prove the contrary; or at leaſt they once were ſo, in order to their greater Perfection, and are now only alter'd by being tranſlated into another State, and put out of farther Tryal; and conſequently they belong to our Author's third Expedient, which will be examin'd in Subſect. 5. to which we muſt refer the Reader.

ſhould be free. For by giving them a Nature endow'd with Choice, he allow'd them to make uſe of it. They cannot therefore be hinder'd without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that God can diſpenſe with the Laws of Nature; but who will require or allow this to be done frequently? The bounds of this World, and the number of Thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we believe that the Syſtem of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any other Security of our Happineſs, and of the Duration of the World, than the Divine Conſtancy and Immutability: the Univerſal Laws of Nature are the Aſſurances of this Conſtancy, and upon them does the Security and Happineſs of the whole Work depend. It is not therefore to be expected that God ſhould lightly diſpenſe with theſe Laws, much leſs alter them by his Omnipotence every Moment. Since then it is provided by an Univerſal Law, that Free Agents ſhould procure to themſelves Happineſs by the uſe of Election, and it is impoſſible but that theſe, being left to themſelves, ſhould ſometimes fall into depraved Elections, would it not be an Infringement and a Violation of this Law, if God ſhould interpoſe and hinder the uſe of that Faculty which by the Law of Nature he had eſtabliſhed? We dont expect that the Situation of the Earth, or Courſe of the Sun, ſhould be alter'd on our account, becauſe theſe ſeem to be things of great Importance, and we apprehend it to be unreaſonable, that, for our private Advantage, the Order and Harmony of things ſhould be chang'd, to the detriment of ſo many Beings. But to alter the Will, to ſtop Election, is no leſs a Violation of the Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Courſe of the Sun. For a Free Agent is a more noble Being than the Sun, the Laws of its Nature are to be eſteem'd more ſacred, and not to be chang'd without a greater Miracle. There would then be a kind of Shock and Violence done to Nature, if God ſhould interfere and hinder the Actions of Free-Will; and perhaps it would prove no leſs pernicious to the Intellectual Syſtem, than the Sun's ſtanding ſtill would be to the Natural. His Goodneſs therefore does not ſuffer him to interpoſe, except when he foreſees that the Evils ariſing from our depraved Elections are greater than thoſe which would enſue upon an

Interruption of the Courſe of Nature, which he only can know who knows all things. (91.)

God by interpoſing in the Elections of his Creatures, would quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents.

III. Secondly, Such an Interruption as this would not only do Violence to Nature, but quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents. This Method is to hinder or excite Elections by Rewards and Puniſhments: To divert them from unreaſonable or abſurd things, and draw them to better by the perſuaſion of Reaſon. But it is doubtful, whether the Nature of the thing will permit an Election to be determin'd by Impulſe, or, as it were, by immediate Contact. For it ſeems equally abſurd to attempt a change of Election by any other means than thoſe above mention'd, as to deſire to ſtop the Impetus of Matter by Intreaty, or offering Rewards. May we not with the ſame reaſon expect that Matter ſhould be moved by Rewards and Puniſhments, as the Will influenc'd by *Phyſical Impulſe*, as they call it? For it is by theſe Means that they would have God to ſtop or alter the Choice. So prepoſterous an Interpoſal would confound

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(91.) By this laſt Conceſſion our Author evidently allows that God may ſometimes have ſufficient reaſon to interpoſe in matters relating to our Elections (tho' perhaps he never acts upon the Will by *Phyſical Impulſe*, or irreſiſtibly, which will be conſider'd in the next Subſection) his Deſign therefore is only to ſhew that this ought not to be done frequently, or as often as Men chooſe amiſs. Now this may be illuſtrated in the ſame manner as we treated of the Laws of Motion, *&c.* That there are general Mechanic Laws in the Natural World, the Eſtabliſhment and Preſervation whereof tends more to the Happineſs of the Creation, and is every way more worthy of the Deity, than to act always by *particular Wills*, was ſhewn in Note 37. If theſe Laws were frequently alter'd and unfix'd, they would ceaſe to be Laws, and all Action, Labour, Contrivance which depends upon the Stability, and computes the future Effects of them, muſt ceaſe, or at leaſt prove inſignificant. In like manner *Liberty* has been proved to be an Univerſal Law of Intellectual Beings, and the great Uſe and Excellence of it evinc'd, and therefore we have equal reaſon to ſuppoſe that it could not be, at leaſt not frequently, ſuſpended, without as great Inconvenience as would attend the Violation of theſe Laws of Mechaniſm. If this were done in the Rational World, all Studies, Enterpriſes, Arguments; in ſhort, all kind of Reaſoning would be vain and uſeleſs, all rewardable Action, and its concomitant Happineſs (of which in Note 89, and more below) muſt entirely ceaſe. Nay, perhaps to deprive a rational Being of Free-Will, would be altogether as abſurd and inconvenient, as to endow a Machine with Reflection, or an Edifice with Self-motion. But our great Ignorance of the Intellectual World muſt render any Argument of this kind very uncertain. However, thus much we are ſure of, that ſo great Violence done to the Will, would be directly contrary to the general Method of God's treating reaſonable Creatures, and quite oppoſite to the end of all thoſe Manifeſtations he has made of his Nature and Will; the very Reverſe of all thoſe Arguments, Exhortations, Promiſes and Threats, which are the Subject of Reveal'd Religion: a Man

found every thing, and leave nothing certain in Nature. How fatal ſuch an Experiment would be, and how it would effect the Minds of the Obſervers, or what Suſpicions concerning God and their own Security, it might ſuggeſt to the whole Syſtem of thinking Beings, God only knows. We ſee that human Laws cannot be diſpens'd with, without very many Inconveniencies, which yet, as they are made upon an imperfect Foreſight, and can provide for few Caſes, ſeem naturally to require ſome Interpoſal: how much greater Evils may we apprehend from a Diſpenſation with the Divine, the natural Laws; on the Obſervance of which the Good of the whole depends? This ſeems to be the reaſon why God makes uſe of ſo much Labour and Pains, ſo great an Apparatus of Means, (92.) ſo many Precepts, Perſuaſions, and even Entreaties for the Amendment of Mankind; which nevertheleſs he could effect in a Moment, if he were pleas'd to apply force; and he would undoubtedly do it, if he had not foreſeen more Inconveniencies from a Change in the Order of Nature, and Violence done to Elections.

IV. Thirdly, That which gives us the greateſt Pleaſure in Elections, is a Conſciouſneſs that we could have not choſen; without this 'tis no Choice at all: but ſuch is the Nature of us rational Beings, that nothing pleaſes us but what we chooſe. In order therefore to make any thing

He would take away that which is the moſt agreeable to us in Elections, *viz.* a Conſciouſneſs that we might have not choſen.

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Man that believes any thing of theſe (upon the Belief of which I am now arguing) can never imagine that they are all made uſe of to no purpoſe, as they muſt be in a great meaſure, if the Will could be over-ruled occaſionally without any conſiderable Inconvenience. This is what our Author endeavours to prove in the following Paragraph.

(92.) The Hiſtory of the *Jewiſh* Nation affords good Inſtances of this. What an apparatus of outward Means was continually made uſe of in the Government of that ſtiff-necked People? What frequent Murmurings, Rebellions and Apoſtacys were permitted, and then puniſh'd? What numerous Miracles, both of the remunerative and vindictive kind were apply'd, in order to bring them to ſome tolerable ſenſe of their dependence on God, and a ſuitable practice of the Duties reſulting from it? All which would have been unneceſſary at leaſt, if one Miracle exerted on their Minds could have done the buſineſs; if their Underſtandings could as well have been illuminated and their Wills reform'd at once, and if their Practice produced by this means, and as it were, extorted from them, would have been equally agreeable to the Deity.

thing agreeable to us, 'tis neceſſary for us to be *conſcious* that we chooſe it voluntarily, and could have refuſed it: But if God determine our Election extrinſically, the moſt agreeable Part of all is taken away. For we muſt either be conſcious that God determines our Will or not; if we be conſcious, how can that be agreeable which is obtruded on us by force? If we be not, we are deceiv'd in the Operations of our own Minds; neither can we know whether the Elections be our own or God's. Nay the force of Laws, together with the Efficacy of Rewards and Puniſhments, would be quite deſtroy'd. For who would regard Laws or Rewards, when he was certain that God would hinder him from doing any thing which might occaſion the Loſs of Rewards, or make him incur the Puniſhments? But however this be, 'tis very certain that our greateſt Pleaſure, nay our very Reward, conſiſts in being conſcious that we have uſed our Choice aright, and done thoſe things which we might have not done, and which another under the ſame Circumſtances would perhaps not have done. On the other hand, 'tis the greateſt Grief and Affliction to have omitted ſuch things as would have tended to our Happineſs, and were in our Power: one of theſe could not be had without the other, and if none were ſuffer'd to grieve for a bad Election, none would rejoice for a good one. But it is better that ſome few ſhould grieve for their own folly, than that all ſhould be deprived of the Rewards of their good Actions. That Privilege then of doing well, and pleaſing ourſelves in what is well done, could not be had without the hazard of Sinning; if God ſhould take away the one, the other would vaniſh of itſelf.

But you would have the Pleaſure which ariſes from Election without the Danger; that is, the End without the Means: Neither do you obſerve that the greateſt Pleaſure in this Caſe is, that you could have done otherwiſe: and this ariſes from the very Nature of Pleaſure, which ſeems to be nothing elſe but *a Senſe of the Exerciſe of thoſe Faculties and Powers which we enjoy.* The more therefore any Action is *ours*, the more it pleaſes us; and ſince a Free Action (which we could either exert or omit) is the moſt of all ours, it muſt neceſſarily pleaſe us moſt: But if the Will were confined to one Side, or detain'd from the other, the Action would ceaſe to be ours, and the Pleaſure

Pleaſure would periſh together with the Senſe of Liberty. A Mind conſcious of Virtue is the Pleaſure and Reward of good Actions, but unleſs it were poſſible for it to become conſcious of Vice, 'tis plain it cannot be conſcious of Virtue. (93.)

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(93.) In oppoſition to what our Author has here advanc'd, *Bayle* * brings a great many Arguments drawn from the Tenets of *Calviniſts*, *Spinoziſts*, *&c.* who believe that all their Actions are neceſſarily determin'd, and yet are no leſs pleas'd with them. Nay ſome, ſays he, rejoice in this very thing, that they are under the abſolute Direction of the Deity. *Dij me tuentur* --- †, and to be naturally determin'd to the beſt was always look'd upon as a peculiar Happineſs, and they that came neareſt it were eſteem'd the beſt Men, as the known Compliments to *Cato* and *Fabricius* declare. Some are as well pleas'd with what they have by Lot or Inheritance, as what they get by their own Labour: Witneſs the Pride of antient Families, *&c.* *Gaudeant bene nati*—is a common Proverb, and among the Things—*quæ vitam faciunt beatiorem*, *Martial* reckons *Res non parta Labore ſed relicta.* And again: If, ſays he, we did take delight in chooſing things, yet it would be enough for us if God conceal'd his determination from us, and we only believ'd that we were free to chooſe and act. --- ---

We need not, I think, ſpend much time in anſwering ſuch Arguments as theſe. For the *Calviniſts*, *&c.* notwithſtanding all their abſurd Tenets, have evidently this Conſciouſneſs of Choice within them, which is the ſecret ſource of the Pleaſure that attends their Actions, and cannot be extinguiſh'd by any of their Principles, but overcomes them all, and conſtantly puts theſe Men upon ſuch Endeavours as are vain and uſeleſs upon the Suppoſition, and inconſiſtent with the Belief of Fate and abſolute Predeſtination: which ſhews us that theſe Notions are neither acted upon in Life, nor purſu'd to their utmoſt Conſequences; that they reſt in pure Speculation, and are generally laid aſide in Practice; in ſhort, that they are abſolutely inconſiſtent with human Nature, as well as human Reaſon.

Secondly, Some Perſons may rejoice in being under the particular Care, Protection and Government of the Deity; but then their Joy proceeds not ſo much from a bare Contemplation of what the Deity does for them, as from conſidering *on what account* he does it, *viz.* becauſe they are agreeable to him, and proper Objects of his Favour, and that on account of ſomething which they *themſelves* have done. If *Horace* meant otherwiſe by his *Dij me tuentur*, he had ſmall reaſon for what he adds in the next Line, *Diis Pietas mea & Muſa cordi eſt.* But in truth this and moſt other of *Bayle*'s Teſtimonies are Rhetorical or Poetic Flouriſhes, rather than Philoſophic Truths, and conſequently not worth a ſerious Examination. To draw any thing like an Argument from another's Words, we ſhould at leaſt be ſure of his determinate Meaning, of the preciſe number of his Ideas, as well as the juſtneſs of their Connection together, which we muſt never expect from ſuch kind of random Quotations. It may not therefore be improper to obſerve here once for all, that *Bayle*'s uſual Method of reaſoning from Authorities muſt be very weak and unphiloſophical; and calculated rather to blind Mens Eyes, than to inform their Underſtandings.

Thirdly, We are pleas'd indeed with what we call *Good Fortune*, when a great Sum of Money comes to us by Lot, or a large Eſtate, or a Title by Inheritance; and are perhaps the more delighted, the greater the Change is in our Circumſtances; and the leſs Expectation we

* *Anſwer to the Queries of a Provincial*, p. 665. Fol.
† *Horace*, B. 1. Ode 17.

You may urge, that you had rather want this Pleaſure than undergo the Danger; that is, you had rather be a Brute than a Man: neither could you by this means avoid theſe natural Evils which you dread ſo much as fooliſhly to wiſh yourſelf a Brute, leſt you ſhould fall into them. But ſuppoſing it were convenient for you to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature: The Syſtem of the Univerſe required free Agents: without theſe the Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodneſs choſe the Benefit of the Univerſe rather than that of yourſelf; eſpecially when this is better for you too, tho' you be ſo ungrateful as not to confeſs it.

Free Agents are placed as it were out of the reach of Divine *Power*, the lights.

V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, to all Nature, for God to hinder bad Elections by his abſolute Power, ſo nothing can be conceiv'd to be more diſagreeable to himſelf. We have ſaid that Government of theſe therefore is the proper Exerciſe of the Divine *Wiſdom*, wherein God de-

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we had of it †. But is this Pleaſure comparable to that Intellectual or Moral Pleaſure, that ſublime Satisfaction and Self-complacency, which we feel upon acquiring a like Sum of Money by ſome laudable Act, or egregious Undertaking, that may properly be call'd *our own?* Is it equal to that ſolid Comfort, and Self-approbation which every ingenuous Mind is ſenſible of from his doing what *deſerves* an Eſtate or Title, and receiving theſe as the proper Recompence and due Tribute of ſuch Deeds? The Man that can value himſelf more upon his Deſcent from an antient Family, than upon being by theſe means the Founder of a new one, is a diſgrace to his Deſcent, and unworthy of the Arms he bears. But to return:

There is undoubtedly an agreeable and exalted Conſciouſneſs attending all the Bleſſings which we ourſelves are inſtrumental in procuring, infinitely beyond all the Satisfaction which they could afford us, if we knew ourſelves to be unconcern'd in the Attainment, and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them. This is the great Spur and Incitement to many noble Actions here, and will be part of the Crown and Reward of them hereafter (as is illuſtrated at large by Dr. *Scott* in the firſt Vol. of his *Chriſtian Life*, and by Dr. *Jenkin*, in his *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, 2d vol. C. 12. prop. 2.) And tho' we cannot properly *merit* any thing at the hand of God, yet the Conſciouſneſs of having perform'd ſuch Actions as are in themſelves acceptable to, and rewardable by him, and of receiving Bleſſings from him in return for ſuch Actions, muſt very much increaſe our Happineſs in the Enjoyment of theſe Bleſſings, both in this World, and the next (as is ſhewn in the ſame places) Nor, laſtly, could we receive this Pleaſure which now reſults from our Choice and Action, if we were determin'd in every thing by the Deity, ſuppoſing that Determination conceal'd from us, and we only made to believe that we were really free to chooſe and act. For, as our Author obſerves, this would be to

† *See* Note 30.

that God made the World in order to have ſomething wherein to exerciſe his Attributes externally. His Power therefore exerts itſelf chiefly in one thing, and his Wiſdom and Goodneſs in another. He exerciſed his Power in creating the World, and putting it into Motion; his Goodneſs and Wiſdom in the Order and Agreement of things: But the Divine *Wiſdom* ſeems to have ſet apart the Government of *Free Agents* as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully exerciſes itſelf, and acts up to its Infinity; for if it were finite it would not be equal to ſo great a Taſk. It does not ſeem a very extraordinary thing for God to be able to govern and abſolutely direct ſuch Beings as are merely paſſive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby they might make any Reſiſtance. For thoſe things obey eaſily which do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of infinite Wiſdom to govern them, for infinite Power, with a moderate uſe of Wiſdom, would have been ſufficient. That there might be a Subject therefore whereon the infinite Wiſdom of God ſhould diſplay itſelf, he created Free Agents; which, being as it were put out of his Power and left to themſelves, might act in a manner independent of his Will. 'Tis evident to any Perſon how much more difficult it is, and how much greater Exerciſe of Wiſdom it requires to direct a Multitude of theſe to a certain End, and make them conſpire to the common

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to arrive at the End without the Means, and to have the Effect without the Cauſe. All our Ideas of Merit ariſe from, and are entirely founded in *Free Choice*: this (as far as we can apprehend) is the neceſſary Medium to ſuch Moral Happineſs; and we can no more conceive how one ſhould come without the other, than how we ſhould ſee without Eyes: and for us to have this Pleaſure, tho' another did the Action, would be the ſame as for one Man to be conſcious of his doing what ſome other really did, or for him to ſee by ſome other's Eyes. Such Suppoſitions as theſe would breed endleſs Confuſion. For we muſt either know whether another did this Action or not; if we do know this, then how can we attribute that to ourſelves, or pride ourſelves in that which we know belongs to another? If we do not know this, then how can we attribute to ourſelves, or pleaſe ourſelves in any thing? Since every thing in and about us may, for what we know, be done by another, and ſo we in reality may never deſerve either praiſe or blame. The natural conſequence of which is, that we might as well never aim at Deſert, or ſtrive to do any thing at all: and this is the genuin Product of all ſuch Suppoſitions as queſtion the Veracity of our Faculties, and would make us ſuſpect that we may be impoſed upon even in the regular Operations of our own Minds. The ſame Arguments with thoſe of *Bayle*, as well as the like method of reaſoning, are made uſe of by the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, &c. p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks, "It

common Good, than to order Brute Beaſts, and ſuch as have no Power of themſelves, in what manner you pleaſe. To them that conſider the vaſt Multitude of Free Agents, which is almoſt infinite, and their Independence (ſince every one is, at leaſt in many Caſes, abſolute Maſter of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to act according to that Liberty) God ſeems to have given a Specimen of the Extent of his Wiſdom, which is able thus certainly and effectually to bring to the End propoſed, ſo many Free Spirits, ſo many Agents that were in a manner ſet at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed every one to his own Government. Here is the proper place for Wiſdom, wherein (ſetting aſide, and in a manner ſuſpending the Exerciſe of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere Dexterity of acting, and brings it to paſs, that ſo many jarring Wills depending on themſelves alone, and no more inclined to either Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no ſuch thing, ſhall yet conſpire together to promote the Good of the Univerſe. 'Tis impoſſible that this Exerciſe of Wiſdom ſhould not be very agreeable to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be eſteem'd agreeable to him. But if he were oblig'd to interfere with his Power, that would ſeem to argue a Defect of Wiſdom; for what occaſion is there for him to interpoſe and ſtop the Liberty of Election before granted, if his Wiſdom could provide ſufficiently for the Good of the whole, without altering his Deſign *?

VI. From

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" It may not be improper to obſerve, that " ſome of the Pleaſures Man receives from " Objects are ſo far from being the Effect of " Choice, that they are not the Effect of the " leaſt Premeditation, or any Act of his own, " as in finding a Treaſure on the Road, or in " receiving a Legacy from a Perſon unknown " to him." But has a Man the ſame Pleaſure in theſe Caſes as if he had done ſomething to *deſerve* a Treaſure of the Public? or had the Legacy conferr'd on him as a Reward for his good Deeds to the deceaſed Perſon, his late lov'd Beneficiary, or his intimate Friend? If this Author can find a difference in theſe two Caſes, this Obſervation of his muſt be improper: if he cannot, I am ſure he has a different Senſe of things from the reſt of Mankind, and of conſequence is not to be argued with. And ſo I take my leave of him.

* *See Dr.* Jenkin, 2d Vol. Ch. 12. p. 240. *&c.*

VI. From hence it ſeems ſufficiently evident why God would not interpoſe his Power, or intermeddle with our Elections, ſince that could neither be advantageous to ourſelves nor to the whole Syſtem, nor agreeable to God. 'Tis no wonder then that abſolute Goodneſs permits Evil Elections, ſince for the moſt part they could not be prevented without greater Evils. But if that can ever be done, there's no doubt but God will take care that the very beſt ſhall be done. (94.)

It would therefore be neither agreeable to God, nor uſeful to us, that God ſhould always hinder bad Elections.

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(94.) What has been urg'd in the foregoing Subſection about the Divine Interpoſition in human Elections muſt be underſtood in a limited Senſe, *viz.* as relating only to an *immediate* Influence, or an abſolute Determination of the Will, *i. e.* to ſuch an intermedling with Elections as would make them to be no Elections at all. For it appears from the following Subſection, that our Author did not intend to exclude all kind of Interpoſition in the Government of Free Agents, but only that particular ſort which would ſubvert their natural Powers, or be deſtructive of their Freedom. Tho' God has eſtabliſh'd general Laws both in the animate and inanimate World, yet he has not left theſe entirely to themſelves, but influences, directs, and governs them in ſuch a manner as is moſt conducive to the great End for which he deſign'd them; which End could not be attain'd without ſuch a particular Influence, as will be ſhewn below. In determining the *manner* of this Government we muſt beware of the two Extremes of ſuppoſing either firſt, that the Deity always influences ſecond Cauſes or Acts (as *Malebranch* terms it) by *particular Wills*, in the Natural or Moral World; which would diſſolve all Laws of Nature, deſtroy the Liberty of the Creature, and reduce every thing to Fate: or, ſecondly, that he never interpoſes in the Government of either World, but lets the general Laws of Mechaniſm or of Liberty take their natural Courſe, and operate as it were independently of himſelf; which would entirely deſtroy a *particular Providence*, and render the *general* one in a great meaſure uſeleſs. The bad Conſequences which would attend the former of theſe Schemes have been touch'd upon above: The latter (which is particularly eſpous'd by *Leibnitz* in his Syſtem of *Pre-eſtabliſh'd Harmony*, and by Mr. *Whiſton* in his *New Theory of the Earth*) will be obviated in the following Subſection. I ſhall here only add the Opinion of *S. C.* on the preſent Subject: " * 'Twas highly ſuitable to the Divine " Wiſdom in the Government of the World, " both to pre-ordain ſome of the principal E- " vents with relation to the entire human " Community, or to the more conſiderable " parts of it, and to reſerve to himſelf a Right " of interpoſing and influencing particular A- " gents, as in other Caſes, ſo more eſpecially " in order to the accompliſhment of theſe E- " vents. That he has actually done ſo is a- " bundantly clear from Scripture-Prophecys, " and Hiſtories. And that in ſo doing he has " acted in a manner moſt worthy his Wiſdom, " is no leſs manifeſt. For hereby it appears " that the Divine Government is equally op- " poſed to Chance and Deſtiny. Had the " Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left " every Man to the Conduct of his own In- " clinations, and natural Effects in general to " the Influence of their Cauſes, without ever interpoſing

* *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 115.

SUBSECT. IV.

Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

Devout Men hope for a change in the courſe of Nature, thro' their Prayers.

I. SOME may apprehend that God is not ſo averſe from interpoſing immediately in the Affairs of this World as is here aſſerted; and that the Laws and Order of Nature are not of ſo great conſequence with him, but that he may be eaſily and frequently induced to diſpenſe with them contrary to what we have here advanc'd. For this ſeems to be the common Opinion of Mankind. Every Supplicant that addreſſes himſelf to God, believes that this is effected by the Deity, on account of his Prayers: for if he perceiv'd it to be otherwiſe, he could hope for nothing from the Prayers he offers to the Deity. For if all came to paſs according to the natural Order of things, and the Series of Cauſes, who could hope to be delivered from a Diſtemper or Calamity; from Evil Affections or Temptations, by

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" interpoſing to direct them to the attainment " of his great Deſign; this would have been " almoſt in effect to diveſt himſelf of the Government of Rational Agents, and to ſubject " their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard " of the utmoſt Diſorder and Confuſion. Or " had he, on the contrary, abſolutely or fatally determined every Event, tho' this " would have been far enough from diveſting " himſelf of the Government of the World, " yet it would have been a Government unworthy of the Deity, a Government entirely excluſive of all proper Sin and Puniſhment, Virtue and Rewards: wherein himſelf would in effect have been the only Agent, and all the Creatures ſtupid and paſſive. " Whereas, by pre-ordaining the moſt material " Events, and ſuffering the Creatures freely " to exert their Faculties in all convenient " Caſes, he appears moſt wiſely to have choſen " the middle way, and thereby to have equally avoided the Miſchiefs of both Extremes." See alſo p. 116.

All the Difference between this ingenious Writer and our Author is, that in the Government of the World he ſuppoſes the general Law of Liberty to be ſometimes ſuſpended, as well as the Laws of Motion, *&c.* Whereas our Author, tho' he aſſerts the ſame of the latter, yet he denys it of the former; at leaſt does not grant that ſuch an Abridgment of Liberty is neceſſary to the aforeſaid Government: How on this Principle he accounts for that which we generally mean by a *Particular Providence*, anſwering the Prayers, and thereupon often influencing and over-ruling the Affairs of Mankind, will be ſhewn in its proper place.

by virtue of a Prayer? Theſe things are either effected by the immediate Interpoſition of the Divine Power, or are requeſted of God in vain. For if they depend upon their own proper Cauſes, which may not be alter'd, thoſe Cauſes would produce their Effects, as well upon the omiſſion as the offering of theſe Supplications. But if God ſometimes vouchſafes to ſuſpend or change the Order and Laws of Nature to gratify his Votaries; why may not the ſame be done to prevent the abuſe of Free-Will and Natural Evils? Either this Interpoſition muſt be admitted in order to oppoſe theſe Evils, or it muſt be rejected with regard to Prayers. This Difficulty deſerves an Anſwer. We attempt to ſolve it in the following manner.

God does not hear all Prayers.

II. 'Tis to be obſerv'd then, in the firſt place, that all *Prayers* are not heard by God, nor do we hope that all things ſhall be done which are requeſted of him, but only ſuch as he has declared to be agreeable to his Will, and has in ſome reſpect promis'd to perform. Thoſe things then which are unneceſſary, trifling, inconſiſtent, hurtful or petitioned for in an unlawful Manner, are not to be expected by the Petitioners, tho' they be requeſted never ſo frequently.

God is oblig'd to the Creatures, by his Goodneſs and by *Covenant.*

III. Secondly, God may be under a two-fold Obligation to his Creature, firſt from his Goodneſs, whereby he is oblig'd ſo to order all external things, that Exiſtence ſhall be better than Non-exiſtence to all who duely perform their Duty. Secondly, By ſome Covenant or Agreement, whereby he engaged, under certain Conditions, to beſtow ſome Favours upon Men, notwithſtanding they were Sinners: Which Covenant, tho' it may not be eſteem'd a natural one, yet it cannot be judg'd to be againſt Nature, or to offer Violence to it.

What may be requeſted of the Deity relates either to the Mind, the Body, or external things.

IV. Thirdly, The things which are requeſted of God either belong to the Mind, *viz.* that the Mind be ſound and vigorous, and able to govern the Affections, *&c.* or to the Body, that Life and Strength be prolong'd, *&c.* or to external things, that the Weather be ſerene and ſeaſonable for the Fruits of the Earth, *&c.* Now theſe differ from each other, and ought not to be prayed for under the ſame Conditions.

V. Fourthly,

God does not give Aſſiſtance to our Minds at random, but under as certain Laws as thoſe of the Natural World.

V. Fourthly, As to the Mind, ſince the Elective Power is the chief Part of Man, and is ſelf-motive, 'tis ſcarce conceivable how it ſhould be determin'd from without itſelf. For that which determines itſelf is entirely different from that which ſtands in need of another to move it, and theſe appear to be no more applicable to the ſame thing, than a Square and a Circular Figure are to the ſame Surface, at leaſt, their Natures muſt be chang'd to make them compatible. But yet this Faculty, as well as others, may be vitiated by abuſe and a perverſe manner of acting, and when it is thus vitiated, 'tis probable that God only can reſtore it, for it is ſuppos'd to be ſubject to him alone.

This Aſſiſtance muſt be afforded to Mankind in ſuch a manner that no blemiſh be thereby caſt upon the Divine Conſtancy, nor any Prejudice done to his Wiſdom in eſtabliſhing the Laws and Order of Nature. Now that all kind of Interpoſition does not prejudice theſe, appears from hence, *viz.* that it is moſt worthy of the Divine Majeſty to have reſerved to himſelf a Power over Nature, eſpecially while the Beings over whom this Power is reſerv'd enjoy their Liberty; it ſeems not only proper that God ſhould be at Liberty to act in this manner with them, but alſo neceſſary, provided this be not done at random, but under ſome known and certain Conditions. And here the Divine Wiſdom has exerted itſelf in a wonderful manner, and deviſed a Way to reconcile the Conſtancy of God, and the Sanctity of the Laws of Nature, with that Aſſiſtance which is occaſionally afforded to Mankind upon their Requeſt. Man might preſume upon ſome Method of effecting this, before Revelation: but 'tis to this alone that we owe the clear and undoubted Manifeſtation of it. From hence we learn that God will give his *Holy Spirit*, under ſome certain Laws and Conditions, to thoſe that are fitly diſpoſed: which would be as certain and conſtant a Principle of Spiritual Actions, to them that are endow'd with it, as Nature itſelf is of the Natural. Since therefore this Spirit by its Grace aſſiſts our depraved Will, and in ſome reſpect reſtores it to its Vigour, it cannot be judg'd to violate the Order of Nature, any more than when its Influence ſuſtains natural Cauſes. If it be aſk'd what thoſe Laws are, under which the Influence of this Spirit is promiſed. I anſwer, all ſuch things as are neceſſary

neceſſary to Salvation are promiſed to them who make a right uſe of their preſent Abilities,---that pray to God thro' *Chriſt* for an Increaſe of them,---and that celebrate the *Sacraments* as the Law of God requires. Upon theſe Conditions this Spirit deſcends into the Minds of Men, and by its holy Inſpiration forms them to Piety.

VI. The giving of this Spirit, and obtaining it by Chriſt, was a moſt miraculous Work of Divine Power, but the Operations of it, ſince they are now produced according to fix'd Laws and a ſettled Order, as regularly and conſtantly as the Works of Nature, cannot be reckon'd a *Miracle* any more than theſe are: For I call a Miracle a ſenſible Operation of God, which is perform'd in a Way contrary to Nature; and as it happens beyond all certain and fix'd Order, it proves God to be the immediate Cauſe and Author: But the Interpoſition of the Divine Power exerted about the Will is not an Interpoſition of this kind, for it is done, as we ſaid, according to a certain Rule and Order, and therefore cannot be miraculous. I confeſs that this is indeed an Exception from the general Law of Free Agents, (95.) but it is no leſs regular than the Law itſelf, nor any more

The Aid of the *Holy Spirit* is not miraculous.

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(95.) He does not mean that this is an Exception from the Law of their *Liberty*, as appears from what immediately follows; but from their being left entirely to themſelves, or to the caſual Impreſſions of thoſe external Objects and Agents which ſurround them; from their acting ſolely upon Principles of their own Formation or Diſcovery, and following the Guidance of their natural Underſtanding, without any internal Aſſiſtance: which ſeems to be the general Law of this their preſent State of Probation. The *Holy Ghoſt* then, according to our Author, does not ſubvert and ſuperſede, but rather ſtrengthen, preſerve and perfect our natural Freedom; it repairs the breaches made therein by the Violence of Temptations, by the Force of Evil Habits, *&c.* counterballances as it were the Influence of Evil Spirits, and reſtores the Mind to its native *Equilibrium*, or Indifference. How theſe Effects may be ſuppos'd to be produced in us, and of what kind the Influence of the Holy Ghoſt, of Good and Evil Angels is, will be conſider'd by and by. We ſhall firſt give the Opinion of an Author or two concerning what the Holy Spirit's Operations *are not*, or that they cannot be in any reſpect deſtructive of our natural Powers,

In the firſt place, " The manner of the " Spirit's Operation is not inconſiſtent with " the Nature of Mankind, which (ſays Dr. " *Stebbing*) is a Truth ſo fully and ſo liberal- " ly granted by all Parties, that nothing needs " to be ſaid to prove it. Now Man we know " is an *intelligent* and *rational* Being, able to " diſcern between Good and Evil; he has al- " ſo ſuch a *Freedom* or *Liberty* of *Will* as " makes him accountable to God for his Be- " haviour in this Life. By conſequence the " Spirit muſt not be ſuppoſed to operate in " ſuch a manner as not to make the leaſt uſe " of the Underſtanding, nor muſt it be ſo far " inconſiſtent with Freedom and Liberty, as " that

more repugnant to their Nature. From hence it appears how God may interpoſe in Matters relating to the Will, and yet not violate the Order of Nature, nor injure his Conſtancy. Not that God actually determines the Will by an immediate Influx, for by this means the Act of Election would change its Nature, and be imputed to God rather than to the Will of the Creature, but that in ſome manner he reſtores the Faculty to its Perfection, and makes it, when thus fitly diſpos'd, exert its proper Actions according to the Rectitude of its Nature, without any Diminution of its Liberty.

VII. Fifthly,

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" that a Man's Actions may not properly " be call'd his own *." Again, " ſuch " is the manner of the Spirit's Operati- " ons, that they do not make our own Care " and Diligence after Virtue and Godlineſs " unneceſſary, but that on the other hand the " Operations of the Spirit will do us no " Good, if our own Endeavours be wanting. " Thirdly, He does not produce his Effects " in us all at once, but in ſuch Order, and by " thoſe Degrees that ſuit with our Capacities " and Qualification †. Laſtly, His Motions " are not diſcernable by us from the natural " Operations of our Minds. We feel them no " otherwiſe than we do our Thoughts and " Meditations, we cannot diſtinguiſh them by " the manner of their affecting us from our " natural Reaſonings, and the Operations of " Truth upon our Souls, ſo that if God had " only deſign'd to give the Holy Spirit to us, " without making any mention of it in his " Word, we could never have known, unleſs " it had been communicated to us by ſome " private Revelation, that our Souls are mo- " ved by a Divine Power when we love God " and keep his Commandments ‖."

This is a Confirmation of what our Author has declared above, particularly that the Holy Spirit's Operations cannot be call'd *miraculous*. A larger Proof and Illuſtration of the foregoing Propoſitions may be ſeen in the ſame Chapter. The Conſequence reſulting from them, *viz.* that the Spirit does not operate *irreſiſtibly*, is clearly proved and defended againſt *Turetin* in Chap. 8, 9, *&c.*

To proceed: " It hath been the antient " Opinion of the Church of God (ſays *R.* " *Battell* **) that the Will is not deſtroy'd by " Grace, but only repair'd. A diſlocated " Joint, when it is ſet again, doth not loſe " the Nature of a Joint, but rather is reſtored " to its former uſe and comelineſs, ſo the " Grace of God healing the Will, doth not " take away the Nature of the Will, but only " makes it able to obey God's Will. So that " when God co-operates with the Will, Man " is left in the hand of his own Council, to " turn or not to turn to the Lord: God ſets " Life and Death before him, and bids him " reach out his hand to whether he will."

And again, p. 77. " Neither Sin nor " Grace take away the natural Power of the " Will; but only thus it is, Sin hurts and " weakens it, eſpecially ill Habits; Grace " heals and ſtrengthens it, and brings it near- " er to its primitive Goodneſs, *&c.*" This is very agreeable to what our Author aſſerts in the Concluſion of this Paragraph. See alſo *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Part 2. Ch. 4. par. 5. p. 237. " God (ſays he) in the ordinary " courſe

* *Treatiſe Concerning the Operations of the Spirit*, C. 7. p. 123. 8*vo*.
† *Ibid.* p. 124. ‖ *Ibid.* p. 125, 126.
** *Vulgar Errors in Divinity removed*, p. 74.

VII. Fifthly, It may be demonſtrated that the *Prayers* themſelves have ſome natural Power and Efficacy with regard to the Will: For Prayers are certain Endeavours towards the Exerciſe of Liberty, and contain in them Acts of Election, tho' perhaps imperfect ones; and ſuch is the Nature of all Powers, that they acquire Strength by trial and exerciſe, and every Act, tho' imperfect, is a Step to a more perfect

Prayers naturally tend to perfect the Mind.

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" courſe of his Government doth as well leave " *free* Agents to the natural *Freedom* with " which he firſt created them as *neceſſary* ones " to theſe Neceſſities which he firſt *impreſs'd* " upon their Natures. For his *Providence* is " *ſuccedaneous* to his *Creation*, and did at firſt " *begin* where that *ended*, and doth ſtill *pro-* " *ceed* as it *began*, *ordering* and *governing* all " things according to the ſeveral *Frames* and " *Models* in which he firſt *caſt* and *created* them. " Nor can he order and govern them *otherwiſe* " without *unravelling* his own *Creation*, and " making things to be otherwiſe than he firſt " made them. For how can he ordinarily *ne-* " *ceſſitate* thoſe Agents whom he firſt made *free* " without *changing* their Natures from *free* to " *neceſſary*, and making them a *different* kind of " Being than he *made* them? So that tho' in " the courſe of his Government God doth " powerfully *importune* and *perſuade* us, yet " he lays no *Neceſſity* on our *Wills*; but leaves " us free to *chooſe* or *refuſe*; and as the *Tempta-* " *tions* of *Sin* incline us *one* way, ſo the *Grace* " *of God* inclines us *another*, but both leave us " to our own *Liberty* to *go* which way we " pleaſe."

Laſtly, what may be expected from the Spirit is (according to Dr. *Rymer* *) contain'd in theſe heads, 1*ſt*. Faith in its ſeveral Degrees. 2*dly*. Support againſt Temptations. 3*dly*. The promotion of Virtue. And, 4*thly*, The Advancement of Piety. All which are produced as he there ſhews, in a manner perfectly conſiſtent with the free uſe of our Faculties. I ſhall cite a Paragraph or two in relation to the 2d and 3d of theſe Heads. " As the Spirit " never offers Violence to the Soul, it may " ſometimes happen that the Light it gives, " the Importunity it uſes, may be ſo far over- " come by ſome glaring Vanity, or ſome noiſy " Paſſion, as not to be obſerv'd: But general- " ly in Minds well prepar'd by its former In- " fluence, it oppoſes the Deluſions of Temp- " tations with good Succeſs, by bringing all " the Arguments of Religion into view.— " And as the Spirit may thus diſcountenance " particular Temptations, it may likewiſe pre- " ſerve us from all vicious Habits, by familiar " Repreſentations of the Reaſon and Nature " of things, and by many ſecret Influences " both on our Minds and Bodies; diverting " dangerous Thoughts, and moderating ſuch " Appetites and Affections as uſually tend to " Vice, and often diſpoſe us for it. On the " contrary, 'tis eaſy to conceive how it may " forward us in Virtue, by preſenting to our " Minds ſuch Thoughts as leſſen our Eſteem " for this World, and excite our Zeal for the " other. The Apoſtle, when he bids us not " quench the Spirit, repreſents it as a Flame " that both lights and warms us; ſhews us " uſeful Truths, and gives us a ſuitable Con- " cern for them; and all this conſiſtent with " the Liberty of our Minds, p. 215, 216." See alſo Bp. *Burnet* on the 10th Article of the Church of *England*, and A-Bp. *Tillotſon*'s 169th Serm. p. 455. vol. 3. or 147th Serm. p. 310. 3d Edit. Fol.

If the foregoing Obſervations be true, it follows that the ordinary Operation of the Spirit cannot be any *Phyſical Influence*, or immediate Determination of the Will; it muſt therefore

* *General Repreſentation of Reveal'd Religion*, C. 9. p. 210, 211.

fect one, till they have attain'd to a Habit and Facility of acting. The conſtant Exerciſe of Prayer may therefore tend, by a natural Efficacy, to reſtore the proper uſe of Free Will, and regain its native Vigour.

And to ſubdue the Affections.

VIII. Sixthly, The ſame may be ſaid concerning the Government of the Paſſions and Affections, which conſtitutes ſo great a Part of human

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therefore be only a *Moral* Influence, or mediate, rational Determination. The manner of effecting this may be by injecting Ideas, repreſenting Arguments, exhibiting Motives, and aſſiſting the Underſtanding in its apprehenſion of them. This I think is all that Mr. *Wollaſton* could mean by the Words *Suggeſtion, Impulſe*, or *ſilent Communication of ſome Spiritual Being* ‖: and ſeems to be the only intelligible Notion of the Influence of either Good or Evil Spirits: in which ſenſe I believe that we are very frequently acted upon and over-ruled in order to promote the Good of the whole, and compleat the Deſigns of a particular Providence. The Author laſt cited has given us a fine Deſcription of the manner in which this Government of Free Beings may be exerciſed and apply'd to the Ends above mention'd. "It is not impoſſible (ſays he *) that many "things ſuitable to ſeveral Caſes may be "brought to paſs by means of ſecret, and "ſometimes ſudden Influences on our Minds, "or the Minds of other Men whoſe Acts may "affect us. For inſtance; If the Caſe ſhould "require that N ſhould be deliver'd from "threatning Ruin, or from ſome Misfortune "which would certainly befall him, if he "ſhould go ſuch a way at ſuch a time as "he intended; upon this occaſion ſome "new Reaſons may be preſented to his "Mind why he ſhould not go at all, or not "then, or not by that Road; or he may for-"get to go; or if he is to be deliver'd from "ſome dangerous Enemy, either ſome new "turn given to his Thoughts, may divert him "from going where the Enemy will be; or, "the Enemy may after the ſame manner be "diverted from coming where he ſhall be, "or his (the Enemy's) Reſentment may be "qualify'd, or ſome proper Method of Defence "may be ſuggeſted, or Degree of Reſolution "and Vigour excited. After the ſame man-"ner, not only Deliverances from Dangers "and Troubles, but Advantages and Succeſſes "may be conferred. Or on the other Side, "Men may, by way of Puniſhment for Crimes "committed, incur Miſchiefs and Calamities. "I ſay, theſe things and ſuch like may be. "For ſince the Motions and Actions of Men, "which depend upon their Wills, do alſo "depend upon their Judgments, as theſe "again do upon the preſent Appearan-"ces or Non-appearances of things in their "Minds; if a new proſpect of things can be "any way produced, the Light by which they "are ſeen alter'd, new forces and directions "impreſs'd upon the Spirits, Paſſions exalted "or abated, the Power of judging enliven'd "or debiliated, or the Attention taken off, "without any Suſpenſion or Alteration of the "ſtanding Laws of Nature; then without "that, new Volitions, Deſigns, Meaſures, or "a ceſſation of thinking may alſo be produ-"ced, and thus many things prevented that "would otherwiſe be, and many brought a-"bout that would not."—See alſo *Sherlock* on *Providence*, p. 51. 2d Edit. Again †, "That "there may be poſſibly ſuch Inſpirations of "new Thoughts and Counſels may perhaps "appear farther from this, that we ſo frequent-"ly find Thoughts ariſing in our Heads, into "which we are led by no Diſcourſe, nothing "we read, no clue of Reaſoning, but they "ſurpriſe and come upon us from we know "not

‖ *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 106. * p. 105. † p. 107.

human Felicity: we have ſhewn that the Elective Power is ſuperior to all others, and has the Government of them, and that when the Mind is corrupted with Vice, the Will in a great meaſure falls from that Power which Nature gave it. Yet the inferior Affections of the Mind have not quite ſhaken off the Yoke, they ſtill obey, tho' with ſome difficulty, but uſe and exerciſe are neceſſary to implant an Habit of Obedience in them. Since therefore Prayers contain in themſelves an exerciſe of Election, they have a natural Efficacy to ſtrengthen the Elective Acts, and by the ſame means accuſtom the Affections to obey: for a repeated Act augments the Power and overcomes Reſiſtance. (96.)

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" not what Quarter. If they proceed from the " Mobility of Spirits ſtragling out of Order, " and fortuitous Affections of the Brain, or " were of the Nature of *Dreams*, why are they " not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as " they are?" Is it not much more reaſonable to imagine that they come by the Order and Direction of an all-ſeeing and all-gracious God who continually watches over us, and diſpoſes every thing in and about us, for the Good of ourſelves or others? Not to ſpeak of the agreeableneſs of this Notion to the Opinions and Belief of the beſt and wiſeſt Men in all Ages. The Conſequence Mr. *Wollaſton* draws from the whole is perfectly agreeable to the Scope of our Author. " If this be the Caſe, as it ſeems " to be, that Men's Minds are ſuſceptive of " ſuch Inſinuations and Impreſſions as fre- " quently by ways unknown do affect them " and give them an Inclination towards this " or that, how many things may be brought " to paſs by theſe means, without fixing and " refixing the Laws of Nature, any more than " they are unfix'd when one Man alters the " Opinion of another, by throwing a Book " proper for that purpoſe in his way?

To the ſame purpoſe ſee *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Part 2. Vol. 2. §. 1. p. 81, 82. Concerning the Operations of the Spirit, as diſtinguiſh'd into ſuch as are *previous*, *concomitant*, and *ſubſequent* to our Converſion and Sanctification, ſee *S. Fancourt*'s Eſſay concerning *Liberty*, *Grace*, and *Preſcience*, Letter 2. §. 2. p. 43, *&c.*

I hope the Reader will excuſe us for inſiſting ſo long on this Point, ſince falſe Notions concerning it have produced the moſt pernicious Conſequences to Religion in general, as well as the principal Objections againſt our Author's Syſtem.

(96.) *Prayer* puts us upon making good Reſolutions, and endeavouring to ſubdue our vicious Inclinations: it animates our Zeal, and enflames our Affections; it exerciſes and improves our Faith, our Hope, and Charity; and therefore is in itſelf a Means of ſtrengthning our Faculties, and removing all Impediments to a due Exertion of them. It alſo makes us ſenſible of our ſtrict Dependence on the Deity, of our manifold Wants, and the great Benefit of his Supplies, and of conſequence it naturally fits us for them, and inclines us to make a right uſe of them when we do receive them. " It is not only a Means, " (ſays Dr. *Barrow* *) by Impetration acqui- " ring for us, but it is an effectual Inſtrument " working

* Firſt Vol. Fol. 1ſt Edit. p. 493.

The Actions of Free Beings will produce a contingency in material things, yet this does not offer any Violence to Nature.

IX. Seventhly, As to Material Objects, *viz.* our own Bodies and the Elements, 'tis plain that the intellectual World is more noble than the Material, and conſequently that this latter was made for the ſake of the former, and is ſubſervient to its uſe: But ſince the Actions of Beings endow'd with Underſtanding and Will are free, and on that account contingent, they neceſſarily produce a Contingency alſo in material Subſtances which depend upon them. For we can excite certain Motions in our own Bodies, and communicate them to the adjacent ones, which Motions are not in this Caſe produced merely according to Mechanic Laws, but the direction of the Will.

Nor

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" working in us all true Good. It is the " Channel by which God conveyeth Spiri- " tual Light into our Minds, and Spiritual " Vigour into our Hearts, It is both the " Seed and the Food of Spiritual Life, by " which all holy Diſpenſations of Soul, and " all honeſt Reſolutions of Practice are bred " and nouriſhed, are augmented and ſtrength- " ned in us. It exciteth, it quickneth, it " maintaineth all pious Affections. The love " of God can no otherwiſe than by it be kin- " dled, fomented or kept in Life (without it " we certainly ſhall have an Eſtrangement and " Averſation from him) it alone can maintain " a conſtant reverence and awe of God, keep- " ing him in our Thoughts, and making us " to live as in his Preſence. It chiefly enli- " veneth and exerciſeth our Faith in God; " it is that which begetteth in us a ſavoury " Reliſh of Divine things, which ſweeteneth " and endeareth to ourſelves the Practice of " Piety; which only can enable us with de- " light and alacrity, to obey God's Com- " mandments: It alone can raiſe our Minds " from the Cares and Concernments of this " World to a ſenſe and deſire of Heavenly " things. By it God imparteth Strength to " ſubdue bad Inclinations, to reſtrain ſenſual " Appetites, to compreſs irregular Paſſions; " to evade the allurements to Evil, and the " diſcouragements from Good which this " World always preſenteth; to ſupport alſo " with Patience and Equanimity, the many " Croſſes we muſt ſurely meet with therein. " It is, in ſhort, the only ſtrong bulwark a- " gainſt Temptation and Sin; the only ſure " guard of Piety and a good Conſcience."

" God's End (ſays Mr. *Chubb*) in requiring " this Duty of Prayer, is wholly and ſolely " the Good and Benefit of his Creatures, *viz.* " that it may be a Means to work in the Pe- " titioner a ſuitable frame and temper of mind, " and to diſpoſe him to a ſuitable Practice " and Converſation, and ſo render him a ſui- " table and proper Object of God's ſpecial " Care and Love. For as Prayer is an Ad- " dreſs or Application of a dependent Being " to his ſupreme Governor and original Be- " nefactor, ſo when this Duty is performed " with ſeriouſneſs and application of Mind, " it naturally tends to work in Men an awful " ſenſe of the Being and Attributes of God, " of our dependence upon him, and of the " many Obligations we are under to ſerve " him. It tends to awake in us a lively " ſenſe of the Sovereignty and Power, of the " Knowledge and Wiſdom, of the Holineſs, " Truth and Righteouſneſs, of the Mercy and " Goodneſs, and Loving-Kindneſs of the " Lord. It naturally draws forth our Souls " in filial Fear, in Hope and Truſt, in Love, " Delight, and Joy in God, and creates in us " a juſt

Nor would they have happen'd at the time or in the manner they do, if the Will had not by its own Liberty excited them. Neither do we ſuppoſe that any Violence or Diſorder happens hereby to the Laws of Nature; for Nature itſelf has provided that the leſs ſhould give way to the more noble, that is, local Motion to the Action of the Will, as being the more excellent of the two. We muſt believe the ſame concerning Agents of a ſuperior Nature, and the more noble Order they are of, the greater Sphere of Action is to be attributed to them. Such little Creatures as we Men are, can convey Water in Canals, drain ſuch Parts of the Earth as are naturally cover'd with Water, drown the Dry-Land, and produce a great many other Changes, both in the Earth, the Water and the Air, who then can affirm but that there may be other Agents who could change almoſt the whole Elements, if they were not prohibited by certain Laws? All who acknowledge the Exiſtence of ſuch Beings, are agreed that theſe things are poſſible; now it muſt be allow'd, that whatever is perform'd by theſe Beings is done according to the Laws of Nature, and that no manner of Violence is hereby offer'd to the Order of it, any more than by the Actions of our own Will.

X. Eighthly, And as all material Beings are connected together, and by mutual Influence act upon each other; *viz.* the Superior upon the Inferior, the Sun upon the Æther and the Moon, and that upon the Air, Water, and Earth; and perhaps, *vice verſa*, ſo 'tis in like manner as much upon each other.

There is a Syſtem of intellectual as well as material Beings, which act

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" a juſt Concern to pleaſe him, and to ap-
" prove ourſelves in his Sight; and conſe-
" quently to put on that Purity and Piety,
" Humility and Charity, which is the Spirit
" and Practice of true Chriſtianity. And as
" this is God's End in appointing this Duty,
" ſo for this End he requires the frequent Re-
" turns of it, that the Mind of the Petitioner
" may be habitually ſeaſoned with a ſenſe of
" himſelf *. See alſo Bp. *Patrick*'s Diſcourſe
" concerning Prayer, Ch. 8 and 9.

Theſe Effects and Uſes of Prayer, moſt of which are diſcoverable by natural Reaſon, prove ſufficiently, I think, that Prayer is a *natural Duty*. Concerning the *Efficacy* of it, and the manner whereby Providence may be ſuppoſed to anſwer our particular Requeſts, ſee the following Notes to this Subſection.

* *Chubb*'s *Tracts*, p. 180, *&c.*

manner probable that there is a certain Order and Syſtem of intellectual Beings conſtituted, who are no leſs ſubordinate to one another, and operate upon each other by a mutual Influence, according to the Laws eſtabliſh'd by Nature.

God makes uſe of the Miniſtry of Angels in the Government of Mankind, nor is this any Violence to Nature.

XI. Ninthly, There ſeems to be no reaſon why God ſhould not make uſe of the Miniſtry of thoſe Beings in the Government of this World* whenever it may be expedient. This we ſee is done in ſome meaſure upon our Earthly Globe. For he makes uſe of Men to govern other Animals, and ſome Men are ſet as Guardians over others. And as the Attendants of Princes and Judges perform their Office, not as they themſelves pleaſe, but according to the Appointment of their Maſters, or the Laws; ſo in like manner we are to believe that Agents more excellent than us (which we ſtile miniſtring Angels) diſcharge their Office according to the Laws preſcribed by God. Suppoſe therefore this about aſſiſting ſuch as regularly apply to God, to be one of theſe Laws; let them be commanded to relieve thoſe who make their humble Addreſſes to him, and let the manner of invoking him be preſcribed by Nature, or ſome poſitive Law: Can it be doubted whether they would not as readily exert their Powers for the Aſſiſtance of theſe Supplicants, and as diligently diſcharge the Duty of relieving them, as a Judge's Officer, or a Prince's Servant performs the Commands of his Maſter? And ſo long as theſe things are done according to the general Order, and under ſuch Conditions as are agreeable to Nature and Reaſon, they can be no more deem'd repugnant to the Order of Nature, or the Laws appointed for the Government of the World, than civil Government and the Laws among Men are. Here is nothing contrary to or inconſiſtent with the Laws of univerſal Nature: for it does not ſeem any more repugnant to theſe, that Angels ſhould uſe their Powers for the Relief of ſuch as pray to God, than that Men ſhould help each other according to their Abilities. If it be granted that theſe things are ſo, it will be very apparent how our *Prayers* may have their Effect, and the deſired Changes may be produced in our Bodies, and the Elements, without doing Violence to Nature, or diſturbing the Order eſtabliſhed by God. Nay it may be provided by a Law, that our Wiſhes be thus fulfill'd:

* *See the Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 108, 109.

fulfill'd: and we need not declare how much this Power over external things granted by free Agents, may tend to raiſe our Affections and incline the Wills themſelves. 'Tis very well known how great an Influence the Temperature of the Blood and Motion of the Spirits have over theſe. Since then our Bodies are by a Law of Nature capable of being moved by free Agents, at leaſt when we deſire it, 'tis not impoſſible but that by the Means of theſe Bodies, they may have Acceſs to the Soul; and though they cannot act upon the *Will* immediately, yet they may indirectly excite it to exert it own Acts. (97.)

XII. Tenthly, There's neither any occaſion nor room to explain how agreeable this is to Reaſon and the Holy Scriptures. Let it ſuffice to obſerve how large a Field is hereby open'd for Prayer, and how effectual it may be for obtaining the Aſſiſtance not only of God himſelf immediately, but alſo of his Miniſters.

God is not oblig'd to take away the abuſe of Free-Will, ſince he has eſtabliſh'd a Method of aſſiſting his Worſhippers.

It muſt be confeſs'd that God ſometimes relieves the Diſtreſs'd, and when apply'd to, interpoſes in Matters relating to the Will: but theſe things are effected according to the Univerſal Law of Nature. And tho' this be ſuperior to that which is implanted in the particular Nature of ſome Beings; yet it is no leſs natural with regard to the Syſtem of Univerſal Nature; neither are we to believe that this is often done, but only in Caſes where a particular Nature cannot be left to itſelf without Detriment to the whole. Nor is God, becauſe he ſometimes vouchſafes to interpoſe and help the Supplicant, alſo oblig'd entirely to remove the abuſe of Free-Will; that is, in reality, to deſtroy the Nature itſelf. By a Law of Nature, the Exerciſe of that Faculty belongs to ſuch Agents as are endow'd with

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(97.) That is, as a Man is excited or inclin'd to any thing by a Proſpect of the Pleaſure or Pain which may attend the Proſecution or Omiſſion of it; or, as we commonly ſay, by another's *working upon* his Paſſions, his Hopes, or his Fears: For that ſuperior Beings act upon us in no other ſenſe—that their Influence conſiſts only in occaſioning pleaſant or diſagreeable Ideas in us—in repreſenting Arguments, Motives, *&c.* to us, may perhaps be gather'd from Note 95. And, I think, it muſt be allow'd that this is very conſiſtent with that Phyſical Indifference, or abſolute Freedom of the Will above deſcribed.

with it, and tho' that Law admit of an Exception, yet it cannot be quite abrogated, without greater Damage done to the whole than what may happen from the abuſe of it. Nor is God obliged, becauſe Prayers have their Effect with him, to relieve ſuch as don't pray to him at all.

The *Efficacy of Prayers* cannot be accounted for if all things be left to neceſſary cauſes.

XIII. Eleventhly, This ſeems to eſtabliſh the *Efficacy of Prayers* much better than their Opinion who hold that all is fix'd by God in a fatal Concatenation, and that ſuch things as are requeſted of God, and ſeem to be obtain'd, are not in any reſpect owing to the Prayers, but that God has by his Foreknowledge join'd the Actions of the Will with corporeal Motions, in ſuch a manner that they ſhould happen together, but without any other relation to each other than what ariſes from his Pre-ordination, as appears in the Agreement between the Index of a Watch and the Sun.

For inſtance: God has pre-ordain'd a Storm from neceſſary Cauſes, and that ſome notorious Offenders ſhall be ſailing in it; when they are in danger they ſhall repent and pray to God, and at length the Wind ſhall ceaſe.

Thus a Calm enſues upon the Prayers of the Petitioners, but without any Connection or Dependence on each other, merely by the force of pre-diſpoſed Cauſes, which do not require any Interpoſition of the Divine Power. (98.)

The

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(98.) The forementioned Hypotheſis of a pre-determin'd and neceſſary Connection between Corporeal Motions and the Operations of the Will, is advanc'd by *Leibnitz* in what is commonly call'd his Syſtem of the *Pre-eſtabliſh'd Harmony*, which occurs in ſeveral of his Works, an account of which may be ſeen in *Fabricius* *. An Explanation of it by *G. Hanſcius* may be found in the *Preſent State of the Republic of Letters*, Vol. 4. *for* Octob. 1729. There are ſome Objections againſt it in *Bayle*'s Dict. Article *Rozarius*. Rem. L.——But as the whole of it is built upon a Suppoſition that the Mind has not a Liberty of *Indifference*, and of conſequence no proper Liberty at all, we need not ſpend any time in confuting it, having, I hope, ſufficiently eſtabliſh'd the contrary Principle above, and thereby remov'd the Foundation of it.

Mr. *Whiſton* in particular has eſpous'd the Opinion which our Author alludes to, and enlarg'd upon it in the following Manner †. "Our Imperfection is ſuch, that we can only "act *pro re nata*, can never know beforehand "the

* *Delectus Argumentorum, &c.* p. 387, &c.
† *New Theory*, B. 4. C. 4. Solution 87.

The Aſſertors of this Opinion are oblig'd from the common ſenſe of Mankind to allow that God is to be invok'd; and that ſuch as duly offer up their Prayers have their Requeſts granted: but as they are of Opinion that things go by Fate, and that there is no room for *Contingency*, or a *particular Providence*, they have invented this Scheme that there might be, or at leaſt might ſeem to be ſome room for Prayers. But all this is to no purpoſe: For ſince God has made Agents free, and allow'd them the uſe of Liberty, he muſt alſo have reſerv'd to himſelf a Liberty of treating them according to what their Nature requires, which cannot be done without a peculiar Providence, and immediate Interpoſition; without theſe no Efficacy will be left to Prayer, no Worſhip to God, no Honour to Religion; For if the Production of thoſe things which we requeſt depend upon antecedent

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" the behaviour or actions of Men, neither " can we foreſee what Circumſtances and Con- " junctures will happen at any certain time " hereafter. And ſo we cannot provide for " futureEvents, nor prediſpoſe things in ſuch " a manner that every one ſhall be dealt with, " or every thing done, no otherwiſe than if " we were then alive and preſent, we ſhould " think proper and reaſonable, and ſhould ac- " tually do. But in the Divine Operation it " is quite otherwiſe. God's Preſcience ena- " bles him to act after a more ſublime man- " ner, and by a conſtant Courſe of Nature " and Chain of mechanical Cauſes to do every " thing ſo as it ſhall not be diſtinguiſhable " from a particular Interpoſition of his Power, " nor be otherwiſe than on ſuch a particular " Interpoſition would have been brought to " paſs. He who has created all things, and " given them their ſeveral Powers and Facul- " ties, foreſees the Effects of them all; at once " looks thro' the entire Chain of Cauſes, Ac- " tions and Events, and ſees at what Periods, " and in what manner 'twill be neceſſary and " expedient to bring about any Changes, be- " ſtow any Mercies, or inflict any Puniſh- " ments on the World. Which being unque- " ſtionably true, 'tis evident he can as well " provide and prediſpoſe natural Cauſes for " thoſe Mutations, Mercies or Judgments: he " can as eaſily put the Machine into ſuch Mo- " tions as ſhall, without a Neceſſity of his " mending or correcting it, correſpond to all " theſe foreſeen Events or Actions, as make " way for ſuch Alterations afterwards by gi- " ving a random Force to the whole: and " when theſe two ways are equally poſſible, I " need not ſay which is moſt agreeable to the " Divine Perfections, and moſt worthy of " God." *And again*: " * We pray to God " for Fruitful Seaſons, for Health, for Peace, " for the Succeſs of our Endeavours, for a " Bleſſing on our Food and Phyſick, and de- " precate the contrary Miſeries from us. Yet " at the ſame time we ſee the Seaſons depend " on the ſettled Courſe of the Sun, or other " natural and neceſſary Cauſes; we find our " Health or Sickneſs to be the proper Effects " of our Dyet and Regimen: we obſerve Peace " and War ſubject to the Intrigues of Princes, " and the plain Reſults of viſible Conjunctures " in human Affairs: we know that worldly " Prudence

* Ibid. *Corollary*, p. 562. 1ſt Edit.

tecedent, natural, and neceſſary Cauſes, our Deſires will be anſwer'd no leſs upon the Omiſſion than the offering up of Prayers. Vows and Prayers therefore are made in vain. If it be ſaid that the Supplicants could not omit them, ſince they were pre-ordain'd. I anſwer: He that could omit them could not poſſibly offer them: his Omiſſion therefore is not culpable: And he that is employ'd in Prayer to God undertakes a ſuperfluous Office: for theſe Petitions in reality contribute nothing to the Effect, and no reaſon can be given why that ſhould be required which is of no Benefit. (99.)

XIV. 'Tis

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" Prudence and Cunning has a main ſtroke in " the Succeſs of Mens Labours: we feel the " advantageous Effects of ſome Food and Phy- " ſic, and have reaſon to believe that the ſame " does very much reſult from the Goodneſs of " the Drugs, the fitneſs of the Proportion, and " the Skill of the Phyſician, and can frequent- " ly give a plain and mechanical Reaſon of " the different Operation of all theſe things; " neither do we hope for the Exerciſe of a " *miraculous* Power in theſe or the like Caſes. " In ſhort, " Second Cauſes, ſays he, will " work according to their Natures, let Mens " Supplications be never ſo importunate: and " to expect a Miracle in anſwer to every Pe- " tion, is more than the moſt religious dare " pretend to." See alſo Mr. *Wollaſton*'s excellent Illuſtration of this Hypotheſis, p. 104. or Dr. *Fiddes*'s *Body of Divinity*, 1ſt vol. p. 154.

We ſhall propoſe an Anſwer to it in the following Note. Let it ſuffice at preſent to obſerve, that this particular Interpoſition of Divine Power which our Author contends for, is very improperly ſtiled *miraculous*, as may be ſeen from Note 95. and the 6th Paragraph of this Subſection.

(99.) Tho this Anſwer is very ſolid, and may by ſome perhaps be thought ſufficient; yet, as the Point before us is of the greateſt Importance; ſince wrong Notions concerning it cauſe Perplexities which diſturb the Minds of moſt Men, as Mr. *Whiſton* obſerves *; and ſince the Scheme of Providence ſo elaborately diſplay'd by this Author will not, I fear, help to clear them as he here promiſes, but rather occaſion worſe;—on theſe accounts it will not be improper to give a fuller Confutation of it from ſuch Authors as endeavour to prove that the foremention'd Scheme of Providence is both impoſſible in itſelf, and attended with Conſequences deſtructive of the very Notion of Prayer, and moſt other Duties of Religion.

" The Abettors of the mechanical Hypotheſis,† " ſays Dr. *Jenkin*, argue, that he is the beſt " Artiſt who can contrive an Engine that ſhall " need the leaſt meddling with after it is made. " But it ought to be conſider'd what the Na- " ture of the Engine is, and what the ends and " uſes of it are; and if the Nature of it be " ſuch that it cannot anſwer the Ends for " which it was framed, without ſometimes an " aſſiſting hand, it would be no point of Wiſ- " dom in the Artificer, for the Credit of his " Contrivance, to loſe the moſt uſeful Ends " deſign'd by it. As if, among other uſes, this " curious Engine were deſign'd to reward the " good, and puniſh bad Men; to remove the " Puniſhment upon Amendment, and to renew " it upon a relapſe: ſince brute Matter is inca- " pable of varying its Motion, and ſuiting it- " ſelf to the ſeveral States and Changes of " free Agents, he muſt aſſiſt it, unleſs he will " loſe the chief End for which it is to ſerve, " It is no defect in the Skill and Wiſdom of " the

* *New Theory*, p. 362.

† *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, 2d vol. p. 218. 5th Edit.

XIV. Tis ſcare poſſible for one who reads this not to think of that famous Difficulty, *viz.* how the Contingency of things can be conſiſtent with the Divine *Preſcience:* Neither is it proper to meddle with it in this Place: For it would require a whole Book. Let it ſuffice to give a hint, that the Solution of it depends upon conſidering the Manner

An Intimation that this is not repugnant to the Divine *Preſcience.*

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" the Almighty, that Matter and Motion have " not Free Will as Men have; but it would " be a great defect in his Wiſdom not " to make them the Inſtruments of Rewards " and Puniſhments, becauſe it is impoſſible for " them of themſelves to apply and ſuit them- " ſelves to the ſeveral States and Conditions " of Free Agents. The Nature of Matter and " Motion is ſuch, that they cannot ſerve all " the Deſigns of their Creator, without his " Interpoſition, and therefore he conſtantly " doth interpoſe according to a certain Tenor " which he hath preſcrib'd to himſelf," *And again,* " * We may well ſuppoſe that God " has as much Regard to his Wiſdom in his " Government of the Moral as of the Material " part of the Creation; and yet he has added " ſupplemental Laws to enforce the Moral " Laws, and theſe additional Laws have been " chang'd as the Condition and Circumſtances " of Men requir'd. Why then ſhould the " Laws of the Material World be ſo much " more ſacred, as that he ſhould never inter- " meddle with them? He aſſiſts Moral A- " gents with the continual Supplies of his " Grace, and Natural Agents with that Help " which is needful for them to perform his " Will: God may haſten and aſſiſt natural " Cauſes upon our Prayers, he may quicken " the Motions, and enforce the Powers of Na- " ture, and remove ſecret Impediments, to " help and make way for natural Operations; " or he may ſuſpend or retard natural Cau- " ſes, *&c.*

He proceeds to a particular Examination of the *Pre-eſtabliſh'd Order* in p. 221. which he oppoſes with much the ſame Arguments as theſe that follow from Dr. *Fiddes*†. " As to the " Opinion of thoſe who ſay, God upon the " Foreſight of the Prayers of Men to him, diſ- " poſed the Order of things in ſuch a manner, " that what they pray for ſhall happen, or " what they deprecate be averted, this is alto- " gether inconceivable; or rather, in the Na- " ture of things, ſuppoſing Men free Agents, " impoſſible. For tho' God does foreſee which " way Men will act, yet nothing upon the " Mechanical Hypotheſis can follow from his " Action, but according to the Laws of Me- " chaniſm. In caſe any one, for inſtance, " ſhould pray to be deliver'd from the danger " of ſome infectious or peſtilentious Diſtem- " per, the Vapour whereby 'tis propagated, " will, notwithſtanding, purſue its natural " Courſe, and produce its Effect wherever it " falls upon a proper Subject; it can make no " manner of Diſtinction between him that *ſa- " crificeth* and him that *ſacrificeth not.* God " may indeed, by ſome ſecret Impulſe on the " Mind of Man, which yet he is at Liberty " to follow, be the occaſion of diverting him " from the Scope of its Motion; or perhaps, " on ſome extraordinary Exigence, by an in- " viſible Power, retard, accelerate, or obſtruct " its Courſe; but ſtill, if all things operate " mechanically, whether Men pray or no, it " will unavoidably have its proper Effect. " There is another Caſe wherein the Motives " to Prayer, if all things come to paſs by the " fix'd Laws of Mechaniſm, appear ſtill more " evidently groundleſs. A Man in the Heat " of Battle, prays that God would preſerve " him from the Inſtruments of Death, which " fly every where about him; yet a Ball from " a Cannon or a Muſquet will neceſſarily pur- " ſue the line of its direction; it depends " however

* p. 220. † *Theol. Spec.* B. 3. Part 2. C. 4. p. 292.

Manner by which we apprehend the things of God. (100.) He that underſtands that manner rightly will never ſtick at this Difficulty. The

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" however on the choice of Man, whether he " will give it ſuch a particular Direction as by " the natural tendency of it will take away the " Life of the Perſon who deprecates the Dan- " ger wherewith he finds himſelf ſurrounded. " In this Caſe it is impoſſible, upon any fore- " ſight of his Prayers, that the order of Cau- " ſes, which are in themſelves of arbitrary and " uncertain Determination, ſhould be diſpos'd " after ſuch a manner as certainly to produce " the deſired Effect of them." Concerning the Impoſſibility of adapting a fix'd and immutable Law to the State and Condition of Free or mutable Agents, ſee B. 2. Part 1. p. 154.

Laſtly: " It is of great uſe to us (ſays Dr. " *Sherlock* †) to underſtand this which teaches " us what we may expect from God, and what " we muſt attribute to him in the Government " of Nature. We muſt not expect in ordina- " ry Caſes that God ſhould reverſe the Laws " of Nature for us; that if we leap into the " Fire it ſhall not burn us; or into the Wa- " ter it ſhall not drown us: and by the ſame " reaſon, the Providence of God is not con- " cern'd to preſerve us when we deſtroy our- " ſelves by Intemperance and Luſt: for God " does not work Miracles to deliver Men from " the evil Effects of their own Wickedneſs: " But all the kind Influences of Heaven which " ſupply our Wants, and fill our Hearts with " Food and Gladneſs, are owing to that good " Providence which commands Nature to " yield her Increaſe; and thoſe Diſorders of " Nature which afflict the World with Fa- " mines, Peſtilence and Earthquakes, are the " Effects of God's Anger and Diſpleaſure, and " are order'd by him for the Puniſhment of a " wicked World. We muſt all believe this, " or confeſs that we mock God, when we bleſs " him for a healthful Air and fruitful Seaſons, " or deprecate his Anger when we ſee viſible " Tokens of his Vengeance in the Diſorders " of Nature. For did not God immediate- " ly interpoſe in the Government of Na- " ture, there would be no reaſon to beg his " Favour or deprecate his Anger upon theſe " accounts."——And to the ſame purpoſe he urges, p. 71. That without this Belief, that God takes a particular Care of all his Creatures in the Government of all Events that can happen to them (which Belief appears to be impoſſible upon the *Mechanical Hypotheſis*) there is no reaſon or pretence for moſt of the particular Duties of Religious Worſhip, as is fully proved in the ſame place. See alſo C. 9. Concerning the true *Notion*, as well as the *Reaſonableneſs* and *Neceſſity* of Prayer, ſee p. 381. *ib.*

(100.) He means the Scheme of *Analogy*, concerning which ſee his Note E. We have given our Notion of the Word *Preſcience* in Note 18. Xe. ſee alſo Mr. *Jackſon* on *Human Liberty*, p. 62. But tho' we cannot perhaps determine the preciſe manner of God's knowing the free Acts of Men, yet we are certain that he does and muſt always know them: ſince otherwiſe he would know many things now which he did not know once, and conſequently his *Omniſcience* or Infinite Knowledge would receive addition from Events which (as we have made appear in Xe.) is contrary to the true Notion of Infinity. This general Argument drawn from God's infinite or *perfect* Knowledge, ſeems to me the only one which can come near to a Proof that he muſt always have a compleat and equal Knowledge of ſuch actions as are in themſelves abſolutely contingent, as all thoſe evidently are which depend upon the Free-Will of the Creature. Theſe actions (as we formerly obſerv'd) may properly be call'd *Future* with reſpect to us or other Men, and the Knowledge of them in the ſame reſpect be ſtiled *Fore-Knowledge*. But with regard to the Deity, whoſe Exiſtence and Attributes can have no relation to time, *i. e.* to which nothing can be at a diſtance, I think, the Expreſſion is abſurd; and we muſt neceſſarily either admit the fore-mention'd abſurdity of

† *On Providence*, p. 38. 1ſt Edit.

The Reader may obſerve, that in this and other Places, I interſperſe ſome things which belong to *Revealed Religion*, contrary to what I intended at firſt; which happen'd becauſe ſome Objections ſeem'd to ariſe from reveal'd Religion, in oppoſition to the Principles and Arguments here laid down. Since therefore I had determin'd to produce nothing but what was perfectly agreeable to the Articles of Faith, and the Principles of the Chriſtian Religion, I found it neceſſary to call in the Scripture to my Aſſiſtance, that the Anſwer might come from the ſame Quarter with the Objections.

One that knows nothing of Reveal'd Religion cannot bring theſe Objections; one that does not believe it has no right to urge them. For if he be ſenſible that the Objections are of any force, he muſt of neceſſity alſo admit the Solutions, ſince both of them depend upon the ſame Authority. (101.)

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of ſuppoſing his Knowledge limited, or elſe allow that all things are at all times equally in his view; and conſequently that Knowledge, as in him, hath nothing to do with *fore* and *after*.

If we admit this Notion of things being always preſent to God, tho' ſucceſſive to us, which ſeems to be the only way of conceiving how Contingencies can poſſibly be Objects of any Knowledge; If this, I ſay, be allow'd, then all things, actions, *&c.* which can properly be ſaid to exiſt, will be equally proper *Objects* of God's Knowledge, ſince he is hereby ſuppoſed not to know them *in fieri*, or in *their Cauſe*; but *in eſſe*, or in their *actual Exiſtence*. Which at the ſame time gives us the *Medium* of their being knowable, *viz.* Their real Exiſtence; and makes it as eaſy for us to imagine how God ſhould always know them, as how we ſhould ever know a thing when it is immediately preſented to us.

'Tis ſubmitted to the Reader, whether this old Notion of the Schoolmen be not ſtill the beſt we are able to frame upon the preſent Subject.

(101.) This general Argument lies againſt all thoſe who bring Objections from the Scripture Account of the *Creation*, *Fall*, *&c.* viz. either they believe the Truth and Divine Authority of thoſe Books, or they do not; if they do, then they muſt believe them alſo when they declare that all the Works of God are holy and juſt and good; and conſequently that the foremention'd Difficulties are no real Arguments againſt the Divine Attributes: if they do not; then the whole falls to the Ground. For to admit one part of an account and reject the other, when both depend upon the ſame Authority, is evidently unreaſonable.

Objections therefore drawn from the Scripture account of theſe Matters can but be mere Arguments *ad hominem* at beſt: and are of no force either to make or juſtify an Unbeliever.

SUBSECT

SUBSECT. V.

Why God does not tranſlate Man to ſome other Place, where nothing would occur that could tempt him to chooſe amiſs.

This is the ſame as if it were ask'd, why God did not give the Earth to be inhabited by the Brutes only.

I. 'TIS plain, that in the preſent State of things it is impoſſible for Man to live without natural Evils, or the danger of erring. 'Tis a common Queſtion, why does not God change this State, and tranſlate Man to ſome other, where all Occaſions of Error, and Incitements to Evil being cut off, he might chooſe only Good; *i. e.* in reality, Why has he placed Man upon the Earth? Why did he not leave it to be inhabited by the Brutes alone? There are ſome perhaps who expect ſuch things as theſe from the Divine Goodneſs, but without any Senſe or Reaſon; ſince it manifeſtly appears to be better that we ſhould contend with the preſent Evils, than that the Earth ſhould be void of all rational Inhabitants. (102.) ſome

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(102.) To ask why Man was placed in ſuch a World as this? is to ask why he was created at all? Since, if he was to be made what he is, *i. e.* conſiſting of a Soul and a Body, this World was a proper place for him. To the Queſtion, Why ſhould he be made of ſuch a Nature as denominates him *Man*, or placed in this lower Claſs of Beings? a ſufficient Anſwer is given in Note 35. where, I think, it is render'd probable, that the ſame Goodneſs which excited the Deity to create Beings of the higheſt Order, would induce him both to create as many of that Order as could commodiouſly exiſt together, or be conſiſtent with the Good of the whole; and likewiſe to produce a Series of as many inferior Orders, and as many particular Beings in each of thoſe Orders as could be conceiv'd to exiſt between himſelf and nothing: or ſo long as Exiſtence in the very loweſt Order might be a Benefit either to the Beings of that Order, or to thoſe of ſome other. The Conſequence of which is, that we muſt either have been placed in the Claſs we are in at preſent, or no where, ſince by the Suppoſition every other Claſs is full. And there will appear ſufficient reaſon for our being created in this Order, and placed where we are, rather than not created at all, provided that

Some make it a Queſtion, why ſo great a Part of the Earth is given away to the Brutes; but theſe Men would have it all left to 'em; and Mankind itſelf extinct.

II. We have often declared that Evils are chiefly to be avoided, nay that they are prohibited by God, becauſe they are prejudicial to human Nature, but how much worſe would it be to take that Nature entirely away? They therefore who require this of the Divine Goodneſs, deſire the greateſt Evil of all as a Remedy for Evils. The ſame Perſons alſo, that with ſuch Earneſtneſs deſire a Change of their Condition, are afraid of Death, forgetting that this Change of their Condition is what they dread the moſt of all in Death.

God in due time will tranſlate good Men to a better ſtate, but the preſent is as neceſſary as Seed-time is to Harveſt.

III. Mankind believes indeed from the Light of Nature, that God will tranſlate good Men into a better State, but it is neceſſary that they ſhould be prepared here, as Plants in a Nurſery, before they be removed into the Garden where they are to bear Fruit. God has therefore decreed this Life to be as it were the Paſſage to a better. Thus this Earth is repleniſh'd with Inhabitants, who being educated under Diſcipline for a while, till they have finiſh'd their Courſe, ſhall depart into another State ſuited to their Deſerts. They who find fault with this in God, ſeem to me to do the ſame as if one who is ignorant of Agriculture and Harveſt ſhould laugh at the Sower

This is totally extirpating Mankind.

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that Exiſtence be a Bleſſings to us, or that we receive in general more Happineſs than Miſery in this preſent State: which point will be conſider'd in the next Subſection.

That theſe ſeveral Claſſes may be ſuppoſed to advance gradually towards Perfection, and of conſequence that we in time may be removed into ſome better State, ſee Note 30.

Theſe Conſiderations will ſupply us with an Anſwer to *Bayle*'s Objection againſt what our Author advances in this Paragraph. "This "(ſays he) is juſt like as if a King ſhould con- "fine ſeveral of his Subjects in his Dungeons, "till they were 60 Years old, becauſe theſe "Dungeons would otherwiſe be empty. But to make any *likeneſs* at all in theſe two Caſes, it muſt be made appear in the firſt place, that we really meet with more Evil of all kinds than Good in this World; and conſequently, that it were better for *us* to be out of it than in it: contrary to what our Author has proved in Ch. 2. par. 7. Ch. 4. §. 8. par. 7. and in the following Subſection: and ſecondly, it muſt be ſhewn alſo, that we might have been placed in ſome better World, without any Inconvenience to the *reſt of the Univerſe*, contrary to what may be concluded from the former Part of this Note, and that other to which it refers.

Sower for throwing away his Corn. For there is no doubt but the preſent State of things is as neceſſary, not only to the Earth leſt it ſhould be void of Inhabitants, and to the Animals, which for the moſt part depend upon the Labours of Men, but alſo to Men themſelves: and as requiſite in the Divine Adminiſtration, in order to ſome better Life, as Seed-time is to Harveſt. (103.)

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(103.) *Bayle* objects, that our Author's compariſon here is not a juſt one, ſince God cannot be ty'd to the uſe of common means, and a ſlow Progreſs of ſecond Cauſes. He is not obliged to nurſe us up as a Gardener does his Plants, but might as well have produced us adult and ripe in Perfection, and have made us happy at once.—But perhaps it may appear a little doubtful to a Perſon who attentively conſiders Note 30, whether this could be done even in *natural* Pleaſure. However, I think, 'tis abſolutely inconceivable how it ſhould be effected in *Moral* Happineſs. If we conſider the Nature of Virtue and of Man, it will not be poſſible for us to imagine how this could be implanted in him at firſt, or infuſed into him afterwards, or he be in any wiſe made morally perfect or *good* on a ſudden. The Idea of Virtue conſiſts in a repetition of free Acts, and therefore it cannot be receiv'd *paſſively*: and tho' the Diſpoſition might be thus communicated, yet to compleat its Nature, and make it actually productive of true moral Happineſs, there muſt neceſſarily be requir'd due time for Exerciſe, Experience and confirmed Habits, as may be gather'd from the *Preliminary Diſſertation*; and will farther appear from Notes 106 and 108.

From the Nature of Man alſo, or a Being in his imperfect State, we may fairly infer, that he could not have ſo great an Idea of the moral Perfections of the Deity, nor ſo clear an apprehenſion of the contrary Qualities, nor conſequently, a ſuitable affection for the one, and an abhorrence of the other, if he had not ſome experience of both *.

We know not the real Value of a good thing, we cannot be duly ſenſible of its Excellence, except we have been in ſome meaſure acquainted with its Oppoſite, or at leaſt have perceiv'd the want of it on ſome occaſion. "Does any one (ſays *Leibnitz* †) ſufficiently "reliſh the Happineſs of good Health who "has never been ſick? Is it not moſt times "neceſſary that a little Evil ſhould render a "Good more ſenſible, and conſequently grea"ter?" See alſo Note 30. The ſame holds ſtronger ſtill in Moral Good: which is a confirmation of the *Alternative* that *Lactantius* ſpeaks of ‖; and which is well deſcrib'd by *A. Gellius* ††. It does not therefore ſeem poſſible for us to have a due Knowledge of Virtue if we never had ſeen Vice. Without this Knowledge of Virtue, we could not ardently deſire it, without ſuch a deſire, and a ſedulous proſecution of that deſire, we could not attain to the proper exerciſe of it, and without this attainment we could not have any conſciouſneſs of deſert, any comfortable ſelf-approbation, or true Moral Happineſs.

It appears then that Virtue is an Act of our own, that a Series of theſe Acts is requiſite to conſtitute an habit of Virtue, and of conſequence that this cannot be *inſpired* into any Being, or however not produced tn one of our weak frame *on a ſudden*: and in the laſt place, that

* *See* Note 90. † *Memoirs of Literature*, v. 3. Art. 25. p. 118.
‖ *De Ira Dei*, §. 13, ſect. ſub fin. *and* 15. †† B. 6. Ch. 1.

SUBSECT. VI.

Concerning the Scarcity of Happy Perſons, and the General Corruption of Mankind.

I. BUT it may ſeem ſtrange, that of ſo great a Multitude of Men, ſo few ſhould attain to Happineſs. For whether that be ſuppoſed to ariſe from the fruition of ſuch things as are agreeable to the natural Appetites, or from free Elections, 'tis manifeſt, that not even one of a hundred thouſand is truly happy. In vain then do we enquire about the Means which lead to Happineſs; the Power of Election is beſtow'd on Man to no purpoſe, ſince it ſo rarely attains the end for which it was imparted.

Some Objections propoſed concerning the Rarity of Happy Perſons.

II. Secondly, The far greater part of Mankind neglecting this Power of pleaſing themſelves in Elections, or rather, to confeſs the truth, not in the leaſt obſerving that they have it, or that Happineſs is to be expected from the uſe of it; give themſelves up entirely to the Government of their natural Appetites and Senſes, and are plainly hurried on according to the Impetus and Direction of the *Animal Nature*,

That the power of Election is not regarded.

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that this preſent State is neceſſary (as our Author ſays) to train us up, and fit us for a better. That this Life is properly a State of *Tryal* and Probation, and the Virtues of it abſolutely neceſſary to the Happineſs of the next, ſee *Rymer's General Repreſentation of Reveal'd Religion*, Part 2. Ch. 3. p. 385, *&c.* and *Scott's Chriſtian Life*, Vol. 2. Ch 4. §. 3. p. 321. 335, *&c.* 8*vo.* and *Sherlock* on *Death*, C. 1. §. 3. p. 77, *&c.* 4th Edit.

To the ſame purpoſe is that excellent Paper in the *Spectator*, N°. 447.—"The laſt uſe I "ſhall make of this remarkable Property in "human Nature, of being delighted with thoſe "Actions to which it is accuſtom'd, is to ſhew "how abſolutely neceſſary it is for us to gain "habits of Virtue in this Life, if we would enjoy "the pleaſures of the next. The State of Bliſs we "call Heaven will not be capable of affecting "thoſe Minds which are not thus qualify'd for it: we

Nature as much as Brutes. If therefore we have this Power in us, it ſeems to be given us in vain, *i. e.* to ſuch as neither uſe it, nor are conſcious that they have it.

That there is an univerſal Corruption.

III. Thirdly, Hence all Mankind lie polluted and immers'd in Vice and Wickedneſs; and 'tis not one or two, but every one, that deviates from the right uſe of Election. How can theſe things be reconcil'd with the Care and Providence of an infinitely good and powerful God?

Theſe are beſt anſwer'd by reveal'd Religion.

IV. I confeſs, that this Corruption of Manners, and almoſt univerſal Deviation from the way to Happineſs, is better ſolv'd from Reveal'd than Natural Religion, and that the neceſſity of a *Revelation* is from hence rightly proved. For ſince the true Cauſe which gave riſe to this is a matter of Fact, *viz.* the Fall of the firſt Man, it cannot be diſcover'd merely by the Strength of Reaſon; but we ſtand in need of *Hiſtorical* Tradition to tranſmit this, as well as other matters of Fact, down to us. But tho' there had been none ſuch, and we were ignorant of the Fall of the Firſt Man, yet we ſhould have been furniſh'd with a proper, tho' not ſo clear an Anſwer, ſince the Miſery or Corruption of Mankind tho' really lamentable, yet is not ſo great but that it may be reconciled with the good Providence of God.

Many attain to a moderate Happineſs.

V. For as to the firſt Objection taken from the fewneſs of them that attain to Happineſs, we may reply that Happineſs is two-fold, *perfect* and *abſolute*, or *moderate* and partial. I call that perfect which anſwers in every reſpect to our Wiſhes, and that moderate which, tho'

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" we muſt in this World gain a Reliſh of " Truth and Virtue, if we would be able to " taſte that Knowledge and Perfection which " are to make us happy in the next. The ſeeds " of thoſe Spiritual Joys and Raptures which " are to riſe up and flouriſh in the Soul to all " Eternity muſt be planted in her during this " her preſent State of Probation. In ſhort, " Heaven is not to be look'd upon only as the " Reward, but as the natural Effect of a Reli- " gious Life." See alſo *Tillotſon*'s Serm. 1ſt vol. Fol. p. 51, 82, 85, *&c.* and the 78th Serm. 2d vol. p. 591. Concerning the true End of Man, and the Means of obtaining it, and the Nature both of thoſe Virtues which will conſtitute the greateſt part of Heaven, and of thoſe *Inſtrumental Duties* by which we are to acquire, improve, and perfect theſe Heavenly Virtues, or make our own Heaven, ſee *Scott*'s incomparable Treatiſe of the *Chriſtian Life*, vol. 1. particularly Ch. 3. which Notion is alſo well defended by Dr. *Rymer* in the Chap. above mention'd. See alſo Dr. *Laughton*'s Serm. on *Rom.* 6. 23.

tho' it does not equal our Deſires, yet is not quite deſtitute of agreeable Enjoyments, with which Life being accompanied, and ſweeten'd as it were by the Mitigation of its Evils, and the Alleviation of its Cares, becomes a Bleſſing, and worth a prudent Man's Choice. As to the former, 'tis certain that it cannot fall to the Lot of any Man in this preſent State, nor is it a Debt due from God to a Creature, tho' never ſo innocent. Since the Condition of Men is, and muſt neceſſarily be ſuch (while we inhabit this Earth in its preſent State) as will by no means admit of this abſolutely perfect Happineſs. For Pains, Griefs, and the reſt of thoſe which we call natural Evils, cannot, as things now ſtand, be totally avoided, but by the preternatural Favour of the Deity. The Earth then muſt either be left deſtitute of Inhabitants, or we muſt take up with a moderate ſhare of Happineſs; this alſo is a Gift worthy of God, and fit to be accepted and embrac'd by Man. Neither is this a rare Felicity, and which happens to few Men; for all may enjoy it, and moſt actually do; eſpecially if they will make a prudent uſe of their Elections. For if there be any bitter thing in Life, it generally flows from depraved Elections, and by a right uſe of theſe, any thing which creates uneaſineſs, or can make us weary of Life, might be mitigated or remov'd. To conclude, tho' we complain of the Miſeries of Life, yet we are unwilling to part with it, which is a certain Indication that it is not a burden to us, and that not ſo few attain this moderate Happineſs, as the Objection would inſinuate. (104.)

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(104.) To calculate whether the Sum of Happineſs in this World exceed the Sum of Miſery, upon the whole, would be an endleſs piece of Work, and what no Man perhaps is able preciſely to determine: I ſhall therefore only produce the Opinion of one or two Authors on the Queſtion, which may ſerve at leaſt to confront the Teſtimony ſo often and ſo largely repeated by *Bayle* in all his Works.—

" I am ſure (ſays Dr. *Sherlock* †) we are very ungrateful to Almighty God if we do not acknowledge that bountiful Proviſion which he has made for the Happineſs of Man in this World. For what is wanting on God's part to make Man as happy as he can be here? We want no ſenſe which is uſeful to Life? we want no Objects to gratifie thoſe Senſes, and which is very conſiderable, the moſt

† *On Providence*, Ch. 7. p. 243, &c. 2d Edit.

Men make uſe of this Elective Power tho' they do not obſerve it.

VI. As to the ſecond thing objected, *viz.* that moſt of us are either ignorant or regardleſs of this Power of pleaſing ourſelves by Election; upon a thorough Enquiry it will be manifeſt, that the uſe of this Power is neither diſregarded, nor ſo rare as might appear at firſt Sight. I own there are few who take notice of this in themſelves, or obſerve, that the Pleaſure which they feel in acting ariſes from the Exerciſe of it. But nevertheleſs they do exerciſe it, and taſte the Pleaſure ariſing therefrom. And the ſame thing ſeems to befal us in the Exerciſe of this Power which happens in ſome Organs of Senſe, tho' we are entirely ignorant which they are, or of what kind, yet we uſe them, and by the uſe of them perceive external things. Thus we pleaſe ourſelves in chooſing, tho' we are not aware that things pleaſe us becauſe they are choſen. Now that this is ſo will be evident, if we examine thoſe things which afford Pleaſure to both young and old, wiſe as well as fooliſh. For if the far greater part of them have no manner of Connection with the natural Appetites, nor with the Neceſſities of Nature, it will appear that they have pleaſed us no otherwiſe than by virtue of Election. Let us weigh the trifles of Children, and the ſerious Affairs of Men; the Temerity of Fools, and the Counſels of the Wiſe; and it will be evident almoſt in all of them, that they pleaſe by Election only *. This, among other things, may

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" moſt uſeful, and neceſſary, and delightful " Objects, are moſt common, and ſuch as " Mankind pretty equally ſhare in. There is " not ſuch a mighty Difference as ſome Men " imagine, between the Poor and the Rich: " in Pomp, and Shew, and Opinion, there is " a great deal, but little as to the true Pleaſures and Satisfactions of Life: they enjoy " the ſame Earth, and Air, and Heavens; " Hunger and Thirſt makes the poor Man's " Meat and Drink as pleaſant and reliſhing as " all the Varieties which cover a rich Man's " Table: and the Labour of a poor Man is " more healthful, and many times more pleaſant too, than the Eaſe and ſoftneſs of the " rich.—Theſe indeed at beſt are but mean " Pleaſures, the Pleaſures of Senſe, which are " the loweſt a reaſonable Soul is capable of; " but yet they are ſo entertaining, that the generality of Mankind think it worth living " to enjoy them.—And yet there are more noble and divine Pleaſures which Men may enjoy in this World; ſuch as gratify the nobler Faculties of the Soul, the Pleaſures of " Wiſdom and Knowledge, of Virtue and Religion; to know and worſhip God, to contemplate the Art and Beauty and Perfection " of his Works, and to do Good to Men. " Theſe indeed are Pleaſures that do not make " us very fond of the Body, nor of this World; " for

* *See more of this in* Sect. 1. Subſect. 5. par. 11, 12, *&c.*

may appear from the Diverſions of *Cards* and *Dice*. Nothing *is* more agreeable to all, or pleaſes more; but upon no other account, if we examine it thoroughly, than becauſe we *will* be thus employ'd.

Nay that *dire Luſt of Rule* which bewitches mortal Minds, and tranſports them beyond themſelves, which cannot be ſatisfy'd unleſs the whole World be ſubdued, and even not then; this neither receives its Origin nor Approbation from Nature or any innate Appetite.

But the force of Election is never more apparent than in ſome Men's inſatiable Avarice, and continual Study to heap up unprofitable Riches, for no uſe, no end, but to ſatisfy their Choice. Behold the covetous Man brooding over his Gold; a Curſe to his Relations, a Jeſt to his Neighbours, a Reproach to Nature; depriving himſelf of Food, Sleep, Reſt, and other Neceſſaries, and yet applauding himſelf ſtill. Why do theſe things pleaſe which are ſo unnatural, ſo abſurd, ſo prepoſterous? This is felt, this is purſu'd, tho' he that does this be not conſcious that he is doing it, neither obſerves what it is which pleaſes him. It is not therefore the Direction of the Senſes, or the Impulſe of Animal Nature only, which tranſports us into Vices and unlawful Acts; theſe are commonly done againſt the Remonſtrance

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" for they do not ariſe from the Body, nor " are they confin'd to this World. We have " reaſon to hope, that when we get looſe " from theſe Bodies, our intellectual Facul- " ties will be vaſtly improv'd; that we ſhall " know God after another manner than we " now do; and diſcover new and brighter " Glories which are conceal'd from Mortal " Eyes; but yet the Pleaſures of Knowledge, " and Wiſdom, and Religion in this World, " are very great and raviſhing, and therefore " we either do or may enjoy at preſent ſuch " Pleaſures as make Life very deſirable: Were " there no other nor happier State after this, " yet it were very deſirable to come into this " World, and live as long as we can here, to " enjoy the Pleaſures and Satisfactions which " may be enjoy'd in this Life."

An Explication of *Eccl.* Ch. 4. v. 2, 3. may be found in the ſame excellent Chapter, ſee alſo p. 225.

Leibnitz, Eſſais de Theodicee *. " It will " be ſaid, that Evils are very great and numerous if compar'd with good things; but it " is a Miſtake; Want of Attention is the only thing that leſſens our Happineſs; and " 'tis neceſſary that this Attention ſhould be " rais'd by a mixture of Evil. Let us ſupply " by Reflection what is wanting to our Perception, to be more ſenſible of our Happineſs. " Were

* *Memoirs of Literature*, V. 3. p. 118.

Remonſtrance of thoſe Appetites which are implanted by Nature, againſt the Remonſtrance of Senſe and Inſtinct, no leſs than Reaſon, and the leaſt Crime we commit is in obeying them. We may learn then, to our great Misfortune, that we are not entirely driven by the *Impetus of Animal Nature*, and that this Power of pleaſing ourſelves by Election does not lie idle; but rather that it is the too great and inordinate uſe of it which tranſports us into Wickedneſs.

Elections produce the ſame effect in the Moral World as Motion does in the Natural.

VII. As to the third Objection, *viz.* that the *Corruption* of Mankind is almoſt *univerſal*; it is to be obſerv'd in the firſt place, that Elections produce the ſame effect in the Moral, as Motion does in the Natural World; neither is it any more to be expected, that in our preſent State all Elections ſhould be conſiſtent and uniform, than that all Motions ſhould be ſo. Now as contrariety of Motion is a neceſſary Cauſe of natural Corruption, ſo the interfering of Elections is of Vice or Moral Corruption. God could indeed take away both, *viz.* by deſtroying Motion and free Choice; but while theſe are permitted, neither of the Evils could be prevented in the preſent State of things.

Things are connected together, and a Defect in one affects many others.

VIII. Secondly, We may obſerve that things are connected together, and have a mutual dependence on each other, on this account, as

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" Were it not for the Knowledge of a future " Life, I believe moſt People would be willing at the point of Death to begin a new " Life, upon condition that they ſhould enjoy as much Good, and undergo as many " Evils, eſpecially if they were of another " kind. They would be contented with a " Change, without requiring a more happy " Condition."

The ſame Concluſion is drawn by Mr. *Hutcheſon* after an accurate Enquiry into the Frame of human Nature, and a Compariſon of the Pleaſures and Pains attending its ſeveral Senſes †. " Here Men are apt to let their Imaginations " run out upon all the *Robberies, Piracies, Murthers, Perjuries, Frauds, Maſſacres, Aſſaſſinations*, they have ever either heard of or read " in Hiſtory; thence concluding all Mankind " to be very wicked; as if a *Court of Juſtice* " were the proper Place of making an Eſtimate of the Morals of Mankind, or an *Hoſpital* of the Healthfulneſs of a Climate. " Ought they not to conſider, that the Number of honeſt *Citizens* and *Farmers* far ſurpaſs " that of all ſorts of Criminals in any State; " and that the innocent or kind Actions of even Criminals themſelves ſurpaſs their " Crimes in number? That 'tis the *Rarity* of " Crimes, in compariſon of innocent or good " Actions, which engages our attention to " them

† *Eſſay on the Paſſions*, p. 177, &c. *and in particular* p. 184.

as Machines which require the moſt Workmanſhip may be ſtopped or diſordered by the defect of a ſingle Nail or Wheel: ſo the Error or Offence of one Man puts the rational Syſtem or Society of Mankind out of Order. Any Perſon, by almoſt one ſingle free Act, may deſtroy a Houſe or Ship, nay a City or a Fleet by Fire or Wreck. Any King or Governor can, by an eaſy and free Act, overwhelm whole Nations with War, Rapine, Slaughter and Villany. A Father may beget Sons, who being yet unborn, are ſure of inheriting his Diſeaſes and Infirmities as well as his Goods. Nor could it be otherwiſe while the Nature and Condition of Men and of the Earth are ſuch as we experience them to be. Either therefore Liberty and the Connection of things muſt be deſtroy'd, or theſe Evils tolerated.

IX. Thirdly, 'Tis certain that God does not permit any bad Elections, but ſuch as may be reconciled with the Good of the whole Syſtem, and has digeſted and order'd every thing in ſuch a manner, Vice and Wickedneſs, tho' deform'd in themſelves, do not impair the Beauty of the whole.

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" them, and makes them to be recorded in " Hiſtory; while incomparably more honeſt " generous domeſtick Actions are overlook'd " only becauſe they are ſo common; as one " great *Danger*, or one *Month's Sickneſs* ſhall " become a frequently repeated Story, during " a long Life of Health and Safety. The " Pains of the *external* Senſes are pretty fre- " quent, but how ſhort in compariſon of the " long Tracts of Health, Eaſe, and Pleaſure? " How rare is the Inſtance of a Life with one " Tenth ſpent in violent Pain? How few " want abſolute Neceſſaries, nay have not " ſomething to ſpend on *Gaiety* and *Orna-* " *ments?* The Pleaſures of *Beauty* are expos'd " to all in ſome Meaſure. Theſe kinds of " Beauty which require *Property* to the full " Enjoyment of them are not ardently deſir'd " by many. The Good of every kind in the " Univerſe is plainly ſuperior to the Evil. " How few would accept of *Annihilation* ra- " ther than Continuance in Life in the middle " State of Age, Health, and Fortune? Or " what ſeparated Spirit who had conſider'd " human Life, would not, rather than periſh, " take the hazard of it again, by returning in- " to a Body in the State of Infancy?"

" ——*Who would loſe*
" *For fear of Pain this intellectual Being,*
" *Thoſe thoughts which wander thro' Eternity*
" *To periſh rather, ſwallow'd up and loſt*
" *In the wide Womb of uncreated Night;*
" *Devoid of Senſe and Motion?*——
Milton's *Par. loſt*, B. 2.

See alſo Mr. *Chubb*'s Supplement to the Vindication of God's Moral Character ††, or *Lucas*'s Enquiry after Happineſs, V. 1. §. 2. C. 2. p. 41.

†† *Tracts*, p. 281, &c.

manner, that theſe very Faults and Vices ſhall tend to the Good of the whole. For as in Muſick Diſcords, if heard ſeparately, grate and offend the Ear with harſhneſs, but when mix'd in conſort with other Notes, make a more ſweet and agreeable Harmony; in like manner bad Elections, if conſider'd alone, are look'd upon as odious and deteſtable, but compared with the whole Syſtem, they promote and increaſe the Good and Beauty of the whole. For when they are temper'd they become medicinal to each other by that very Contrariety, and thoſe which would poiſon ſeparate, when mix'd become a Remedy *.

For inſtance, One by a depraved Choice raiſes an immenſe Sum of Money, and a vaſt Eſtate, and either the ſame Perſon or his Heir, by his Vanity and Profuſeneſs, compenſates for what he had acquir'd by his Extortion, and perhaps does as much Good by ſquandering away his ill-gotten Wealth to the moſt idle Purpoſes, as if he had beſtow'd all upon the Poor. For he applies a Spur to Induſtry, whereas he would otherwiſe afford an handle to Sloth. The rich Man offends in Luxury and Idleneſs: the Poor tranſgreſſes no leſs by too much Labour and Solicitude, which he indulges perhaps for no other End than to provide Inſtruments of Luxury for the Rich: but each of them pleaſes himſelf in his Choice, and 'tis almoſt the ſame thing with reſpect to the benefit of the Univerſe, as if one had converted to pious Uſes what he ſpent in Luxury, and the other had labour'd moderately to provide only what was uſeful. The ſame almoſt may be ſaid of all Vices, they are prejudicial, but only to the Criminals themſelves, or thoſe that deſerve to ſuffer; nay they are often beneficial to others; and ſo long as the whole comes to no harm, 'tis fit to allow every one the uſe of their own Will, and let them ſuffer for their Sin. God could indeed cut off all Occaſion of Sin, by taking away free Elections: But it is plain that this would be far from an Advantage to intelligent Agents. 'Tis our Buſineſs to prevent bad Elections, and if we will not, we ſuffer for our Folly: But

* *See* Leibnitz *in the Memoirs of Literature refer'd to above.*

But God will procure the Good of the whole by our Folly no leſs than by our Wiſdom. (105.)

X. If

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(105.) We may add, and by our *Sin* no leſs than by our *Righteouſneſs*. Thus it may be ſaid in a good Senſe that *private Vices* (as well as private Misfortunes) often becomes *public Benefits*, tho' the Authors be no leſs liable to Puniſhment: But it will be objected, that this makes Vice to be neceſſary for the Public Good, and therefore to be no Vice at all; nor conſequently puniſhable. For a tendency or oppoſition to the general Happineſs of our Syſtem, is the very Criterion of Virtue and Vice: If then what is call'd my Wickedneſs tends to the Good of the World, how can I be puniſh'd for it? And if my Action promotes the Glory of God, *why doth he yet find fault?* We anſwer, Vice naturally and in general tends to the Miſery of any Syſtem; ſo that if *all* were vicious, all would be wretched; and on the contrary, if every one were virtuous, all muſt be happy; to be vicious and to be productive of Pain or Miſery, would then be convertible terms. But in a mix'd irregular State, where ſome purſue the Rules of Virtue and others do not, the Caſe is very much alter'd, there Pain or Evil, and ſuch Actions as produce it, may often be the moſt proper means to remedy ſome greater Evil, or procure ſome ſuperior Good; to reform a Vice, or improve a Virtue; in which Caſe, tho' that way of acting which in general tends to Miſery, happens to be productive of ſome real Happineſs which could not have been produced without it, yet this is not ſufficient to excuſe or juſtify it, nor is it ſo much the conſequence of its own Nature, and attributable to its immediate Author, as an effect of the ſuperintendency of ſome other Agent, who applies it, and makes it inſtrumental to ſome End of his own, who brings Good out of Evil, or from Evil takes occaſion to do ſtill more Good than he could be conceiv'd to have done without that Evil.

All this I think may be ſuppoſed of God, and yet the different Natures of Good and Evil continue fix'd. Man, who cannot ſee all the Conſequences and Connection of things, muſt be obliged to ſome general Rules of acting, and whenever he deviates from theſe Rules he does amiſs; at leaſt when he intends to act againſt the very *End* of theſe Rules, *i. e.* the general Good, he evidently ſins, let the Conſequence of his Acts be what it will. Thus the Actions of a Man may be often morally Evil to himſelf, tho' they prove naturally Good to ſome others: they may proceed from a bad Intention in him, or he may be a Tranſgreſſor by acting againſt his Rule; and tho' God may have an occaſion of *Glorifying* himſelf thereby, of diſplaying his Wiſdom and Goodneſs, *&c.* to a higher degree than they could otherwiſe have been exhibited; and therefore may reaſonably permit the Actions of this Man, and convert them, either to the Puniſhment and Correction of himſelf or other Sinners, or to the Bleſſing of ſome righteous Perſons; yet the immediate Author is nevertheleſs accountable both to God and Man for ſuch his Actions. Inſtances of this kind are innumerable, and may be ſeen in *Sherlock* on *Providence*. See particularly what is required from God's Goodneſs in a State of Diſcipline. p. 221, 224, 230, *&c.* 2d Edit. or in *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, p. 83. 4th Edition, *Lond.* 1670.

What has been ſaid here only relates to God's *permitting* Moral Evil, ſo far as it is a means of ſome prepollent Good.

S. C. in his *Impartial Enquiry*, *&c.* carries the Matter farther, and ſuppoſes that God may for the general Good *decree* ſome ſuch Acts as ſeem to be morally Evil; which I can ſee no reaſon or neceſſity for ſuppoſing. How he endeavours to make this out and reconcile it with the *Holineſs* and *Juſtice* of the Deity, may be ſeen in Part 1. Ch. 11. prop. 9. p. 94, *&c.*

If this be apply'd to particular Caſes, it accounts for the univerſal Corruption.

X. If this be true, it is a ſufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodneſs, notwithſtanding ſuch a plentiful Crop of Vices be permitted; nor need we inſiſt upon a longer enquiry how this may be applied to particular Caſes; for whether this Corruption was occaſion'd by the *Fall of our firſt Parents* as Truth itſelf declares, or by any other Cauſe whatever, 'tis certain that God would never have permitted it, if it could have been prevented without greater Damage to the whole. (106.) We may wonder indeed that almoſt all Mankind

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(106.) Perhaps ſuch a Scheme as this of the *Fall* appears to be from the Repreſentation given of it, and its effects in Scripture, was neceſſary to make us duly ſenſible of the Nature of Good and Evil, to acquaint us more fully with the Moral Perfections of the Deity (which could not have been ſo clearly exhibited to us if there had never been any room for the Exerciſe of them) and conſequently to bring us to an Imitation of theſe Perfections, and thereby to the greateſt and moſt refined Happineſs that our better part is capable of. Man (as we obſerv'd in Note 103.) is a very imperfect compound Being, who, by the conſtitution of his Nature, ſeems incapable of being made truly wiſe and virtuous, or which is the ſame thing, *morally* happy on a ſudden, he muſt therefore receive Improvement gradually, and as he is to compleat his good Habits by a Series of virtuous Acts, ſo it ſeems proper for him to be train'd up by various Diſpenſations, and a Series of Events adapted to the ſeveral Faculties of his Body and Mind; the various conſtituent Parts of his Nature, and different Sources of his Happineſs: accordingly we find that the Happineſs of Man in his firſt Eſtate was chiefly *Animal*, to which an Earthly Paradiſe was exquiſitely fitted; a Change in this was probably requiſite to introduce the *rational* or *moral* kind into the World, and to make him direct his Thoughts to ſomething higher than mere ſenſitive Delights. This we are told was the Method of Divine Providence with the *Jewiſh* Nation in particular, who had a Law of Carnal Ordinances to exerciſe them for a while, and lead them on to the Expectation of better things; to ſpiritualize their Notions by Degrees, and prepare them for the Heavenly Doctrines of *Meſſiah*. And why might not the like Method be made uſe of in the Government of Mankind in general, or even all rational Beings? What if God, willing to make known the greater Riches of his Glory, ſuffer'd our firſt Parents to fall ſoon from that Condition wherein he created them at firſt, in order to raiſe them and their Poſterity to a much higher State of Glory and true Happineſs after? And who can prove that the former was not conducive to the latter? We believe that the Bliſs of Heaven will infinitely exceed the Pleaſures of a Terreſtrial Eden; why then ſhould we not ſuppoſe that the leſs might be in ſome manner uſeful and introductory to the greater? Why might not a ſhort Life in Paradiſe be as proper a State of Probation for the Virtues of this preſent World, as this World is for the Glories of another? There is a Paſſage concerning Paradiſe in *Scott's Chriſtian Life* * which confirms this Notion: But it is the moſt fully explain'd by Mr. *D'Oyly* in his *firſt Diſſertation*, C. 3. p. 31, *&c.* I ſhall tranſcribe ſo much as may be neceſſary to ſhew his general Deſign. " If " we conſider our Nature as it came in *Innocence* out of the hand of its Creator, God " foreſaw how very ſoon it would fall from " its primitive Purity, and therefore deſign'd " it farther for a *much happier* State, raiſed and

* Vol. 1. p. 26.

Mankind are polluted in Wickedneſs, and that God puts no ſtop to the Progreſs of thoſe Vices which deform his Work; but in reality this is no more to be wonder'd at, than that this inferior World is by Motion univerſally ſubjected to natural Corruption. For as Contrariety of Motions neceſſarily works a Change in ſolid and heterogeneous Bodies, and tranſpoſes them into another Form and Condition, whence neceſſarily proceed Diſſolution and Concretion, Cor-

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" and refined by a clearer and more extenſive " *Manifeſtation* of himſelf: But had it ſtood " the Reward (at leaſt as far as we know) " would have been the indefeaſable Poſſeſſion " of a Paradiſe in this World, the enjoying of " an immortal Life here on Earth, chequer'd " as it were with Spiritual and Senſitive, or " Animal Pleaſures. And for their Conduct " in that State God ſeems to have left them " (one or two Inſtances excepted) under the " Direction of the *Law of Nature*, the *Spiritual* " or Religious Part of which taught them to " look up to him as the Creator of the World; " the Lord and Author of their Being, and to " fear and obey him as their Almighty So- " vereign. The *Civil* part of it furniſh'd them " with right Reaſon, dictating what was ne- " ceſſary to be done in order to their well- " being in this World. So that had they " ſtood, their Happineſs would probably have " been—what that of Mankind was afterwards-- " a mixture of *rational* and *ſenſitive*, or bodily " Enjoyments. And as to any Knowledge of " God, farther than that now mention'd; it " may, I conceive, be thought reaſonable to " preſume that they had the ſame awful ſenſe " of his *Veracity* as of any other Attribute: " and yet how very eaſily were they wrought " into a Belief by the firſt Story they heard, " and from they know not whom, that he had " acted *colluſively* in barring them the Fruit of " the *Tree of Knowledge*, deſigning by it only " to keep them down under the Veil of Igno- " rance, and that there was no ſuch imminent " Danger of Death conſequent to their taſting " it, as they were at firſt made to believe? " Whatever ſuch Knowledge therefore we ſup- " poſe them to have had, it may be doubted, " its Impreſſions were not vivid and forcible " enough to influence their Wills to ſuitable " Efforts in *loving* and *cleaving* ſteadily to " him: ſince no one can love whom he does " not believe, and without Faith 'tis as im- " poſſible to *love* as to *pleaſe God*: So that " thoſe Impreſſions could not conſequently be " very inſtrumental in making an Addition to " their Happineſs, as has been ſhewn above. " Nay as to *Adam* himſelf in particular, it " may perhaps ſeem reaſonable to think he " had not that profound Reverence and awful " regard for the Divine Majeſty which he " might juſtly have been expected to expreſs, " (tho' not under the Circumſtances of a *Cri-* " *minal*) ſince after the Fact committed, he " ſeems attempting to ſcreen his Guilt, even " by throwing the blame *obliquely* upon God " himſelf, where he anſwers, *The Woman* whom " *Thou* gaveſt to be with me, *ſhe gave me of the* " *Tree and I did eat* *."

The Author proceeds to enquire into the State of Religion in the Antedeluvian World, the Patriarchal Ages, and down to the *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation, and ſhews that Mankind could not from the Works of Creation and Providence only (which yet were their only means of Knowledge) have ſo extenſive and perfect a Knowledge of God as was requiſite to advance their Happineſs properly

* Diſſert. 1. p. 33.

ruption and Generation: In like manner free Choice neceſſarily adminiſters occaſion of Sin to Agents endow'd with an imperfect Underſtanding, and obnoxious to Paſſions and Affections. And as in the natural World the Corruption and Contagion of one thing extends itſelf to others, and acquires Strength by ſpreading; ſo alſo in the moral, if Election once deviate to Evil, the Poiſon is diffuſed along with it, and ſeizes and infects all about it.

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properly ſo call'd, as rational Agents, to any conſiderable Degree; nor conſequently to be the foundation of a Worſhip worthy of him. From whence he concludes, " The Faculties " of our rational Nature muſt have lain dor- " ment and uſeleſs as to the greateſt Happineſs " it was capable of attaining by the *Exerciſe* of " them; and as to the higheſt Honour and " moſt exalted Worſhip it was in itſelf qua- " liſy'd to pay to the Divine Majeſty, unleſs " he had pleas'd to make proviſion for the " farther *Manifeſtation* of himſelf: which, in " what manner he has in his infinite Wiſdom " and Goodneſs determin'd to effect, will ap- " pear by laying open the moſt *advantageous* " *Changes* which has been made as to theſe " and other reſpects, by the appearance of " *Chriſt in the Fleſh*. For if it be ſhewn, that " by that amazing Tranſaction he has ſo diſ- " play'd the infinite Excellencies and Perfec- " tions of his Nature, as to give the utmoſt " poſſible Scope to the whole rational Crea- " tion, to exert their nobleſt Faculties, and " ſtrain them up to the moſt exalted aſtoniſh- " ing Thoughts of, and ſeraphical *Devotion* to " him: if farther he has thereby apply'd the " moſt proper and forcible means to rectify " the *Moral Errors*, reform the Vices, and o- " vercome the *daring Wickedneſs* of Mankind; " and laſtly, if it be ſhewn that he has done " all this in ſuch a manner that it could not " have been effected *to ſo great Advantage* any " other way, then will it be demonſtratively " evident, that whereas he foreſaw from all " Eternity, that Man whom he had decreed to " create would abuſe his *natural Liberty*, and " ſo, being tempted, fall into Sin: There " was infinite reaſon on this account as well " as that mention'd before, why he might " have pleas'd alſo, in his infinite Wiſdom " and Goodneſs, to have decreed to permit it, " thereby to open a way for the ſtupendous " *Manifeſtation* of himſelf, as above expreſs'd. " And particularly—that by what follow'd " from it, Mankind might become capable of " attaining far *greater Happineſs* than they " would have been had our firſt Parents con- " tinued innocent." p. 43.

How this Author makes out the fore-mentioned Particulars may be ſeen in the remainder of his *Diſſertation*.

See alſo Dr. *Jenkin* on the ſame Subject *.

Now this is not, as *Bayle* objects †, " To " compare the Deity to a Father who ſhould " ſuffer his Children to break their Legs, on " purpoſe to ſhew to all the City his great " Art in ſetting their broken Bones. Or to a " King who ſhould ſuffer Seditions and Fac- " tions to encreaſe thro' all his Kingdom, that " he might purchaſe the Glory of quelling " them." But rather like a King who permits ſome of his Subjects to put their ſeditious Deſigns in practice, and to promote a Revolt, in order to illuſtrate his Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs more fully in reducing them to their Duty, and to convince them more clearly of the Expedience and abſolute Neceſſity of obeying him, and thereby to confirm them, or at leaſt

* *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, 2d vol. C. 12.
† *Crit. Dict.* p. 2488.

But yet both *natural* and *moral Corruption* have their Bounds, neither does God permit them to ſpread farther than is conducive to to the Good of the whole *. It may ſeem ſtrange to us that he ſuffers both of them to wander over this World of ours without Reſtraint; but what is our World to the whole Syſtem of the Univerſe? How ſmall a Part! how next to nothing! (107.) Let this whole Earth of

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leaſt all the reſt of his Subjects, in a well grounded Obedience to his Government, in which their Happineſs entirely conſiſts: Or like a Father that finding his Children obſtinately diſobedient, ſuffers them ſometimes to wander aſtray, and to fall into ſome Dangers and Inconveniencies, and lets them ſmart under the Miſery which they bring upon themſelves, in order to make them more ſenſible of their need of his Aſſiſtance and Direction, and thereby more dependent on him for the future, and more ſubject to him, and therefore more ſure of Happineſs. This Compariſon is well explain'd by *Sherlock* on *Providence*, Chap. 7. p. 262.

Hence then it will perhaps appear that we have reaſon to ſuppoſe, that the Fall of Man from Earthly and Animal Delights, was deſign'd to raiſe him to a Rational and Heavenly State of Happineſs, and to make way for ſuch a wonderful Diſplay of all the Divine Attributes in that Expedient, as could not have been exhibited at all, or not to ſo high a Degree without it; and conſequently that this Method was the very beſt even for *our own* Syſtem. But if this Suppoſition ſeem improbable, or inſufficient, yet ſtill why may not all the Miſery in this Syſtem of ours promote and encreaſe the Happineſs of ſome others †? We have good reaſon to believe that there is ſome Connection between the different Syſtems of the Univerſe; but have ſmall ground to imagine ours the beſt, why then may it not be ſubſervient to a better? This indeed is only Conjecture; however, I think it would be no eaſy Matter to confute it; till which be done, we may very ſafely conclude with our Author, that the *Fall itſelf*, as well as all the Sin and Miſery conſequent upon it, could not have been prevented without greater detriment to the whole: and one may ſay the ſame of *Eve* as the Poet did of the hand of *Mutius Scævola*: *Si non erraſſet, fecerat illa minus* ‖.

(107.) "It will be objected, that even after "this Life Miſery will prevail above Happi- "neſs (ſince there are but few *Elect*) which "appears inconſiſtent with the Goodneſs of "the ſupreme Being. "In anſwer to this "Difficulty, granting that the Number of "thoſe who are to be tormented in Hell will "be incomparably greater than that of the "Bleſſed, the Evil will ſtill appear like no- "thing if compared with the Good, conſider- "ing the true Extent of the *City of God*. The "Ancients had a narrow Notion of the Works "of the Author of Nature; and St. *Auguſtin*, "for want of knowing the modern Diſcove- "ries, was not a little perplex'd when he un- "dertook to juſtify the prevalency of Evil. "It was in former times a common Opinion, "that the Earth was the only part of the World "furniſhed with Inhabitants; nay the Antients "were afraid of admitting any *Antipodes*: they "believ'd that the reſt of the World did only "conſiſt of ſome ſhining Globes and Cryſtal- "line Spheres: But in our Days it will be "acknowledg'd that there is an innumerable "Number of Globes, as large and larger than "ours,

* *See* Sherlock *on Providence*, Ch. 7. p. 261. 2d Edit. *and* Scott's *Chriſtian Life*, V. 2. Ch. 4 par. 3. p. 318, &c. 8*vo*.

† *See the next Note.* ‖ *See* Leibnitz *Eſſais de Theodicee*, Part 2. §. 239.

of ours be ſtain'd with Corruption of both kinds; ſuppoſe it clouded and benighted with Darkneſs and Vice, yet it will but be like a very ſmall Spot in a very beautiful Body, which is ſo far from leſſening, that it encreaſes the Comelineſs and Beauty of the whole. The Earth, notwithſtanding its Obſcurity, has its Uſe and Place in Nature, which it could not commodiouſly fill if thoſe things which render it liable to Darkneſs and Corruption were removed. The ſame muſt be ſaid of Men, they have their proper Uſe and Station, and in order to fill it commodiouſly, they were to be created of ſuch a Nature and Diſpoſition as might eaſily be corrupted with Vice. Neither have we any more reaſon to conclude that all free Agents are involv'd in Evil Elections, becauſe this happens almoſt univerſally to Men, than that all the Regions of the Heavens are ſubject to the ſame Changes that our Air is liable to. The whole Work of God may be bright and beautiful, tho' that Point which conſtitutes our World ſeem by itſelf rude and unadorn'd: and tho' ſome Parts appear to us who have not a View of the whole Contexture, larger or leſs than the juſt Proportion requires, yet they may agree with others in the moſt perfect Symetry. Nor need we preſume upon the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs in the *Moral*, any more than

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" ours, which may be inhabited by rational " Creatures, tho' it does not follow that they " are Men. Our Earth is only a Planet, that " is, one of the ſix principal Satellites of our " Sun. And becauſe all fix'd Stars are ſo " many Suns, 'tis plain the Earth is a very " inconſiderable part of the Univerſe, ſince " it is only an *Appendix* of one Sun. Perhaps " all the Suns are inhabited by happy Crea- " tures, at leaſt we have no reaſon to believe " that many of their Inhabitants will be dam- " ned. Beſides, conſidering that there is no " reaſon to affirm that there are Stars every " where, it may very well be, that there is a " vaſt Space beyond the Region of the Stars. " Whether it be the *Empyreal Heaven* or not, " that immenſe Space which ſurrounds all that " Region may be filled with Glory and Hap- " pineſs. It may be conceiv'd like an Ocean, " which receives the Rivers of all happy Crea- " tures, when they have attain'd to their Per- " fection in the Syſtem of the Stars. What " will then become of the Conſideration of " our Globe and its Inhabitants? Will it " not be a thing incomparably leſs than a " Phyſical Point, ſince our Earth is like a " Point with reſpect to the diſtance of ſome " fix'd Stars? And therefore the Proportion " of that part of the Univerſe which we know " being loſt in a kind of Nothingneſs, it may " very well be ſaid that all Evils are almoſt " *nothing* in compariſon with all the good " things that are in the Univerſe †.

† Leibnitz *in Memoirs of Literature*, Vol. 3.

than in the *Natural* World. The Crimes and Vices themſelves are very few in compariſon of the free Agents, and may contribute to the Good of the whole, no leſs than natural Corruption does to the Preſervation of the Syſtem. Nay one Man's Fault is very often corrected by the Vices of another, and the Deformity ſtamp'd upon the Works of God by the Wickedneſs of ſome, is obliterated by the ſupervening Iniquity of others. By the vitiated Elections of ſome, a Stop is put to the Wickedneſs of many; and the Virtue and Happineſs of a great many is confirmed and increaſed by the Miſery of a few; nay an Opportunity of doing Good is offer'd to ſuch as are ſo diſpoſed, which never could have been if none had abuſed their Choice. (108.)

SUBSECT.

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(108.) Upon the whole, from that little which we know of the Scheme of Divine Providence in the Formation and Government of the *Moral* World, it ſeems very reaſonable for us to conclude concerning this, in the ſame manner as we did concerning the *Natural* World, *viz.* That no conſiderable part of it can be alter'd for the better; or that no Evil in it could either have been originally avoided, or may now be removed, without introducing greater—Since the whole Controverſy depends upon the truth of this general Concluſion, 'tis proper that we ſhould be as fully ſatisfy'd as poſſible about the ground of it.

But to attempt to demonſtrate it by an Induction of Particulars would be infinite, I ſhall therefore chooſe rather to illuſtrate it by a review of ſome of the Principles before laid down. In the firſt place then the Deity is ſuppoſed out of pure Benevolence to have created as many immaterial Beings of the nobleſt kinds as were agreeable to the Order and Convenience of his Syſtem; for his Benevolence being unbounded, ſeems to require this as much as it does the Creation of any Beings at all: The ſame Benevolence alſo prompted him to produce more imperfect, mixt ones, becauſe even thoſe were better than none. He endowed theſe with an abſolutely free Principle of *Volition* and *Action*, becauſe ſuch Freedom was abſolutely requiſite to that Happineſs for which he deſign'd them; *viz.* Goodneſs, Virtue, or a reſemblance of his own Moral Qualities, which is the only true Happineſs of a rational Being.——He continues this Freedom to them, tho' many abuſe it to the Corruption of their Natures, and Introduction of the greateſt Miſery; becauſe this abuſe proportionably improves the Nature, and increaſes the Felicity of *others*, and ſo Liberty ſtill tends to the Good and Perfection of the whole: and this it may be conceived to do in the following manner. The miſerable Effect of the abuſe of Freedom by ſome in this World, makes all others much more ſenſible of the Nature and Conſequences of Sin, and thereby renders them conſcious of a double Pleaſure in uſing their Powers aright: it exerciſeth ſome Virtues in them which could have no place without it; it improveth and exalteth others, and conſequently raiſes their whole Nature to an higher degree of Perfection than it could otherwiſe acquire. By parity of Reaſon we may believe that in the next World alſo, the Happineſs of them, as well as of ſome other Syſtems, will be infinitely advanced by reflections naturally ariſing from their View

SUBSECT. VII.

Wherein the Principles before laid down are apply'd to the Solution of ſome Objections.

Moral Evils are not neceſſary in reſpect of Free-Will, but they are neceſſary

I. FROM the foregoing Principles it ſeems not impoſſible to anſwer ſuch Objections as are commonly brought againſt the Goodneſs and Providence of God. For in the firſt place, when it is objected with regard to God, ſo that he muſt either tolerate theſe or greater.

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View of the Miſery which ſome ſhall undergo: (which ſeems to be the beſt, the only ſolid reaſon that can be aſſign'd for the Creation of thoſe Beings who ſhall be finally miſerable, and for the continuation of them in their miſerable Exiſtence *.)

" To have eſcaped Hell, and to find ourſelves in the unchangeable Poſſeſſion of Sal-
" vation by the free Mercy and Goodneſs of
" God, and by the Death of his own Son, are
" Thoughts which muſt create a new Heaven
" as it were in Heaven itſelf; I mean, they
" will enlarge our Souls to the utmoſt Capa-
" city of our Natures, and fill and actuate
" them with ſuch Divine Ardors of Love, as
" if we had been kept neceſſarily from all
" Sin, ſeem impoſſible to have been raiſed in
" us †.

This then we may with Reverence preſume to have been the principal Deſign of God in permitting all Mankind to bring themſelves into ſuch a dangerous Eſtate, and ſome of them to ſuffer under it; and perhaps the ſame reaſon will hold for his permitting the *Fall of Angels*: For I think it plainly appear'd from Note 23. that the Good, or rather *Goodneſs* of the Creature, is properly the ultimate End of all the Diſpenſations of God, and not his own *Glory*, as ſome love to ſpeak: This Glory ſeems to be diſplay'd no otherwiſe than as it is ſubſervient and neceſſary to that End; and neceſſary it is (as has been partly ſhewn above.) For Goodneſs is of our own making, and muſt require Knowledge, Love, *&c.* as Motives and Means to further us in the gradual Formation of a ſuitable Temper and proper Habits here, the Enlargement and Improvement of which will conſtitute our Heaven hereafter, as *Scott* and Dr. *Rymer* have ſhewn at large.

Virtue

* *See the* Appendix, §. 2. par. 9.

† *Jenkin*, 2d vol. Ch. 12. p. 244, *&c.* 5th Edit.

objected, that Moral Evil is not a neceſſary concomitant of human Nature, and therefore is voluntarily permitted by God, and that no Benefit ariſes from the permiſſion of it, as there does from Hunger, Thirſt, and the Paſſions: We muſt reply, that Liberty of Choice is a neceſſary Concomitant of our Nature, and that the Exerciſe of it cannot be hinder'd, as we have ſeen, without greater Evils: In reſpect then of our own Will, Moral Evil is not neceſſary, but in reſpect of God it is, *i. e.* he muſt either tolerate this Evil or a greater; from hence alſo proceeds no ſmall Advantage to univerſal Nature, as well as to Mankind.

II. Secondly, Hence we perceive the Anſwer to *Cicero*'s Objection in his third Book, *De Natura Deorum*, where *Cotta* is introduced arguing *Cicero*'s Objection propoſed which is taken from a Phyſician who gives his Patient Wine when he knows that he will dye of it. Or a Father who leaves his Eſtate to a Prodigal Son.

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Virtue therefore or *Moral Good* cannot (as *Bayle* imagines) be *infuſed into us* miraculouſly; neither could God, *according to the Order of our Ideas*, have acquainted us with ſo much of his adorable Nature, his *Mercy*, *Long-ſuffering*, *Goodneſs* and *Truth* (as he himſelf deſcribes it *) nor conſequently have brought us to ſo great a reſemblance of it by any other Method. The ſole Idea of a *Being infinitely perfect*, &c. (as *Bayle* objects †) would not do the Buſineſs, nor if it were perceiv'd and would have been attended to, could it be of ſufficient force to influence the Minds of Men, and regulate their Practice, as is evident from daily Experience. The preſent Scheme of Providence was therefore neceſſary, in order to produce in the generality of Men the greateſt degree of *Goodneſs* in this Life, which is the ground and foundation of their *Happineſs* in the next. Even there alſo may the Memory of their former Trials (as was hinted above) the Conſciouſneſs of their own happy Choice, when others did, and they had the ſame Power and the ſame Temptations to have done otherwiſe: the joyful Reflection on their paſt Dangers and preſent Safety, and the natural Conſequence of all this Love and Gratitude, and Glory to God in the Higheſt, and mutual Congratulations of each other.—Theſe and the like Contemplations will (as Dr. *Jenkin* ſays) create a new Heaven in Heaven itſelf.

And tho' in one reſpect a view of the Miſery which the damned undergo, might ſeem to detract from the Happineſs of the Bleſſed, thro' Commiſeration, *&c.* Yet under another, a nearer, and much more affecting Conſideration, *viz.* that all this is the Miſery which they themſelves often expoſed themſelves to, and were in imminent Danger of incurring; in this View, why may not the ſenſe of their own Eſcape ſo far overcome the Senſe of another's Ruin, as quite to extinguiſh the Pain that

* Exod 34. 6, 7.
† Crit. Dict. p. 2488.

guing in this manner: "If a Phyſician knows that his Patient, who "is order'd to drink Wine, will drink too much and dye of it im- "mediately, he is greatly blameable for allowing him it. Thus is "this Providence of yours to be blamed, which has given Reaſon "to ſuch as it knew would make a perverſe and wicked Uſe of it." He proceeds alſo to confute thoſe Perſons who endeavour to excuſe Providence, by ſaying, "that it does not follow that we are not ve- "ry well provided for by the Gods, becauſe a great many uſe their "Gifts perverſely; ſince many make a bad uſe of their Paternal "Eſtates, and yet theſe cannot be ſaid to have no Benefit from their "Fathers." To which he replies in theſe Words: "I wiſh the "Gods had not beſtow'd that Cunning upon Men which very few "make a right uſe of: In ſo much that this Divine Gift of Reaſon "and Deliberation may ſeem to be imparted for a Snare and not a "Benefit to Mankind." He adds, "We leave Eſtates to our Chil- "dren in hopes of leaving them well, wherein we may be deceiv'd; "but how can God be deceiv'd?"

'Tis ſhewn that the Compariſon is ill put between Reaſon and Free-Will, Sin, would

III. To all which we reply, Firſt, That it is very unfair to com- "pare the Reaſon which is granted to Man with Wine given to the and the giving of Wine; and that God, if he took away Liberty for fear we ſhould be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he ſhould be ſick.

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that uſually attends the Idea of it, and even render it productive of ſome real Happineſs? To this purpoſe apply that of *Lucretius*, B. 2.

Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis
E terra alterius magnum ſpectare laborem,
Non quia vexari quenquam eſt jucunda voluptas.
Sed, quibus ipſe malis careas, quia cernere ſuave eſt.

But however this be, moſt of the foregoing Reflections ſeem juſt and unexceptionable.

I ſhall conclude with another Paſſage from Dr. *Jenkin* *, which ſets them in the ſtrongeſt Light.

"It muſt advance the Happineſs both of "Angels and Men in Heaven, that upon "Choice and Trial they have preferr'd God "before all things, and upon that find them- "ſelves confirm'd and eſtabliſh'd in the per- "petual and unalterable Love and Enjoy- "ment of him. This very Conſideration, "that they might once have fallen from his "Love, inſpires them with the higheſt Ar- "dors of Love, when they rejoice in the "infinite

* p. 242.

the Sick. For a ſick Perſon may enjoy Life, and even recover, without Wine; but Man cannot be what he is without Reaſon. The Compariſon therefore is very improperly made between things that are *diſperate*. Neither is there a leſs difference between *ſinning* and *dying*. 'Tis very true, that no body would let a ſick Perſon take Wine which he knew would kill him: but yet any prudent Phyſician would allow his Patient to take ſome Meat, without which he knew that he certainly muſt die, tho' he underſtood, that upon taking it the Fever would encreaſe a little. In like manner God has given Reaſon to Men, without which they would not be Men, tho' he foreſaw that ſome Evils would ariſe from it. Reaſon therefore ought to be compared to Life, and natural Evils to the Diſtemper. If then God were to take away Reaſon leſt Men ſhould uſe it amiſs, he would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he ſhould be ſick.

IV. Secondly, Human Reaſon is improperly compared to a *Patrimony*, ſince it is the very *Being* and Life of Man: and who would rather put his Son to Death than ſuffer him to lead a ſort of an irregular Life? Reaſon is no leſs improperly compar'd to an Eſtate.

V. Thirdly, We ought to remember that we are not born for ourſelves alone, but are ſubſervient to Nature as Parts of the Univerſe, 'tis reaſonable therefore that we ſhould bear ſuch things as It tends to the good of the whole, and of ourſelves too, that we ſhould have

tend or without the uſe of Free-Will: for we had rather be what we are than in the Condition of Brutes, Reaſon.

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" infinite Rewards of ſo eaſy and ſhort a " Tryal: and the Reflection upon the Dan- " gers eſcaped, heightens even the Joys of " Heaven to them, and makes an addition to " every Degree of Bliſs. The remembrance " of their paſt Sins and Temptations, and " the Senſe of their own Unworthineſs ari- " ſing from that Remembrance, will conti- " nually excite in the Bleſſed freſh Acts of " Love and Adoration of God, who has rai- " ſed them above all Sin and Temptation, " and fix'd them in an everlaſting State of " Bliſs and Glory. The Trial that the Righ- " teous underwent here, makes up ſome part " of their Happineſs in Heaven; and in " what Degree ſoever their Happine's can " be ſuppoſed to be, yet it is in ſome " meaſure increaſed, and as it were en- " deared to them, by reflecting on their " former State of Trial, in which they " were

tend to the Good of the whole, tho' they be a little inconvenient to us. Now we have ſhewn before that the Abuſe of Reaſon cannot be prevented without Violence done to the Laws of the Univerſe, without Detriment to Mankind and to ourſelves. If therefore a Father could not refuſe a Son his Inheritance, without breaking the Laws of his Country, without injuring his Family, and laſtly, without the Loſs of his Son's Life, he would not deſerve to be blamed for giving him it, tho' he underſtood that he would make a bad uſe of it: Eſpecially if he foreſaw that the Brothers of this Prodigal would take warning by his Error and become frugal, and that the Eſtate which he ſpent would turn to their Benefit. The ſame muſt be ſaid of the Phyſician who gives his Patient a Glaſs at his Requeſt; which if he did not give, the Patient would immediately ſtab himſelf. Is he culpable if he compound for a leſs Evil, in order to avoid a greater? More eſpecially, if many labour under the ſame Diſtemper, and would not be convinc'd of the danger of uſing Wine but by Experiment: would it not be better to let one or two make the Experiment than that all ſhould periſh? God therefore knowingly permits us ſick Perſons to uſe Wine; for tho' we abuſe it, yet our Condition will be better than if he had not beſtow'd it upon us. If any urge, that it is better not to be at all, than to be miſerable, and conſequently that 'tis more proper to deprive us of Life, than to ſuffer us to abuſe it. I anſwer as before, That we muſt make a Diſtinction in Miſery; for where there is more Evil than Good, it is indeed preferable not to be, than to be involv'd in this kind of Miſery, but that which attends human Reaſon is not ſuch, by our own Judgment. For we had rather be what we are than not be at all, or be without Reaſon. Elſe why are we unwilling to change our Condition with

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" were ſubject to Temptation and Sin." See the ſame handled more diſtinctly in the firſt of Mr. *D'Oyly*'s four Diſſertations, Ch. 10. or A-Bp. *Dawes*'s 5th Sermon on the *Eternity of Hell-Torments*, Argument the 4th. p. 73, &c. or *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Vol. 5. p. 100.

with the Brutes, or Mad-men, if we do not think it better than theirs?

VI. But to conclude, *Cotta* in *Cicero* has neither brought pertinent Similitudes, nor given good Advice to Providence. For God, as a Phyſician, does not give Wine to the ſick Perſon to kill him; but to one that will die, in order to prevent his dying ſooner. Neither has the Divine Father given an Inheritance to his Sons that they may waſte it, but has beſtow'd it upon ſuch as will waſte it, leſt they ſhould want Neceſſaries. Whereas, if *Cotta* had been Counſellor to Providence, he would have adviſed Phyſicians to let their Patients die with Thirſt, leſt ſome of them ſhould drink too much; he would have perſuaded Parents either to kill their Children, or never beget them, leſt they ſhould make a bad uſe of their Eſtates when they came to Age. (109.)

Cicero has neither brought appoſite Similes, nor given good Advice to Providence

VII. From

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(109.) The ſame holds good againſt all *Bayle*'s Compariſons, *Crit. Dict. Art.* Paulicians, *Rem.* E. F. K Δ Δ, *&c.* p. 2488. where he ſays, that to permit Men to ſin rather than over-rule their Wills, is like a Mother that lets her Daughters go to a Ball, where ſhe is ſure they will loſe their Honour, and then pleads in her own Juſtification, "that ſhe "had no mind to reſtrain the Liberty of her "Daughters, nor to ſhew any Diſtruſt of "them." *Again* †, If a Son ſhould ſee his "Father ready to throw himſelf out of the "Window, either in a fit of Frenzy, or becauſe he is troubled in Mind, he would "do well to chain him, if he could not reſtrain him otherwiſe. If a Queen ſhould "fall into the Water, any Footman that "ſhould get her out of it, either by embracing her, or taking her by the Hair ‖, tho' "he ſhould pluck off above one half of it, "would do a very good Action; ſhe would "not certainly complain of his want of Reſpect to her. If any one ſhould ſuffer a "Lady finely dreſs'd to fall into a Precipice, "would it not be a very fooliſh Excuſe to "ſay, that it had not been poſſible to ſtop "her without ſpoiling her Ribbons and "Head-dreſs?" *And to name no more* *,

"To have regard to the Free-Will of a "Man, and carefully to abſtain from laying "any reſtraint upon his Inclination, when he "is going to loſe his Innocence for ever, to "be eternally damn'd, can you call that a "lawful Obſervation of the Laws of Liberty? "You would be leſs unreaſonable if you "would ſay to a Man who gets a Fall near "you, and breaks his Leg, *that which hinder'd us from preventing your Fall is, that "we were afraid to undo ſome Folds of your "Gown, we had ſo great a reſpect for its Symetry, that we would not undertake to ſpoil "it, and we thought it was much better to "let you run the hazard of breaking your "Bones*," &c-

In all which this Author evidently miſtakes the Caſe, by comparing the *Deſtruction of Free-Will*

† *Crit. Dict.* p. 2497.

‖ *Thus Q.* Chriſtina *was taken out of a Lake at* Stockholme.

* p. 2497.

The Objection of Epicurus propoſed which accuſes God of Impotence if he was not able; or of Envy, if he was able to remove Evils.

VII. From the ſame Principles we may ſolve that ſtrong Objection of *Epicurus* againſt Providence, which *Lactantius* enforces in his Book *De Ira Dei* †, and, as ſome think, does not ſufficiently anſwer. It ſtands thus: "Either God is willing to remove Evils, "and not able, or able and not willing, or neither able nor willing. If he be willing and not able, he is impotent, which cannot be apply'd to the Deity: If he be able and not willing, he "is envious; which is equally inconſiſtent with the Nature of "God. If he be neither willing nor able, he is both envious and "impotent, and conſequently no God. If he be both willing "and able, which is the only thing that anſwers to the Notion "of a God, from whence come Evils? Or why does he not remove them?"

'Tis a Contradiction, that all Evils be removed from created Beings: God is not impotent, therefore becauſe he does not remove them.

VIII. We muſt take the third of thoſe four Branches of his puzling Argument; *viz.* That God neither will nor can remove Evils. (110.) Yet we deny the Conſequence. He is neither to be eſteemed Envious nor Impotent, becauſe he does not work Contradictions:

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Will (for that is the only thing, as we have prov'd, that can prevent the abuſe of it) which *Will* has been ſhewn to be the very Life and Soul of Man; to ſuch mere trifles as tearing his Hair, or diſcompoſing his Habit: Whereas, from the foregoing account of the ineſtimable Worth of Liberty to each Individual, and the many Advantages that ariſe in common, even from the abuſe of it, it plainly appears, that to abridge, or which is the very ſame, to deprive a Man of Liberty for fear he ſhould abuſe it, would, in regard to him, be juſt as good as to knock him on the Head for fear he ſhould maim or diſfigure himſelf. And with reſpect to the Publick, he would be far more unreaſonable who ſhould deſire the abſence of this Liberty, becauſe of its frequent abuſe, than he who ſhould wiſh that there were no ſuch things as Fire, Wind, or Water, in the World, becauſe ſo many Men, Houſes, and Ships are deſtroy'd by them.—As the reſt of *Bayle*'s elaborate Similes are founded on the ſame Miſrepreſentation, one hint of this kind is, I think, enough to invalidate them.

(110.) *Leibnitz* would rather ſay, "that "God could take them away, but he was "not willing to do it abſolutely; and for a "very

† §. 12. p. 435. *Camtr.* Edit.

dictions: But it is a Contradiction that all Evils ſhould be removed, without removing the whole Univerſe; which would be the greateſt of all Evils. For ſome kind of Evils adhere (as we have often declared) to the very Natures of things, and cannot be removed while any created Nature continues. For when a Circle is once made, all the Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference, muſt neceſſarily be equal; neither is God impotent becauſe he cannot make them unequal while it continues to be a Circle: In like manner, when he has made a Creature, he muſt neceſſarily tolerate the Evil of Imperfection in it, which is as eſſential to it as an Equality of the *Radij* is to the Circle. When therefore Matter, Motion and Free-Will are conſtituted, he muſt neceſſarily permit Corruption of things, and the abuſe of Liberty, or ſomething worſe. For theſe cannot be ſeparated (as was ſhewn) without a Contradiction. God therefore is no more impotent becauſe he cannot remove theſe Evils from things while the things themſelves remain, than becauſe he cannot ſeparate an Equality of the Radij from a Circle. The Conſequence then is falſe which charges God with Impotence becauſe he cannot remove Evils.

IX. Neither is that Aſſertion leſs falſe which attributes it to Envy that he will not. For he that always wills the beſt, and the leaſt of many Evils, is abſolutely Good, and the fartheſt from Envy: and we have ſhewn that this is the Caſe with reſpect to God. If a Perſon

God always chooſes the leaſt of Evils, and therefore is not envious.

NOTES.

" very good reaſon, becauſe he ſhould have " taken away the Good at the ſame time, and " becauſe he ſhould have taken away more " Good than Evil †."

The Anſwer of Lactantius *is as follows.* " Deus poteſt quicquid volet, & imbecillitas vel " invidia in Deo nulla eſt: poteſt igitur mala tollere, ſed non vult, nec ideo tamen invidus eſt, id circo enim non tollit quia ſapientiam (ſicut edocui) ſimul tribuit, & plus " eſt boni ac jucunditatis in ſapientia, quam " in malis moleſtiæ; ſapientia enim facit ut etiam Deum cognoſcamus & per eam " cognitionem, immortalitatem aſſequamur, " quod eſt ſummum Bonum. Itaque niſi prius malum agnoverimus, nec poterimus agnoſcere Bonum, ſed hoc non videt *Epicurus*, nec alius quiſquam, ſi tollantur mala " tolli pariter Sapientiam, nec ulla in homine remanere virtutis veſtigia, cujus ratio " in ſuſtinenda & ſuperanda malorum acerbitate conſiſtit. Itaque propter exiguum compendium ſublatorum malorum, maximo & " vero & proprio nobis bono careremus.

† *Remarques*, p. 488.

Perſon had his Choice either to aboliſh or not to aboliſh Evil, he would be malicious if he did not aboliſh it. But when the choice is between this and a greater Evil, he that chooſes the leſs is far from being malicious. The Divine Goodneſs therefore reduces God to this Difficulty, that he muſt chooſe to make either no Creature at all, or an imperfect one; either no ſuch thing as Matter and Motion, or tolerate Contrariety and Corruption in things; either no free Agent, or admit a Power of ſinning. He muſt neceſſarily have choſen one of theſe, and 'tis eaſy to ſay whether of them was more directly oppoſite to Envy.

God could neither be conceiv'd to be infinitely powerful, if he were not able to create imperfect Beings, *i. e.* Creatures, or things that are contrary to each other; *i. e.* Evils: nor infinitely Good, if he had been contented in himſelf, and deny'd Exiſtence to every thing elſe

X. To ſpeak my Thoughts, I dare confidently, but with Reverence, pronounce, that God would neither have been infinitely powerful nor good, if he could not have made any thing which we call Evil. For there are ſome things poſſible which are not conſiſtent with each other, nay are repugnant and mutually deſtructive, *i. e.* are Evils to each other: If God were unable to produce any of theſe, how would he be infinitely powerful, ſince he could not do all that is poſſible? Nor would it be leſs injurious to his Goodneſs to be unwilling, for by this means his Power muſt lie idle and never effect any thing at all; ſince nothing can be ſimply Good and exempt from all manner of Evil, but God himſelf. If therefore the Divine Goodneſs had deny'd Exiſtence to created Beings, on account of the concomitant Evils, he might really have been eſteemed Envious, ſince he had allow'd none to exiſt beſide himſelf, and while he refuſed to admit of any kind of Evil, he would have rejected all the Good. Thus vaniſhes this *Herculean* Argument, which induced the *Epicureans* to diſcard the good Deity, and the *Manichæans* to ſubſtitute an Evil one.

Epicurus therefore is deceiv'd who endeavours to attribute impotence and Envy to the Deity, when he ought to have inferr'd the higheſt Power and Goodneſs.

XI. *Epicurus* then is both a Deceiver and deceived himſelf, when from the preſent Evils he concludes againſt the Omnipotence and Goodneſs of the Deity. Whereas on the contrary God would neither have been powerful nor Good if he had not tolerated Evils. From a competition or (if we may be allow'd the expreſſion) a *Conflict of two Infinites*, i. e. Omnipotence and Goodneſs, Evils neceſſarily

ceſſarily ariſe. Theſe Attributes amicably conſpire together, and yet reſtrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Oppoſition between them, whereof the Evils in Nature bear the Shadow and Reſemblance. Here then, and no where elſe, may we find the Primary and moſt certain Riſe and Origin of Evils; and here only muſt we look for that celebrated Principle of the Antients

Νεῖκος ἐλόμενον καὶ δῆρις ἀιματόεσσα.

The Peſtilential Strife and Bloody Fight.

Empedocles.

APPEN-

APPENDIX:

Concerning the Divine Laws.

Why God made Laws when he knew that they would not be obſerv'd.

The Divine Laws are either natural or poſitive

I. THE Divine Laws are either thoſe which God has implanted in the Nature of every Being, or thoſe which he has publiſh'd to Mankind in a particular manner, by certain *Meſſengers* choſen and ſent for this Purpoſe. For ſince a *Law is the Will of a ſuperior ſufficiently promulg'd to an Inferior, and attended with the Hope or Fear of Reward or Puniſhment:* 'tis plain that God may be conceiv'd to have made this Declaration of his Will to his Creatures two Ways: Firſt, by giving them ſuch a Nature as requires that ſome things be done, and others avoided, in order to its Preſervation: thoſe things which are made known to us in this manner, are commanded or forbidden, we ſay, by the Law of Nature: and that Law which thus diſcovers itſelf to our Underſtanding

derſtanding we look upon as the Will of God promulg'd to his Creatures: For we are very certain that God, according to his Goodneſs, wills the Good and Preſervation of all things which he himſelf has made, as far as is poſſible: and conſequently hates any thing that is hurtful to the Creature.

II. Now it muſt be obſerv'd that theſe natural Laws are either *Univerſal* or *Particular*; and 'tis fit the particular ones ſhould give way to the more Univerſal, and thoſe of leſs Moment to the more important. For inſtance, 'tis of the Nature of Body that it be capable of Motion, that it be ſtopp'd and broken in Pieces by meeting with others in Motion, and this is the *Univerſal Law* of Bodies. But it is of the Nature of an Animal to preſerve itſelf, and uſe its utmoſt Endeavour that the Parts of its Body be not ſeparated or diſſolv'd, and this is the *particular Law* of Animals.

Particular Laws ought to give place to more general ones, ſince all kind of Repugnancy could not be avoided.

Now ſince theſe Laws are ſometimes inconſiſtent, it is reaſonable that the latter, as being a particular one, and of leſs Conſequence, ſhould yield to the former: and this is evidently the Will of God. If it be aſk'd, Why did God make Laws which in ſome reſpect interfere with one another? I anſwer, as before, That this could not be avoided without a greater Evil: Since therefore of two Evils the leſs is to be choſen, God will'd that particular Laws, and thoſe of leſs conſequence, ſhould give place to the more Univerſal and thoſe of greater Importance, rather than remove that Inconſiſtency, for there ariſes leſs Inconvenience to Nature from thence.

III. The ſame muſt be ſaid of thoſe Laws which relate to Morality. 'Tis the Univerſal Law of Free Agents, that they ſhall pleaſe themſelves by Election, but there are ſome things eligible which may be prejudicial to ſome particular Beings. Now it is better, as was ſaid before, that Particulars be injur'd, than that the Univerſal Law of Free Agents be violated. We muſt ſuppoſe then that God willed this as the leſs Evil of the two. Men are permitted therefore to abuſe their Free-Will, and it is neceſſary that God ſhould tolerate either this Inconvenience or a greater. But it is not at all neceſſary that Man ſhould make an Evil Choice; therefore he alone is faulty; for it proceeds from his Act that God is reduced to a neceſſity of chooſing the leaſt among many Evils.

The ſame muſt be ſaid of thoſe Laws which relate to the moral World.

IV. From

Why God is ſaid to be angry with Sinners, ſince his Will is always done.

IV. From hence it appears that all the Laws of Nature are always obſerv'd according to the Will and Intent of God. For he will'd that the Particular ſhould give place to the General ones, and that Man ſhould ſin rather than be driven from Sin by force. You'll ſay, Why then is he angry at Sinners, ſince nothing is done againſt his Will? I anſwer: When Anger is attributed to God, 'tis *after the manner of Men* †; whereas it is order'd and effected by the very Nature and Conſtitution of things, that whoever does any thing in oppoſition to any Law of Nature, tho' it be a particular one, ſhall bring ſome Inconvenience upon himſelf. By which contrivance God has taken care that the very leaſt Law ſhould not be violated raſhly and without Neceſſity. When an Offender therefore, who willingly breaks a particular Law, brings certain Miſery upon himſelf, God who wiſely coupled theſe together is ſaid to be *angry:* Becauſe a Man in Anger would not take any other or more effectual Revenge on the Perſon that provok'd him; and the Evil which naturally attends a bad Election, is to be eſteem'd a Puniſhment inflicted as it were by an Angry God.

God may alter or add to the Laws of Nature, and give us aſſurance that he intends to do ſo; hence the origin of poſitive Laws, and a Revelation.

V. As to the ſecond ſort of Divine Laws, *viz.* the *Poſitive*; 'tis certain, that God, who is the Author of Nature and eſtabliſh'd the Laws of it, can either alter them or add to them when he ſees it proper. Neither does he want Means whenever he pleaſes, to aſſure Mankind that he will do it. When therefore we find any Alteration in the Laws of Nature, we may from hence conclude that God demands our Attention. And hereupon we eſteem the Promulgation of a new Law recommended to us by this Token, to be an authentic Declaration of the Will of God. In this manner were the *Moſaic* and *Evangelic* Laws eſtabliſhed; *viz.* by *Miracles.*

Laws are the means of informing Free-Agents of what is uſeful or prejudicial to them

VI. But it is uſually aſk'd, Why did God eſtabliſh and promulge thoſe Laws which he knew Men would not obſerve? It muſt be anſwer'd, That theſe Laws are Means of acquainting Free Agents with what is expedient for them, and of moving them to the choice of

† *See* Chap. 1. § 3. par. 10. *and* Note E.

of it. Neither does their Nature admit of any that are more efficacious: for it is ſuch as muſt be perſuaded and not compell'd. Notwithſtanding therefore God knew that his Laws would not be obſerv'd by all, yet he propoſes them to all, for by this Means a great many learn their true Intereſt, thankfully embrace the Laws and obey them; and the reſt are no worſe for them, ſince they would be involv'd in the ſame Evils which they feel from the Sanction of the Laws, and perhaps greater, tho' theſe Laws had never been. (111.) But

NOTES.

(111.) 'Tis a very uſeful Obſervation which our Author makes in this place, and illuſtrates in the following Section, par. 3. *viz.* that the Divine Laws (eſpecially thoſe of the *Chriſtian* Diſpenſation) are chiefly *Declarations* of the natural and neceſſary Effects of Sin, or *Directions* and *Means* to avoid them; which neceſſary Effects are conceived to be the real *Sanction* of theſe Laws. Conſequently theſe Laws cannot properly bring us into a worſe State than we ſhould have been in without them.——They do not introduce a new Train of arbitrary and additional Evils, but on the contrary are deſign'd in pure Goodneſs to leſſen the Number of the old ones,—to forewarn us of the natural Conſequences of our own Acts and Habits, and prevent thoſe Moral Evils to which we are expoſed by the very conſtitution of our Being,—which the univerſal Law of Liberty makes it poſſible for us to incur, and impoſſible for God to hinder, by any other means, as has been ſhewn above. Farther; this Notion, that moſt of the Miſery both in this World and the next, is the *neceſſary Conſequence* of ſinful Actions, according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, rather than any poſitive Puniſhment immediately inflicted by the Deity, will, I am apt to think, have the greateſt Influence on moſt Men to deter them from ſuch Actions. I am ſure I find myſelf more deeply affected with this Reflection, that Miſery will follow of Courſe upon ſome certain Practices, and that by indulging them, I naturally and neceſſarily deſtroy myſelf, than I ſhould be by a Proſpect of the very ſame Degree of Pain threatned as a Puniſhment for ſuch Practices. And the Reaſon of this is evident: I am apt ſtill to hope that the latter may poſſibly be remitted: but the former leaves no room for Hope. Again, A due attention to this Doctrine, that all our moral Happineſs in this World muſt be of our own making, and that diſordered, evil Affections, irregular and perverſe Habits, *&c.* will conſtitute the greateſt part of our *Hell* in the next, (which might be ſhewn in the ſame manner as was hinted concerning virtuous Habits, in Note 103. but is render'd unneceſſary by the Authors there mention'd.) This Doctrine, I ſay, if rightly underſtood and apply'd, would diſcover the weakneſs of all ſuch pretences to Salvation as are built upon the bare Belief of a Confidence in what any other has done or can do for us; or even of what we do ourſelves purely by way of *Opus operatum.* i. e. as ultimately relying on the bare Diſcharge of or ny Duty, and not uſing and applying it as a means to ſome farther End, v. g. on *Prayer*, as the mere Labour of the Lips, on the *Sacrament* as a Charm, on *Repentance* as a ſimple Act entitling us to Happineſs, *&c.* In ſhort, of any thing which does not enter the Heart and improve the Temper. If Heaven be not ſo much the *Reward* of Religion, as the *natural*

granting that ſome who tranſgreſs the Laws meet with greater and more Inconveniencies than they would have done without them, 'tis better that ſome ſhould ſuffer Inconveniencies thro' their own fault, than that all ſhould be deprived of the Benefit of the Divine Laws; God therefore, out of infinite Goodneſs, which is always inclined to the beſt, promulg'd thoſe Laws which he knew all Men would not obſerve.

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tural Conſequence of a Religious Frame of Mind, and *vice verſa*; then how abſurd is it for us who are aſpiring after that State, to ſtop by the way, to reſt in any particular Acts of Religion as arbitrary Inſtitutions procuring, and as it were *purchaſing* it for us, inſtead of uſing them as, what they really are, fit Inſtruments to *work out* our Salvation, by *producing* this frame of Mind in us, as proper Helps and Aſſiſtances enabling us to *acquire* this Heavenly Temper? And on the other Side, how vain muſt be our Hopes of eſcaping Hell by any ſuch Methods as theſe, if we ſtill carry our Hell within us. See par. 11. of the following Section.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Concerning Divine Rewards and Puniſhments.

I. IT was proper to ſay ſomething concerning theſe, ſince Puniſhment is a natural Evil, *viz.* Pain, Diſappointment of Appetite, or Damage annex'd to a wrong Choice, by a Foreſight whereof we might be deterr'd from making a wrong Choice. In theſe conſiſts the Power and Efficacy of Laws, nor would they be of any force without them. Now Good or Evil, *i. e.* Rewards and Puniſhments, may be annex'd, either by Nature, or by Laws of poſitive Inſtitution.

Puniſhment is a natural Evil connected with a depraved Choice.

II. As to *Nature*, all Evil is prejudicial to it, *i. e.* interrupts its Courſe: Evil therefore proceeds from ſome Violence done to Nature, and that which offers Violence muſt neceſſarily ſuffer it; for every natural Action has Re-action join'd with it. According to the Laws of Mechaniſm then Evil done to another is for the moſt part repair'd with Evil to the Doer, *i. e.* with Puniſhment. By which piece of Machinery or Contrivance, God has manifeſted both his Wiſdom and Goodneſs. For by this means he has taken effectual Care that none ſhould tranſgreſs the Laws of Nature without Puniſhment, or offer unneceſſary Violence to the Appetites of others; or if it were neceſſary to offer it, yet that it ſhould not be without ſome Inconvenience to him that does offer it. For it is better that a Creature ſhould be able to provide for its own Safety with ſome Inconveniencies,

Evil is violence done to Nature; but every natural Action has re-action correſpondent to it: therefore he that does Violence muſt neceſſarily ſuffer Violence, that none may ſin without Puniſhment.

conveniencies, than that it ſhould be at Liberty to offer needleſs Violence to others, and the Laws belonging to their particular Nature be broken to no manner of end: For by that means there would be more Evils in Nature than there are at preſent, and they would be multiply'd unneceſſarily. Hence it appears how worthy it is of God to have framed the Nature of things in ſuch a manner, that from the very Conſtitution of them, the Intemperate, Injurious, the Thief, Robber, Adulterer, Proud, Envious, *&c.* ſhould have ſomething to dread. If any one aſk, why there are not ſuch Puniſhments as might effectually imprint a lively ſenſe upon our Minds, and thereby totally reſtrain us from a wrong Choice? I anſwer: A greater Evil muſt not be done on account of a leſs; but if the Puniſhments and Dread of them were increas'd to ſuch a Degree, as to be ſufficient to prevent all kind of Evil, they themſelves would be the greateſt of all Evils, and the dread of them would more deeply affect, and be a greater Affliction to the Minds of Men, even of thoſe who would not do amiſs, than the Evils themſelves are, for the Prevention of which theſe Puniſhments are propoſed by God. It was therefore fit that there ſhould be ſome meaſure in Puniſhments; *viz.* leſt by being always preſent to the Minds of Mortals, they ſhould prove a greater Prejudice to our Eaſe and Happineſs, than thoſe very Evils which are prohibited under the Penalty of them would be, were we forced to undergo them.

Poſitive Laws acquaint us with the Puniſhments which attend deprav'd Elections from the Nature of the thing, rather than inflict new ones.

III. As to the Puniſhments which God has affix'd by way of *Sanction to poſitive Laws*, we muſt affirm, that they are to be eſteem'd as Admonitions and Notices of the Miſchiefs conſequent upon evil Elections, rather than that God himſelf will immediately inflict them. Natural Conſcience is for the moſt part ſufficiently able to inform us what is Good and what is Evil: but it was impoſſible for Nature to acquaint us with all the Conſequences which attend our Actions in an infinite Train and Continuance of things. Now, leſt we ſhould be involv'd in Evils unawares, and contrary to our Expectations, God has inform'd us by poſitive Laws what our Condition muſt be if we will indulge ourſelves in Evil Elections. And has promulg'd them by way of *Puniſhments* denounc'd, rather than by ſimple *Prediction* that

that they might enter more deeply into our Minds, and oblige us to take care of ourſelves.

IV. But if there be any thing which is not reducible to this head, and ſeems to prove an *immediate Infliction* by the Deity, neither is that done without Reaſon. For it is fit that God ſhould remove that Being out of the World which cannot be made conſiſtent with the Good of the Univerſe: and reform that by Chaſtiſement which would otherwiſe, thro' its irregular Motion, prove offenſive to the Author, and all about it. Puniſhments then are annex'd to Evil Elections, in order to *prevent* them, and inflicted to *correct* and *amend* the Offenders, or to *deter* others from the like Offences. If therefore the Appointment and Infliction of Puniſhments prevent greater Evils than they are themſelves; it follows that God has choſen the better Part in eſtabliſhing and exacting them.

That the decreeing and inflicting Puniſhments prevents greater Evil:

V. It may be aſk'd, how this can agree with the Puniſhments of the Wicked, which the *Chriſtian Religion* declares to be *Eternal*. For in the firſt place, 'tis plain that they are not inflicted either to reform the Guilty (for there is no room for Reformation in Hell) or to deter others from the like Guilt: for Sin will be at an end, and the very poſſibility of ſinning taken away before they ſhall be inflicted. They can neither be of uſe to the Dead therefore, nor to the Living; for they are kept ſecret while they might be of any uſe. Conſequently there ſeems to be ſome other end of theſe Puniſhments, *viz.* to make Satisfaction to the Divine *Vengeance* for the Injury and Affront offer'd to his Majeſty.

'Tis ask'd in the firſt place, how this can be reconcil'd with eternal Puniſhments, which don't ſeem capable either of reforming the puniſhed, or of being a warning to others.

VI. Secondly, Theſe Eternal Torments appear to be not very agreeable to the Divine OEconomy in another reſpect. For it is to be obſerv'd that God has framed all things, and diſpoſed them in ſuch a manner, that nothing can repent of its having been made by him: for when it is come to this, that its Miſery exceeds its Pleaſure, the Being periſhes, and is withdrawn from both. Not to *exiſt* therefore, or not to perceive any means of Relief, is the very worſt Condition, as was ſhewn before†. A violent Object not only deſtroys the

'Tis ask'd in the ſecond place, how Puniſhments can be eternal, ſince it is agreeable to Goodneſs, to have created all things in ſuch a manner that nothing might repent of its being created.

† Ch. 4. § 8. par. 5.

the Senſory, but takes away the Senſe itſelf; the Divine Goodneſs providing that no Creature ſhould be worſe by its Exiſtence than if it had not exiſted. And as far as appears, thinking Beings ought to be dealt with after the ſame manner, *viz.* When Pain, Sorrow, Fear, Anxiety, and the reſt of the Paſſions and Affections increaſe to ſo great a Degree that the Mind receives more Evil than Good from the Senſe of its Exiſtence, 'tis reaſonable that the Exceſs of theſe ſhould extinguiſh Thought itſelf, as the Exceſs of bodily Pains deſtroys the Senſe: Otherwiſe theſe miſerable Beings ſeem to receive no Benefit from God, ſince Providence has reduced them to a State worſe than that *Non-exiſtence* in which it found them*. Neither does it ſeem a ſufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodneſs, to ſay, that this befalls them thro' their own Fault, for it is hardly agreeable to Goodneſs to have placed any Being in that State which was obnoxious to ſuch exceſſive Miſery: For who would chooſe Exiſtence attended with a danger that ſo very much overballances it? He is not a wiſe Man that expoſes all his Eſtate to hazard, nor a good Man that obliges any one to do it.

'Tis ask'd, thirdly, how Puniſhments can ſubſiſt without a natural cauſe.

VII. 3*dly.* Whatever is perpetual muſt have a *natural* and *perpetual Cauſe*; for a perpetual Miracle is not to be expected. If therefore the Puniſhments of the Wicked be eternal, it ſeems neceſſary for theſe Puniſhments to ariſe from the Laws and Conſtitution of Nature. For it is ſcarce conceivable how a State of Violence ſhould be perpetual. I have propoſed theſe Objections at length, leſt I ſhould ſeem to have declined them on account of their Difficulty, (112.)

VIII. As

NOTES.

(112.) The chief of thoſe Authors who ſeem to oppoſe the ſtrict, abſolute Eternity of Hell-Torments, are A-Bp. *Tillotſon*, *T. Burnet*, *de Statu Mort.* Ch. 10. p. 290, *&c.* *T. Swinden* in the *Appendix* to his Book on Hell. The Author of the Annotations on *Lux Orientalis*, p. 73, 74 *S. Collier* in his *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 105, *&c.* and his *Eſſay on Reveal'd Religion*, p. 142, *&c.* *Whitby* Appendix to the 2d *Theſſ.* *Bayle*, *Epiſcopius*, and the *Fratres Poloni*. See alſo *Fabricii Delectus Argumentorum*, *&c.* C. 47. p. 720. concerning ſome Pieces in the *Phenix*, &c.

Some of thoſe who have particularly inſiſted on the Defence of it are A-Bp. *Dawes*, *Jenkin*, *Fiddes*, *Lupton*, *Lake*, *Sherlock* on *Providence*, Ch. 2. and Diſcourſe concerning the Happineſs of good Men and Puniſhment of the

* *See* Matth. 26. 24. *and* Mark 14. 21.

VIII. As to the firſt Objection, I anſwer: It appears from the Light of Nature, that there ſhall be *future Puniſhments* but not that theſe ſhall be *Eternal*; we muſt not therefore enquire of Natural Reaſon why they are inflicted; for they belong to reveal'd Religion, by which they are denounced: that is, there may be a Reaſon for them, but ſuch as is beyond the mere natural Sagacity of Man to diſcover. Now we find many things of this kind in Nature; it does not therefore follow, becauſe the Goodneſs of God has reveal'd to us that the Puniſhment of the Wicked ſhall endure for ever, that he is alſo obliged to reveal why and how that comes to paſs. For perhaps it may be above the Power of our Mind to conceive it in the preſent ſtate of Things.

To the firſt 'tis anſw r'd, that eternal Puniſhments are made known to us by Revelation, and that God is not therefore oblig'd to reveal how or why they are ſo: for perhaps the Reaſon is above our Comprehenſion.

IX. Secondly, Who will undertake to ſhew that the Eternal Puniſhment of the Wicked has no Tendency towards confirming good Men in the Choice of their Duty? (113.) If God make uſe of *Means* for that End, and do not immediately exert his Omnipotence alone, ſcarce could any other more effectual means be found out to make the Bleſſed approve themſelves in their Choice conformed to the Divine Will, and perſevere therein, than the continual Contemplation of thoſe miſerable Beings who have done otherwiſe. Election is matter of Freedom, and not to be excited or prevented by other means than a Repre-

It does not appear but that the Puniſhments of the Wicked may be of uſe to the Good.

NOTES.

the Wicked, *&c. Rymer*, Part 1ſt. Chap. 7. *Nichol's Conference with a Theiſt*, Part 3. p. 309, &c. *Scott's Chriſtian Life*, vol. 5, p. 91, *&c.* 8*vo.* and Diſcourſe 22d. p. 435, *&c.* 2d vol: of his Works, Fol. *Patrick, Witneſſes of Chriſtianity*, Part 2d. *Bates* on *the Exiſtence of God, &c.* Ch. 12.

(113.) See A-Bp. *Dawes's* Serm. 5. p. 73, *&c.* or Note 108. Or it may be for the perpetual Benefit and Improvement of ſome other Syſtems; ſee the latter end of Note 106. Or perhaps for a ſtanding Monument and Warning to the Heathen World during their State of Probation, which, for ought we know, may be extended beyond this Life, tho' we Chriſtians have no reaſon to expect any farther Tryal.

See *Scott's Chriſtian Life*, 8*vo.* 2d Vol. p. 351.

Something of this kind, I humbly apprehend, muſt be conceiv'd as the Reaſon for Hell-Torments, in order to make them conſiſtent with perfect Goodneſs †, whatever we ſuppoſe the Nature of theſe Torments to be; of which below.

† *See* Note 23.

a Repreſentation of *Good* or *Evil* to the Underſtanding. Since therefore God has undertaken to conduct and preſerve an almoſt infinite Multitude of thinking Beings to all Eternity, thro' all the Changes and Succeſſions of things, in as great a degree of Happineſs as poſſible, without Violence done to Elections; where is the Wonder if he leave a few to the Miſery which they brought upon themſelves, thereby to give the reſt a Warning how much they ought to ſtand upon their guard againſt the like? There's no neceſſity therefore to attribute eternal Puniſhment to the Divine *Vengeance* (nor is there properly any ſuch thing in God, but it is aſcribed to him, as other human Paſſions are in condeſcention to our Capacity.) For ſince theſe Puniſhments may be conceiv'd to promote the good of the whole, they may ariſe from the *Goodneſs*, and not the *Vengeance* of the Deity.

To the ſecond 'tis reply'd, that the matter is yet in debate whether it is preferable to be miſerable or not to be at all. The Miſery of the Damned may be like that of Mad-men

X. As to the ſecond Objection, The Matter is yet in debate, whether it were better to be miſerable than not to be at all, and there are Arguments on both Sides. (114.) 'Tis manifeſt, that what the Objection mentions, *viz.* thoſe Evils which overballance the Deſire and Happineſs of Life, put an end to Life itſelf, and that ſuch Objects as are hurtful to the Senſe at length deſtroy it. The ſame ſeems to hold good in thinking Subſtances, *viz.* thoſe things which affect the Mind to a higher Degree than it is able to bear, may in like manner put an end to it. For they may be ſuppoſed either to drive us to Madneſs, or ſo far to diſorder the thinking Faculty, as to make us think of nothing at all. Who can tell then whether the Puniſhment of the Wicked may not lead them into a kind of Phrenſie and Madneſs; Thus they may indeed be very miſerable, and become a ſad Spectacle to others; they may be ſenſible of their Miſery alſo, and ſtrive againſt it

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(114.) A moſt elaborate Diſputation on this Subject may be ſeen in Bp. *Barlow*'s Remains, p. 470, *&c.* But our Author, in the laſt Subſect. of his Book, par. 5, *&c.* very reaſonably grants, *That Non exiſtence becomes preferable to Exiſtence whenever the Sum of Miſery exceeds that of Happineſs, and Evil becomes predominant in the whole*; and therefore, if he takes this Queſtion in the ſame Senſe, he had no great occaſion to ſtart it. Nay the Queſtion will be about an abſolute *Impoſſibility*, if any Miſery which overballances the Happineſs of Life do *ipſo facto* put an end to Life, as our Author maintains in this very Paragraph: Concerning which Notion ſee Note 55.

it with all their Power but while they don't obſerve or believe that it is founded in perverſe Election, they may hug themſelves in the Cauſe the Effects whereof they abhor; being ſtill wiſe in their own Opinion, and as it were pleaſing themſelves in their Miſery.

Thus, the more they labour under it, the more they embrace the Cauſe of it, and thereby become their own hindrance from ever getting free; and will not ſuffer themſelves to be any thing but what they are. This we ſee done daily by mad and frantic Perſons, and reckon it a part of their Unhappineſs. The Divine Goodneſs therefore is not to be charg'd with Cruelty for letting them continue in that Exiſtence, tho' it be very miſerable, when they themſelves will not have it remov'd: or for not altering their Condition, which they utterly refuſe to have alter'd. 'Tis better for them indeed not to be than to be; but only in the Opinion of wiſe Men, to which they do not aſſent. For they indulge themſelves in their obſtinate Election, and tho' every way ſurrounded and oppreſſed with Woes, yet will they not alter what they have once embraced. We have frequent examples in this Life reſembling this kind of Obſtinacy.

XI. We ſee perverſe People voluntarily undergoing Pains, Afflictions, Torments, and even Death itſelf, rather than repent of their Reſolution and change what they have once determin'd in their Mind. Nor is it uncommon for ſome to indulge, and in a manner *pleaſe* themſelves in their very Miſeries. Thus the ſorrowful love all ſuch things as aggravate and foment their Grief: and in like manner the Envious, the Angry, the Ambitious, the Deſpairing: not that they are inſenſible of Uneaſineſs under theſe Paſſions, or don't believe themſelves to be miſerable; but becauſe they had rather have that Miſery ſo long as they enjoy their Choice, than want it and them too; or at leaſt they can perſiſt in it, becauſe they do not obſerve that this Miſery ariſes from thence. When therefore the Wicked obſtinately oppoſe themſelves to God, and refuſe to make their Elections conformable to his Will, they take delight perhaps in that very Oppoſition: to hate God, to diſobey his Commands, and ſtrive againſt him with all their Power, is pleaſing to them; and tho' they ſee themſelves overwhelm'd with innumerable Evils, yet they had rather endure them all than repent. As Men that are deſperately in Love, ambitious, envious, chooſe to bear Torments, loſs of Eſtate, and hazard of Life, rather

The Damned chooſe their miſerable State, as Lovers, angry, ambitious, envious Perſons indulge themſelves in thoſe things which increaſe their Miſery.

rather than lay aſide theſe fooliſh and bewitching Affections. We may eaſily conceive then how the Wicked in Hell may be in very great Miſery upon the increaſe of their Obſtinacy and Folly, and yet unwilling to be freed from them. All ſee and exclaim againſt the Folly, Miſery, and Madneſs of thoſe Men who ſpend their Eſtate in Vice, impair their Health, and bring on an untimely Death; who involve themſelves in Labours, Dangers, Deaths; and for no other end but becauſe they will do ſo: yet they perſiſt in this, and their Obſtinacy increaſes with their Evils. Theſe are ſome *Preludes* of the Miſery of the Damned, and from hence we may underſtand that theſe Perſons are extremely miſerable, and yet will not be ſet at Liberty. (115.)

It may be objected, that theſe miſerable Beings may receive ſome kind of *Pleaſure* from their *Elections*. But we place Felicity not barely in the *Act* of *chooſing*, but much more in the *Enjoyment* of the Objects choſen. The more obſtinately therefore any one chooſes abſurd and impoſſible things, the more miſerable will he be when fruſtrated of

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(115.) From hence likewiſe we may underſtand what a natural, abſolute, and indiſpenſible Neceſſity there is for watching over all our *Habits*, *Affections*, *Appetites*, &c. for curbing our Paſſions, and correcting our Deſires by *Reaſon*; for taking a ſtrict and conſtant care that theſe be neither violent, irregular, nor fix'd on improper Objects in this Life, if we hope to avoid Miſery in the Life to come. For if theſe accompany us into the other World, (and if we conſider what *Scott* and *Rymer* have ſaid on the Subject, it will appear infinitely probable that they do) the ſame or greater Unhappineſs muſt unavoidably attend them there. If we ſhall have any Memory in the other World of what paſs'd in this (which we muſt have, in order to give us either a good or evil *Conſcience*, and to make us capable of Reward or Puniſhment in that reſpect) how probable is it that we ſhall then alſo feel the force of all thoſe *Habits* and *Aſſociations* which in this Life were ſo ſtrong as to raiſe Paſſions, Affections, &c. in us, and make us conſtantly proceed upon them for ſelf-evident Principles, and purſue them for ultimate *Ends* of Action, as appear'd from the *Preliminary Diſſertation?* " And this being ſo, of what unſpeakable conſequence are the Actions of Men, that thus " draw after them a Chain of Joys or Woes, " as long as Eternity? And how careful " ought we to be to what courſe of Life we " determine ourſelves, conſidering that our " *Eternal* Fate depends upon what we are " now doing, that every moral Action we " perform is a Step *Heaven* or *Hell-wards*, that " in every bad Choice we make, we are planting our *Tophet*, or our *Paradiſe*, and that " in the Conſequents of our preſent Actions " we ſhall *rue* or *rejoyce* to eternal Ages? " *Scott*, 2d vol, p. 26. See alſo 4th vol. Ch. " 6, p. 692, &c. Fol. Edit, or *Hutcheſon* on the Conduct of the Paſſions and Affections, §. 4, and 6. or Note 103, 111, 116. and par. 14, 15 of this Sect.

of his Choice; and we may imagine the damned to be always *fruſtrated*: nevertheleſs, after ſo much Warning and Experience, they don't intend to alter their Elections, but ſtill perſiſt in them, oppreſſed with the Senſe and Weight of their Miſery, and plung'd in deep deſpair. For it is poſſible that they may be regardleſs or ignorant that there is no other Way for them to be freed from theſe Miſeries, but by altering their Elections, and not know how to do this, ſo as to perſiſt in them for ever, and become more deſperate by Diſappointments, and to augment and multiply their Miſery by new Attempts, which prove no leſs unhappy. The Power of willing the State they are in is not therefore of any Service to them towards the Attainment of Happineſs, but renders them capable of Eternal Miſery. For ſuch Election may have the ſame Relation to this kind of Miſery, as the natural Appetites have to Pain.

XII. Now it is ſufficiently conſonant to the Divine Goodneſs to permit or inflict this kind of Puniſhment, nor would it be leſs ſubſervient to the Ends for which Puniſhments are wont to be impoſed, *viz.* that by a previous Apprehenſion of them we may learn to be wiſe, and others be deterr'd from offending by our Example. For who does not dread Fury and Madneſs as the moſt miſerable ſtate of Mind? Who does not condemn the Folly and Madneſs of Men in Love, of envious and ambitious Perſons? Eſpecially when he beholds them labouring thereby under innumerable Evils, from which they will not be delivered?

Such Puniſhment is very great, and very well anſwers the End of Divine Puniſhments

XIII. But allowing that Exiſtence is worſe than Non-exiſtence to the Damned, let them imagine their Miſery to be greater than it really is. Let it be a part of their Miſery, to be conſcious that they were the only Cauſe of all their Grief: yet ſince that could not be prevented without greater detriment to the whole, there's no room for objecting againſt Providence which always does the beſt. If God had made nothing at all, and been contented to have remain'd alone, there would have been nothing that could ſin, that could chooſe amiſs, that could be miſerable. But ſince it is impoſſible that there ſhould be more *Gods*, the Deity made *Creatures* ſuch as the Nature of a Created Being allow'd. Now it was expedient, for the Good of the whole, that ſome of theſe ſhould have a Power of bringing Miſery upon themſelves by evil Election. Nor can any thing be charg'd

God ought to prefer the common Salvation to that of particulars

charg'd upon the Goodneſs of God in this, unleſs that he created *Men*, and not *Gods* equal to himſelf; and that he preferr'd the Salvation of the *Generality* to that of ſome *Particulars*. He choſe therefore that ſome ſhould regret their having been made by God, *viz.* thro' the abuſe of their Free-Will, rather than that none ſhould be happy by uſing it aright.

Anſwer to the third Objection. 'Tis probable that the Miſery of the Wicked ariſes from the very Nature of Sin.

XIV. As to the third Objection, I believe it to be a great Truth that the Miſery of the Wicked ariſes from the very Conſtitution of the Sinner, and that the Laws of Nature hold in evil Elections. We ſee that our Bodies may be maim'd for ever, and our Limbs diſlocated and diſtorted to ſuch a degree as to become totally incapable of thoſe Functions for which Nature deſign'd them. Why ſhould we not have the ſame Opinion of the Mind, *viz.* that by depraved Elections, Paſſions, and Affections, it may be ſo far diverted from the right way of thinking, as to become equally diſabled and unfit for governing its Actions according to the Dictates of Right Reaſon, as a lame Man is for a Race? We may ſee every Day that right Notions of things are capable of being perverted by a perverſe Habit of thinking; and it is evident from Experience that we miſtake and are ignorant of uſeful things. We are wont to labour under Prejudices, and be averſe to ſober Counſels; in ſhort, we are willing to endure any thing rather than alter our Choice. 'Tis a common thing for us to pleaſe ourſelves in Dangers, in the Ruin of our Fortunes, in the Loſs of Eaſe, and Life itſelf; and our Volition, perverſe as it is, ſometimes appears more deſirable than Friends, Kingdoms, Pleaſures, or even Life. If therefore God does not interpoſe his Omnipotence, the ſame Errors, the ſame Ignorance, the ſame habits of a perverted Mind and obſtinate Propenſity to Evil, which here draw us aſide from the right Path, may continue with us for ever: nor will the Soul that is immers'd in this kind of Evil be capable of curing itſelf: For one that is infected with theſe Maladies, is as unfit to help himſelf, as one that has cut off his Hands and Feet is unable to run or feed himſelf. (116.)

XV. Secondly,

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(116.) This is the true Meaning of that *Macula Peccati* which always remains and ſets us at Enmity with God, and under a natural Incapacity of Happineſs, and ſeems to make it impoſſible

XV. Secondly, A Perſon of this Diſpoſition of Mind hates God, for he ſees that he has choſen ſuch things, in the Enjoyment whereof he places his Delight, as cannot be conſiſtent with the Divine Will. He therefore looks upon God as his Enemy, and conſequently avoids all Commerce with him, and endeavours to abſcond from him, but never thinks of changing his own Will: For thro' Error and Ignorance he knows not how to take delight in any thing elſe. Therefore he applies all his Endeavours to the Attainment of ſuch things as cannot really be attain'd, and ſtrives for ever in vain with a more powerful Being, *i. e. God*; nor ceaſes he from ſtruggling, tho' full of Miſery and Deſpair. For tho' he feels himſelf tormented with a moſt exquiſite Pain, yet he dreads a greater from the change of his Reſolution: he ſees Miſery invading him on each hand, and is forced either to oppoſe the Deity without any proſpect of Succeſs, or to give over the Conteſt, and lay aſide all Hopes of enjoying the Object of his Choice: He embraces the former, as the leſs Evil of the two, and yet a greater can ſcarce be deviſed. The perverſe Fool may be pleas'd with the very Conteſt, tho' it proves to no manner of purpoſe. In the interim God leaves ſuch an one to himſelf, who, by purſuing abſurd and impoſſible things, will become troubleſome to himſelf and others, aſſaulting ſome, and being attack'd by others like himſelf. We ſee in this World how much bad Men delight in heaping Miſery on others, and who are therefore bad Men becauſe they take delight in Miſchief. The Servant of

The Wicked, thro' Ignorance and Error, will delight in ſuch things as they cannot enjoy, and may not know how to take delight in any thing elſe.

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poſſible for future Puniſhments to have any other Period than the total Extinction or Annihilation of the Subjects of them: and what Ground there can be to hope for that may be ſeen from the Authors referr'd to in Note 12.

Our Author, in the following Paragraph, explains how this *Macula* may be conceiv'd to render God and good Men our Averſion, and 'tis eaſy to apprehend how utterly incapable of Happineſs that Man muſt be, whoſe whole Soul is bent another way; whoſe every Motion, Thought, and Inclination; whoſe Deſigns, Deſires, and Hopes, are all fix'd and riveted to thoſe Objects which can never ſatisfy them, which are either quite different from, or contrary to the very Nature and Idea of true rational Happineſs. A view of the Conſequences attending each inveterate evil Habit, each ungovernable

of an abſurd Maſter is unhappy, and ſo is he who lives near a malevolent and moroſe Neighbour. Suppoſe then the Wicked who are baniſhed from God, and odious to all good Men, aſſociating together, and 'tis eaſy to conceive what kind of Society that of Reprobates and Devils muſt be, how grievous and offenſive to each other. We may obſerve how very pernicious a wicked Governor is in his Province, how miſerable they that are ſubject to ſuch: how much more wretched muſt the ſtate of the Wicked be, who are ſubjected to, and joined with none but mad, malicious, envious and froward Beings?

The Wicked are confin'd to certain places and Companions by the Laws of Nature, as we are to the Earth.

XVI. 'Tis to be believ'd that God has provided a place that is ſuitable and proper for them, and to which they are as much confined by the Laws of their Nature, as Fiſhes to the Sea, or terreſtrial Animals to the Earth. What ſort of a Place that is we know not, but it is reaſonable to believe that there is ſuch an one. Men in this Life chooſe for themſelves Habitations and Companions according to their ownGenius, Temper, and Diſpoſition of Mind: and likeneſs begets Love: and who can doubt but the ſame thing may attend the bad and good after Death? The Good reſort therefore to the Society of *God*, *Angels*, and *Spirits of Good Men*, but the Wicked chooſe thoſe *Ghoſts*, which were Partakers in their Iniquity, and *Devils* for their Companions: And this may poſſibly be brought about by natural Inſtinct, and mere human Diſpoſition. Nor is God wanting in Goodneſs if he ſuffers them to live in their own way, and enjoy

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vernable Paſſion, or Affection miſapply'd, will ſhew the abſurdity of ſuppoſing any Perſon in ſuch a Caſe to be happy even in Heaven itſelf *. But this important Doctrine of the force of *Habits*, *&c.* in this World, as well as the Continuance of them in the next, has been ſo well ſtated and inforced by the Authors referr'd to above, that an attempt to give any further Illuſtration of it ſeems impracticable. I ſhall therefore diſmiſs it with a Paſſage from the *Cauſes of the Decay of Chriſtian Piety*, Ch. 1. "Thoſe immaterial Felici-
"ties we expect, do naturally ſuggeſt to us
"the neceſſity of preparing our Appetites,
"and hungers for them, without which Hea-
"ven can be no Heaven to us: For ſince
"the Pleaſure of any thing reſults from the
"Agreement between it and the Deſire,
"what

* *See the* Spectator, N°. 90.

enjoy the Life themſelves have choſen. For this could not be prevented without doing Violence to the Laws of Nature. And theſe Puniſhments which the Wicked voluntarily bring upon themſelves, tend to the Benefit of the Univerſal Syſtem of Rational Beings.

XVII. So much for *Moral Evils*, *Laws*, *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*. In which ſome things may appear too ſubtle for common Apprehenſion; but we ought to remember that the Diſpute is concerning one of the niceſt things in Nature, *viz.* the Operations of our own Mind: and whatever is ſaid in order to explain theſe, muſt neceſſarily be ſubtle. On this Account the Art of *Logic* is call'd ſubtle, becauſe it has theſe for its Object, and any thing that is more ſubtle than ordinary, is reckon'd Logical. He that does not like any thing that is ſubtle therefore, ought not to diſpute about what relates to our own Minds. *Moral Evil* is as it were the Diſtemper of our Minds ariſing from the irregular Motion of the cogitative Faculties; now, as 'tis difficult to diſcover the Cauſes of thoſe Diſtempers which infect the Body, ſo it is much more difficult to find out the Cauſes and the Motions of thoſe Maladies which afflict the Mind. For it is neceſſary that we perfectly underſtand our own Minds, the Notions, Operations, and Means whereby the Will is moved, and the Underſtanding operates, before we can hope to make a full Diſcovery of theſe Paſſions of the Mind, and the Cauſes of them. And 'tis evident to any one how difficult

The diſpute about *Moral Evil* relates to the Mind and its Operations, and on that account muſt neceſſarily be ſomewhat ſubtle.

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" what Satisfaction can *Spiritual* Enjoyments " give unto a *Carnal Mind?* Alaſs, what " Delight would it be to the Swine to be " wrapt in fine Linen and laid in Odours? " His Senſes are not gratify'd by any ſuch " Delicacies; nor would he feel any thing " beſides the Torment of being with-held " from the Mire. And as little Complacency would a brutiſh Soul find in thoſe " purer and refined Pleaſures, which can only upbraid, not ſatisfy him. So that could " we, by an impoſſible Suppoſition, fancy " ſuch an one aſſum'd to thoſe Fruitions, his " Pleaſure ſure would be as little as his preparation for it was. Thoſe Eyes which " have continually beheld *Vanity*, would be " dazled, not delighted with the *beatific Viſion*; neither could that Tongue which has " accuſtom'd itſelf only to *Oaths* and *Blaſphemies*, find Harmony or Muſic in *Hallelujahs*. 'Tis

that is; what ſubtle Abſtractions, and long Deduction of Conſequences it muſt require. 'Tis no wonder then if the Inveſtigation of the Cauſes, and Orgin of the *Evil of the Mind* require ſome things which are too ſubtle for all to comprehend.

NOTES.

" 'Tis the peculiar Privilege of the pure in " Heart, that they ſhall ſee God; and if any " others could ſo invade this their Inclo- " ſure, as to take Heaven by Violence, it " ſurely would be a very Joyleſs Poſſeſſion " to theſe Men, and only place them in a " Condition to which they have the grea- " teſt Averſion and Antipathy. So that Ho- " lineſs here is not only neceſſary to the " acquiring, but the Enjoyment of Bliſs " hereafter.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Concerning the Queſtion, Why bad Men are happy, and good Men miſerable.

I. THIS Queſtion ſeems to have ſome relation to the former. For if *Puniſhment*, that is, Natural Evils, be inflicted in Proportion to the deſert of Evil Elections, whence come good things to evil Men, and Evil to the Good? 'Tis not ſo difficult to anſwer this Queſtion upon the Suppoſition of a future State, as to make it neceſſary for us to inſiſt much upon it. And it muſt be confeſſed, that it has been treated of in a very proper Manner by ſeveral Writers: (117.) ſo that there's ſcarce any Room left for Scruple. Nevertheleſs a few things ſhall be touch'd upon, and very briefly, that we may not repeat what has been ſaid already.

This Queſtion has been ſo well treated by many, that there is ſcarce any room for ſcruple.

II. In the firſt place then the matter of Fact is very often doubtful, notwithſtanding the Complaints which many Perſons make to the contrary. We ſee indeed good Men frequently miſerable, but it is a Query whether their Goodneſs may not be owing to their Miſery, and they would have prov'd wicked if they had been tempted by Proſperity? by Adverſity: Nor are bad Men proſperous, but made bad by Proſperity.

The matter of Fact is often doubtful: for it is not good Men that are miſerable, but rather reform'd by Proſperity.

NOTES.

(117.) V. G. *Sherlock* on *Judgment*, Ch. 1. §. 3. p. 76, *&c.* 1ſt Edit. —— on *Providence*, Ch. 7. p. 258. 2d Edit. *Cudworth*, p. 877. *Cockburn*, Eſſay 5. prop. 7, 8. p. 137, *&c.* *Wollaſton*, p. 71, and 110, *&c.* *Cradock* on *Eccl.* 9. 2. *Seneca*, Ep. 24. *Fiddes* Sermons, Fol. 14 and 19. *Scott*, 2 vol. Ch. 4. §. 3. p. 331, *&c.* 8*vo.* and Diſcourſe 16. p. 320, *&c.* 2d vol. Fol. *Stillingfleet*, *Origines Sacræ*, B. 3. Ch. 3. §. 21. p. 326, *&c.* Fol. *Grew*, *Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 3. Ch. 2. §. 57, 58.

Proſperity? it is not the Good then that are afflicted, but the miſerable that are reclaimed. On the other hand, we behold happy, rich, and powerful Men that are wicked; but their Wickedneſs may be attributed to their Proſperity, and they would perhaps be very good if the Incitements to Evil were removed. 'Tis not the Wicked therefore that are happy, but the happy that are corrupted with Proſperity, and thereby fall into Wickedneſs.

We are partial Judges of Merit: from the inſtance of *Hannibal* and *Scipio*.

III. Secondly, We are blinded with Prejudice, and thereby render'd very *partial Judges* of the Goodneſs or Badneſs of other Men. He that is our Acquaintance and befriends us, is a good Man, he that favours our Enemies is a very bad one. Thus *Scipio* is celebrated by the *Roman* Hiſtorians, and if any hard or unproſperous Accident befal him, they begin to aſk whether there be any Gods? Whether Divine Providence takes care of human Affairs? But *Hannibal* is condemn'd, his Victories are charg'd as Crimes on Providence, and they repine at his having been ſo long ſucceſsful. Whereas 'tis really dubious whether of the two was the worſt Man; both certainly were very bad: For their Aim was to put the World into Confuſion, to ſubdue Nations by force of Arms, the one intending to make *Carthage*, the other *Rome*, Head of the World, by Slaughter, Rapine, War, and Injuſtice. Now the Man that ſtudies to oppreſs the whole World in Servitude, and bring it under the Power of that Nation to which he belongs, this Man is truly wicked and unworthy of Succeſs, however he may veil his Ambition, Pride, and Fury in ſome particular Inſtances, under the ſpecious pretence of Clemency and Love of his Country.

We are bad Judges of the Happineſs of Men: for thoſe are often the moſt miſerable whom we eſteem happy: and the contrary.

IV. Thirdly, As we are partial Judges of the *Deſerts* of other Men, ſo are we no leſs unqualify'd to pronounce on their *Felicity*. For we are taken with the pomp, and noiſe, and glittering outſide of things, and conſequently judge the Rich, the Potent, the Noble, and the Learned to be happy. And yet herein we are very frequently miſtaken, ſince neither of them are what they appear to be. For Life is often attended with more Happineſs among Cottages, Huſbandry, and Trade, nay in the midſt of Bodily Pains and Diſeaſes; than among Sceptres, Diadems, high Pedigrees, and ſuperfluous Heaps of Books; ſince, as we have ſhewn before, and Experience teſtifies, Happineſs lies chiefly, if not ſolely, in Election.

V. Fourthly,

V. Fourthly, It is to be obſerv'd, that the greateſt Part of the Happineſs in this Life conſiſts in *Hope*, and that the Fruition of the deſired Object is not anſwerable to the Hope pre-conceiv'd, which muſt be eſteem'd an Indication that complete Happineſs is reſerv'd by Nature for another Life; the more then we aſpire after, and adhere to the preſent Objects, the leſs Care we ſhall take of thoſe things which tend to our future Happineſs. It was therefore wiſely provided by God, that the Good ſhould not be corrupted with too plentiful an Enjoyment of the things of this World, but that the Bad ſhould have them in abundance: For by this means all may underſtand that their time ought not to be ſpent in theſe things, but that the Space of this ſhort Life ſhould be employ'd in looking after other Matters, *i. e.* ſuch as regard Eternity.

The chief Happineſs here conſiſts in Hope; which is a ſign that perfect Happineſs is reſerved for another Life, and all theſe things which befal good or bad Men, are means to it.

To conclude, we muſt affirm that nothing happens to good Men which may not prove a Means of greater Good; nor to the Bad, which may not be for their Puniſhment or Reformation.

VI. And I hope it appears from what has been ſaid, that the Objections of the *Manicheans* and *Paulicians* are not ſo formidable as they have ſeem'd to ſome; and that human Reaſon is not ſo blind but that it can ſolve theſe Difficulties from the Principles laid down, and ſuch Suppoſitions as are generally admitted; and tho' not abſolutely certain, yet probable however, and ſuch as we uſe to acquieſce in, in the Solution of other Phænomena.

Concluſion of the whole.

But I offer all theſe things to the Cenſure of the Learned: I ſubmit them entirely to the Judgment of the *Catholic Church*, eſpecially to the Governours of thoſe Parts of it which conſtitute the Churches of *England* and *Ireland*. If there be any thing herein which ſeems not perfectly agreeable to their Faith, as I hope there is not, and would not have it, I deſire that may be look'd upon as abſolutely unſaid and retracted.

FINIS.

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